PERCEPTION

THE PRATYAKṢA KHAṆḌA OF THE TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

(With Introduction, Sanskrit Text, Translation and Explanation)

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VOLUME - I

V.P. BHATTA

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V.P. BHATTA

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Dedicated to my parents

Shrimati Mahadevi

and

Vidvan Katte Parameshvar Bhatt

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PREFACE

The Nyāya Śāstra, which constitutes one of the six systems of Indian Philosophy, has played a significant role in the development and analysis of philosophy, logic and epistemology in India. The Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama, the foremost work in the Nyāya system, has dealt with the analysis of means of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*), object of Knowledge (*Prameya*) and other principles of Philosophy, logic and epistemology.

However, the advent of the Navya-nyāya has brought a revolutionary change in the out look of the Nyāya philosophy. It has systematized all the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣka concepts and brought them under the four heads, viz. i) perception (*pratyakṣa*), ii) inference (*anumāna*) iii), analogy (*upamāna*) and iv) word (*śabda*). Further, the Navya-nyāya has developed the most useful methodology of the analysis of arguments, and in the post Navya-nyāya period, all the Shastric texts and the later texts of rhetorics have adopted the Navya-nyāya methodology in the analysis and presentation of arguments of principles. Thus, it is imperative that the students and the scholars of philosophy must become acquinted with the Navya-nyāya methodology of arguments to understand the intricacies of the principles of philosophy.

The 'Thought Jewel of Reality' Tattva cintāmaṇi (T.C.) was composed by Gangeśopādhyāya of Mithilā at the thirteenth century A.D. It introduced a new era in the development of Indian theory of knowledge and logic and is considered as the first work among the various texts on the Navya-nyāya. It is divided into four books, viz. Perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), Analogy (*upamāna*) and word (*śabda*) and brought all the sixteen categories of the Navya-nyāya under the four heads.

The significance of the text (T.C.) cannot be stressed too adequately in the context of philosophy, logic and epistemology. It has recognized the first of the sixteen categories (*padārthas*) of the Nyāya-sūtra, viz. means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), as the real categoriy by strictly adhering to the theory of four means of valid knowledge; and brought all other categories under the means of knowledge. The methodology used in the presentation of various theories in the T.C. made a profound impact on the philosophical writings during the period of five hundred years from thirteenth century A.D. to eighteenth century A.D. in India; and almost all the Shastrakāras adopted the

T.C. methodology of presentation. Thus, the study of T.C. is imperative not only for its contents, but also for its methodology.

Since my college days in Mysore, Karnātaka, I had wished for a translation of the Tattva Cintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa. However, owing to the vastness of the book and the obstruseness of the theories, a complete English translation of T.C. is not yet available. Although certain sections of T.C. have been rendered into English, a complete translation of all the four books of T.C., viz. Perception (Pratyakṣa), Inference (Anumāna), Analogy (Upamāna) and word (Śabda) is yet to be made available.

The plan, therefore, is to bring out an English traslation of entire T.C. in four volumes, each devoted to the books of Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word. The first volume, which is being broughtout at present contains English translation of the first book of Perception with introduction and Sanskrit text.

The methodology adopted for the translation is a standard one. Each book (Khaṇḍa), section (Vāda) and paragraph of T.C. have been numbered separately; and thus the first paragraph of the first section (Mangala vāda) of the first book (Pratyakṣa khaṇḍa) of T.C. is numbered as I.l.l. in both Sanskrit text and corresponding English tranlation. Also for the sake of elucidation of technicalities of passages, translation of each passage is followed by explanaatory note. Further, for introducing the readers with the subject matters of various sections, introduction explaining subject matters of different sections would be provided in each of volumes. The first volume, for instance, contains introduction, Sanskrit text and English translations with explanatory notes of Perception (Pratyakṣa).

With the publication of 'Perception' Pratyakṣakhaṇḍha of T.C., a long cherished dream of making English translation of T.C. available in a modern language, is partially realized. I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to my teachers Prof. J.F. Staal, Prof. R.P. Goldman, Prof. N.S. Ramānuja Tatacharya, Prof Ramabhadracharya and Prof. Arcaka Venkannacharya, without whose teachings and guidance I could not have brought out this volume. Also I would like to express my deep regard to my parents Shrimati Mahadevī and Vidvan Katte Parameshvar Bhatt who have immensely encouraged me to take up Sanskrit studies. Also my sincere thanks are due to my wife Mrs. Sarveshvari Bhat and son Mr. Giridhar Bhat who have helped me in various ways. Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Ravi Malhotra for publishing this work.

Deccan College, Pune - 2011 **V.P BHATTA**

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Nature of Knowledge (Jñāna)

Introduction: Knowledge (*Jñāna*) may mean congnition (*buddhi*) (Nyāya sūtra, i.1.15; Vaiśeṣika sūtra, Viii.l.l); and valid knowledge is a special kind of cognition (*buddhi viśeṣa*). Also knowledge is same as apprehension (*upalabdhi*). Hence Knowledge in Nyāya constitutes cognition or apprehension and it consists of manifestation of objects (*artha* prakāśa, Tarka kaumudi. P.6). As S. Chatterjee (Nyāya theory of knowledge, 1950) states, when objects become manifest to us, they become the objects of knowledge. Hence an object like jar (*ghaṭa*) becomes object of knowledge, when it manifests to us.

Knowledge is not Action (Kriyā)

Nyāya admits knowledge to be an attribute or property of self (*ātmaguṇa*). However, other systems of Indian philosophy generally admit knowledge to be an action or activity (kriyā) (Nyāyabhāṣya, i.l.15) by refuting the positions that it is either mode (*vṛtti*) or substance (*dravya*).

The Buddhists and the Mīmāmsakas explain that to exist means to act; and knowledge is an existent fact. Also the Mīmāmsakas state that the act of knowing refers to an object; and hence the knowledge of an object is an action or activity. In the west Kānt and Spencer (Principles of psychology, Vol. i pt. iv) too admit that consciousness arises when the tendencies towards action counteract one another and knowledge appears as an incident in the adaptation of the organism.

However, the Naiyāyikas reject the activity theory of knowledge. According to them (Nyāya mañjari, p.20), the activity theory of knowledge is not tenable, as it arises from the confusion between the knowledge and the verb 'to know' (*jñā-*). Also the Naiyāyikas reject the activity theory of knowledge on the ground that it is a grammatical prejudice and is excluded from the actual action (*karman*). Knowledge cannot be any kind of physical or mental action, as it is not produced from any substance.

The behaviouristic contention, as S. Chatterjee states (Nyāya theory of Knowledge, 1950), that knowledge is a kind of bodily behaviour is not tenable either. For, behaviour cannot explain knowledge; rather behaviour arises out of knowledge.

Knowledge is not Relation (Sambandha)

The second theory of the nature of knowledge is that it is a relation between certain entities. Russell (Our Knowledge of the external Knowledge) reduces knowledge to the special sort of relation between objects. Meinong, the realist, holds that knowledge is a relation between three terms; viz. mind, object and content. The Neo realists go further and reduce knowledge to the relation between one type of entities (Essays in critical realism, p. 80).

However, according to S. Chatterjee, the relation theory of knoledge cannot be justified. Although the relation between the subject and the object through the mind helps to acquire knowledge, the relation itself cannot constitute knowledge. In the Nyāya, knowledge arises out of the comprehensional relation between the soul and the objects or between the senses and the objects through the mind. Further, the relation is what is to be cognized and not the cognition itself.

Knowledge is Quality (Guṇa)

The Sānkhya and Yoga systems (Gautama Vṛtti i.1.15) consider knowledge (*jñāna*) to be the modification (*pariṇāma*) of intelligence (*budhi*); and knowledge of the form of manifestation of object is produced from the reflection of the modification of intelligence on the conscious self. The Rāmānuja school (Sarvadarśana sangraha) too admits knowledge as a special quality of self. Further, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika schools admit knowledge to be one of the qualities inhering in the soul. (Nyāya sūtra i.1.15).

However, according to S.Chatterjee (Nyāya theory of knowledge), the quality theory of knowledge too involves certain difficulties as it cannot explain the referance to the objects inherent in knowledge. According to him, knowledge refers to its objects means it constitutes cognition of objects. Knowledge is the most fundamental fact of reality. Knowledge is present in all living beings as an attribute. As Bosanquet (Logic, vol. 11. p.322) explains, knowledge is an essential form of self - revelation of universe and one experiences universe in oneself as an essential form.

Classification of Knowledge

Naiyāyikas divide knowledge (Tarka saṅgraha, 34) mainly into two types as direct experience (*anubhava*) and remembrance (*smṛti*). Direct experience manifests objects directly; and it is not the reproduction of the previous knowledge. On the other hand, remembrance is not the manifestation of objects; rather, it is the reproduction of previous knowledge. And both direct experience and remembrance can be either valid (*pramā*) or invalid (*apramā*) depending upon their causes.

The direct experience, which presents or manifests objects as they are, is valid (*pramā*). And valid knowledge is four fold as perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumiti*), comparison or analogy (upamiti), and verbal cognition (*śābda*). The four types of valid knowledges present or manifest their objects as they are or as real; and hence they are conducive to fruitful human activity.

However, the direct experience, which presents or manifests objects as they are not, is invalid (*apramā*). And invalid knowledge is three fold as doubt (*saṁśaya*), error (*viparyaya*) and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*). The three types of invalid knowledge do not present or manifest their objects as they are or as real; and hence they are not conducive to any fruitful human activity.

Valid Knowledge (Pramā)

Generally speaking, valid knowledge (*pramā*) (Vātsyāyana, i.1.l) is a knowledge of an object (*artha vijñāna*). It (Nyāya Mañ - 1.l) is a direct experience of an object as it is (*yathārthānubhava*). Valid knowledge is an experience of an object as it is means it is an experience of reality. Also it is a definite and assured cognition (*asaṁdigdha*) of an object, and hence excludes all types of invalid knowledge such as doubt, error and hypothetical argument as well as remembrance.

Valid knowledge is true or unerring knowledge means it is not contradicted by the experience of its object (*arthāvyabhicārin*). That is to say that it is a knowledge of an object as characterized by its properties (*tadvati tatprakārakam*). For instance, the knowledge 'This is a pot' (*ayamghaṭaḥ*) is a valid knowledge, as it is the knowledge of the pot as characterized by its property of the potness. Thus, valid knowledge (Nyāyakośa) can be defined as a knowledge of an object wherein the property existing in it is cognized as the characteristic of it.

Factors of Knowledge

Valid knowledge, which is defined as the direct experience of object as it is (*yathārthānubhava*), involves subject - object - relation (jñātṛ *jñeya sambandha*). Hence it involves three factors, viz. subject or knower (*jñātṛ* or *pramātṛ*), object of knowledge (*prameya*) and means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The first factor, viz. subject or knower (*pramātr*), is the substratum of knowledge and he is the self (*jñānā dhikaraṇam ātmā*). Hence the knower is the intelligent self.

The second factor, viz. object of knowledge (*prameya*), is the object to which knowledge refers. Hence the object of knoledge is a thing or attribute, a state, a process, or a positive or negative fact that is known.

The third factor, viz. means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), is the special cause producing knowledge (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). It is an operative cause that helps to obtain valid knowledge and hence is the method of knowledge. While the Nyāya does not overlook the three fold distinction of factors, it necessarily considers the three factors as useful in producing valid knowledge.

It should be noted that means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) needs to be distinguished from both the subject or knower (*pramātṛ*) and the object to be known (*prameya*). While all the three factors are useful in the obtainment of knowledge, it is only the means of knowledge which is the special cause. The subject obtains the valid knowledge only with the help of means of valid knowledge. Also valid knowledge varies according to the nature of means of knowledge; and hence it is the link between the necessary conditions and knowledge.

Means of Valid knowledge (Pramāṇa)

Means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) (Vātsyāyana on i.1.1) etymologically means an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramākaraṇa*) in Sanskrit. Thus it is the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) that produces valid knowledge.

Since instrumental cause (Tarkabhāṣā. p.2) is a cause and also since cause is what is invariable and unconditional antecedant of an effect (*ananyathāsiddha niyata pūrvavṛtti*), instrumental cause of valid knowledge is an invariable and unconditional antecedant of valid knowledge.

It should be noted that instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is a unique or extraordinary operative cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). However, it is the complex of specific conditions, other than subject and object, which produces the valid knowledge without fail.

Vaiśeṣikas' view

The Vaiśeṣikas (Tarka kaumudi, p.6) define means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as the unique operative cause of both true knowledge or experience and remembrance (*smṛtyanubhavāsādhāraṇam pramākaraṇam*).

The Vaiśeṣikas set aside the Nyāya view that means of valid knowledge is restricted to mere means of experience; and include even means of remembrance under means of knowledge.

Jainas' view

The Jainas seem to be taking means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in a general sense covering both the cause of mediate perception (*paro'kṣa*) and immediate perception (*pratyakṣa*). However, they insist that such a menas of valid knowledge must be the cause of only true or valid knowledge of both types.

Vedāntins' view

The Vedāntins (Tārkikarakṣā, 5-7) too agree that means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is the unique or extraordinary operational cause of valid knowledge (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). However, they maintain that valid knowledge consists of both the characteristics of novelty (*anadhigatatva*) and noncontradictoryness (*abādhitatva*); and hence means of valid knowledge may or may not be the means of remembrance depending upon whether it is noncontradictory or not.

Buddhists' view

The Buddhists (Nyāyabinḍutīkā, ch.l.) hold that useful knowledge leading to activity is valid knowledge (*pramā*) and source of such a useful knowledge is means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). According to them, we seek knowledge because it leads to effective activity; and means of knowledge fulfills its function when it manifests useful knowledge so as to cause activity.

However, the Naiyāyikas (Nyāya mañjari, p.23) object to such a view. According to them, practical utility (*artha siddhi*) does not constitute the truth of any knowlege; and hence the source of such a knowledge cannot be the means of valid knowledge. Also they object (Nyāya vārtika tātparyatīkā, p.20) to the views of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas that valid knowledge consists of the identity of the content between the content of the cognition and the cognitum (*viṣaya sārūpya*); and hence valid cognition has the same object as the object cognized; and thus means of valid knowledge is what produces the true knowledge of its object. According to them, the content of the cognition cannot be revealed by its cognition; therefore one and the same thing cannot be both the content of the knowledge and the object of the knowledge. Also they object to the views of the Yogācāras that consciousness (*vijñāna*), as the power of self-manifestation (*ātma prakāśa*), is the source of all knowledges (*pramāṇa*). According to them, the powever of self-manifestation in the form of consciousness is untenable, as the self-manifestation inherent in the consciousness cannot be the effect of any power or capacity.

Mīmāmsakas' view

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas (Śāstra dīpikā, p.45) hold that valid knowledge (*pramā*) is the knowledge which grasps previously unknown object (*agṛhīta grāhi*); and hence means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) is that which leads to the acquisition of such knowledge referring to the unknown objects (*anadhigatārtha*).

However, the a Naiyāyikas oppose such a view. According to them, valid knowledge cannot always be admitted to grasp the novelty which is not yet known (*anadhigata*); and hence it excludes such valid knowledges which do not refer to the new objects. Eternal objects such as space, time and soul etc cannot be regarded as totally unknown to us; and hence knowledge referring to such eternal objects would not be valid knowledge. Thus, means leading to the knowledge of eternal objects would not be means of valid knowledge.

Sāṅkhyas' view

The Sāṅkhyas (Sāṅkhya sūtra, 1.18) hold that the self comes to know an object through the modification of intellect or mind (*buddhi vṛtti*); the mind presents object to the self through its modification upon the impression of object of sense-organ. Thus, means of valid knowledge is the modification or function of intellect or mind through which the self acquires knowledge.

However, the Naiyayikas reject the Sāṅkhyas' view. According to them, only the self, which is intelligible is the substratum of knowledge; and the principle of intellect or mind which is unintelligible, cannot be the substratum of knowledge; and hence the modification or function of intellect cannot be the means of valid knowledge.

Validity and Invalidity of knowledge

Nyāya admits knowledge (*jñāna*) to be both valid (*pramā*) and invalid (*apramā*). However, the questions are: how are the validity of a knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) and the invalidity of a knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*) constituted and also how are the validity of a knowledge and the invalidity of a knowledge known to us. The answers are generally that the validity and the invalidity are constituted and known by the totality of causes that produces knowledge (*jñāna sāmagrī*); and that they are constituted and known by external conditions. In the first alternative, both truth and falsehood are self evident and constituted and known by intrinsic conditions (*svataḥ*). In the second alternative, both truth and falsehood are evideced by something else and constituted and known by extrinsic conditions (*parataḥ*).

The Sāṅkhyas have generally admitted the first alternative that both validity and invalidity of knowledge are constituted and known by intrinsic conditions. (*svataḥ*). On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas generally admitted the second alternative that both are constituted and known by extrinsic conditions (*parataḥ*). Whereas the Buddhists supported the view that the validity of knowledge is constituted and known by extrinsic conditions and the invalidity of knowledge is constituted and known by intrinsic conditions. However, the Mīmāmsakas and the Vedāntins admitted the view that validity

of knowledge is self evident and is constituted and known by intrinsic conditions; and invalidity of knowledge is evidensed by others and known by extrinsic conditions.

Sāṅkhya view of Intrinsic Validity and Invalidity

The Sāṅkhyas (The Nyāyabhāṣya, on ii.1. 12-16) believe that both truth and falsify are inherent in knowledge; and hence both validity and invalidity of knowledge are self-evident and constituted and known by intrinsic conditions, i.e. by the totality of causes that produces knowledge. According to them, the causation is only the manifestation of the effect that potentially exists in the cause (*sakārya*). Hence validity and invalidity of knowledge are inherent in knowledge and are self evident. They are not constituted or known by extrinsic conditions and belong to knowledge *ab-initio*.

However, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmsakas refete the Sāṅkhya view of intrinsic validity and invalidity. According to them, causation of the effect as potentially existing in the cause is untenable. Causation is a process of real effectuation; and hence validity and invalidity of knowledge need to be constituted and known by some extrinsic conditions. Also suppose validity of knowledge is self-evident, then there cannot be any unsuccessful activity caused by knowledge; also suppose invalidity of knowledge is self-evident, then there cannot be any successful activity at all. The knowledge of silver in a shell should be either valid or invalid. If it is valid and known intrinsically by itself, then the activity of picking it up should not lead to disappointment. And if it is invalid and known intrinsically by itself, then no one should ever strive to pick it up.

Nyāya view of Extrinsic Validity and Invalidity

The Naiyāyikas (Sarva darśana Samgraha. p.282-300) hold that knowledge means manifestation of objects (*artha prakāśa*). And no knowledge is valid or invalid by itself. Truth and falsify are not innate natures of any knowledge and knowledge is true or false depending upon its conformity or non-conformity to the object it manifests. Thus validity and invalidity of knowledge are not self-evident; and hence constituted and known by some extrinsic conditions. Validity and invalidity of knowledge need to be inferred from such extrinsic conditions as its capacity and incapacity to produce activity.

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection that if validity and invalidity of knowledge are to be known extrinsically by extrinsic conditions, then they need to be known by the volitional experience of capacity of producing activity (*arthakriyā kāritva*); and then validity and invalidity of the same experience

need to be known by yet another volitional experience of capacity; and thus, infinite regress becomes contingent. According to them, the experience of capacity does not require any test of its validity.

Also the Naiyāyikas reply to the objection that the theory of extrinsic validity and invalidity of knowledge involves the contingency of mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśraya*), as validity and invalidity of knowledges depend upon successful and unsuccessful activities; and successful and unsuccessful activities depend upon validity and invalidity of knowledges. According to them, such a mutual dependence is only admissible and not a fault, as it is desired.

Buddhist view of Intrinsic invalidity and Extrinsic validity

The Buddhists believe that while falsity or invalidity is intrinsic and inherent in knowledge, truth or validity is extrinsic and not inherent in knowledge. According to them (Nyāyabinduṭīkā, p. 3.f), while any knowledge is invalid naturally, it (knowledge) is valid only due to its capacity to produce successful activity. Thus, while invalidity of knowlege is constituted and known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, validity of knowledge is constituted and known extrinsically by extraneous conditions such as successful activity.

However, the Naiyāyikas (Nyāya mañjari., pp. 160) refute the Buddhists' view. According to them, if invalidity is intrinsic and inherent in knowledge, then striving and seeking for unsuccessful activity and seeking false things would become untenable. Thus, invalidity of knowledge needs to be constituted and known by extraneous conditions such as unsuccessful activity. Also it should be noted that invalidity of knowledge is not merely absence of validity; rather it is a positive character of invalid knowledge such as doubt and error etc.

Mīmāmsā view of Intrinsic Validity and Extrinsic Invalidity

The Mīmāmsakas (Nyāyabhāṣya, ii.l. 17-19) and the Vedāntins believe that truth or validity is organic and very nature of knowlege; and it is revealed by knowledge itself, as to reveal is the nature of knowledge. Also falsity or invalidity is accidental and extrinsic to knowledge. Thus, while truth or validity of knowledge is constituted and known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, falsity or invalidity of knowledge is constituted and known extrinsically by the extrinsic conditions such as unsuccessful activity.

However, the Naiyāyikas (Nyāyamañjari, pp.166) reject the Mīmāmsakas' view. According to them, truth or validity of knowledge cannot be organic or nature of knowledge; and hence cannot be due to the intrinsic conditions of

knowledge itself. And if validity were so, then there would not be any invalid knowledge at all. Valid knowledge is more than mere knowledge; and therefore validity of knowledge needs to be constituted by some special conditions and characteristics just like invalidity of knowledge. If validity were inherent in knowledge, then every knowledge would need to carry truth and validity and doubt and error would become untenable. Also truth and validity cannot be self-evident and known by the totality of causes itself. It needs to be known by another knowledge such as inference, as knowledge can reveal only its objects and not validity.

Western theory of Truth or Validity

A Reid, a modern realist (Knowledge and Truth, pp.185) thinks that truth is nothing but knowledge doing its job. He says "Truth is indeed.... the quality of knowledge perfectly fulfilling its functions." Here truth is admitted to be a natural function of knowledge, but not inherant and self-evident in all knowledges.

As to the question that how is the truth or validity of knowledge constituted or produced, the realists (The New realism and Essays in critical realism) believe that it is correspondance to the facts that constitutes the nature of truth. Others like Alexander (Space, Time and Reality, vol. II. 251) state that coherence is the ground of truth. The truth consists in the coherence of all experiences as one self maintaining and all-inclusive system. The truth of knowledge consists in its capacity to produce practically useful consequences.

Now as to the question that how is the truth or validity of knowledge is known, Lossky (The Intuitive basis of knowledge, pp. 227) states that it is in this consciousness of objectivity and subjectivity, and not... in the laws of identity, contradition and excluded middle, that our thought has a real and immediate guide in its search for the truth. According to Lossky, truth and falsity are known through an immediate consciousness of their objectivity and subjectivity respectively.

Thus, as S. Chatterjee (Nyāya Theory of Knowledge) says, there is no exact parallel to the Indian theory of validity of knowledge and invalidity of knowledge in the west.

Invalid knowledges: Rememberance (Smṛti)

Remembreance or memory (*smṛti*) (Tarkasaṅgraha, 34) is the knowledge of the past. It is a representation produced from the impression of the past experience (*samskāramātra janyam jñānam*). In the rememberance, there is revival of the past experience of objects through impression (*samskāra*).

And the ground for the revival is the latest impression left by the past experience of objects (VaiśeSū, ix. 2.6). The impression, called psychic disposition (*bhāvanā*), and produced from past experiences (*smṛti janyā*) causes remembrance of the corresponding original experience (Tarkasaṅgraha Dipikā, on 34). Thus, remembrance, which is a knowledge by the self such as 'I remember a jar' is the knowledge arising only from the impression of the previous experience of objects. And it needs twenty three conditions (Nyāya Sū. iii. 2. 42) such as attention for help.

Remembrance or memory (*smṛti*) is either true (*yathārthā*) or false (*ayathārthā*). It is true if produced from valid experience of things (*pramā janyā*) and false if produced from invalid experience of things (*apramā janyā*). Thus, truth and falsehood of rememberances depend upon those of corresponding original experiences of objects.

It should be noted that remembrance (Tarka bhāṣā, 5-7) can be both true and false; and it is generally true in the wakefullness (*jāgara*) and false in the dream (*svapna*). The Vaiśeṣikas, the Jains and the Vedāntins are not opposed to the idea of remembrance being true provided that corresponding past experiences of objects is true. However, the Mīmāmsakas oppose the view that remembrance can be valid on the ground, that it gives no new ideas. However, the Naiyāyikas disagree with the Mīmāmsakas, but hold remembrance to be invalid on the ground that it lacks of the character of presentation. (anubhūti).

Doubt (Samśaya)

Doubt (*samśaya*) is the first type of invalid knowledge (*apramā*). Doubt (*samśaya*) is the contradictory cognition (*vimarśa*) with regard to one and the same object (Nyāy Sū, i.l. 23). It constitutes cognitions of various contradictory properties ascribed to the same object (*viruddha nānā dharma vaiśiṣṭya,* Tarka sangraha, 64.). Doubt arises when two conflicting alternatives (*koṭis*) are perceived with respect to the same object such as 'Whether this one is post or man' (*sthāṇur vā puruṣovā*); and hence it is incomplete and no definite cognition of any differential is possible.

The process of generation of doubt may be analysed as follows: First, there arises the presentation of an object. Next two or three appreceptive alternatives are associated with the object. Due to the absense of any definite cognition ascertaining any one alternative, the mind oscillates between them; and finally the perceiver has the doubt.

Doubt may arise due to five different reasons (Nyāya Vārtika on i.l.23). For instance, it may arise due to the common property such as the tallness,

due to unique property such as the eternality, due to conflicting testimony regarding soul etc, due to the irregularity of perception such as existence or non-existence of a thing; and due to the irregularity of non perception such as existence and non-existence of a thing.

Doubt is generally not considered to be valid knowledge (*pramā*). It consists of neither the definite character, nor the true correspondance with the object; and hence does not lead to any definite activity. Doubt neither affirms nor denies anything, but only raises the problem for thought. As Bosanquet (Logic, vol. p. 35) says, "A definite doubt is unquestionably a disjunetive judgement." According to the Nyāya too, doubt is never a definite cognition (*avadhāraṇa*), but an indecisive questioning attitude towards an object. Hence it is not an ascerting judgement.

Error or Illusion (Viparyaya)

Error or illusion (*viparyaya*) is the second type of invalid knowledge (Gautama Sūtra Vṛtti, iv.l.3). While valid knowledge is the perception of an object as it is (*yathārtha*), invalid knowledge is the perception of an object as it is not (*ayathārtha*) (Saptapadārthī, 140). In an error or illusion, an object is cognized as having certain properties that are non-existent. In other words, error is wrong apprehension of an object which is taken for what it is not (*atasmin tad buddhiḥ*, Nyāya Vārtika, on i.1.2). For instance, consider the cognition of shell as silver in the form of 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*). It is an error, as it is the wrong apprehension of the shell which is taken for silver which it is not. In such a cognition, the property such as the silverness is attributed to the shell in which it is absent (*tad abhāvavati tat prakāraka*). Thus, while doubt has two alternatives of which one may be true, error or illusion is positively false and hence differs from doubt.

Invalid knowledge (Anyathākhyāti)

The Naiyāyikas propose that error is invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*). According to Nyāya, while valid knowledge (*pramā*) is objective, invalid knowledge (*apramā*) or error (*viparyaya*) is subjective due to the super imposition of certain foreign attributes to the object (*adhyāropa*). In an error or illusion, first contact of sense arises with an object such as shell; however, the sense fails to ascertain the real characteristics of the object (shell) due to some defect; and it attributes certain non-existing foreign attributes of silver to it. Thus error or illusion such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), where in 'this' refers to the shell and 'silver' refers to the silver, results in a judgement of the object (shell) as something else (silver) (*anyathā khyāti*) (Mūla Mathurānāthī, 1).

The Buddhists such as the Yogācāras propose that error or illusion is subjective idea as objective or extra mental reality (*ātma khyāti*). According to them, things are only thoughts or ideas (*vijñāna*); and there exists no extra mental reality. Reality is a stream of cognitions divided into subjective and objective series of ideas. Error consists in the projection of subjective ideas as extra mental reality or objective reality (*ātma khyāti*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the Buddhists' theory of subjective ideas as objective reality (*ātmakhyāti*). According to them, the idealism of the Yogacāras negates the difference between subjective ideas and objective reality, as everything is only an idea. Also, then, the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' would become untenble and only the knowledge 'I am silver' would become necessary.

Vācaspati Mīshra (Siddhānta Candrodaya, 19), on the other hand, proposes that error or illusion is the knowledge of non-existent (*asat - khyāti*). According to him, error or illusion such as 'This (shell) is silver' is the knowledge of non-existent silver on the shell.

However, some Naiyāyikas reject the theory of the knowledge of non-existent (*asat khyāti*). According to them, error or illusion of shell as silver is not entirely baseless and not totolly non-existent; it is only the imposition of the property of silverness, existing else where, on the shell. The totally non-existent cannot be imposed and hence cannot be the object of any knowledge.

Also the Mādhyamikas, who negate all existence, negate the theory of knowledge of non-existence. According to them, the theory of knowledge of non-existentce, which supports the manifestation of non-existent as existent, is not tenable.

The Advaitins propose that error or illusion is the knowledge of inexplicable (*anirvacanīya*). According to them, mental modification (*manovṛtti*) produces the illusion of inexplicable silver through the operation of nescience (*avidyā*) after the contact of sense with the shell. It is neither real nor unreal; nor both real and unreal; and thus only inexplicable and indeterminate (*anirvacanīya*).

However, the Naiyāyikas oppose the theory of knowledge of inexplecable. According to them, suppose silver is actually produced, then there should be valid perception of the same. Also suppose, it is only an illusion, then the silver can neither be natural (*laukika*), nor supernatural (*alaukika*).

The Prābhākaras propose that error or illusion is the non-knowledge or non-cognition of object (*akhyāti*). According to them, in an illusion such as "This (shell) is silver", there is lack of discrimination between percept and image or between direct apprehension and object memory. And due to certain abnormal conditions, the two things, i.e. shell and silver are not distinguished, and hence the error or illusion of silver refers to the shell.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the Prābhākaras' theory of non-cognition. According to them, such a theory fails to account for the presentative character of error or illusion. Also lack of discrimination between precept and image cannot be the ground for the activity associated with illusion. Hence error or illusion must be a discriminative and determinate knowledge which causes activity. Also error or illusion is a defect of perception and not that of memory. Also illusion cannot be non-cognition, as in it there exists cognition of the object (shell) as what it is not.

Hypothetical Argument (Tarka)

Hypothetical argument (*tarka*) is the third type of invalid knowledge (*apramā*). It is a type of implicative argument through which validity of any reasoning can be tested. The process of reasoning in the argument (Tarka bhāṣā, p.43) consists in the deduction of certain utenable proposition (*aniṣṭa prasaṅga*). It has the logical effect of exposing the inavlidity of proposition lending support to the counter proposition. It (Gautama Sūtravṛtti. iv.1.3) is the imposition of the undesired pervader from the imposition of the pervaded (*vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropaḥ*) such as 'if the mountain be fireless, then it must be smokeless'.

When, a proposition established by any means (*pramāṇa*) is doubted, the hypothetical argument is used to ascertain the validity of counter proposition (Tarka Saṅgraha, 64). However, argument is not a means to prove the validity of the opposite, and hence it is an auxiliary to prove the validity of a means. Thus, the argument such as if the mountain is fireless, it must be smokeless facilitates the inference that mountain possessing smoke has fire.

The Nyāyasūtra Vṛtti (i.1.40) lists five kinds of hypothetical arguments which are as follows:

i) Self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*). It constitutes the argument such as 'If A is the cause of A, then A must be different from itself'. Such an argument proves that if anything is dependent on itself, then it cannot prove itself.

ii) Mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśraya*). It constitutes the argument such as 'If A depends on B and B depends on A, then A cannot depend on B'. Such an argument proves that reciprocal dependence is self contradictory.

iii) Circularity (*cakraka*). It constitutes the argument such as "If A is presupposed in B, and B is presupposed in C, then explanation of A needs to be by C". Such an argument is a reasoning in a circle, as C leads back to A.

iv) Infinite regress or *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*). It constitutes the argument such as 'If A is dependent on B, and B on C; and C on D etc, then

A cannot be deduced.' Such an argument cannot deduce anything due to infinite regress.

v) Contingency of objective contradicted by means of knowledge (*pramāṇa bādhitārtha prasaṅga*). It constitutes the arguments such as 'If smoke deviates from fire, then it would not be produced from fire' or 'If mountain is fireless, then it would be smokeless'. Such an argument leads to the establishment of pervasion or establishment of fire on mountain.

It should be noted that classification of hypothetical argument into five types is untenable and amounts to inconsistent argument, as the given reasoning is invalid (Nyāya theory of knowledge, 1950).

Four types of Knowledges

Valid knowledges (*pramā*) are four types as : i) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), ii) Inference (*anumiti*); iii) Analogical understanding (*upamiti*) and iv) Verbal knowledge or cognition (*śābda bodha*). Accordingly, means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) too are four types as: i) means of perception (*pratyakṣa*); ii) means of inference (*anumāna*); iii) means of analogy (*upamāna*); and means of verbal cognition or word (*śabda*).

For instance, perception is a knowledge produced from contact between senses and objects such as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) or 'This is a jar' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*). Inference is a knowledge produced from the knowledge of the property of the subject associated with invariable concomitance such as 'Mountain is firey because of smoke' (*parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*). Comparison or analogy is a knowledge of the relation between name and named produced from the knowledge of comparison such as 'This animal is to be expressed by the term *gavaya*' (*ayam gavaya pada vācyaḥ*). Verbal cognition is a knowledge of sentence-meaning produced from the knowledge of word such as 'Kṛṣṇa is black' (*nīlaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ*).

Nature of Perception (Pratyakṣa)

Preception (*pratyakṣa*) is the most fundamental and final test of knowledge. One can question the truth or validity of inference etc; but one cannot question the truth or validity of perception; it is beyond question. According to western philosophy, truth of perception is unquestionable and self-evident. Thus, J.F. Mill (A system of logic, p.4), states that whatever is known to us by consciousness (intuition) is known beyond the possibility of question. Also W.T. Marvin (The New Realism, PP.66) states that perception is the ultimate crucial test and as such it does not presuppose its own possibility.

Buddhists' definition

The Buddhists (Nyāyabindu., I.) define perception (*pratyakṣa*) as an unerring cognition of a given object devoid of any assumption (*kalpanāpoḍham*). In the cognition of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), the process of cognition is mere sensing without any element of assumption. Vasubandhu (Nyāyavārtika, on i.1.1) defines perception as a cognition directly produced from object (*tato'rthād vijñāna*). And Diṅnāga (Pramāṇa samuccaya, 1) supports Vasubandhu by stating that perception is determined by object; and hence it cannot be construed by mind.

However, the Naiyāyikas (Nyāyabindutīkā, ch. I.) refute the Buddhist definition on the ground that if perception is what is determined by objects, then all true knowledges would need to be perceptions. Also they argue that since all things and objects are momentary (*kṣaṇika*) in the Buddhism, the Buddhists cannot claim perception to be derived from objects which are only momentary.

Vedāntins' Definition

The Mīmāmsakas (Prakaraṇa pañcikā, p.52) define perception to be direct cognition of object. According to them, perception is the immediate knowledge (*sākṣāt pratīti*) regarding either object (*meya*), or subject (*mātṛ*) or knowledge (*pramā*). Jainas (Prameyakamala mārtāṇḍa. pp. 57) too define perception to be direct or immediate knowledge of objects. According to them, however, it is two types as primary (*mukhya*) and practical (*samvyavahārikā*). The first is independent of mind; whereas the second is conditioned by mind and senses. In both cases, perception is a direct knowledge of objects.

The Vedāntins (Vedānta paribhāṣā, ch. I.), on the other hand, define perception (*pratyakṣa*) as an immediate and timeless knowledge (*caitanya*). Such an immediate knowledge is only self, as only self constitutes pure immediate knowledge. In such a perception of the form of immediate knowledge, mental modification (*manovṛtti*) is not different from objects, as immediacy of perception cannot be caused by sense-stimulation alone. According to the Vedāntins, in a perception, mind reaches objects through the senses and becomes one with objects.

It should be noted that many philosophers in the west too have admitted that immediate knowledge may be possible without sense-stimulation. According to Ewing (Mind, p.140), immediate direct cognition is produced without direct sense-perception. However, they too admit that perception in general is a cognition of objects through senses.

Nyāya Definition

The Prācya-naiyāyikas (Nyāyasūtra, i.1.4) define perception (*pratyakṣa*) as a knowledge produced from sense-object-contact (*indriyā rtha sannikarṣa*). According to them, when we perceive, knowledge of the object is produced from the contact of senses with the object. That is to say that perception is a knowledge produced from the stimulation of senses. This definition of perception follows etymological meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* (Nyāyabhāṣya, on i.1.4) that perception is the operation of the senses to reach objects (*akṣasya prativiṣayam vṛttiḥ*).

The Prācya-naiyāyikas' definition of perception as a knowledge produced from sense-object-contact is recognized as a standard one. Thus, the Vaiśeṣikas (Padārtha dharma saṅgraha, p. 94) too define perception as a knowledge conditioned by senses. Further, the Mīmāmsakas (Jaimini sūtra, i.1.4) too define that perception is a cognition produced by the efficient contact of senses with objects.

However, such a definition of perception may be viewed to be too wide at some cases, and too narrow at other cases. For instance, (Tattva cintāmaṇi, I. 3.10) such a definition of preception as a knowledge produced from sense-object-contact is too wide, as it can apply to even inference which too involves sense-object-contact of smoke etc; and also it is too narrow, as it can apply to only human preception *(laukika)* and cannot apply to devine perception which is produced without sense-object-contact (Nyāya kusumāñjali., 1).

In view of such a difficulty, the Navya-naiyāyikas (Tattva cintāmaṇi. I. 3....) defined perception as an immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāri*) which is produced without the instrumentality of any anticedent knowledge (*jñānā karaṇakam jñānam*). According to them, such a definition applies to all cases of perception, as immediacy (*sākṣātkāritva*) and the state of being produced without any antecedent knowledge are common to all perceptions. Thus, only the Navyas' definition of perception as an immediate knowledge produced without the antecedent knowledge applies to all cases of perception, as immediacy is an essential characteristic of all perceptions; and the Pracyas' definition of perception as knowledge produced from sense-object-content is too narrow, as sense-object-content is not an essential characteristic of all perceptions.

Senses (Indriya)

When the Nyāya says that perception is produced from sense-object-contact and self comes into contact with object through mind, it means that production of perception involves four operative causes, viz.: senses, objects, mind and self (Nyāya sūtra, i.1.4)

The Buddhists (Nyāyasūtra vṛtti, iii.1.30) hold that senses (*indriya*) are the external organs occuring at different parts of body such as pupil of eye. Also the Jainas (Prameyakamala mārtāṇḍa, p.61) hold that senses are physical organs with specific powers *(śakti)*. However, the Sāṇkhyas hold that senses are the modifications of subtle material principle (*ahaṅkāra*) and not physical organs occupying different parts of body.

The Naiyāyikas, however, reject the definitions of senses presented by the Buddhists and the Sāṅkhyas that senses are the organs of bodily parts or modifications of subtle material principle. According to them, senses are both external and internal organs and they are six: viz: olfactory sense (*ghrāṇa*), gustatory sense (*rasana*), visual sense (*cakṣu*), cutaneous sense (*tvak*), auditory sense (*śrotra*) and internal sense or mind (*manas*). However, it should be noted that mind is not regarded as an internal organ of sense in the western philosophy; rather, a number of internal senses are added to five external senses in the modern psychology.

Function of senses (Indriya vyāpāra)

Function of senses (*indriya vyāpāra*) produces perception of objects. According to the Buddhists, senses function without direct contact with the objects of perception; they are distant receptiors (*aprāpya kārin*) and do not require the immediate contact with objects to produce perception of objects.

However, the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṅkhyas and the Mīmāmsakas (Tarkasaṅgraha, 43) hold that senses function only with the direct contact with the objects; they are immediate receptors (*prāpya kārin*) and require the immediate contact with objects to produce perception of objects. The sense-object-contacts are six in number: i) contact (*saṁyoga*); ii) inherence in what is connected (*saṁyukta samavāya*); iii) inherence in what is connectedly inherent (*samyukta samaveta samavāya*); iv) inherence (*samavāya*); v) inherence in what is inherent *(samaveta samavāya)*; and vi) qualification (*viśeṣaṇatā*).

However, the Prācya-naiyāyikas (Siddhānta muktāvali, 61) regard sense-object-contect to be the extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa*) of perception. Also the Navya-naiyāyikas (Siddhānta muktāvali, 58) regard only sense-organs to be extraordinary cause of perception, as they can produce perception by their operations.

Mind (Manas)

Western philosophers hold that mind (*manas*) corresponds to the self (*ātman*) and the totality of consciousness in which self manifests; however, it does not correspond to the internal organ (*antar indriya*) as held by the Indian

philosophers. Also some European philosophers hold that mind corresponds to the function of body like the Cārvākas.

However, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas (Tarkabhāṣā, 5.20) hold that mind (*manas*) constitutes internal organ of sense (*antar indriya*) located in the self (*ātman*). The perception of objects cannot arise merely with the contact of external sense organs with the objects; the perception can arise only when the external organs come into contact with the internal organ of mind. Since the mind is atomic in nature, different external organs can come into contact with the mind at different times to produce perceptions of different objects. Also, if the external perception of objects depends on the external organs, the internal perception of objects depends on the internal organ of mind.

However, the Vedāntins hold that mind is a function of intellect or that of inner conciousness (*buddhi vṛtti* or *citta vṛtti*); and the inner cause (*antaḥ karaṇa*) produces perception through its function.

Self (Ātman)

The self (*ātman*) constitutes the individual soul (*jīvātman*) which is the substratum of all the knowledges. The knowledge and other qualities need to belong to only the self and cannot belong to any other physical substance except the self, as they are mental. The self is different in different bodies and is eternal (*nitya*) and all pervading or infinite (*vibhu*).

The Naiyāyikas (Bhāṣāpariccheda, 51) do not accept the Vedānta view that the self is eternal and self shining intellegence. The self is not the intelligence or consciousness (*cit*); rather it is the substance (*dravya*) which is the substratum of such qualities as intelligence; and hence is known as the locus of ego or I consciousness (*ahaṅkārāśraya*). According to the Naiyāyikas, the self is the ground of all the mental functions and hence is involved in all cognitions. All the knowledges inhere in the self and he is the controller of all senses (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*). In the case of perception of external objects, the self comes into contact with objects through the mind and external senses.

Ordinary perception (Laukika pratyakṣa)

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is two kinds as ordinary perception (*laukika*) and extraordinary perception (*alaukika*). Ordinary perception is produced by sense-object-contact; whereas extraordinary perception is produced by unusual medium. Ordinary perception is further divided two kinds as external perception (*bāhya*) and internal perception (*mānasa*).

Objects of perception (*padārtha*) are again two fold as objects of existence (*bhāva*) and objects of non-existence (*abhāva*). Objects of existence are six as substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), universal

(*sāmānya*), particularly (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*); and object of non-existence is only one type as non-being (*abhāva*).

Relations (Samsarga)

There are two main relations (*saṁsarga*) (Tarkabhāṣā, p.2) recognized in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophy. These are relation of contact or conjunction (*saṁyoga)* and relation of inherence (*samavāya*). The relation of conjunction is a relation between two substaces which exists normally separated. It is a temporary contact between two things which are separated (*yuta siddha*); and is an external relation of two things such as two jars which exist separately. Conjunction can be perceived by the sense of sight and touch.

The relation of inherence (*samavāya*) (Siddhānta muktāvali, 11) is an eternal relation (*nitya*) between two things in which one inhres in another (*ayuta siddha*). Inherence holds good between such two entities as whole and part (*avayavāyavin*), attribute or action and substance (*guṇa guṇin*), universal and individual (*sāmānya*) and particularity and eternal entity (*viśeṣa*) which cannot exist separately (*ayuta siddha*). However, unlike conjunction, it is not produced; it always subsists between the two things which are naturally related to each other. In the perception of inherence, the sense-object-content is qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*). For instance, we can directly perceive that cloth inheres in the threads. However, the contact of the relation of inherence with our sense is indirect qualifierness. Thus, it is the qualifierness of the inherence in the threads.

The third kind of relation admitted by the Naiyāyikas (Siddhānta muktāvali, II) is the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*). Unlike conjunction and inherence, it is not distinct from the objects related. The qualifierness is constituted by one of the relata, viz. substratum. For instance, knowledge is related to its object by the qualifierness, as no other relation is tenable and it is only the object known. Object as known to us is what we mean by knowledge is related to its object.

Substance (Dravya)

Substances (*dravya*) are the substatum of quality such as knowledge (*guṇāśraya*) (Bhāṣā pariccheda, 85). They are nine as earth, water, light, wind, sky (or ether), time, space, soul and mind. Excepting soul, which is the object of internal perception, remaining eight substances are the objects of external perception. In the external perception of substances, senses come into direct contact with objects. This sense-object-contact is conjunction (*saṁyoga*). For instance, the sense of sight comes into direct contact with earth etc possessing qualities and produces the perception of earth through conjunction.

Qualities (Guṇa)

Qualities or attributes (*guṇa*) exist in substances and hence they are devoid of qualities and actions (*nirguṇa niṣkriya*) (Bhāṣapariccheda, 86). They are twenty four in number as form etc. Though qualities are perceptible in general, all qualities do not admit sense-perception. Faculty (*samskāra*), effort (*prayatna*) and heaviness (*gurutva*) are beyond perception. Connected-inherence (*saṁyukta samavāya*) constitutes comprehensional relation in the perception of qualities such as form. For instance, the sense of sight comes into direct contact with the jār and the form is inherent in it.

Actions (Karman)

Actions (*karman*) are physical movements (Tarkasaṅgraha, 5.). Like qualities or attributes, they inhere in substances. They are five in number as throwing up (*utkṣepaṇa*) etc. All the five actions are perceptible; and connected - inherence (*samyukta - samavāya*) constitutes the comprehensional relation in the perception of actions. For instance, the sense of sight comes into direct contact with the things and actions inhere in them.

Universals (Sāmānya)

Universals (*sāmānya*) constitute the fourth category among the sense-objects (*padārtha*) (Tarkasaṅgraha,6) which are two types as more extensive and less extensive (*param aparam*).

The Buddhists (Tarkabhāṣā, p.28), however adopt nominalistic view regarding universal. According to them, only individuals are real and universal or generic property is mere assumption of name. Thus there are only assumptions of names such as 'cow' and the cowness is nothing but the assumption of non-existing reality.

The Jainas and the Vedāntins (Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p.115) adopt conceptualistic view regarding universal. According to them, universal does not exist apart from individuals. It is mere concept of essential common attributes of individuals.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas (Siddhānta muktāvali, 8) adopt a realistic view regarding universal. According to them, universal or generic property is a real entity inhering in individuals. (*nityatve sati aneka samavetatva*). Universal is the basis of commonness of individuals. Universal is a timeless real and eternal entity shared by many individuals such as cows.

The universal that subsists in the super sensible objects (*atīndriya*)is imperceptible and the universal that subsists in the perceptible objects is perceptible. Connected inherence constitutes the comprehensional relation in

the perception of the universal inhering in substace. For instance, the sense of sight comes into direct contact with a jar and the universal, i.e. the jarness is inherent in it. Also the inherence in the connected-inherent (*samyukta samaveta samavāya*) is the comprehensional relation in the preception of the universal pertaining to quality etc. For instance, the sense of sight comes into direct contact with jar and the universal, i.e. the qualityness inhers in the quality of black quality which is inherent in the jar.

Particularity (Viśeṣa)

Particularity (*viśeṣa*) is the opposite of universal (*sāmānya*) (Tarkasaṅgraha, 7). While universal is the basis of commonness, particularity is the basis of difference. Particularity is the unique distinguishing character of simple and eternal substances (Siddhānta muktāvali, 10) . It is eternal and subsists in the eternal substances such as space, time, sky, wind, soul, and atom etc. Particularities are mere ultimates (*antya*) and hence nothing can actually perceive them. Thus, nothing constitutes comprehensional relation in the perception of them.

Non-existence (Abhāva)

Non-existence (*abhāva*) (Siddhānta muktāvali, 12) constitutes the negation of all eight existent positive realities (*dravyādy aṣṭakānyon-yābhāvatva*). While positive existent realities have existence (*bhāva*), negative non-existent facts have non-existence (*abhāva*). Non-existence, while constituting non-inherence, is non-inherent (*asamavāyatve saty asamavāyaḥ*).

The Sāṅkhyas and the Prābhākaras (Tattvakaumudi, P.50) hold that non-existence of a thing in a substratum means mere existence of substratum. For instance, non-existence of a jar on the ground means mere existence of ground. However, Viśvanātha (Siddhānta muktāvali, 12) opines that non-existence is an objective character and not mere existence of substratum or locus. Western scholars too think that non-existence is as real as existence. Some scholars like Alexander (Space, Time and Deity, p.200) state that non-existence is not mere subjective attitude of mind. Non-existence is a real character of things. And this position supports the Nyāya doctrine that non-existence is a separate entity and constitutes an objective positive category. Russel (The objective of Mind, p.276) states that negative facts are real but non sensible facts. For instace, non-existence of a jar is primarily a real subjective fact and not a sensible fact.

The qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) is the comprehensional relation of sense-object-contact in the perception of non-existence. For instance, the senses merely recognize a jar on the ground; and no separate sense-object-contact

is possible. Thus, mere qualifierness is the comprehensional relation of non-existence.

Internal Perception (Mānasa)

Internal perception (*mānasa*) (Bhāṣāparicchеda, 57) is produced from the internal sense of mind (*manas*). The internal perception is the knowledge of the mental facts due to their contact with the internal sense of mind.

The objects of internal perception are feelings of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, cognition and volition. The Nyāya system recognizes that the feelings of pleasure etc. are the attributes of self; and they are related to self through inherence. Also the connected inherence (*samyukta samavāya*) constitutes the comprehensional relation of sense-object-contact in the internal perception of feelings. For instance, the senses are connected with mind and mind is connected with the self, wherein the feelings are inherent.

Types of Ordinary Perception (Laukika)

The Nyāya system (Nyāyakośa) devides perception as ordinary perception (*laukika*) and extra ordinary perception (*alaukika*). Ordinary perception (*laukika*) is three types: as i) indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*), ii) determinate perception (*savikalpaka*); and iii) recognition (*pratyabhijñā* or *anuvyavasāya*). While indetermimate perception is the most abstract view of objects, determinate perception is the most concrete view of objects; also recognition is the after-knowledge or rememberance of the already known facts.

Indeterminate Perception (Nirvikalpaka)

Indeterminate perception or knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) constitutes the first type of ordinary perception. The Vedāntins (Rāmānuja on the Brahmasūtra, i.1.1) hold that indeterminate knowledge is the knowledge of pure being (*sanmātra*). Such a knowledge is a knowledge of mere individual as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) and does not involve any relation or qualification of attributes.

The Buddhists hold (Pramāṇasamuccaya, ch.l.) that indeterminate knowledge is the only type of valid knowledge; and it is devoid of any thought or ideation (*kalpanāpoḍham*). It is the cognition (Śāstradīpikā, p. 41) of mere unique particutlar (*svalaṣaṇa*) without the association of name and class (*nāma jātyādi yojanā rahita*).

The Mīmāmsakas hold (Śāstra dīpikā, p.40) that indeterminate knowledge is a direct cognition of real individual which is a unity of universal and particular. However, the Bhāṭṭas hold that indeterminate knowledge arises spontaneously at the contact between senses and objects. It is the perception of the children and the like. However, the Prābhākaras think that it is the non-verbalized judgement of an object as an individual whole.

The linguists, however, contend that indeterminate knowledge as a non-verbalized judgement of an object is untenable. According to them, perception or knowledge without words is untenable.

However, the Prābhākaras (Tarkabhāṣā, p.5) refute the linguists' contention. According to them, indeterminate knowledge is first experience of an object; and it is a simple apprehension of existence of object without verbal association. While objects and their attributes stand in subject-and-predicate relationship in determinate knowledge, the same objects and their attributes are unreated and do not stand in subject-and-predicate relationship in indeterminate knowledge.

The Naiyāyaikas, on the other hand, hold (Bhāṣāpariccheda, 58) that indeterminate knowledge is a real but non-sensuas conscious state (*atīndriya*). Since it is undifferentiated feeling of an indefinite object, it cannot be definite perception.

Determinate Preception (Sarikalpaka)

Determinate perception or knowledge (*savikalpaka*) constitutes the second type of ordinary perception. It is the most concrete perception of objects with its attributes.

The Vedāntins (Rāmānuja on Brahmsūtra i.1.1) hold that determinate knowledge means a qualificative knowledge of an object distinguishing an object from other objects. (*vikalpa*). Thus, determinate knowledge is a knowledge wherein a thing is determined by certain qualities or class. For instance, 'This is a cow' (*iyam gauḥ*) is a determinate knowledge as the cow is determined by the class of cowness here.

The New Advaitins agree with the epistemologists that determinate knowledge is a verbalized judgement of an object as an individual whole. In such a knowledge, objects and their attributes stand in subject-and-predicate-relationship. For instance, 'This is a jar' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is a determinate knowledge, as the object of jar and the class of jarness stand in subject-and-predicate-relationship.

The Buddhists (Nyāyavārttika tātparyatīkā, on i.1.4), on the other hand, hold that determinate knowledge is a verbal experience in which an object is determined by the concepts of name and class etc. (*nāmajātyādi yajanā sahita*). According to them, in a determinate knowledge, an object is thought to be a complex of parts and attributes bearing certain name and class. However,

such a determinate knowledge is false, as it is produced due to our conceptual construction of it.

The Mīmāmsakas (Śāstradīpikā, p.41), on the other hand, hold that determinate knowledge is a direct cognition of real individual which is a unity of universal and particular. The Bhāṭṭas contend that the contents of determinate perception are arranged and ordered. According to them, the object in such a perception is known as the individual related to the universal. Also the Prābhākāras consider the determinate knowledge as a verbalized judgement of an individual as related to the universal. Hence it is a judgement of an object and universal involving subject-predicate-relationship.

The Naiyāyikas (Bhāṣāpariccheda, 58), on the other hand, hold that determinate knowledge is a qualiticative knowledge of an object as qualified by the attributes (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). According to them, the object of perception is known here as qualified by some attributes. For instance, determinate knowledge is a judgement such as 'This is a cow' (*ayam gauḥ*) wherein the object cow is known as qualified by the attribute of cowness. Thus, determinate knowledge is a proposition where in subject is object or individual and predicate is attributes.

It should be noted that while indeterminate is the first stage of ordinary perception, determinate is the second stage of perception. Also while indeterminate is the simple apprehension of objects, determinate is the perception of the object as qualified by certain attributes. And contents do not differ between indeterminate and determinate knowledges, but they differ in their presentation.

Recognition (Pratyabhijñā or Anuvyavasāya)

Recognition *(pratyabhijñā or anuvyavasāya)* constitutes the third type of ordinary perception. It is the after knowledge of determinate perception and quite distinct from both determinate and indeterminate perceptions. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), in general, means the understanding of the nature of the object as such; and it, in a narrow sense, means the knowing again of an object which is already known. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is used in the second narrow sense in the Nyāya philosophy.

The Jainas (Prameyakamala mārtāṇḍa, p. 97) hold that recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) means both the understanding of the nature of the objects and the knowing again of the object already known. For instance, the recognition such as 'This (jar) is that jar' (*so'yan ghaṭaḥ*) is the understanding of the nature of the jar as having certain properties and also the knowing of the jar which is already known afresh.

The Buddhists (Nyāyamañari, p. 448), however, state that recognition is a dual cognition including both perception and memory. For instance, consider the recognition 'This (jar) is that jar' once again. Here the recognition is a dual cognition including both perception of 'this jar' and memory of 'that jar'. Thus, according to the Buddhists, recognition is a dual cognition representing both the present and past knowledges.

The Naiyāyikas (Mitabhāṣiṇī, p.25) hold that re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is the knowledge of a thing perceived now as the one perceived before. For instance, the re-cognition 'This (Devadatta) is that Devadatta' *(so'yam devadattaḥ)* is the knowledge of Devadatta perceived now as the one perceived before. Such a re-cognition is a knowledge produced by both senses and the impressions *(saṁskāra)* of the previous experience of objects (Nyāyamañjari. p. 459). Thus, re-cognition constitutes both perception and recollection, as it is brought about by both senses and impressions. Thus, re-cognition is a special means or method of perception. However, the Mīmāmsakas and the Advaitins hold that recognition is a special kind of determinate knowledge wherein the object is determined by the name etc; and hence is not a distinct kind of perception different from determinate knowledge.

Extra ordinary Perception (Alaukika-pratyakṣa)

The Nyāya system (Nyāyakośa) devides perception two ways as ordinary perception (*laukika*) and extraordinary perception (*alaukika*). It recognizes extraordinary perception of three types: as i) perception characterized by universal (*sāmāmya lakṣaṇa*); ii) perception characterized by knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇa*); and iii) perception characterized by intutive contact (*yogaja*)

Perception characterized by Universal (Sāmānya lakṣaṇa)

Perception characterized by universal or generic property (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*) constitutes the first type of extra ordinary perception. It is a perception of whole class of objects characterized by universal or generic property. For instance, the perception such as 'This is a jar' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is a perception of jar characterized by the universal of jarness.

The Naiyāyikas hold that perception characterized by universal is a necessity. (Bhāṣa pariccheda, 65). According to them, if perception characterized by universal is not accepted, then the knowledge of invariable concomitance such as 'Fire exists in all cases where smoke exists' would became untenable. Also otherwise, the negative judgement such as 'This cloth is not jar' would become untenable. Thus, perception characterized by universal is a distinct type of extraordinary perception.

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The Vedāntins object, however, to the perception characterized by univesal. According to them, universal, being a common property to all individuals, may be perceived with individuals; however, it cannot give rise to the perception of individuals characterized by universal.

However, the Naiyāyikas (Siddhāntamuktāvali, 65) justify perception characterized by universal. According to them, knowledge of univesal of individuals can produce the knowledge of individuals in general. In the Western logic, general knowledge such as "A; B, C. are mortal; and hence all men are mortal" is admitted as inductive inference. The Naiyāyikas state that without the perception of universal of things, even generalization cannot arise. Thus, knowledge characterized by universal is a type of general knowledge or perception arising out of the knowledge of universal or generic property.

Perception characterized by Knowledge (Jñānalakṣaṇa)

Perception characterized by knowledge (*Jñāna lakṣaṇa*) constitutes the second type of extra ordinary knowledge. It is (Bhāṣāpariccheda, 65) the perception of an object in contact with senses acquired through the operation of knowledge (*viṣayīyasya tasyaiva vyāpāraḥ*). For instance, 'I perceive fragrant sandal wood' (*surabhicandanam*) is a perception characterized by knowledge, as the fragrant sandal wood cannot be obtained through the sense of sight; and it needs to be obtained by the operation of knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas state further that illusion such as 'This (shell) is a piece of silver' (*idam rajatam*) too needs to be explained through the operation of previous knowledge of silver, as sense of sight is in contact with only shell and not with silver.

The Vedantins, however, hold that perception characterized by knowledge such as 'I perceive fragrant sandal' (*surabhi candanam*) is an instance of inference due to the inference of fragrance; and hence need not be explained as perception through knowledge. In the west such a knowledge as 'I perceive fragrant sandalwood', like 'Ice looks cold' is considered 'complication'. It should be noted that perception is an immediate knowledge not brought about by any other knowledge; whereas inference is an indirect knowledge brought about by another knowledge of invariable concomitance. (*vyāpti jñāna*). Now fragrance is a part of presentation of the sandal wood perceived by sense of sight; and hence to reduce perception characterized by knowledge to inference is to ignore the fundamental difference between perception and inference.

Perception charactcrized by Intutive contact (Yogaja)

Perception by intutive contact (*yogaja*) constitutes the third type of extraordinary perception or knowledge. It is the perception of past, present and future objects from the powers generated in the mind by meditation (*yogābhyāsa janito dharama viśeṣaḥ*). For instance, it is the perception of the Yogins such as Rāma will be born to Daśaratha. In the case of those who have attained spiritual perfection (*yukta*), intutive perception of objects is spotaneous. However, in the case of those who are about to attain spiritual perfection (*yuñjāna*), it requires the help of concentration of mind.

The Naiyāyikas (Siddhānta muktāvali, 66) hold that Śruti etc. have admitted intutive perception as valid means of knowledge. It is a psychological fact that we cognize certain past and other objects by concentration of mind. Past, present and future objects cannot be the objects of ordinary perception; and hence need to be perceived extraordinarily through the concentration of mind.

I

Theory of Benediction (Maṅgala Vādaḥ)

Introduction :

People in this world undertake various activities to reap benefits from the completed activities. History is replete with cases where people completed difficult activities successfully in time and reaped huge benefits. No prudent person would ever like to undertake an activity that is futile and cannot be completed in time; and therefore suffer huge losses without personally benefitting in any way. However, there are also numbere of contrary cases where people undertook activities but suffered huge losses due to the non-completion of commenced activities. In view of this fact, traditional learned scholars (*śiṣṭa*) in India tried to ensure that commenced activity is completed duly in time without any delay. And the method employed for due completion was the performance of benediction *(maṅgala)* (T.C. I.i.4) in the beginning of literary and other works.

Practice of benediction is widespreal all over India without any geographical limit. People from all regions and all walks of like perform benediction for the completion of their works. However, benediction varies from work to work and people to people. While *'Śrī gurubhyo namaḥ hariḥ Om'* is chanted at the beginning and end of Vedic recitations, praise of Vināyaka is carried out at the beginning of various religious works. Also while people like Gangeśa are seen to be performing the benediction of salutation to the lord Īśvara, others are seen to be giving their blessings to younger ones or merely stating the subject matter in the beginning of their works. Thus, benediction may be classified three fold as i) blessing (*āśīrvāda*), ii) salutation (*namskāra*) and iii) statement of matter (*vastunirdeśa*).

Nature of benediction : Prācyas' view

While almost all the Hindu scholars in India believed that benediction is necessary to overcome hurdles and destroy obstackles in the completion of commenced works, they differed amongst themselves as to the exact nature of benediction. The Prācyas usually held that any work undertaken faces many obstackles and benediction produces completion of the work through the destruction of obstackle. Thus, Annambhaṭṭa (Tarka Saṅgraha. 1.) holds that benediction is an act of salutation (*karman*) having the completion of the work

as the fruit (*samāpti phalaka*) through the operation of the destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvamsa dvāraka*); whereas Śaśadhara (Nyāya siddhānta Dīpa, p.3) holds that it is an act leading to the completion of the work undertaken (*sādhya*) and it has the removal of obstackle as the extra ordinary cause (*vighnotsāraṇāsādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). For instance, the act of salutation to the Īśvara etc. at the beginning of various literary works can be considered as benediction, as the same leads to the completion of commenced works through the destruction of obstackles.

Reiteration of Pracyas' view

However, Gangeśa (T.C. I. i.22) seems to differ from the Prācyas that the state of being the benediction is the state of being the salutation or praise of the deity (*devatā stutitva*) on the ground that the same lacks of conscecutiveness. Also he refutes the position that the state of being the benediction is the state of being the activity producing the removal of obstackle (*vighnotsāraṇa hetu kriyātva*) or the state of being the activity having the removal of the obstackle as its extra ordinary cause (*vighnotsāraṇā sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). According to him, the object of activity cannot be obtained without the knowledge of either the qualified activity or extraordinary cause of such an activity. Further, Gangeśa refutes the position that the state of being benediction is the state of being the practice of the traditional learned scholars with the desire for the completion of the work without obstackle. According to him, first ever practice of learned scholars cannot be established.

However, the Prācyas, following Kaṇāda (Vaiśeṣika sūtras. i.l.l), reiterate their position. According to them, the state of being the benediction can be the state of being the activity prescribed by the Vedas (*veda vihitatva*) with the desire for the completion of the commenced work without obstackles. This, benediction leads to the completion of work through the destruction of obstackles.

Śruti establishes benediction to be the cause

Others such as Mathurānātha (Mūla Mathurānāthī) hold that Scripture (*śruti*) inferred from the practice of traditional learned scholars (*śiṣṭācāra*) establishes benediction to be the cause of completion. According to them, the form of the scripture which needs to be inferred can be 'One who is desirous of completion should perform benediction' (*samāptikāmo maṅgalam ācaret*). And the inference that establishes such a Scripture can be 'Benediction such as salutation (*namaskārādikam maṅgalam*) has the completion of the work as its fruit (*samāpti phalakam*); for, it is an object of uncensured practice of traditional scholars' (*avigīta śiṣṭācāra viṣayatvāt*); or can be 'Benediction is prescribed to be done by the Vedas (*maṅgalam vedabodhita kartavyatākam*); for, it is the object of uncensured practice of traditional scholars *avigītaśiṣṭ-ācāra viṣayatvāt*) like the New and Full moon sacrifice (*darśādivat*)'.

Further, scholars opine that even inference can establish benediction to be the cause of completion. For instance, the inference 'Benediction is fruitful (*maṅgalam saphalam*); for, it has a fruit while not having any fruit other than completion as its fruit (*samā ptyanyā phalakatve sati saphalatvāt*).' can establish benediction to be the cause of completion.

Here 'fruitful' (*saphala*) means being conducive to a fruit which is not further conducive to greater undesired consequences (*balavad aniṣṭānanubandhi*); and 'uncensured' (*avigīta*) means 'not being conducive to the greater undesired consequences' (*balavad aniṣṭānanubandhi*). Here since benediction is an action (rite) conducive to the fruit of completion not further conducive to the greater undesired consequence, the same can be fruitful and the object of uncensured practice of traditional learned scholars.

Problem

However, the Buddhists raised the objection against the practice of benediction and the Mīmāmsakas staunchly supported the practice. Also the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas differed between themselves regarding the status of benediction and viewed benediction to be a subsidiary rite and the cause of destruction of obstackles respectively. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refuted the view that benediction is the cause of completion. Thus, the present article is meant to introduce all these positions and Gangesa's conclusion.

Objection: Causality of Benediction

The Buddhists and others (T.C. I.i.5) object, however, that the causality of benediction cannot be established due to deviation. According to them, while the work of Kiraṇāvali undertaken by the careless Udayanāchārya is completed even without benediction, the work of Kādambari undertaken by Bāṇabhaṭṭa is not completed dispite the performance of benediction. Thus, benediction cannot be considered to be the cause of completion of any work.

Also the Buddhists refute the argument that the causality of benediction can be established from the inference. According to them, the causality of benediction cannot be established even from inference due to the deviation in the works of the careless ones etc.

Refutation of Objection

The Mīmāmsakas (T.C.I. i.6) refute the objection. According to them, the causality of benediction can be established, as in the case of the careless ones, benediction performed in the previous birth can be the cause, and in

the case of Baṇabhaṭṭa, lack of subsidiaries can be the reason for the non-completion.

Benediction is Subsidiary rite (Aṅga)

While almost all the traditional scholars admitted benediction to be the cause of completion of the commenced work, the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas took divergent positions regarding the status of benediction. The Mīmāmsakas believed that benediction needs to be a subsidiary rite of the commenced activity (*ārabdha kārmāṅga*), and hence supplements the commenced activity for the completion of the work. According to them, Scripture teaches benediction to be the means performed with the desire for the completion of the commenced activity; and therefore, benediction is only a subsidiary rite (*aṅga*).

Refutation of objection

The Mīmāmsakas refute (T.C. I.i.7) the objection that the Takṣa sūtra, viz. '*alaukikam laukike nāṅgam*' stipulates that no Vedic rite can be subsidiary rite (cause or means) in the production of ordinary fruit; and hence benediction, a Vedic rite, cannot be subsidiary rite (cause or means) in the production of ordinary fruit of completion of already commenced work. According to them, the Takṣasūtra refers merely to the fact that subsidiary cause, conducive to the operation of transcendental merit, cannot be the cause of production of ordinary fruit. Whereas benediction, conducive to the operation of the destruction of obstackles (*vighna dhvamsa*), can be the cause which produces ordinary fruit. Thus, the Takṣa sūtra does not contradict the theory that benediction is a subsidiary rite producing completion of commenced work.

Alternative theory

The Mīmāmsakas propose an alternative theory (T.C.I.i.8) that in accordance with the practice of the benediction in the cases of both certainty and doubt of obstackle, merely the absence of obstackle (*vighnābhāva*), and not the destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvamsa*), needs to be the operation conducive to the completion of ordinary commenced work. Also, transcendental merit (*adṛṣṭa*) cannot be the operation conducive to the completion of ordinary work, as then benediction cannot be the subsidiary rite (cause or means) of completion.

Desire for completion is qualification

Also the Mīmāmsakas establish (T.C.I. i.9) that only the desire for completion of the already commenced work is the qualification of the agent

who is entitled to undertake the work. According to them, obstackle and qualification are mutually contradictory; and hence obstackle cannot be the qualification of the person who undertakes the work. Though benediction is performed with a desire to complete the work through the destruction of obstackle, oblstackle only deters and does not prompt any one to commence the work. Thus, only the desire to complete the work needs to be the qualification.

Qualified Agent

Since obstackle has been ruled out to be a qualification, qualified agent cannot be determined in terms of possessing obstackle. Rather, since the desire to complete the commenced work is admitted to the a qualification, qualified agent needs to be determined only in terms of possessing desire to complete the commenced work. Thus, the Mīmāmsakas establish that only the person, having the desire for the completion of the work, and not the person of doubtful obstackle, can be the qualified agent for the performance of benediction.

Justification of Practice of Benediction

The Mīmāmsakas justify (T.C.I.i.10) the practice of benediction (*maṅgalānuṣṭhāna*) even in the case of doubt regarding obstackle. According to them, in the case of occasional rites such as New and Full moon sacrifices (*darśapūrṇa māsa*), only the person having the definite knowledge of insidental cause is entitled to perform the occasional rite; and therefore, the person, having merely the doubt regarding the sticking of food-particles to the laddle (*sphyāśleṣa*), is not entitled to perform the subsidiary rite of installation of duty on the previous day. However, in the case of benediction, even the person having merely the doubt regarding the obstackle is entitled to perform the benediction; and therefore, even the person having merely the doubt regarding the obstackle can perform the benediction. Thus, the performance of benediction at the time of doubt regarding obstackle is justified.

Benediction need not be prescribed

The Mīmāmsakas hold (T.C. I.i.11) that benediction is subsidiary rite. However, the same benediction need not be prescribed by the injunction of principle rite. According to them, only the Vedic subsidiary rite producing transcendental merit, needs to be prescribed by the injunction of principle rite. And since benediction is not a subsidiary rite producing transcedental merit, the same need not be prescribed by the injunction of principle rite. Thus, benediction, dispite not being prescribed by injunction of principle rite, can be subsidiary rite.

Mīmāmsakas' conclusion

The Traditional Mīmāmsakas conclude their view that benediction is a subsidiary rite (T.C.I.i.12) by refuting the argument that the Vedic injunction teaching benediction becomes invalid, as benediction is not performed in the case where absence of obstackle is established intrinsically by itself. According to them, Vedic injunction teaches benediction only in the case where obstackle is known to have been produced from ordinary means (*lokāvagata kāraṇa*), and not otherwise; however, Vedic injunction does not teach benediction in the case where the absence of obstackle is established intrinsically.

Also the Traditional Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the performance of benediction becomes contradictory in the case where benediction is not performed due to the knowledge that absence of obstackle is obtained intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself (*svatas siddha duritā-bhāva*). According to them, the traditional scholars aware of abstackle perform benediction any way, like obligatory rites, regardless of presence or absence of obstackle.

Refutation of Traditional Mīmāmsakas' view

Gangeśa refutes the Traditional Mīmāmsakas' view (T.C.I.i.13). According to him, the view that benediction is a subsidiary rite (cause) (*aṅga*) of the principle activity of composing is untenable, as the literary composition of the careless like Udayanācārya is completed even without benediction. Further, Gangeśa notes that in the cases such as Kādambari, work is not completed dispite the performance of benediction by Bāṇabhaṭṭa. Also Gangeśa refutes that benediction, like Kārīrī, performed in this life without any fruit, can be assumed to have fruit in the next life. According to him, benediction, unlike Kārīrī etc, is performed specifically with a desire for the completion of the work in this life; and therefore, the completion in the next birth cannot be the fruit.

Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' view:Benediction is principle rite

The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins, on the other hand, hold (T.C.I.i.14) that benediction is a principle rite (*pradhāna*), completion of the commenced activity is the fruit (*phala*) and the person desirous of completion is the entitled or qualified agent (*adhikārin*). According to them, the completion of work cannot be obtained without a principle rite; and non-completion of the commenced work such as Kādambari is due to the imperfection in the performance of benediction. Also according to them, benediction is the most efficient means (*karaṇa*) which is performed at the time of the commencement of literacy composition etc. However, dispite being an optional rite, it is performed regularly at the commencement of literacy work, as the person desirous of completion needs to perform benediction as a means of completion.

Refutation of Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' view

However, Gangeśa refutes the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' view that benediction is a principle rite (T.C.I.i.15). According to him, when benediction is a principle rite, the transcendental merit produced from benediction needs to constitute the totality of causes that facilitates the fruit of completion. Thus, the completion of the commenced work would become contingent in the present birth only, as Vedic rites can never be performed without the obtainment of fruit. And such a contingency cannot be termed as desired contingency, as, at times, commenced work like Kādambari is not completed dispite the performance of benediction with all its subsidiaries. Also the future completion at the next birth cannot be the fruit, as all the Vedic rites have only the completion in the present birth as their fruit.

Prima facie view: Benediction is not cause

The Pūrvapakṣin holds the view (T.C.I.i.16) that the Vedic scripture cannot teach the state of being the means (cause) of completion of commenced work to benediction in the presence of the known totality of causes of completion, unlike the Vedic scripture teaching the state of being the means (cause) to the Putrakāmeṣṭi. According to him, in the case of the obtainment of children, the known totality of causes is not sufficient; and hence the performance of Putrakāmeṣṭi is necessary; however, in the case of the completion of commenced work, the known totality of causes is sufficient; and hence the performance of benediction is not necessary.

Also the Pūruapakṣin refutes the argument that the transcendental merit produced from benediction (*maṅgala janyādṛṣṭa*) is required to complete the commenced literary work, as the completion may be delayed due to some obstackles. According to him, no delay in the completion occurs in the presence of the totality of causes. Also, since the completion of the Kiraṇāvali undertaken by the careless Udayana is experienced even without benediction, benediction cannot be the means (cause) of completion.

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument (T.C.I. i.17) that the Vedic injunction does not teach the necessary existence (practice) of benediction before the fruit of complexion of literary work (*phalaniyata pūrvabhāva*); rather, it teaches merely the necessity of production of fruit of completion (*phalāvaśyam bhāva*) from benediction. According to him, only the state of being the means to the desired goal (*iṣṭasādhanatva*) is the meaning of the Vedic scripture; and hence the same scripture cannot teach the necessity of fruit from benediction.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the deviation of a cause from fruit is a fault only in the case where the causality is known from the positive and negative concomitances; however, it is not so in the case where the causality is known from the Scripture; and hence the causality of benediction can be established. According to him, the necessary presence prior to the completion, which is to be known from Vedic scripture, is lacking in benediction; and hence the benediction cannot be taught to have the causality even from the vedic scripture.

Position of others: Absence of obstackle is operation

Others hold (T.C.I.i.18) that benediction is the producer of the completion of commenced work (*ārabdha karma nirvartaka*) through the operation of the constant absence of obstackle (*vighna samsargābhāva*); and the same constant absence continues to exist till the completion of the commenced work either as the destruction of the existing obstackle or as the antecedent absence of the future obstackle.

Also the Others refute the objection that in the case where the absence of obstackle is accomplished intrinsically by itself, benediction cannot be the cause conducive to the absence of obstackle; and hence the Vedic scripture enjoining the performance of benediction would become invalid. According to them, benediction can be conducive to the absence of future obstackles even in such cases; and hence the Vedic scripture need not become invalid.

Refutation of the Position that absence of benediction is operation

The Pūrvapaṣin, however, refutes the position of others (T.C.I.i.19) that the absence of obstackle is the operation through which benediction produces the completion of the commenced work. According to him, the absence of obstackle needs to be merely an associate cause in the completion of the work; and hence cannot be the operation. He contends that in the case where benediction is performed, the causes of obstackle need not necessirily be present; and hence the antecedent absence of obstackle need not be obtained from benediction. Thus, benediction cannot be the cause conducive to the completion of the commenced work through the operation of the absence of obstackle in the case where absence of obstackle is obtained by the totality of causes of itself. (*svataḥ siddha*).

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin notes that when benediction is merely an option to the praise of Vināyaka, the neccessary performance of benediction becomes untenable; and hence benediction cannot be the cause of completion regularly. Also the Pūrvapakṣin notes that when benediction is considered to

be principle rite (*pradhāna*), every benediction along with its subsidiaries needs to be the cause of completion of the commenced work,; however, it is not tenable, as the completion occurs even without benediction at times. Also, neither abundant quality of benediction nor both abundant and small quanity of benediction can be the cause of completion, as at times, the completion is produced without abundant quality or both abundant and small quantity of benediction.

Gangeśa's Conclusive View: Benediction is the cause of destruction of obstackle

Gangeśa, refutes the view (T.C.I.i.20) that benediction (*maṅgala*) is neither a subsidiary rite (*aṅga*) nor a principle rite (*pradhāna*) that is conducive to the completion of the commenced work (*samāptiphala*). According to him, benediction is not the cause of the completion of commenced work; rather it is merely a primary activity conducive to the destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvamsa*). He believes that benediction is performed with the desire that obstackle should be destroyed; and therefore, benediction can be the cause of only the destruction of obstackle which is required for the completion of the commenced work.

Gangeśa notes that only the destruction of obstackle is the fruit of benediction, as the same is required for the completion of the commenced work even in the view that benediction is performed with a desire for the completion of commenced work. Thus, Gangeśa concludes that since only the destruction of obstackle is the fruit of benediction performed along with all its subsidiaries (*sāṅga maṅgala*), the performance of benediction leads to the obtainment of fruit in the case of Vedic rites. However, since only the destruction of obstackle is the fruit, the Vedic scripture enjoining benediction for the completion of the commenced work cannot be authoritative.

Benediction leads to the destruction of obstackle

Gangeśa establishes (T.C. I.i.l.21) that benediction leads to the destruction of obstackle. According to him, only benediction and not expiation (*prāyaścitta*) leads to the destruction of doubtful obstackle, as only benediction, and not expiation, is prescribed at the time of doubt regarding obstackle.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that when benediction is a principle rite leading to the destruction of obstackle, the performance of the same benediction becomes untenable in the absence of obstackle. According to him, the Vedic scripture inferred from the practice of the traditional scholars teaches

the practice of benediction, regardless of the existence of obstackle, regularly at the commencement of any work; thus benediction can be practiced. Further Gangeśa notes that benediction can be performed even in the middle of an activity provided that doubt regarding the continuance of benediction persists.

It should be noted here that according to the Navya-naiyāyikas (Nīla kanṭhi, Maṅgala vāda), completion of the commenced work is accomplished, after the destruction of obstackle, from the causes such as intelligence *(buddhi)* and literary excellence (*pratibhā*) etc. Benediction does not directly lead to the completion of any work; and its influence stretches only upto the destruction of obstackle.

Benediction *(maṅgala)* is polysemous

Traditional people in India are observed to undertake various activities with the hope of overcoming obstackles. Also people are observed to practice such acts as are indirectly conducive to the good of mankind. For instance, people practice the act of looking into mirror at dawn etc which are indirectly conducive to the good and are tought by the injunction 'The poeple who are engaged in the auspicious practices... obtain no sin'. Thus the question arises as to how to account for such practices. Thus, Gangeśa suggests (T.C.I.i.23) that the term 'benediction' *(maṅgala)* may be taken to be polysemous (*nānārtha*) and cover all such cases.

Further, Gangeśa suggests that the term '*atha*' (now), used at the commencement of many a work, constitutes benediction in the primary sense of the term by destroying obstackle. However, it is benediction by being sanctioned by the Smṛīti text, viz. '*Omkāraścā.... athaśabdaśca maṅgalāvubhau*'. Also Gangeśa defines the act of praising (*stuti*) and salutation (*namaskāra*), which are widely regarded as benediction, as the act of indicating deity to be the possesor of virtues (*guṇavattayā jñāpana*) and as the particular operation conducive to the indication of the inferiority of oneself compared to the god (*svāparkaṣānukūla vyāpāraḥ*) respectively. According to him, the term 'salutation' is not used merely in the sense of physical contact of two hands with head, but rather, it is used in the sense of oral expression of reverence, as it is conducive to the destruction of obstackle. However, he refutes the Prābhākaras' view that benediction conveys only the particular mental resolve and indicates physical and other operations, as the term 'salutation' is not used in the physical and other operations without being preceded by the mental resolve. According to him, the state of being preceded by the particular mental resolve is not known without understanding the particular physical and other operations.

Nature of Śiṣṭa and Śiṣṭācāra

Since benediction is established to be either the cause of completion of the commenced work or that of the destruction of the obstackle from the scripture inferred from the practice of the traditional scholars (*śiṣṭācāra*), Gangeśa (T.C.I.i.24) incidentally discusses the nature of the terms 'traditional scholar' (*śiṣṭa*) and 'practice of traditional scholar' (*śiṣṭācāra*). According to him, 'traditional scholar' means one who has accepted the authority of the Vedas and 'practice of traditional scholar' means the practice as qualified by the state of not being censured by the Vedas.

However, considering the view that the practice of traditional scholar, producing the operation of the destruction of obstackle, leads to the completion of commenced work, Gangeśa provides an alternative definition of 'practice of traditional scholar'. According to him, thus, 'practice of traditional scholar' can mean merely the action not produced from illusion (*bhramājanya*). Thus, any action which is not produced from illusion and conducive to the completion of the commenced work is the practice of traditional scholar.

Now as regards the use of the term 'traditional scholar' (*śiṣṭa*). Gangeśa notes that the use of the term 'traditional scholar' is dependent on the admittance of the authority of the Vedas (*vedaprāmāṇya*) and the non-agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas (*vedaniṣiddhākartṛtva*). Also, as an alternative, however, Gangeśa combines both the qualifications and states that traditional scholar is one who admits the authority of the Vedas while not practicing the action prohibited by the vedas. Now since the traditional learned scholar does not possess the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas, the Buddhist who possesses such an agency becomes automatically excluded from the category of traditional learned scholar.

Gangesa refutes the view (T.C.I.i.25) that traditional scholar is one who is devoid of passion and hatred (*rāga dveṣa vihīna*); and only Manu etc. are such scholars due to lack of passion and possession of omniscience (*sārvajñatva*). According to him, when traditional scholar is admitted to be omniscient, modern scholars cannot be traditional scholars practicing benediction due to the lack of omniscience. Also Gangeśa notes that composers of Smṛti texts need not be omniscient, as they can compose Smṛti texts by understanding the subject matter from the Vedas. Thus, any scholar who practices the tradition (benediction) that has come down to us through the ages of succession is a traditional scholar.

Conclusions

Indian traditional scholars (*śiṣṭa*) practiced benediction to complete the

already commenced activities or works without obstackle. However, benediction varies from work to work and person to person.

Scholars differed regarding the nature of benediction; and the Prācyas such as Annambhaṭṭa held that benediction is salutation having the completion of the work as its fruit through the destruction of obstackle; whereas Śaśadhara held that it is an act to be completed having the removal of the obstackle as the extra ordinary cause. The Prācyas, including Annambhaṭṭa, followed Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda and believed that benediction is an act prescribed by the Vedas (*veda vihita*) which leads to the completion through the destruction of obstackles.

The Buddhists, on the other hand, did not believe in the practice of benediction and objected that the causality of benediction cannot be established due to the deviation of benediction from the completion in the Kiraṇāvali and the Kādambarī etc.

The Mīmāmsakas, however, had absolute faith in the practice of benediction and refuted the objection on the ground that the deviation is due to the lack of subsidiaries. Also the Others held that the Scripture inferred from the practice of traditional learned scholars can establish benediction to be the cause of completion; whereas yet Others held that even inference can establish benediction to be the cause of completion.

Also, the Mīmāmsakas believed that benediction is a subsidiary rite of the commenced activity; whereas the Naiyāyikas believed that benediction is merely the cause of the destruction of obstackle. The Mīmāmsakas opined that benediction, through the operation of absence of obstackle, completes the work. Also while the desire for the completion is the qualification, the person having the desire for the completion is the qualified agent. The Mīmāmsakas concluded that benediction, dispite not being prescribed by Vedic injunction, is practised by traditional scholars aware of obstackles regularly.

The Naiyāyikas, however, refuted the Mīmāmsakas' view that benediction is a subsidiary rite and held that benediction is only the cause of destruction of obstackle. Also they refuted the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' view that benediction is a principle rite on the ground that benediction cannot constitute totality of causes of completion.

The Pūrvapakṣin, however, held the view that Scripture cannot teach benediction to be the cause of completion in the presence of the known totality of causes. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refuted the view that benediction is the cause of completion through the operation of constant absence of obstackle on the ground that the absence of obstackle is merely an associate cause.

Gangeśa, the founder of the Navya-nyāya, concluded that benediction is neither subsidiary rite nor principle rite producing the completion of the work; rather, it is only a primary activity conducive to the destruction of obstackle, as only the same destruction is required for the completion of the work. Thus, the Navya-naiyāyikas established that the completion of the work is accomplished, after the destruction of obstackle, from the causes such as intelligence and literary excellence.

Gangeśa incidentally examines the term 'benediction' (*maṅgala*) and states that the term is polysemous and covers a wide range of activities conducive to good by refuting the view of the Mīmāmsakas that 'benediction' stands for a particular mental resolve. Also he incidentally examines the nature of 'traditional scholar' and 'practice of traditional scholar' and states that 'traditional scholar' is one who accepts the authority of the Vedas or one who pracitces the tradition which has come down to us and 'practice of traditional scholar' is the practice not censured by the Vedas or the action which is not produced from illusion.

II.

Theory of Validity or Authoritativeness (Prāmāṇya vādaḥ)

A

Ascertainment of validity (Jñaptivādaḥ)

Introduction Truth value of any knowledge is very essential, as activity is undertaken only after the ascertainment of truth value of knowledge and no activity is undertaken in the absence of the ascertainment of truth value of the same. For instance, the activity to acquire silver is undertaken after the ascertainment of the truth value of the knowledge 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*) and the same is not undertaken in the absence of the same. Thus, the Indian philosophers, like the rest of the philosophers in the world, laid great emphasis on the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*). According to them, no knowledge is useful if it lacks validity or authoritativeness. The knowledge of unascertained validity is ineffective and does not lead to the intended goal. On the other hand, the knowledge of ascertained validity is effective and leads to the intended goal. Thus, Gautama (NyāyaSū. i.1.1) has stated that the highest goal of salvation (*niśśreyasa*) is attained by the valid knowledge of reality (*tattva jñāna*) of sixteen categories (T.C. i.2.1).

Since only the knowledge, whose validity or authoritativeness is ascertained or known, produces activity, Indian philosophy divides knowledge into two fold as valid or authoritative (*pramā*) and invalid or non-authoritative (*apramā*). And the valid knowledge is defined (NyāyMā. 1.) as the knowledge of object as it is (*yathārthānubhava*) or as the knowledge or experience that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tatprakārakānubhava*) (T.C. i.3.14); and the invalid knowledge is defined as the knowledge of object as it is not or otherwise (*ayathārthānubhava*) or as the knowledge or experience that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the property (*tadabhāvavati tatprakārakānubhava*). However, some philosophers, especially the Buddhists, perceive that the valid knowledge of sixteen categories is dependent on the knowledge of the reality of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa tattva*). Thus, the Buddhists (T.C.i.2.2) object that the ascertainment of the reality of the same knowledge

is not tenable, as it is dependent on the ascertainment of the real nature of valid knowledge which is impossible.

The Mīmāmsakas propose that the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is to be ascertained or known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhya*) itself. However, the Gurus, the Bhāṭṭas and the Murāri Mishras among the Mīmāmsakas differ among themselves and hold that i) awareness or knowledge (*prāthamika jānagraha*) means first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) such as 'This is a pot' (*ghaṭo'yam*), ii) inference having the knownness as the probans (*jñātatā lingakānumiti*) such as 'This pot has a knowledge, because of the knowness' (*ayam jñānavān jñātattvāt*), and iii) after knowledge or recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) such as 'I know that this is a pot' (*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*) respectively (Nīlakaṇṭhī. P.35). Thus, while the Gurus propose that since the knowledge such as 'This is a pot' refers to even the authoritativeness of the knowledge (*svaprāmāṇya viṣayaka*), the totality of causes of the knowledge itself (*svajanaka sāmagrī*) ascertains even the authoritativeness of knowledge (*svaprāmāṇya niścā yikā*); the Bhāṭṭas propose that since the knowledge is transcendental (*atīndriya*) and needs to be inferred, even the authoritativeness of knowledge needs to be ascertained by the totality of causes of inference producing the awareness of knowledge; and the Murāri Mishras propose that since the after-knowledge or recognition such as 'I know that this is a pot' referring to the objects of first knowledge, refers to even the authoritativeness of first knowledge, the totality of causes of after-knowledge or recognition itself ascertains even the authoritativeness of first knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas, however, propose that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is to be ascertained extraneously by other means of knowledge such as inference (*parataḥ*). According to them, if the authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, then the doubt regarding the authoritativeness, which is experienced by people as to whether this knowledge is valid or not, would not be tenable with respect to the very first knowledge of an object such as water (*anabhyāsa daśotpanna jñāne*). For, when the first knowledge of an object is ascertained, even the authoritativeness of the knowledge would become ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself.

It should be noted here (T.C. i.2.23) that the validity of knowledge is to be ascertained intrinsically (*svataḥ*), means, it is to be ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svajñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhyatva*); and it is to be ascertained extraneously (*parataḥ*), means, it is to be ascertained without the totality of causes of knowledge (*tadanyathā grāhyatva*).

Problem

Here two questions arise: i) How do we ascertain or how are we aware of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*jñapti*) and ii) how is the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge produced (*utpatti*). Now, suppose the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is admitted to be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), then the doubt may arise as to whether the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*jñāna prāmāṇa*) is to be ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge (*yāvajjñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhyam*) while not producing the non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*tadaprāmāṇyāgrāhakam*) or not; or whether it is to be ascertained by the knowledge not produced by the knowledge (*jñānājanya jñāna grāhya*) referring to the knowledge of authoritativeness (*tajjñāna viṣayaka*) or not?; whether it is to be ascertained by the cause such as the knowledge, i.e. the substratum of the authoritativeness (*svāśraya grāhaka*) or not?; or whether it is to be ascertained by the knowledge, i.e. the substratum of the authoritativeness (*svāśraya*) or not? or whether it is to be ascertained individually (*pratyekam*) or not?

However, the Gurus (Prābhākaras), the Mishras and the Bhāṭṭas among the Mīmāmsakas, believed that the validity of knowledge is ascertained and produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of first knowledge, that of after knowledge and that of inference respectively; also the Mīmāmsakas proposed various theories of valid knowledge. As against them, the Naiyāyikas believed that the validity of knowledge is ascertained and produced extraneously from inference and merit. Further, they proposed that valid knowledge is a distinct effect from invalid knowledge and differs in its nature from invalid knowledge. The present article is, thus, meant to explain exact positions of the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas and also Gangeśa's conclusion.

The *prima facie* view that prāmāṇya is ascertained svataḥ

The Mīmāmsakas state (T.C.i.2.4) that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) may be defined as the state of being the knowledge, neither having the property excluded from the qualifecand, as the qualifier (*viśesyāvṛtty aprakārakatvam*) nor having the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatvam*). However, they maintain that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge needs to be either the state of being the knowledge that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tat prakāraka jñānatva*) or the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualification of the qualifier (*tadviśiṣṭa jñānatva*), because the unwavering and firm activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) is possible only from such a knowledge of authoritativeness.

The Gurus, the Mishras and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas further state (T.C.i.2.5) that the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is ascertained intrinsically by knowledge itself (*svataḥ*) which means that it is ascertained by the totality of causes producing the knowledge itself (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhya*). According to them, in the case of the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*), the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), i.e. the state of referring to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*taddharma prakārakatva*), is ascertained by the totality of causes of first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) or by the totality of causes of after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) or by that of the inference (*anumiti*) which are self-illuminative or self-conscious (*svaprakāśa*) respectively. Since the knowledge of an object (*jñāna*) is to be described by the object (*viṣaya nirūpya*), the object becomes the object of the apprehender of knowledge (*jñāna vitti vedya*). Therefore, even the qualification of the property (*tadvaiśiṣṭya*), like the property and its substratum, (*dharma dharmi vat*), would become the object of knowledge, as the comprehensional relation of the form of knowledge (*vyavasāya rūpa pratyāsatti*) is equal to both. It should be noted here that the form of the after-knowledge or recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) is that 'I know the object in front as being silver' (*rajatatvena purovartinam jānāmi*) and not that 'I' know the object in front and silver' (*purovartinam rajatam ca jānāmi*); and therefore, it refers to the object in front as delimited by the silverness (*rajatatvāvacchinnatvena pūrovarti viṣaya*). It should also be noted that, according to these Mīmāmsakas, the after-knowledge refers to the qualification of the object of illusory first knowledge (*bhrama viṣaya vaiśiṣṭya viṣaya*); and therefore even the invalid knowledge is ascertained to be valid knowledge partly. And the validity or authoritativeness can be imposed on the invalid knowledge, as the same validity or authoritativeness is to be ascertained by the totality of causes producing knowledge (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhya*).

The Mishras and the Bhāṭṭas hold that the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*), which is of the form of being the knowledge referring to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the property (*tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānatva*), is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*) such as inference; for, the state of being the substratum of the absence of the property (*tadabhāvavattva*), not being described by the illusion (*bhramānullikhitatvena*), cannot be the object of after-knowledge. Thus, while the validity or authoritativeness is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of after-knowledge itself, the invalidity or non-authoritativeness is to be ascertained extraeously by some other means.

Objection

The Naiyāyikas raise an objection here (T.C. i.2.6) that the validity or

authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) cannot be ascertained intrinsically (*svataḥ*) by the causes of first knowledge in the case of non-consciousness of the first knowledge (*asvaprakāsa*). According to them, when the substratum of the qualifier is not ascertained, even the qualifier, i.e. the authoritativeness cannot be ascertained. Also in the case of the self-consciousness (*svaprakāśa*) of the after-knowledge, the cause of after-knowledge, does not have the competency for the ascertainment of the qualifier, i.e. the authoritativeness. Even if they have the competency, they would ascertain even the non-authoritativeness of first knowledge like the authoritativeness. However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the objection on the ground that the particularity of the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*), like the qualifier and the qualificand, is referred by the first knowlege; and therefore, the same becomes the object of even the second or after-knowledge.

Establishment of the Mīmāmsakas' *prima facie* view

The Mīmāmsakas establish their *prima facie* view (T.C.i.2.7) that the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is of the form of either the state of being the knowledge that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatva*); or the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualification of the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati tadviśiṣtta jñānatva*); and the same authoritativeness is ascertained intrinsically by the totally of causes of first knowledge (*vyavasāyena*) or by that of the second or after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāyena*) or by that of inference (*anumityā*) in the theories of the Gurus, the Mishras and the Bhaṭṭas respectively. The Mīmāmsakas point out that suppose the authoritativeness is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*), then the infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would arise, as the authouritativeness in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāne*) too would require another means of ascertainment.

Conclusive View that *prāmāṇya* is ascertained *parataḥ*

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, were greatly influenced by the Bhaṭṭas' theory and modified them. According to them, (T.C. i.2.8), the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) needs to be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*) and not intrinsically (*svataḥ*). Their main objection is that when the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of the knowledge itself, the doubt regarding the same validity or authoritativeness would become untenable in the case of the knowledge which is produced at the time of non-repetetion, i.e. knowledge not produced from the observation of particularity (*anabhyāsa daśāyām*). For, the authoritativeness too would become

ascertained automatically when the knowledge is ascertained. Also the Naiyāyikas maintain that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness would become untenable enen in the case of the non-ascertainment of knowledge, as the knowledge of the substratum of the authoritativeness is absent.

Doubt regarding Authoritativeness is tenable: Arguments

The Mīmāmsakas, however, argue (T.C. i.2.9) that the knowledge of the substratum of the property, i.e. the authoritativeness (*dharmi jñāna*) is not the necessary cause of doubt. According to them, the apprehension of the first knowledge (*jñāna graha*), of the form of doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*samśaya rūpa*), can be produced from the knowledge of two contradictory sides (*koṭi jñāna*), non-observation of any particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*) and contact of sense organs with the substratum (*dharmīndriya sannikarṣa*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument on the ground that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness, having the first knowledge as the substratum (*taddharmika māna samśaya*), would become untenable in the absence of the substratum, i.e. the first knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas again argue (T.C. i.2.10) that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge can be tenable from the other defects in the causes of knowledge despite the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇa niścaya*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument on the ground that suppose the doubt arises despite the ascertainment of the authoritativeness, then the activity (*pravṛtti*) would become unavoidable even in the presence of doubt. Also the Mīmāmsakas argue that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge is tenable from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness in the knowledge of authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāne*). The Naiyāyikas refute this on the ground that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness would become untenable when the authoritativeness is not ascertained intrinsically by the causes of the knowledge itself.

The Mīmāmsakas further argue (T.C. i.2.11) that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge is tenable due to the doubt regarding the state of being the illusion (illusoryness) (*bhramatva samśaya*) itself. The Naiyāyikas refute the above argument saying that the state of being the illusion means the state of being the non-redundant knowledge (*ananyathā siddhatva*); and therefore, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness can arise in the object of the first knowledge only through the doubt regarding the illusoryness in the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge; but the same doubt is impossible in the theory that the authoritativeness is ascertained intrinsically.

The Mīmāmsakas again argue (T.C. i.2.12) that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness can arise in the object of first knowledge merely from the

doubt regarding the common property of objects (*samāna dharma*); and therefore the position that it is produced from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge is not correct. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument on the ground that the doubt regarding the object of knowledge needs to be produced only from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge arising from the non-universality (*asārvatrikatva*) of doubt.

Further, the Mīmāmsakas argue that in the theory of the Naiyāyikas, the authoritativeness of knowledge means the state of being the knowledge referring to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property; and therefore, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge becomes untenable when such a state is already ascertained by the totality of causes of first knowledge itself. However, the Naiyāyikas refute this argument also. According to them, despite the fact that the authoritativeness of knowledge constitutes such a state, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge is experienced even after the after-knowledge; and therefore the state of having the authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot constitute the object of after-knowledge.

Uadayana's Refutation of Miśhra Mīmāmsakas' Position

The Mishra Mīmāmsakas now propose (T.C. i.2.13) that only the after-knowledge or recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) is the means or proof that the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) refers to the substratum 'this' as qualified by the qualifying properties such as the 'thisness' and the 'silverness' (*idantva rajatatva viśiṣta idam viṣaya*); and therefore, the substratum as qualified by all the qualifiers referred by the first knowledge too is recognized by the after-knowledge. Thus, the after-knowledge such as '*idam rajatam jānāmi*' is a determinate knowledge referring to the objects of first knowledge. Now, since the after-knowledge ascertains the qualification of the thisness and the silverness in the substratum 'this', the ascertainment of the authoritativeness becomes necessary intrinsically by the totality of causes of after-knowledge itself. Therefore, since the doubt regarding the authoritativeness is not tenable in the substratum, the untenability of doubt cannot be a fault in the theory of the Mīmāmsakas.

However, the followers of Udayanācārya refute the position of the Mīmāmaskas. According to them, the form of the after-knowledge or recognition is only that 'I know this object in front as being this and also as being silver' (*idam idantvena rajatatvena ca jānāmi*) and not that 'I know this object in front and silver' (*idam rajatam ca jānāmi*), as the internal organ of mind is not competent in referring to the outside substratum, i.e. the object.

In the after-knowledge, both the thisness and the silverness are cognized to be the qualifiers, whereas the after-knowledge referring to the qualifiers is the property of soul. Thus, the after-knowledge is the proof that the same refers to the first knowledge referring to both the qualifiers in the substratum, i.e. this (*idantva rajatatva prakāraka jñāna viṣayatve*) and that soul is the possessor of such an after-knowledge,; thus such an after-knowledge is a determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*). However, since only the first knowledge, and not the qualification of the thisness and the silverness in the substratum 'this' is the object of after-knowledge, the authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of after-knowledge itself. Rather, therefore, the authoritativeness of first knowledge needs to be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*).

Prābhākaras' (Gurus') Theory of Svataḥ prāmāṇya

The Prābhākaras (Gurus) among the Mīmāmsakas propose (T.C. i.2.25) that the knowledge (*jñāna*), whose validity or authoritativeness is not ascertained (*agṛhīta prāmāṇya*), can ascertain the validity or authoritativeness of other knowledge; and therefore, even the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*), whose authoritativeness is not ascertained, can ascertain the authoritativeness of its own objects. According to them, the knowledge, whose authoritativeness is ascertained by some other source (*gṛhīta prāmāṇya*), cannot ascertain the authoritativeness of other knowledge due to the infinite regress. Thus, only the theory of self-validity or self-authoritativeness (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) must be admitted.

Refutation of Prābhākaras' Theory

The Naiyāyikas now refute the Prābhākaras' theory of self-validity or self-authoritativeness (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*). According to them (T.C. i.2.25), the first knowledge is observed at times to have even the non-authoritativeness; and therefore, the same cannot be held to be ascertaining the authoritativeness of its own objects. Although inference too fails at times to ascertain the authoritativeness of first knowledge, knowledge in general, which includes the first knowledge, may ascertain the authoritativeness of its objects provided that the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of the first knowledge is absent. Thus, only the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge need not necessarily produce the authoritativeness of its objects.

Final Refutation of the Positions of the Mīmāmsakas

The Naiyāyikas now refute the theory of the Mīmāmsakas. According to them (T.C. i.2.14), the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge having the condition of non-authoritativeness (*anabhyāsadaśāpanna jñāna prāmāṇya*), is not to be ascertained intrinsically by its substratum, i.e. by the

totality of causes of first knowledge as held by the Gurus (*svāśraya grāhya*) or by what is other than its substratum, i.e. by the totality of causes of after-knowledge or that of inference as held by the Mishras and the Bhāṭṭas (*svāśraya vyatirikta grāhya*); for, it is only the object of doubt arising at the third moment of the first knowledge (*samśaya viṣayatvāt*).

Also the Naiyāyikas establish that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is what is to be ascertained extraneously by the merits in the causes of knowledge. According to them, the point of debate, i.e. the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*vivāda padam*), is not to be ascertained by the totality of causes of the first knowledge producing the ascertainment of the substratum of the authoritativeness (*na yāvat svāśraya grāhaka grāhyam*); for, it is being doubted even without the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness at the third moment from the ascertainment of the first knowledge or even without the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness like the non-authoritativeness.

Also it should be noted that there arises contradiction in the view that the authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained by the totality of causes of the first knowledge itself; and therefore the authoritativeness needs to be ascertained extraneously by other sources.

View of the Sampradāyavādins that Prāmāṇya is Parataḥ

The Traditionalists (Sampradāyavādins) (T.C. i.2.15) state that the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is to be ascertained extraneoulsy by some other source (*parataḥ*) and the knowledge of the authoritativeness is to be produced by inference of negative concomitance that "The knowledge having the fire as the qualificand (*vahniviśeṣyaka jñānam*) is not delimited by the qualifier not existing in the fire (*vahnyavṛtti prakārānavacchinnam*); for, it produces the activity towards the fire competent of burning (*dāhasamartha viśeṣyaka pravṛtti janakatvāt*)". And the fire can be stated to have the state of not being delimited by the qualifier not existing in the fire, as the same amounts to the authoritativeness of the knowledge of fire.

Position of the Navya-naiyāyikas that Validity is ascertained by Inference

The Navya-naiyāyikas (T.C. 2.16) hold, on the other hand, that the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge of the form of absence of non-authoritativeness is ascertained first by the inference of negative concomitance. And the form of the inference of negative concomitance is that 'This knowledge of fire (*idam jñānam*) does not refer to the qualifier not existing in the fire (*vahny avṛtti prakārakam*); for, it is a determinate knowledge referring to the fireness as the qualifier (*vahnitva prakāraka niścayatvāt*) while having what is competent of burning as the qualificand (*dāhasamartha viśeṣyakam*)'.

Invalidity too is ascertained extraneously

The Navya-naiyāyikas (T.C. i.2.17) hold that the invalidity or non-authoritativeness like the validity or authoritativeness too is ascertained only extraneously. According to them, the non-authoritativeness, which is the state of being the knowledge referring to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the property, is ascertained by the inference. And the absence of the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier becomes inferred, by taking into consideration the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier after the doubt as to whether the knowledge of fire referring to the fireness as the qualifier, refers to the fire in the substratum of the fire or in the substratum of the absence of fire. Thus, both the authoritativeness and the non-authoritativeness of knowledge are ascertained extraneously by inference.

Form of Inference

Fearing deviation of probans in the earlier form of inference (T.C. i.2.16), the Naiyāyikas propose an alternative form of inference. According to them (T.C. i.2.18), the alternative form of inference could be that 'This knowledge of fire, referring to the fireness as the qualifier (*vahnitva prakāraka jñānam*), refers to the substratum of the fireness as its object (*vahnitva viṣayakam*); for, it is a knowledge referring to an object (*saviṣayakatvāt*) while not referring to the substratum of the absence of the fireness as the object (*vahnitvābhāvavadā viṣayakatve sati*)'.

Refutation of positive Form of Inference

Others (Yattu) (T.C. i.2.21) hold that the inference establishing the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge could be positive. For instance, the inference could be that 'This is earth is a knowledge that refers to the objectness, resident in earth, not delimited by the property not existing in the earth; for, it is a knowledge of the counter positive of the objectness having the community of locus with the odour'.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute such a position. According to them, the probandum cannot be established or exampled (*aprasiddha*) in such an inference. Therefore, the inference establishing the authoritativeness of knowledge must necesserily be negative in form and the positive probandum, i.e. the authoritativeness, gets established indirectly through implication. Also according to them, only the state of being the knowledge that refers to the

property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tatprakārakatva*) is the probans that establishes the authoritativeness of knowledge.

Positive Form of Inference

It should be noted (T.C. i.2.23) that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge can be ascertained by the universal positive inference (*anvayin*) that belongs to the same class of inference as that of negative inference (*vyatirekin*). And the form of the inference could be that 'The knowledge of body (*śarīra jñānam*) is valid or authoritaive (*pramā*); for, it is a knowledge of body (*śarīra jñānatvāt*) with respect to the hand and foot etc. (*karacaraṇādi mati*)'. Here the proband is not deviating, i.e. is not found in the case of what is other than the substratum of hand and foot,; and hence the extraneousness can very well be established in the ascertainment of authoritativeness of knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas explain (T.C. i.2.24) further that in the positive inference '*śarīra jñānam pramā, śarīra jñānatvāt*', the state of being the knowledge of the body (*śarīra jñānatvāt*) referring to the bodyness as the qualifier and the substratum of hand and foot as the qualificand (*karacaraṇavad viśeṣyaka śarīratva prakāraka*) could be the probans; and the same is not deviating, as the body possessing hand and foot can be the qualifier in the illusion of body (*śarīra bhrama*).

Explanation of Activity

Since the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness in knowledge is actually meant for the activity, the Naiyāyikas have taken keen interest in the explanation of activity. According to them (T.C. i.2.25), in the case where the doubt regarding the objects (*artha samśaya*) arises from the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya samśaya*), activity is possible only from the ascertainment of the objects from the knowledge dependent on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścayādhīna niścaya*); and hence it must be admitted that only the knowledge, whose authoritativeness is not ascertainment by the totality of causes itself, ascertains the authoritativeness of the other (first) knowledge. Also according to them, in the case of the doubt regarding the authoritativeness in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya samśaya*), the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*) is produced in the knowledge of the authoritativeness from the knowledge of the authoritativeness only.

Avoidance of Infinite Regress

The Naiyāyikas avoid infinite regress (T.C. i.2.26) in their theory that the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the objects is

dependent on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge of objects. According to them, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge is not necessary, as the recollection of the alternative side of the doubt (*koṭyantara*) is absent; and therefore the authoritativeness of knowledge need not be ascertained again. Whereas, in the theories of the Bhāṭṭas and the Mishras, that the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge is dependent on the means such as inference and after-knowledge, the authoritativeness of such knowledge needs to be ascertained again.

The Mīmāmsakas object here that (T.C. i.2.27) when the authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained extraneously by inference, distinct knowledge of probans, subject and invariable concomitance (*linga pakṣa vyāpti jñāna*) needs to be ascertained to have the authoritativeness by some other knowledge; and therefore infinite regress arises; and if the same are not to be ascertained, then the fault of unexampledness arises.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, when the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śankā*) is absent, only the knowledge of the probans (*liṅga jñāna*) produces the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects (*artha niścaya*); and therefore, separate inference is not necessary for the ascertainment of the authoritativeness; and thus no infinite regress becomes contingent.

It should be noted that even the Mīmāmsakas must admit that the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness in the first knowledge arises only at times; and hence inference providing the authoritativeness is not necessary always.

Naiyāyikas' Conclusion

Thus, the Naiyāyikas conclude (T.C. i.2.28) that while the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is to be ascertained extraneously by the inference, the validity or authoritativeness of the inference can be ascertained intrinsically by itself, if no doubt or illusion regarding the non-authoritativeness persists. However, according to Gangeśa, the inference is ascertained by the second after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) to have the state of referring to the property (fireness) as the qualifier in the substratum of the property. Thus, the unwavering activity (*niśkampa vyavahāra*) is produced from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness from the inference which in itself is authoritative.

However, Gangeśa observes that instant activity (*jhaṭiti pravṛtti*) is produced from the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness; and hence the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge is the cause only in the case of the doubt regarding the authoritativeness.

B

Constitution or Production of Validity or Authoritativeness (Utpatti vādaḥ)

Indian philosophers, especially the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas, explained in great detail the process of production of the validity in the first knowledge *(prāmāṇyotpatti)*, as the ascertainment of the validity is directly dependent on the production of the validity. However, they have proposed diametrically divergent theories regarding the constitution or production of the validity of knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas were greatly influenced by their theory of Vedic knowledges which are intrinsically valid or authoritative. They proposed that all knowledges are only intrinsically valid; and therefore, the validity of knowledge is produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*). However, they held that knowledge becomes invalid due to extraneous defect; and therefore, the invalidity of knowledge is produced extraneously from the defect in the totality of causes of knowledge (*parataḥ*).

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, believed that knowledge is extraneously valid or authoritative; and hence held (T.C. i.2.29) that the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is produced only extraneously (*parataḥ*) by the merits in the totality of causes of knowledge; and it is not produced intrinsically *(svataḥ)* by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. According to them, when the authoritativeness is produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, even the invalid knowledge would become valid (*pramā*) by being produced by the same totality of causes of knowledge. Thus, both the validity and the invalidity or the authoritativeness and the non-authoritativeness of knowledge need to be produced extraneously by the merits and demerits existing in the totality of causes.

The Mīmāmsakas' objection

The Mīmāmsakas object (T.C. i.2.30) that valid and invalid knowledges, like twins, though distinct, are established to be constituted or produced from the same totality of causes of knowledge (*ekajātīya sāmagrī*); and hence both the validity and the invalidity cannot be admitted to be constituted or produced extraneously by the merit and the demerit in the totality of causes.

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that valid knowledge and knowledge in general need to be constituted or produced from two distinct causes. According to them, valid knowledge, being knowledge, cannot be distinguished from the knowledge in general; and hence both can be produced from the same totality of causes of knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas refute also the inference of the Naiyāyikas (T.C. i.2.31) that 'This Validity or the authoritativeness of knowledege (*pramātvam*) is the delimiter of the effectness, which has the causeness different from the causeness described by the effectness of the knowledge in general, as its relational adjunct; for, it is the property pervaded directly by the knowledgeness in general'. According to them, the validity of knowledge being the property of the eternal substance, cannot be the delimiter of the effectness.

Establishment of the *prima facie* view of the Mīmāmsakas

The Mīmāmsakas conclude (T.C. i.2.32) that the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge needs to be constituted or produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. According to them, the particular sense contact producing valid knowledge is both the producer of valid knowledge and independent of invalid knowledge; and hence valid knowledge cannot be established to have a distinct quality of being the effect in general. Also valid perceptual knowledge cannot be admitted to have a distinct quality common to all valid knowledges. Merit and demerit cannot be the causes of valid and invalid knowledges respectively by merely being causes in general. Thus, the contention of the Naiyāyikas that the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge is produced from a distinct cause such as merit is untenable.

Naiyāyikas Reply

The Naiyāyikas reply (T.C. i.2.33) that when valid knowledge is held to be constituted or produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, even invalid knowledge would be required to be constituted or produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge only, as demerit or fault cannot be held to be the cause of the production of invalid knowledge. Thus, the Naiyāyikas hold that the Mīmāmsakas' theory that 'while valid knowledge is produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, invalid knowledge is produced extraneously by demerit in the totality of causes of knowledge' is untenable.

Also the Naiyāyikas hold that the inference that "The non-eternal valid knowledge (*anitya pramā*) is to be produced from the cause that belongs to a different class (*vijātīya kāraṇa*) from that of invalid knowledge *(apramā*

kāraṇa); for, it is an effect that belongs to a different class from that of invalid knowledge (*vijātīya kāraṇatvāt*)" establishes valid knowledge to be a distinct effect and produced from a cause distinct from that of invalid knowledge.

Also, the Naiyāyikas hold (T.C. i.2.34) that the state of being the non-eternal valid knowledge (*anitya pramātva*) is the delimiter of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*), as it is a property existing in all the effects, i.e. valid knowledge; and hence the valid knowledge needs to be the effect produced extraneously from the cause (merit) other than that (demerit) of invalid knowledge. Also they hold that the consecutive cause, excluded from invalid knowledge (*apramā vyāvṛttānugata hetu*), can be admitted in the production of the non-eteranal valid knowledge. Thus, the valid knowledge, like the pot, is an effect produced extraneously from a distinct cause (merit).

Refutation of Mīmāmsakas' objection

The Mīmāmsakas object here (T.C. i.2.35) that the state of being what is other than the valid knowledge (*pramānyatva*) is a deviating condition (*upādhi*) in the establishment of the probandum, viz. the state of being what is produced from the cause that belongs to a different class than that of invalid knowledge (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa janyatva*) (T.C. i.2.33). According to them, the defect, viz. the deviating condition cannot be avoided by stating that valid knowledge is what is other than the subject (*pakṣetara*), as the knowledge of the Lord (*īśvara jñāna*) is only valid.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the probans (*hetu*) such as the state of being the effect that belongs to a different class of effect (*vijātīya kāryatva*) is pervaded by the probandum (*sādhya*) such as the cause that belongs to a different class than that of invalid knowledge; and hence the so-called deviating condition cannot pervade the probandum, i.e. cannot make the probans deviating.

Doṣābhāva is the Cause

Further, the Mīmāmsakas object that only the absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*), and not the presence of merit (*guṇa*), needs to be the cause of valid knowledge; and hence the validity of knowledge can be maintained to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*).

However, the Naiyāyikas again refute the objection. According to them, valid knowledge is produced in the collective presence of the causes such as the sense organ-contact (*avayavendriya sannikarṣa*); whereas invalid knowledge is produced in the absence of the causes such as the sense-organ-contact; and hence only the presence of the merit needs to be the cause of the validity of knowledge and the absence of merit or defect needs to be the cause of the invalidity of knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas, however, object (T.C. i.2.38) that only the absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*), and not merit (*guṇa*), is the cause of the valid knowledge. According to them, the defect such as the ointment of frog-marrow (*maṇḍūka vasāñjana*) produces the invalid knowledge of cane as serpent; and the absence of such a defect produces the valid knowledge of cane as cane; and therefore, only the absence of the defect needs to be the cause of valid knowledge everywhere.

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the valid knowledge of hair is produced only in the case of the merit of eye-contact with the hair of the same class (*sajātīya samyoga*); and therefore, only the merit of the form of eye-contact needs to be the cause of valid knowledge everywhere. According to them, the merit of eye-contact is the cause of only the valid knowledge of hair existing at a distance; but not that of hair existing nearby; and hence only the absence of demerit is the universal cause of valid knowledge.

Doṣābhāva is conducive to validity

Also the Mīmāmsakas suggest that (T.C. i.2.39) only bile (*pitta*) hindering the observation of particularity of objects (*viśeṣa darśana*), and not the non-observation of particularity (*viśeṣa darśanābhāva*), is the defect (*doṣa*); and the absence of the same defect (*doṣābhāva*), is conducive to the validity of perception (*yāthārthya*). Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas that the merit such as the sense organ-contact is the cause of valid knowledge; whereas the defect such as bile is the cause of invalid knowledge. According to them, if the defect is the cause of invalid knowledge, then over-pervasion would occur in the case of invalid inference. Also the Mīmāmsakas suggest (T.C. i.2.36) that the absence of the cause (*hetvabhāva*) such as the absence of merit producing valid knowledge is the cause of invalid knowledge. Thus, it is not necessary that while the merit such as sense-organ contact is the cause of valid knowledge, the demerit or defect is the cause of invalid knowledge.

Naiyāyikas' Reply

To this Naiyāyikas reply (T.C. i.2.40) that only the merit in particular such as the sense-organs-contact with most parts of an object, and not the merit in general, must be admitted to be the cause of valid perceptual knowledge. Also they state that (valid knowledges of) probans, similarity and sentence-meaning in particular must be admitted to be the causes of inference, analogy and verbal cognition respectively.

The Naiyāyikas refute the proposal of the Mīmāmsakas that the cause of the observation of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana hetu*) can be the cause of valid knowledge, as the same valid knowledge is absent in the absence of such a cause. According to them, the causes of the observation of particularities, being non-consecutive, cannot be the cause of valid knowledge.

Conclusion that Merit is Cause

The Naiyāyikas however, hold (T.C. i.2.41) that the existence of the particular merit such as the observation of particularity (*tad bhāva*), which is contradictory to the illusion (*bhrama virodhi*), can be the cause of valid knowledge (*pramā hetu*); and therefore, the observation of the particularity of a person, which is contradictory to the illusion of the person, is the cause of valid perceptual knowledge of person.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the position of the Mīmāmsakas that only the group of four viz. absence of illusions, mistake, deceit and lack of sharpness of means (*bhramādy abhāva catuṣṭaya*) constitutes the cause of valid knowledge in the Vedas, as the valid knowledge in the Vedas is produced only in the absence of illusion etc. According to them, absence of illusion etc. are redundant in producing the valid knowledge, as only the knowledge of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha jñāna*) is the cause of valid verbal knowledge or cognition due to brevity.

Both Guṇa and Doṣābhāva as Cause

As an alternative, however, the Naiyāyikas admit (T.C. i.2.42) that both merit (*guṇa*) and absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*) can be admitted to be the causes of valid knowledge. However, they insist that only merit can constitute the cause of valid knowledge in the case of the Vedas; as only the unseen merit (*adṛṣṭa*) produces the fruit there. Also they note that the absence of defect is not tenable to be the cause in the case of the utterance of parrot etc. which are valid only by conformity to human utterance (*samvādāt pramāṇa*) and defectlessness.

Prābhākaras' Position that Yāthārthya is Svataḥ

The Prābhākaras' maintain (T.C. i.2.48) that the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge (*yāthārthya*) is both produced and known intrinsically form the totality of causes of first knowledge itself (*svataḥ*); and the same validity, which is common to both experience and recognition (*smṛty anubhava sādhāraṇa*), is not to be produced extraneously from merit (*guṇa*) or absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*), as all the knowledges are only valid. According to them, only activity of people (*vyavahāra*), and not knowledge

(*jñāna*), is ever contradicted; and the designation of 'invalid' (*ayathārtha*) to the knowledge is conditioned only by the production of opposite activity.

The Prābhākaras do not agree that when the validity (*yāthārthya*) is of the form of authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), the knowledge of silver cannot be invalid in the case of shell; and also that the invalidity or non-authoritativeness cannot be constituted or produced extraneously from the defect (*parataḥ*). According to them, the invalidity does not constitute the non-authoritativeness; as all the knowledge are only valid; rather only the state of causing the opposite activity (*viparīta vyavahāra pravartakatva*) constitutes the non-authoritativeness. And the non-authoritativeness of the form of non-grasping of non-relation between property and its substratum is produced extraneously from the association of defect. Also, the non-authoritativeness is facilitated from the contradiction (*bādhaka*), as it cannot be grasped intrinsically from the causes of knowledge itself.

The Prābhākaras hold (T.C. i.2.49) that knowledge is valid or authoritative with respect to the existing objects; and invalid with respect to the non-existing objects; and it is so because one and the same totality of causes is independent with respect to the existing objects and dependent with respect to the non-existing objects. According to them, the knowledge is valid or authoritative, and it means that, the knowledge describes its existing objects or the knowledge refers to the property as the qualifier in its substratum (*tatprakāraka*).

The Prabhākaras point out (T.C. i.2.50) that if the validity of knowledge is to be ascertained and produced extraneously from other sources, then infinite regress would result, as the validity of the knowledge of the cause too would be required to be ascertained and produced extraneously yet from other totality of causes extraneosly. Therefore, only knowledge of unascertained validity ascertains and produces the validity of knowledge by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. The Prābhākaras conclude (T.C. i.2.51) their theory of self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) by refuting the objection that when the validity or authoritativeness is produced intrinsically, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness would become untenable. According to them, all kinds of knowledge are only true; and hence the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness is not necessary.

Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' position and Indirect Refutation of Prābhākaras' position

The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins (T.C. i.2.52) hold that only the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, and not the doubt regarding

the authoritativeness of knowledge, is the cause of activity (*pravṛtti nimitta*); and also they hold that the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge is not of the form of the ascertainment of the validity of objects (*artha tathātva niścaya*). Further, they hold that only the ascertainment of being a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*), which is excluded from illusion, but not the ascertainment of validity of objects, is the cause of activity.

The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins maintain (T.C. i.2.53) that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is only the state of being the qualificative knowledge and not the state of being the ascertainment of the validity of objects, as it is common to even illusion.

They refute the argument that the validity or authoritativeness of the form of the ascertainment of the qualificative knowledge can be known and produced intrisically by itself (*svataḥ*). According to them, the state of being the qualificative knowledge, being excluded from illusion and referring to the property and substratum of non-grasped non-relation, cannot be known and produced intrinsically due to the absence of the totality of causes of non-relation. Also according to them, when the validity or authoritativeness is admitted to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself, then even the illusion (*bhrama*) would be required to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of illusion only.

Navyas' Theory

The Navya Mīmāmsakas (T.C. i.2.54) on the other hand propose that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇnya*) is the non-existing difference (*avidyamāna bheda*) which is a constant absence (*atyantābhāva*). And since the constant absence is produced intrisically, the authoritativeness too is produced intrinsically (*svataḥ*). Also the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*) is the non-grasping of existing difference (*vidyamāna bhedā–graha*) which is an antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*). And since the non-grasping of existing difference is to be produced extraneously from the defect (*doṣa*), the non-authoritativeness is to be produced extraneously from the defect (*parataḥ*).

Refutation of Navyas' Theory and Gangesa's Conclusion

Gangeśa refutes the Navyas' theory. According to him, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is that which produces unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti hetu*); and the same, despite being of the form of non-grasping of non-existing difference (*avidyamāna bhedāgraha*), cannot be ascertained and produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge,

as the counter-positive, viz. the grasping of the non-existing difference, is unexampled.

Gangeśa concludes, thus, that the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge, which is excluded from illusion (*bhrama vyāvṛtta*) and causes activity (*pravṛtti janaka*), is the state of being the qualificative knowledge referring to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property; and it is both ascertained and produced extraneously from observation of particular merit.

General Conclusions

Indian philosophy has recognized that the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge is a crucial factor in the production of unwavering activity and also that the invalidity or the non-authoritativeness of knowledge is a crucial factor in the absence of production of activity. Hence knowledge has been divided into valid and invalid. However, Indian philosophers, especially the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas, differed between themselves and proposed diametrically opposite theories of ascertainment of the validity of knowledge and those of constitution or production of the validity of knowledge. While the Mīmāmsakas proposed that the validity of knowledge is known or ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, the Naiyāyikas proposed that the validity of knowledge is known or ascertained extraneously by some other means such as inference.

Among the Mīmāmsakas, the Prābhākaras, the Murāri Mishras and the Bhāṭṭas proposed further that the validity of knowledge is known or ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of first knowledge,; it is known by the totality of causes of after-knowledge or recognition and that it is known by the totality of causes of inference respectively; and they believed that the validity is an intrinsic nature of knowledge itself and hence it is ascertained along with the production of knowledge itself and also that infinite regress would become contingent when it is ascertained by some other means.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, proposed that the validity of knowledge is known or ascertained extraneously by the other source of knowledge such as inference; they believed that the validity is an extraneous factor caused by other extraneous things and also that doubt regarding the validity would become untenable when it is ascertained intrinsically by itself.

The Mīmāmsakas held that only the after-knowledge or recognition such as *idam rajatam jānāmi* is the proof that first knowledge refers to the substratum 'this' as qualified by the qualifying properties such as the thisness and the silverness; and therefore, the validity of first knowledge is ascertained

intrinsically by the totality of causes of after-knowledge. However, the followers of Udayanācārya refuted this position on the ground that the form of after-knowledge is only that *'idam idantvena rajatatvena ca jānāmi'* and not that *'idam rajatam ca jānāmi'*; and therefore the validity of the first knowledge cannot be ascertained by the totality of causes of after-knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas believed that first knowledge has even the invalidity or non-authoritativeness at times and also that it is only the object of doubt arising at the third moment of first knowledge; and therefore they held that the validity or authoritativeness needs to be ascertained only extraneously by other source such as inference, but never intrinsically by itself.

However, among the Naiyāyikas, the Sampradāyavādins and the Navya-naiyāyikas held that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the inference of negative concomitance; whereas some others held that the same is to be ascertained by the inference of positive comcomitance. Also these Naiyāyikas differed amongst themselves as to the exact form of the inference. However, Gangeśa finally admits that the authoritativeness of knowledge can be ascertained even by the inference of positive concomitance.

The Naiyāyikas held that since the non-authoritativeness, like the authoritativeness, is extraneous, the same needs to be known or ascertained only extraneously by inference. Also they believe that in the case where the doubt regarding the objects arises from the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of knowledge, activity is possible only from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness.

The Naiyāyikas avoid the infinite regress in their theory that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained extraneously by other source such as inference on the ground that the distinct knowledge of probans and subject etc. of the inference need not be ascertained to have the validity or authoritativeness again extraneously by yet other sources, as doubt regarding the authoritativeness is absent in them. Further, the inference etc. are self-conscious (*svayam prakāśa*), like in the theory of the Mīmāmsakas; and hence the authoritativeness of inference etc. can be ascertained intrinsically by itself.

Now as regards the constitution or production of the validity or authoritativeness. The Mīmāmsakas believed that the validity of knowledge is intrinsic; and hence the validity of knowledge is constituted or produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself; whereas the Naiyāyikas believed that the validity of knowledge is extraneous; and hence

the validity of knowledge is produced extraneously by the merit in the totality of causes of knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas opined that valid and invalid knowledge, like twins, are established to be produced from the same type of totality of causes; and therefore both validity and invalidity cannot be produced extraneously by the merit and demerit in the totality of causes.

The Mīmāmsakas concluded that the particular sense-contact is both the producer of the validity of knowledge and an impediment to invalid knowledge; and hence the validity of knowledge needs to be produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself.

The Naiyāyikas reply that if the validity of knowledge is admitted to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge, then the invalidity of knowledge too would be required to be produced only intrinsically from the same totality and not extraneously from the demerit in the totality of causes of knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas also establish that valid knowledge is a distinct effect from invalid knowledge; and hence needs to be produced from a distinct cause (merit) from demerit.

The Mīmāmsakas, object, on the other hand, that only absence of demerit, and not merit, needs to be the cause of valid knowledge, as the absence of the ointment of frog-marrow produces valid knowledge of cane as cane. Therefore, only the absence of defect such as bile is conducive to the validity of knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas, however, establish that only the merit such as sense-organ contact or observation of particularity, which is contradictory to illusion, needs to be the cause of valid knowledge, as only the unseen merit produces the valid knowledge in the case of the Vedas.

The Prābhākaras firmly believed that all knowledges are only inherently valid and hence the validity of knowledge is both produced and known only intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself, but not extraneously from merit or absence of defect.

The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins, however, refute the Prābhākaras' theory indirectly by stating that if the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is admitted to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself, then even the illusion would be required to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself.

The Navyas among the Mīmāmsakas, on the other hand, held that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is the non-grasping of non-existing

difference and the invalidity or non-authoritativeness is the non-grasping of existing difference, and while the former is produced intrinsically by itself, the later is produced extraneously from defect.

Gangeśa refutes the Navyas' theory on the ground that the counter-positive, i.e. the grasping of the non-existing difference cannot be exampled; and concludes that the validity of knowledge, which is excluded from illusion and causes activity, is the state of being the qualificative knowledge produced extraneously from merit.

III. DEFINITION OF VALID KNOWLEDGE (Pramālakṣaṇam)

Introduction

Indian philosophers and epistemologists recognized means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as one of the sixteen categories (Nyāyasūtra i.1.1). They admitted that knowledge (*jñāna*) is the cause of activity (*pravartaka*), as only the knowledge of the object to be accomplished or effect (*kārya jñāna*) prompts one to strive for the effect. Knowledge is divided as valid (*pramā*) and invalid (*apramā*). While the valid knowledge of reality (*tattva jñāna*) is the cause of salvation (*niśśreyasa*) (Nyāya Sūtra. i.1.1), invalid knowledge or lack of knowledge of things is the cause of bondange and sufferings (*bandha*). Thus, Indian philosophers and epistemologists were very keen on the analysis of the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) and the invalidity of knowledge (*apramātva*).

Knowledge is the experience that refers to the object (*artha vijñāna*). For instance, the experience which refers to the substance such as the pot can be knowledge of pot. And the knowledge, which grasps or refers to the object as it is (*yathāthānubhava or yathātha jñāna*), is valid knowledge (*pramā*); and the knowledge, which grasps or refers to the object as it is not or otherwise (*ayathārthānubhava or ayarthārtha jñāna*), is invalid knowledge (*apramā*). For instance, the knowledge 'This (silver) is silver, (*idam rajatam*), which refers to the silver as silver, is the valid knowledge of silver; whereas the knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), which refers to the shell as silver, is the invalid knowledge of silver.

Problem

However, various Indian philosophers and epistemologists have defined the validity of knowledge variously from different angles. For instance, the Prabhākaras among the Mīmāṁsakas defined the validity of knowledge as the state of being the knowledge grasping what is not already grasped (*yathārthāgṛhīta grāhivta*). Also they provided the information that valid knowledge is qualificative knowledge (*viśṣṭa jñāna*); and collective knowledge (*samūhālambana*) can refer to the objectness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) described by qualificative knowledge. However, the most authoritative definition of the

validity of knowledge was provided by Gangeśa (T.C. I.iii.12) in the form that the state of being the knowledge which refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatva*) is the validity of knowledge. Thus, the present article is intended to analyze different theories of validity of knowledge for arriving at a final conclusion.

Pramātva is not jāti

Analysis and definition of the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) is possible generally as the generic property (*jāti*) of knowledge. When the validity of knowledge is defined as the generic property, the same can be perceived, in all the cases of valid knowledge, as a unifying and comprehensive character. However, the same is not much of a use as far as understanding the real nature and characteristic of the validity of knowledge is concerned.

Gangeśa thus refutes the position (T.C.I. iii. 1) that the validity of knowledge is the generic property. According to him, when the validity is defined tobe the generic property, the doubt (*saṁśaya*) regarding the validity of knowledge would become untenable in the qualificative perception (*viśiṣṭa pratyakṣa*) due to the presence of the validity of knowledge in the form of the generic property always. Further, the validity of knowledge is cross-connected with the directness of knowledge (*sākṣātva*) in the case of the direct valid knowledge (*sākṣāt pramā*); and therefore the validity of knowledge cannot be considered to be the generic property.

Gangeśa notes (T.C.I.iii.2) that invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) has the validity in the aspect of this (shell-ness) (*idam aṁśe*); whereas it has the invalidity in the aspect of silverness (*rajatatvāṁśe*). However, if the validity of knowledge is admitted to be the generic property, then the invalid knowledge cannot have the validity in the aspect of this (shell-ness), as the generic property is of the pervasive occurrence (*vyāpya vṛtti*).

It can be argued (T.C.I. iii.3) now that, like contact and its absence (*saṁyoga tadabhāvau*), even the validity of knowledge and its absence (*pramātva tadabhāva*) are of non-pervasive occurence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) by rejecting the rule that generic property is of pervasive occurence (*vyāpya vṛtti*).

However, Gangeśa refutes the argument on the ground that the two contradictory entities such as the validity of knowledge and its absence cannot occur or appear together in one place without the difference between the delimiters of substratum (*avacchedaka bheda*) like the two different aspects of knowledge, i.e. the shell-ness and the silver-ness. Thus, the validity of knowledge cannot be the generic property. (*jāti*)

Pramā is Arthaviṣaya jñāna

Any knowledge needs to refer to an object to qualify to be a knowledge. Unless a knowledge refers to an object, it does not qualify to be a knowledge. Thus, Vātsyāyana (Nyāya Sūtra Bhāṣya on i.1.1) defines valid knowledge (*pramā*) to be that clear understanding or knowledge which refers to the object (*yad arthavijñānam*). For instance, the knowledge of the substance such as 'This is substance' (*idam dravyam*), which refers to the substance as the object, is the valid knowledge of substance.

The definition of valid knowledge provided by Vātsyāyana can be said to be most economical and precise, as it applies to the essential nature of valid knowledge without ambiguity. However, the difficulty is that it may appliy to even invalid knowledge (*apramā*). An invalid knowledge, like valid knowledge, is an understanding or knowledge of an object. Consider for instance, the invalid knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*). Here, this invalid knowledge of silver refers to, although incorrectly, to both the object 'shell' and to the non-object 'silver'. Thus, the definition that valid knowledge is clear understanding or knowledge which refers to an object, is too wide and applies to even the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver'.

Pramātva is Yathārthānubhavatva

A valid knowledge of an object is an experience of an object as it is. A valid knowledge of an object can be said to grasp an object exactly as it is, and not otherwise. Thus, the valid knowledge of the silver grasps the object, i.e. the silver as it is and not otherwise. On the basis of such an experience, a number of philosophers such as Jayanta (Nyāy Mañ. i.1) and Varadarāja (Tārkika rakṣā) have proposed that the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) is the state of being the experience of an object as it is (*yathārthānubhavatva*). In the case of the knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), which refers to the silver as the silver, the validity of knowledge is tenable, as it is an experience referring to the silver as the silver and not otherwise.

Jayanta clarifies here that the validity of knowledge or the state of being the experience of object as it is (*yāthārthya*) means the state of referring to the property in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tadavagāhitva*). For instance, the valid knowledge such as '*idam rajatam*' has the validity of knowledge, as it refers to the property of the silverness in the substratum of the silverness, i.e. the silver.

Udyanācārya (Nyāyakusumāñali 4. 1), however, explains that valid experience or experience of object as it is, is expected to be an independent knowledge (*mānam anapekṣatayeṣyate*). According to him, any valid

experience is an independent knowledge, as it does not depend on the validity of another knowledge referring to the same objects.

However, Gangeśa (T.C. I. iii. 6) refutes the proposal of Jayanta that the validity of knowledge is the state of being an experience of object as it is. According to him, the similarity or conformity with the object (*sādṛśya*), i.e. the meaning of the word *'yathā'*, cannot be tenable in the knowledge by way of referring to the particular property such as the potness:; and the mere conformity is common to even illusion.

Pramātva is Abādhitānubhavatva

A valid knowledge can also be explained to be a non-contradictory experience. When we percive an object like silver as silver, the valid knowledge of silver is the non-contradictory experience of silver. Thus, some philosophers (T.C.I.iii.6) have stated that the state of being the non-contradictory experience (*abādhitānubhavatva*) can be the definition of the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*). In the case of the valid knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the validity can be known or ascertained as the same is not contradicted by any other means.

However, Gangeśa does not recognize the state of being the non-contradictory experiece as tenable definition. According to him, the contradiction (*bādha*) involved in the definition constitutes the opposite of valid knowledge or invalid knowledge (*viparīta jñāna*); and hence such a definition is not conducive to the understanding of the validity.

Also a valid knowledge can be described to be a conforming experience. When we perceive an object like silver as silver, the valid knowledge of silver is the conforming experience of silver. Thus some philosophers (T.C. I.iii.6) have stated that the state of being the conforming experience (*samvādy anubhavatva*) can be the definition of the validity of knowledge. In the case of the valid knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver', the validity can be ascertained by another knowledge of the same objects.

However, Gangeśa does not approve of the validity of knowledge to be the state of being the conforming experience either. According to him, the state of being the conforming experience is only the state of referring to the objects referred to by another knowledge (*jñānāntarollikhyamānatva*); and hence is common to illusion.

Also Gangeśa refutes the position (T.C.I. iii.6) that the validity of knowledge can be the state of being the experience producing competent activity (*samartha pravṛtti janakatva*). According to him, such a state of being the experience producing competent activity cannot apply to the knowledge of indifference which may not produce any activity.

Prabhākaras' theory

The most basic aspect of any knowledge is to grasp the object not-grasped earlier. One comes to know an object means one grasps the object previously not grasped. For instance, one comes to know a jar means one grasps the jar previously not grasped. Thus, the Prābhākaras among the Mīmāṁsakas hold that (T.C.I. iii.5) the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) is the state of being the valid knowledge grasping what is not already grasped (*yathārthāgṛhīta grāhitva*). In the case of the knowledge of silver such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the validity can be explained, as the same knowledge is a valid knowledge and grasps the silver which was not grasped earlier.

However, Gangeśa refutes the Prābhākaras' position. According to him, the definition cannot apply to the continuous series of knowledge (*dhārāvāhika buddhi*). Continuous series of knowledge such as 'This is a post' (*ayam stambhaḥ*) grasps the object such as the post which is already grasped earlier.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that the state of grasping what is not grasped earlier (*agṛhīta grāhitva*) can be explained in the continuous series of knowledge by taking into account the production of quality etc. at every moment which is not grasped earlier. According to him, the quality etc. are not produced a new in the post etc. every moment. Further, he notes that the state of grasping what is not already grasped earlier cannot be tenable in the Vedas which grasp what are already grasped.

The knowledge such as 'Thus (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), which refers to the existing or real object such as silver, is valid; and the knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), which refers to the non-existing or unreal object such as shell, is invalid. In other words, the knowledge that refers to the existing or real object such as the silver becomes valid; and the knowledge that refers to the non-existing or unreal object such as the shell becomes invalid. On the basis of such a conviction, Mishras etc. (T.C.I. iii.6) held that the validity of knowledge is the state of being the experience of the real object (*tattvānubhavatva*) or the state of being the experience referring to the existing object (*sadviṣayakānubhavatva*). According to them, such a definition of validity of knowledge is necessary to distinguish valid knowledge from illusion (*apramā*).

However, Gangeśa is against such a definition of validity. According to him, unreal object (*avastu or asadvastu*) never shines or appears; and suppose the unreal object shines or appears, then the knowledge of the unreal object (*avastunaḥ*) becomes equal to illusion (*bhrama sādhāraṇa*). Thus, the valid knowledge need not be distinguished from the knowledge of unreal object.

Viśeṣyaniṣṭhā... cannot be the *Pramātva*.

In a valid knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the property such as the silverness, which exists in the qualificand, i.e. the silver, is the qualifier. And this can be interpreted to mean that the valid knowledge has a reference to the property, not possible to negate in the qualificand, as the qualifier. Thus, some scholars (T.C.I. iii.7) propose that the validity of knowledge is either the state of being the experience, having the property, not constituting the counter-positive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand, as the qualifier (*viśeṣyaniṣṭhātyantābhāvāpratiyogi dharma-prakārakānubhavatva*); or the state of being the experience, having the property, constituting the delimiter of the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence existing in the qualificand, as the non-qualifier (*viśeṣyavṛtty anyo'nyābhāva pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharmāprakārakānubhavatva*). In the case of the valid knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the property of the silverness, does not constitute the counterpositive of the absence existing in the qualificand, i.e. the silver; or it is not the delimiter of the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence existing in the qualificand, i.e. the silver; and hence the knowledge is valid.

However, Gangeśa refutes the above definitions. According to him, both the definitions cannot apply to the valid knowledge of contact etc. (*saṁyogādi pramā*) which refers to the contact etc. of non-pervasive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*). Both constant and mutual absences of contact etc. are of non-pervasive occurrence as the experience 'The tree has monkey on the bottom but not on the top' (*mule vṛkṣaḥ kapisaṁyogī, nāgre*) illustrates.

Viśeṣyatāsamānādhikaraṇa ... is not Pramā

A valid knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) has a reference to the silverness, which has the community of locus with the objectness of knowledge, as the qualifier. On the basis of such an experience, some others (T.C.I. iii.9) propose that valid knowledge is the experience, which has a reference to the property, having the community of locus with the objectness of knowledge as the qualifier (*viśeṣyatā samānādhikaraṇa prakārānubhava*). Since the valid knowledge 'This (silver) is silver' has the silverness, having the community of locus with the objectness, as the qualifier, the same can be covered.

However, Gangeśa refutes such a definition as well. According to him, the definition does not apply to the indeterminate knowledge such as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) which does not have reference to any property as the qualifier; but it applies to the illusion such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) which has the thisness as the qualifier.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument of the Mīmāṁsakas that the illusion '*idam rajatam*' is valid with respect to thisness (shellness) aspect; and hence the coverage of the same illusion by the definition of valid knowledge is not a fault. According to him, if coverage of illusion were to be admissible, then merely the state of being the experience (*anubhavatva*) would have sufficed to be the validity of knowledge.

Svavyadhikaraṇa ... viṣayatāpratiyogyaṇubhava is Pramā

The Mīmāṁsakas opine (T.C.I. iii. 10) that the experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the property, not having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*svavyadhikaraṇa dharmānavacchinna viṣayatāpratiyogy anubhava*), can be considered to be valid knowledge. According to them, such a definition has the advantage of applying to both indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) and collective knowledge (*samūhālambana*), as they describe the objectness, not delimited by the property, not having the community of locus with the objectness itself.

However, Gangeśa refutes such a position. According to him, such a definition does not apply to the valid knowledge having reference to the illusory aspect (*bhramāṁśa pramā*) such as 'This is shell and silver' (*idam raṅgam rajatam ca*). In such a knowledge, the objectness, which is delimited by the contradictory property of the shellness, cannot be claimed to be not delimited by the same property.

Some epistemologists (Yattu) argue however, (T.C.I. iii.11) that the validity and the invalidity of knowledge (*pramātvāpramātve*) are mutually contradictory; and hence no valid knowledge having reference to the invalid or illusory aspect (*bhramāṁśāpramā*) is tenable; and therefore the same need not be covered by the definition of valid knowledge.

However, Gangeśa refutes the argument. According to him, both the validity and the invalidity are experienced in the case of the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) due to the difference between the valid (thisness) and invalid (silverness) aspects (*aṁśabheda*). Thus, the position that the knowledge (*jñāna*) having reference to the property, not having the community of locus with the objectness itself as the qulifier (*svavyadhikaraṇa prakāraka*), is invalid, and the knowledge, which is other than that is valid, is untenable.

Invalid knowledge has no single objectness

It should be noted (T.C.I.iii. 12) that in the case of the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), only a single objectness (*ekaviṣayatā*), as delimited by the property existing in the non-substratum of

the qualifier (*prakārānadhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinna*), cannot be admitted in both the object in front (shell) and the silver. For, then the invalid knowledge '*idam rajatam*' would become invalid even with respect to the substratum, i.e. 'this' (shell) aspect (*dharmyaṁśa*), as the objectness existing in the substratum, i.e. shell too is only delimited by the contradictory property.

Svavyadhikaraṇa ... anubhava is not pramā

Gangeśa (T.C.I.iii. 13) refutes the position of the Pūrvapakṣin that the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the qualifying property contradictory to the objectness it self (*sva vyadhikaraṇa prakārānadhikaraṇa pratiyogy anubhava*), is valid knowledge. According to him, such a definition cannot apply to the valid knowledge referring to the unnegatable such as 'This is knowable' (*idam prameyam*). In a knowledge of unnegatable, the non-substratum of the objectness, having the knowability as the qualifier cannot be established, as all entities are only the substrata of the objectness having the knowability as the qualifier (*prameyatva prakāraka viṣayatāśraya*).

Conclusive Theory

Gangeśa was probably influenced by Jayanta's analysis of the state of being the experience of object as it is (*yāthārthya*) as the state of referring to the property in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tadavagāhitva*). Thus, he has concluded that any knowledge, to become valid, has to refer to the property in the substratum of the property. For instance, consider the valid knowledge of silver such as 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*). Here, the knowledge is valid, as it refers to the silverness in the silver, i.e. the substratum of the silverness. Thus, Gangeśa (T.C.I. iii.14) states that the experience of the object (*tasya anubhava*) in the substratum (*tatra*) wherein it exists (*yatra yad asti*) is valid knowledge (*pramā*). Also Gangeśa states that the valid knowledge can be defined as the experience that refers to the property as the qualifier (*tatprakārakānubhava*) in the substratum of the property (*tadvati*). For instance, the experience of the silverness, as the qualifier, in the silver, wherein it exists or the experience 'This is silver' which refers to the silverness, as the qualifier, in the silver, i.e. the substratum of the silverness, is the valid knowledge of silver. It should be noted that valid knowledge needs necessarily to be distinguished from invalid knowledge.

Also Gangeśa has concluded that any knowledge, to become invalid, has to refer to the property in the non-substratum of the property. For instance, consider the invalid knowledge of silver 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*). Here the knowledge is invalid, as it refers to the silverness in the shell, i.e. the non-substratum of the silverness. Thus, Gangeśa states that the experience of

the object (*tasya anubhava*) in the non-substratum (*tatra*) where it does not exist (*yatra yannāsti*) is invalid knowledge (*apramā*). Also Gangeśa states that the invalid knowledge can be defined as the experience that refers to the property, as the qualifier (*tatprakārakāumbhava*) in the substratum of the absence of the property (*tadabhāvavati*). For instance, the experience of the silverness, as the qualifier, in the shell, wherein it does not exists, or the experience 'This (shell) is silver', which refers to the silverness, as the qualifier, in the shell, i.e. the substratum of the absence of the silverness, is the invalid knowledge of silver.

Valid Knowledge is qualificative knowledge

The most important contribution of Gangeśa to the field of Indian philosophy is his analysis of valid and invalid knowledges as qualificative knowledges. When Gangeśa states that the validity of knowledge is the state of being the knowledge, referring to the property, as the qualifier in the substratum of the property, he means that the validity of knowledge is the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification of such a qualifier (*tadvaiśiṣṭya viṣayakatva*); similarly when he states that the invalidity of knowledge is the state of being the knowledge, referring to the property, as the qualifier, in the non-substratum of the property, he means that the invalidity of knowledge is the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification of such a non-qualifier. Thus, both valid and invalid knowledges, according to Gangeśa, are qualificative knowledges.

Indeterminate knowledge is neither valid or invalid

Gangeśa holds (T.C.I. iii. 15) that indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) such as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) is excluded from both valid and invalid knowledges; and hence the non-application of the same by the definitions of valid and invalid knowledges is not a fault.

Gangeśa explains further that illusory or invalid knowldge such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) can be both valid and invalid. It is valid with respect to thisness by referring to the thisness in the substratum of the thisness; and it is invalid with respect to the silverness by referring to the silverness in the non-substratum of the silverness.

Collective knowledge is valid

Also Gangeśa notes that the collective knowledge such as 'These are pot and clothing' (*ghaṭapaṭau*) need not be invalid as the same does not refer to the properties such as the potness and clothingness in the non-substrata of the potness and the clothness respectively. Thus it could be established that the collective knowledge such as 'These are pot and clothing' is equally valid

like the valid knowledge 'This (silver) is silver'. Therefore the definition of the validity of knowledge must apply to even the collective knowledge.

Gangeśa refutes the position (T.C.I. iii.20) that a clear distinction is experienced between the collective knowledge such as 'These are the absence of pot and the ground' (*ime ghaṭābhāvo bhūtalamca*) and the qualificative knowledge such as 'The ground has the absence of pot' (*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam*); and therefore a particular objectness of the absence of pot (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) is the object of qualificative knowledge. According to him, the collective knowledge too can refer to the objectness of the absence of pot; and hence no additional objectness is necessary to be assumed in the case of collective knowledge. Gangeśa asserts that the distinction of the qualificative knowledge from the collective knowledge is produced either from the effect or from the qualifier.

Avoidance of Validity and Invalidity

Also Gangeśa avoids the fault of validity and invalidity (T.C.I. iii. 16) in the case of the knowledge of non-occurrence exacting presence and absence of contact (*avyāpyavṛtti bhāvābhāvau*). According to him, the knowledge of such a presence of contact and its absence need not be both valid and invalid due to the reference to the contact at (the bottom of) the tree, i.e. the substratum of contact, and the obsence of the same on the top of the tree, i.e. the non-substratum of contact. For, the contact and its absence are referred to exist on the tree only as delimited by different parts, i.e. bottom and top; and not on the tree in its entirety.

Also Gangeśa explains that the knowledge 'This (pot) is black' (*śyāmo'yam*) with respect to the pot, which has become red after baking (*pākarakta*) can be valid, as the black colour did exist in the pot before baking. However, the knowledge, 'This (pot) is black now' (*ayam śyāmaḥ*) cannot be valid, as it refers to the pot which has already become red due to baking.

Anubhavatva can be Pramātva

Gangeśa reports the position of Some other (*Anye*) (T.C.I. iii. 17) that the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) can be defined merely as the state of being the experience (*anubhavatva*). According to them, since even the illusory knowledge (*bhrama*) is the object of the usage 'valid knowledge' with respect to certain aspect (of thisness), the same too needs to be covered.

However, Gangeśa states that they need to concede that valid and invalid knowledges need to be distinguished as the experience of the property (silverness) in the substratum of the property (silver), and the experience of the property (silverness) in the non-substratum of the property (shell)

respectively, as only the valid knowledge referring to the particular qualifier (silverness) in the substratum of the property (silver) is the cause of activity.

Alternative definition

The Others suggest (T.C.I. iii.18) that valid knowledge can be analysed alternatively as the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the qualifier constituting the counterpositive of the constant absence, having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*viṣayatā samānādhikaraṇā tyntābhāva pratiyogi prakārānavacchinna viṣayatāpratiyogi*); and the illusory or invalid knowledge can be described as the knowledge, which describes the objectness delimited by the qualifier not having community of locus with the objectness itself (*svavyadhikaraṇa prakārāvacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogi*). In the case of the valid knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver', the objectness of the silver is not delimited by the contradictory qualifier; whereas in the case of the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver', the objectness of silver is delimited by the contradictory qualifier; therefore the definitions have neither under-application (narrowness) nor over-application (wideness).

Conclusions

Gangeśa was aware that the validity of the knowledge can be analyzed and defined as the generic property of valid knowledge (*jāti*). However, he rejects the analysis on the ground that such a broard analysis is not conducive to the understanding of the real nature of the validity of knowledge. No property, which is too large and over-pervasive or wide, is of any help in the understanding of specific exclusive nature.

The most basic characteristic of knowledge is that it refers to the object concerned. Based on such a theory, Vātsyāyana has defined valid knowledge to be the knowledge referring to the object. However, it must be noted that such a definition cannot distinguish valid knowledge from invalid knowledge.

Probably, as if to answer such a difficulty, Jayanta and others have proposed that the validity of knowledge is the state of being the experience of object as it is; and this proposal remains to be the most original and significant to date in Indian philosophy. And even more significant is Jayanta's analysis of the validity of knowledge as the state of being the experience of object as it is or as the state of referring to the property in the substratum of the property, since it provides the very basis of Navya-nyāya analysis of the validity of knowledge; and hence Gangeśa's refutation is very trival. The analysis of the validity of knowledge as either the state of being the non-contradictory experience, or as the state of being the conforming experience, or as the state of being the experience producing the competent activity is mere description.

The Prābhākaras' analysis of the validity of knowledge as the state of being the valid knowledge grasping what is not already grasped, though stating the most significant aspect of a knowledge, fails to apply to continuous and other types of valid knowledges which refer to already known objects.

Also Miśras' analysis that the validity of knowledge is the state of being the experience of the real object, unnecessarily distinguishes the valid knowledge from the knowledge of unreal object.

The analysis of the validity of knowledge as 'the state of being the experience, having the property, not constituting the counter-positive of the constant absence, existing in the qualificand as the qualifier' marks the beginning of the Navya-nyāya analysis and recognizes the fact that the valid knowledge refers to the qualifier in the qualificand of the qualifier.

The analysis of valid knowledge as the experience, which has the property having the community of locus with the objectness, or as the experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the property, not having the community of locus with the objectness itself, though failing to apply to indeterminate and other valid knowledges, recognizes the fact that valid knowledge refers to the qualifier and describes the objectness existing in the qualificand.

Gangeśa's conclusive theory that valid knowledge is the experience of the object in the substratum where it exists or the experience that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property is truly a path-breaking analysis; and recognizes the valid knowledge as a qualificative knowledge. And also since qualificative knowledge necessarily refers to the qualification of the qualifier, the same cannot obviously apply to indeterminate knowledge; and hence Gangeśa rules that indeterminate knowledge is neither valid nor invalid.

Further, Gangeśa's proposal that even collective knowledge is valid; and no distinction can be maintained between collective knowledge and qualificative knowledge reflects his perception that both can refer to the objectness concerned.

Finally, Gangeśa maintains that mere state of being the experience cannot constitute the validity of knowledge; and the experience must refer to the property in the substratum of the property to qualify to be valid knowledge.

IV.
Theory of Invalid Knowledge (Anyathākhyātivādaḥ)

Introduction

Both valid or true knowledge (*yathārtha jnāna*), which refers to the generic property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tatprakāraka*), and invalid or false knowledge (*anyathārtha jñāna*), which refers to the generic property as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the property (*tadabhāvavati tatprakāraka*), produce activity. For instance, the valid knowledge of pot such as 'This is pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*), which refers to the potness in the pot, the substratum of the potness, and the invalid knowledge of silver such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), which refers to the silverness in the shell, the substratum of the absence of the silverness, produce the activity towards the pot and shell respectively in the persons desirous of the pot and silver.

However the problem is how can invalid knowledge referring to the silverness in the shell can produce activity. Different Indian Philosophers, owing allegiance to different thoughts and theories, have therefore explained five different types of knowledge (*khyāti*) which produce activity. The Yogācāras, who affirm the theory of reality of knowledge (*vinjñānvāda*), have explained that self-knowledge (*ātmakhyāti*) produces activity. For instance, the self-knowledge such as 'This is silver', though empty of any object, appears as the object, i.e. as the silver; and then such self-knowledge produces the activity towards the shell in the person desirous of the silver (*rajatārthin*).

The Mādhyamikas, who affirm the theory of void or emptyness (*śūnyavāda*), have explained that the knowledge of non-existing object (*asat khyāti*) produces activity. For instance, the knowledge of non-existing silver such as 'This is silver' produces the activity towards the shell in the person desirous silver.

Also the Vedāntins, who affirm the theory of illusion (*māyāvāda*), have explained that the knowledge of the indescribable object (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*) produces activity. For instance, the knowledge of the indescribable silver such as 'This is silver' produces the activity towards the shell in the person desirous

of silver. Here the silver cannot be described as existing *(sat)*, as then illusion and contradiction (*bhrānti bādhayoḥ*) would become untenable; also the silver cannot be described as non-existing (*asat*), as then knowledge and contradiction (*khyāti bādhe*) would become untenable.

The Naiyāyikas, who affirm the theory that knowledge is both valid and invalid (*yathārthāyathārthau*), have explained that the invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*) produces activity. For instance, the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver', which is the comprehension of one thing (shell) as the other (silver) (*anyathākhyāti*), produces the activity towards the shell in the person desirous of silver. It should be noted (T.C.I.iii. 29) that since valid knowledge is a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) referring to the qualificand of the (existing) qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyiya*), even invalid knowledge is a qualificative knowledge referring to the qualificand of the (non-existing) qualifier.

Problem

However, the Mīmāṁsakas, who affirm the theory of valid knowlege (*yathārtha jñāna vāda*), were totally opposed to the theory of invalid knowledge of the Naiyāyikas (*ayathārtha jñāna or anyathā khyāti*). They held that all knowledges are only valid and produce activity. In the case of 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the absence of knowledge of silver (*akhyāti*) produces activity towards shell in the person desirous of silver. Thus, Mīmāṁsakas, especially the Prābhākaras, raised several objections to the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, rufuted all the objections and established invalid knowledge. Following is a brief account of Mīmāṁsakas objection and Naiyāyikas' refutation as outlined by Gaṅgeśa.

Objection of the Mīmāṁsakas

The Mīmāṁsakas (T.C.I. iv. 1) object that the use of the term 'qualifier' in the definition of the valid qualificative knowledge (*yathārtha viśiṣta jñāna*), viz. 'The state of referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier' (*tadvati tatprakārakatva*) is unnecessary, as no distinction as valid (*yathārtha*) and invalid (*ayathārtha*) is tenable in the case of knowledge. According to them (T.C.I. iv. 2), even the inference, viz., 'The shell is the substratum of the objectness; for, it is the object of the activity towards the silver' (*śuktiḥ jñāna viṣayatā śrayaḥ rajata pravṛtti viṣayatvāt*) cannot establish the invalid knowledge, as the silverness constitutes the preventing condition of inference (*upādhi*); and hence the theory of invalid knowledge *(anyathā khyāti)* is untenable.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the inference such as "The activity towards the shell is to be accomplished from the qualificative knowledge; for, it is an activity" (*suktau pravṛttiḥ viśiṣṭa jñāna janya pravṛttivat*) can establish the qualificative knowledge.

Prābhākaras' theory that Bhedāgraha is Pravartaka

The Prābhārakas, on the other hand, modified the theory of non-knowledge (*akhyāti*); and explained that the non-grasping of difference or distinction (*bhedāgraha*) produces activity. According to them, the person desirous of silver, owing to some defect, does not grasp the distinction between the shell and silver, i.e. between the perception and the recognition respectively; and the same non-grasping of distinction produces activity towards shell.

The Prābhākaras (T.C.I.iv.4), refute the Naiyāyikas' position that 'This (shell) is silver' produces activity towards the shell. According to them, only the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) between the shell and silver needs to be admitted as the cause of activity, as the invalid qualificative knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' is very heavy. Also according to them, the non-grasping of difference needs to be admitted even by the Naiyāyikas for regulating the invalidity of knowledge (*āropa niyamārtham*).

The Prābhākaras state (T.C.I. iv. 5) that suppose the knowledge of non-difference (*abheda jñāna*), recognized to be illusory, is not conducive to the activity, then even the knowledge of difference (*bhedajnāna*), recognized to be illusory, cannot be conducive to the activity.

Also the Prābhākaras propose (T.C.I. iv. 6) that only the subsequent knowledge (*jñāna*), not referring to the difference (of the shell) from the desired object (shell) (*iṣtabheda viṣayaka*), is the cause of activity. However, they refute the argument that then the qualificative knowledge referring to the silver (*rajate viśeṣta jñāna*) could not be established to be the cause of activity, as the activity can be tenable merely from the non-grasping of difference only (*bhedāgraha*). According to them, in such cases, the recollection of the silver *(smṛti)* cannot be established due to the absence of the experience of silver first; and hence, only qualificative knowledge needs to be admitted there.

Aniṣṭabhedāgraha is Nivartaka

Also the Prābhākaras state that the non-grasping of difference of the undesired object (shell) (*aniṣta bhedāgraha*) recollected independently is the cause of withdrawal from the shell (*nivartaka*). However, they firmly rule out the possibility of the grasping of non-difference of the undesired object (shell) (*aniṣtābheda graha*) being the cause of withdrawal from the shell. According to them, then the withdrawal from the silver would become untenable in the case of the wrong assumption that 'This (silver) is not silver (*nedam rajatam*) with respect to the silver.

Anyathākhyāti is untenable

A section of the Mīmāṁsakas (T.C.I. iv. 9) refute the objection of the Naiyāyikas that since contradiction (*bādha*) of the form of negation of wrongly superimposed validity (*prasajya pratiṣedhātman*) is unjustified in the non-knowledge (*akhyāti*); the same contradiction establishes only the invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*). According to them, the knowledge which contradicts (*bādhaka*) and the knowledge which is contradicted cannot be distinguished properly; and therefore, the state of being what is to be contradicted (*bādhyatva*) cannot be regulated.

The Mīmāṁsakas state further that the knowledge of one (shell) as the other (silver) (*anyathākhyāti*) stands refuted by the very nature of the knowledge of silver (*pramiti*). For, when one object, i.e. silver is being perceived as the qualificand of the silverness, the other object, i.e. shell cannot be perceived as the qualificand. Thus, invalid knowledge of the form of the knowledge of one as another is untenable.

Knowledge cannot be invalid

The Mīmāṁsakas further point out (T.C.I.iv. 10) that knowledge cannot be invalid (*anyathākhyāti*), as illusion (*bhrama*) needs to refer to only existing object (*sat*), but never to any non-existing object (*asat*); otherwise Mādhyamikas' theory of knowledge of non-existing object (*asat khyāti*) would become contingent. Also no valid reason (*hetu*) exists to justify invalid knowledge, as both word (*śabda*) and probans (*liṅga*) prove only valid knowledge (*yathārtha jñāna*). Thus, the Mīmāṁsakas insist that only two kinds of knowledge, viz. valid knowledge and non-knowledge (*akhyāti*) of the form of non-relation (*agṛhītā samsarga*) must be admitted.

The Mīmāṁsakas refute the argument that invalid knowledge is like recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) wherein the recollected silverness is grasped in the shell through eye. According to them, such an argument is untenable due to the distinction between impression and perception (eye). And invalid knowledge cannot be a distinct effect produced in the organ of sense, as the defect in the organ cannot produce any knowledge. Thus, the theory of invalid knowledge is untenable due to the contingency of the knowledge of empty qualifier (*sākāravāda*); due to the untenability of the knowledge of non-existing object (*asato na bhāna*); due to the contradiction to the valid knowledge (*samvid virodha*); due to the lack of any valid reason (*hetv abhāva*); and also due to the fear of non-confidence in the valid knowledge (*anāśvāsa bhāva*).

Establishment of Akhyāti

The Mīmāṁsakas (T.C.I. iv.11), thus conclude that the knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) is the non-knowledge of silver (*akhyāti*); and has the form the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) but does not have the contradictory silverness as the qualifier. And the two knowledges, viz. valid knowledge (*satkhyāti*) and non-knowledge (*akhyāti*), which are identical in nature and object, produce activity. However, the designations 'valid' (*yathārtha*) and 'invalid' (*ayathārtha*) are applied to knowledge in accordance with conformity (*samvāda*) and non-conformity (*visamvāda*) of activity.

Naiyāyikas' Reply

The Naiyāyikas reply (T.C.I. iv. 12) that the knowledge of the desired object (silver) in front (*iṣṭapurovarti jñāna*) is established to be the cause of the conforming activity (*pravṛtti*) towards silver in the case of the true or valid knowledge (*satya sthale*) in both the schools; and therefore, the qualificativeness of the knowledge (*vaiśiṣṭya*), describing the objectness of the object in front (*viṣayatā*), needs to be the delimiter of the causality of the qualificative knowledge (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*). Thus, only valid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) needs to be the cause of conforming activity towards silver.

The Naiyāyikas refute (T.C.I. iv. 13) the objection of the Mīmāṁsakas that the non-grasping of difference in general (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of both conforming and non-conforming activities on the ground that the causality (*kāraṇatā*) of the non-grasping of difference needs to be assumed only subsequent to the assumption of invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭānyathā khyāti*); and therefore, cannot be simultaneous with the assumption of the causality of invalid knowledge.

Establishment of Anyathākhyāti

Thus the Naiyāyikas establish (T.C.I. iv.14) that only invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭānyathākhyāti*) needs to be the cause of non-conforming activity towards shell (*visamvādi pravṛtti*) as the same too is an activity like conforming activity.

The Naiyāyikas note (T.C.I. iv. 15) that the non-conforming activity towards shell is not tenable from mere non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*). According to them, then, both activity towards shell and withdrawal from silver (*pravṛtti nivṛtti*) would become necessary simultaneously in the case of collective knowledge.

Objection : Invalid qualificative knowledge is not the Cause

The Mīmāṁsakas object (T.C.I. iv. 18) that the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) can be the causes of the two different effects, viz. conforming activity and non-conforming activity respectively. However, the Naiyāyikas reply (T.C.I. iv.19) that only the knowledge produces any kind of activity; and hence the non-grasping of difference cannot produce any activity, i.e. non-conforming activity towards shell.

The Mīmāṁsakas again object (T.C.I. iv. 20) that merely the knowledge of the substratum, viz. 'This is silver' (*idam jñāna*), and not the knowledge of the desired object, viz. 'This is the desired silver (*iṣṭajñāna*) can be admitted to be the cause of the non-conforming activity towards shell (*visamvādi pravṛtti*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection on the ground that in accordance with the positive and negative concomitances (*svatantrānvayavyatireke*), only the knowledge of the desired object needs to be the cause of all sorts of activity.

The Mīmāṁsakas further raise the argument (T.C.I. iv. 21) that the perception that 'Knowledge is valid' (*jñānam yathārtham*) contradicts the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge; and also the inference proves that knowledge cannot be invalid. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument on the ground that the inference refuting the theory of invalid knowledge is based on the causality ascertained by the redundant positive and negative concomitances; and therefore the same inference destroys the very pervasion supporting the theory of valid knowledge. And since no effect is ever possible without the assumed cause, the means conducive to the unwavering activity (*niṣkarmpa pravṛtti*) needs to be explained in terms of invalid knowledge.

Avoidance of Yugapat pravṛtti nivṛtti

A section of the Prābhākaras proposes (T.C.I. iv. 22) that the contingency of the activity and the withdrawal simultaneously (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛtti*) can be avoided in their view, as the silver and the shell cannot be grasped to have the difference from the silver and the shell respectively at the same time. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the view on the ground that then the over pervasion of the grasping of difference of the shell from the silver (*atiprasaṅga*) would become contingent in the recollection of opposite four (*viparīta catuṣka*) produced from the knowledge of one single shell and one single silver.

Another section of the Prābhākaras proposes (T.C.I. iv. 24) that the activity and the withdrawal are produced from the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counter-positiveness (*pratiyogitvābhāvagraha*) of the desired and the undesired objects respectively in the difference known to be existing in the objects in front. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the position

on the ground that only the qualificative knowledge such as 'This is silver' is established to be the cause of activity (*pravartaka*) by positive and negative concomitances; and therefore it is a matter of dispute as to whether such a grasping of the absence the state of describing the counterpositiveness or the qualificative knowledge is the cause of activity.

Invalid qualificative knowledge is necessary

The Naiyāyikas refute (T.C.I. iv. 25) the position that the property (*dharma*), which is grasped to be existing in the desired object (*iṣṭa*), but not grasped to be existing in the undesired object (*aniṣṭa*), produces activity. According to them, then the activity towards the shell and the withdrawl from the silver would become untenable from the invalid knowledge of words (*śabdābhāsa*) that 'These are silver and shell' (*ime rajataraṅge*), as the properties existing in the silver and the shell cannot be comprehended from words.

The Naiyāyikas further refute (T.C.I. iv.26) the position that since one does not have the activity towards the silver due to the non-grasping of the difference from all the properties as being the silver (*rajatatvena*), but has the activity towards the shell due to the non-grasping of difference of only one property as being the silver, only the non-grasping of difference needs to be the cause of activity. According to them, invalid qualificative knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' is much more economical compared to the non-grasping of difference; and hence the same deserves to be the cause of activity.

Anyathātva of Anyathākhyāti

Also the Naiyāyikas explain (T.C.I. iv. 32) that despite the knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) referring to the two existing objects, viz., shell and silver, the same needs to be invalid. According to them, the invalidity of knowledge (*anyathātva*) means the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier (*tadabhāvavati tatprakārakatva*) or the state of being the knowledge referring to the objectness contradictory to the qualifier (*prakāravyadhikaraṇa viṣayatākatva*); and since the knowledge *'idam rajatam'* refers to the silverness in the shell, i.e. the substratum of the absence of the silverness, or since the same knowledge refers to the objectness of the silver contradictory to the silverness, the same knowledge is invalid (*anyathākhyāti*).

Cause of qualificative knowledge

The Naiyāyikas note (T.C.I. iv.28) that the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) such as the silverness constitutes the comprehensional relation with the qualificand such as the 'this' (*viśeṣyasambandha*) and also that the non-grasping of the non-relation between the qualifier and the qualificand

constitutes the cause of the qualificative perception. And therefore, the same non-grasping of non-relation between the qualifier and the qualificand is common to both valid perception (*satya pratyakṣa*) and illusion (*brahma*). Here the epistemological rule is that if the entity in general (*yatsāmānya*) constitutes the cause of the comprehension of the effect in general, then the particular entity of the same class constitutes the cause of the comprehension of the effect in particular. And it should be noted that since the valid qualificative knowledge refers to the qualificand of the qualifier, even the invalid qualificative knowledge needs to refer to the qualificand of the qualifier.

Perception can constitute the Means

The Naiyāyikas state (T.C.I. iv. 29) that even the perception such as 'This is silver' can constitute the means (*māna*) establishing the invalid knowledge, as no contradiction arises to the causality. Further, they state that even the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) such as 'I know this (shell) to be silver' (*idam rajatatayā jānāmi*) can establish the invalid knowledge, as recognition is valid only by referring to the existing knowledge.

Doṣa is also the Cause

The Naiyāyikas state (T.C.I. iv.32) that the defect of sense organ (*doṣa*) too needs to be admitted as the cause of invalid knowledge (*hetu*), as no effect can be produced without the cause and the invalid knowledge is the effect. Further, they state that even the Mīmāṁsakas need to admit the defect to be the cause, as otherwise the illusion cannot be explained. Also illusion (*brahma*) cannot mean the absence of grasping of non-relation (*asamsargāgrahābhāva*), as the absence can neither be the substratum nor the knowledge of any substratum.

Bādhya bādhakābhāva need not be contradicted

The Naiyāyikas explain (T.C.I.iv. 30) that when knowledge is admitted to be invalid (*anyathā*), the relation of being contradictory and contradicted (*bādhyabādhakābhāva*) need not become untenable. According to them, though invalid knowledge cannot contradict anything due to the absence of distinction between what contradicts and what is contradicted, valid knowledge, which is not rendered redundant (*ananyathā siddha*), can certainly contradict. Also it should be noted that the very idea of illusion (*bhrama buddhi*) can be contradicted by the valid contradictory knowledge.

Also the Naiyāyikas explain (T.C.I.iv. 31) that the confidence in the validity of knowledge need not become untenable in the view that some knowledges are invalid (*anyathā*). According to them, the means to ascertain the validity of knowledge (*prāmāṇya grahopāya*) has already been stated in the *Prāmāṇyavāda*; and by using proper means one can always ascertain the validity of knowledge. Also, on the contrary, when all the knowledges are held to be valid, confidence in the validity of knowledge becomes useless. Further, when invalid knowledge, referring to the non-existing objects, is absent, the very destination between valid and invalid knowledge becomes untenable.

Conclusions

Indian philosophers recognized both valid knowledge (*pramā*) and invalid knowledge (*apramā*) according to the truth value or the absence of truth value of knowledges respectively. They have also recognized that both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge produce activity. However, owing allegiance to differenct thoughts, different Indian Philosophers admitted five different types of knowledges (*khyāti*) which can produce activity towards the shell in the case of 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajataṁ*).

The Mīmāṁsakas, admitting all knowledges to be only valid (*yathārha*), strongly opposed the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*); and they also admited only non-knowledge (*akhyāti*) in the cases such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) on the ground that distinction of knowledge as valid and invalid is untenable.

The Prābhākaras modified the Mīmāmsakas' original theory of non-knowledge (*akhyāti*), and held that while non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) produces activity (*pravartaka*), non-grasping of difference from undesired object (*aniṣta bhedāgraha*) produces withdrawal (*nivartaka*).

The Prābhākaras held that knowledge cannot be invalid; and hence the theory of invalid knowledge is untenable. The Mīmāmsakas concluded that the knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver', therefore, needs to be considered only as non-knowledge (*akhyāti*); and the same, having the nature of valid knowledge (*sat khyāti*), produces activity.

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the Mīmāmsakas' theory of non-knowledge (*akhyāti*) on the ground that only qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣta jñāna*) needs to be the cause of activity (*pravartaka*); and while qualificative knowledge of the desired object in front (*iṣṭa purovarti jñāna*) is the cause of conforming activity, the invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭānyathākhyāti*) is the cause of non-conforming activity. The Naiyāyikas establish the theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*) on the ground that non-conforming activity towards shell is not tenable from non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*). alone.

The Naiyāyikas also establish that the invalidity of knowledge (*anyathātva*) means the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (*tatprakārakatva*) in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier (*tadabhāvavati*). The Naiyāyikas state that perception (*pratyakṣa*) and defect in organ (*doṣa*) can be the cause of invalid knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas observe that valid knowledge can contradict; and hence the relation of being contradictory and contradicted (*bādhyabādhakābhāva*) need not become untenable in the case of admitting invalid knowledge. Further they observe that the means to ascertain the validity of knowledge can be ascertained; and hence confidence in the validity of knowledge need not become untenable.

V.

A - Theory of Perception (Pratyakṣavādaḥ)

Introduction

Indian philosophers were greatly concerned with epistemology and dealt extensively with knowledge (*jñāna* or *pramā*) and means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). While the Sāṇkhyas (VaiśeSū. viii. 1.1) held that knowledge is the transformation of intelligence (*buddhi pariṇāma*), the Yogācāras held that only intelligence or consciousness has reality (*vijñāna vāda*); also the Māyāvādins held that knowledge is mental function or psychosis (*manovṛtti*) or consciousness (*caitanya*). Also Akṣapāda Gautama (Nyāya sū. I.1.1) states that supreme felicity (*niśśreyasa*) is attained by the true knowledge (*tattva jñāna*) of sixteen categories. Since valid knowledge (*pramā*) is four fold as perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inferential knowledge (*anumiti*), analogical knowledge (*upamiti*) and verbal cognition (*śābda bodha*), Akṣapāda Gautama held means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to be four fold as perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*) and word or verbal testimony (*śabda*). For instance, 'This is a Brahmaṇa' (*ayam brāhmaṇaḥ*) is the perceptual knowledge produced from the means of perception such as eye. 'This mountain has fire' (*parvato vahnimān*) is the inferential knowledge produced from the means of inference such as the (knowledge of) smoke. 'The *bos gaveas* is like a cow' (*gosadṛśo gavayaḥ*) is the analogical knowledge produced from the means of analogy such as the similarly of *bos gaveas* to cow. 'The pot is identical with blue' (*nīlā bhinno ghaṭaḥ*) is the verbal cognition produced from the means of word or verbal testimony such as *nīlo ghaṭaḥ*.

The term 'perception' (*pratyakṣa*) means the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organs with the objects (*akṣam akṣam pratītya utpadyate*). And the comprehensional relation is found between soul and internal sense organ of mind, between mind and other external sense organs, and between other sense organs and objects (Vātsyāyana. I.1.4). The sense organs are two fold as external and internal organs. The external sense - organs are five: i) eye (*cakṣus*), ii) nose (*ghrāṇa*), iii) tongue (*rasana*), iv) ear (*śrotra*), v) touch or skin (*tvak*); and internal organ is only one as mind (*manas*).

Perception is two fold as eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*). The perception of the Lord (Īśvara) is eternal; whereas the perception of the ordinary human being (Jīva) is non-eternal. The non-eternal perception is devided two fold as ordinary (*laukika*) and extra ordinary or transcendental (*alaukika*). The perception produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ is ordinary; whereas the perception produced from the comprehensional relation of those other than sense organ is extra ordinary or transcendental. For instance, the perception such as 'The pot exists on the ground' (*iha bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*) which is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ or eye, is ordinary; and the perception such as 'All smokes have the smokeness' (*sarve dhūmāḥ dhūmatvavantaḥ*), which is produced from the comprehensional relation of other than sense organ, is extraordinary.

The ordinary perception is divided further twofold as determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). The determinate perception is a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) referring to the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhin*) of the qualifier (*saprakāraka*). For instance, the determinate perception such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is a qualificative knowledge referring to the qualification of the qualifier potness. The indeterminate perception is a non-qualificative knowledge not referring to the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhin*) of the qualifier (*niṣprakāraka*). For instance, the indeterminate perception such as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) is a non-qualificative knowledge not referring to the qualification of any qualifier.

The ordinary perception is again sixfold as: i) that produced from nose (*ghrāṇaja*) such as 'This sandal wood is fragrant' (*candanam surabhi*); ii) that produced from tongue (*rāsana*) such as 'Honey is sweet' (*madhu madhuram*); iii) that produced from eye (*cākṣuṣa*) such as 'Pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*); iv) that produced from skin or touch (*spārśana or tvāca*) such as 'This iron ball is hot' (*uṣṇam ayogolakam*); v) that produced from ear (*śrautra*) such as 'This sound is high in pitch' (*tāro'yam śabdaḥ*); and vi) that produced from mind (*mānasa*) such as 'I am happy' (*aham sukhī*).

The extraordinary or transcendental perception is threefold as: i) that produced from comprehensional relation characterized by universals (*sāmānya lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) such as 'The pot has potness' (*ghaṭaḥ ghaṭatvavān*); ii) that produced from comprehensional relation characterized by knowledge (*jñāna lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) such as 'This has fragranceness' (*idam surabhitvavat*); and iii) that produced from comprehensional relation of transcendentalmerit or intution (*yogaja*) such as 'This is the supreme soul' (*ayam paramātmā*).

Problem

However, while Gautama laid the foundation stone by analysing perception as the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ with the object, Jayanta analysed the same as the direct knowledge. Further while the Bauddhas analysed perception as the knowledge that reveals the object, Gangeśa analysed perception as the knowledge that does not have any other cause; and the Prābhākaras and other philosophers presented various theories which represent different angles of perception. Thus, the present article is meant to discuss various analyses of perception.

Definition of perception

Gautama defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) (Nyāy Sū. I. i.4) as the knowledge (*jñāna*) produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ with object (*indriyārtha sannikarṣotpanna)*, but not produced from word (*avyapadeśya*), not deviating (*avyabhicārin*) and of the form of determinate knowledge (*vyavasāyātmaka*). Here the term 'not produced from word' is used to exclude verbal knowledge or cognition (*śābda bodha*); the term 'not deviating' is used to exclude illusion (*bhrama*); the term 'of the form of determinate knowledge' is used to exclude indeterminate knowledge; and the term 'produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ with object' is used to exclude the mental perception of happiness etc.

Some, who do not understand the mutual exclusivity of different knowledges, may consider perceptual knowledge to be verbal knowledge or verbal cognition due to the possibility of obtaining the knowledge of the object of perception from word. Apprehending such a difficulty, Gautama has qualified perceptual knowledge to be not produced from word (*avyapadeśya*). Since perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a pot' cannot be expressed by the word, perceptual knowledge is distinct from verbal knowledge.

Further some argue that perceptual knowledge is inferential knowledge, as it can be obtained by grasping only a part of the thing to be grasped. For instance, the perceptual knowledge of a tree can be obtained by grasping only a part of the tree. However, it must be noted that even the objector has to agree that perceptual knowledge of a tree is obtained only by partial perception of a tree. Thus, perceptual knowledge must be admitted to be different from inferential knowledge.

Naiyāyikas have admitted knowledge to be two fold as right or valid knowledge (*pramā*) and wrong or invalid knowledge (*bhrama*). And perceptual knowledge too can be twofold as valid and invalid depending upon the absence and presence of some defect in the producing organ. However,

Gautama does not want to cover invalid perception by his definition as it is useless. Thus, he excludes the invalid perceptual knowledge by the term 'not deviating', as the invalid knowledge deviates from its object.

It should be noted that knowledge can be divided twofold again as determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*). And perceptual knowledge too can be two fold as determinate and indeterminate depending upon the reference to the qualifier and its absence. However, Gautama does not want to cover indeterminate knowledge, as it is too wide. Thus, he excludes the indeterminate knowledge by the term 'of the form of determinate knowledge'. Also it should be noted that ordinary perceptual knowledge can be divided two fold as that produced from external sense-organ and that produced from internal sense-organ of mind. However, Gautama does not want to cover perceptual knowedge produced from the comprehensional relation of soul with mind as it is endless. Thus, he excludes such a perceptual knowledge by the term 'produced from the comprehensional relation of external sense organ with the object'.

Jayanta's objection

Jayanta raises the objection (T.C.I. v.2) that perceptual knowledge cannot be defined as the non-deviating knowledge (*avyabhicārin*) produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ with object (*indriyārtha sannikarṣotpanna*). According to him, such a definition over pervades inference of soul (*ātmānumiti*), recollection (*smṛti*) and knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*), as the same too are produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ, i.e. mind with object, i.e. soul etc; also such a definition under pervades the perceptual knowledge of the Supreme soul, as it is not produced from comprehensional relation of sense organ with object.

Pratyakṣa is different from mānasa

Jayanta was in agreement with Gautama that perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) must be distinguished from the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of soul with mind or mental knowledge (*mānasa*). Thus Jayanta (Nyāyamañ. I. ii.p.3) states that perceptual knowledge is existing knowledge that is devoid of the property (*tacchūnya jñāna*) which is existing in only the knowledge produced from the produced knowledge (*janyadhī janya mātra vṛtti*), but not existing in the mental knowledge (*mānāsā vṛtti*). Such a knowledge is the direct knowledge (*sākṣātkāra*) which is devoid of the property of the inferenceness etc, existing in the inference etc. produced from the produced knowledge, i.e. knowledge of concomitance etc, but which is not existing in the mental knowledge.

It must be observed here that while almost all the later philosophers agree that perceptual knowledge should be distinguished from other types of knoledges such as verbal cognition and inference etc, they are not in complete agreement with the view that the same perceptual knowledge should be distinguished from mental knowledge, as the same too is a type of perception.

Baudhas' view

The Bauddhas were primarily concerned with the object-revealing aspect of knowledge. According to them, main function of all knowledges is to reveal the objects concerned. Thus, they have defined that perceptual knowledge or perception (Nyāyakośa) is the knowledge that reveals or manifests the object (*yatkiñcidarthasya sākṣatkāri jñāna*). Consider for instance, the perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*). This knowledge reveals or manifests the object of pot; and hence the same is a perceptual knowledge.

It must be observed here that though one cannot disagree with the fact that perceptual knowledge reveals object, the Baudhas' definition is too wide and can apply to all sorts of knowledge such as inference as they too reveal object directly or indirectly.

Heavily influenced by the Bauddhas, the Prācyas state (T.C.I.v.3) that the state of being the direct knowledge (*sākṣāt kāritva*) can be the definition of the perceptual knowledge. According to them, such a definition is justified, as the perceptual knowledge is a direct knowledge produced from sense organs. However, they state that the state of being the knowledge produced from the sense-organ (*indriya janyatva*) cannot be the definition of perceptual knowledge, as then the fault of mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśraya*) between such a knowledgeness and the perceptual knowledgeness cannot be avoided. Further, the Prācyas state that the state of being the ordinary direct knowledge (*janya sākṣātkāratva*), not produced from the comprehensional relation producing the direct knowledge (*sākṣātkāra hetu pratyāsatty ajanya*) can be an alternative defintion of perceptual knowledge.

Others' definition

Others state (T.C.I.v.4) that sense organ (*indriya*) are intended to be the producers of perceptual knowledge (*janaka*) only as being the sense-organs (*indriyatvena*); and therefore, ordinary perceptual knowledge (*janya pratyakṣa*) can be defined to be the knowledge produced from sense organs (*indriya janya jñāna*). According to them, mind (*manas*), only as being mind (*manastvena*), but not as being sense organ (*indriyatvena*), is the cause of recollection and inference (*smṛty anumitī*); and therefore, the same mind need

not be the cause of perceptual knowledge. Thus, the definition does not become overapplicable to recollection and inference etc.

Gangeśa's Position : Jñānākaraṇaka *jñāna* is Perception

Gangeśa, however, defines perception (T.C.I.v.5) as the knowledge not having another knowledge as its cause (*jñānākaraṇaka jñāna*). It means that the knowledge, devoid of the property such as the inferenceness existing in the knowledge such as inference produced from another knowledge, is perception. Such a knowledge is inclusive of both perception of lord, which is not produced from any other cause, and ordinary human perception, which is not produced from anyother perception.

Gangeśa notes here that in the case of the recognition (*pratybhijñā*) such as 'This one is that one' (*so'yam*), only the recollection of the thatness (*tattā smṛti*), through the mental impression (*samskāra*), but not the experience (*anubhava*), is the cause or means. Otherwise, recognition would amount to the recollection (*smṛti*).

Prābhākaras' position : Sākṣāddhī is Perception

The Prābhākaras state (T.C.I.v.6) that since inferential knowledge or inference too is perceptual with respect to the knowledge and the knower (*miti mātṛāmśe*), the Naiyāyikas' definition, viz. that the knowledge, which does not have another knowledge as its cause, is the perceptual knowledge cannot apply to inferential knowledge with respect to knowledge and knower (*miti mātrāmśe*). According to them, therefore, perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) needs to be the direct knowledge (*sākṣāddhī*); and the directness (*sākṣāttva*) is only the state of not being produced from determinate knowledge (*savikalpakājanyatva*), and not a generic property (*jāti*), due to the absence of any manifestor.

The Prābhākaras define the direct knowledge (*sākṣāddhī*) as the knowledge not produced from the determinate knowledge (*savikalpakā janya*) with respect to certain objects. Also the Prābhākaras note that the consecutive qualificative knowledge referring to the generic property (*jāti*), can be perceptual, as it is produced only from indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) of generic property and individual. Thus, the definition need not be underapplicable. Further inference and recognition can be non-perceptual, as they are to be produced from other knowledges with respect to the probandum (*sādhya*) and the thatness (*tattā*) respectively. Thus the definition need not be overapplicable.

Refutation of Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' position

The Prābhākaras refute (T.C.I. v.7) the position of the

Mīmāmsakaikadeśins that recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) such as 'This one is that one' (*so'yam*) too is only perceptual, as the same is the cause of the manifestation of the thatness as being the after-knowledge of the thatness. According to them, suppose recognition is admitted to be perceptual, then inference too would be required to be perceptual, by manifesting the probandum as the knowledge of probans (*sādhya*).

Refutation of Prābhākaras' definition

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute (T.C.I.v 8) the Prābhākaras' position that perceptual knowledge is direct knowledge, whereas inference and recognition are indirect knowledges. According to them, recognition referring to the thatness (*tattā*) cannot be indirect knowledge (*paro'kṣa jñāna*) due to the absence of any cause of indirect knowledge. Also if sense organ associated with the thatness is admitted to be the cause of recognition, then recognition would become only direct knowledge due to being produced from sense organ.

Also according to the Naiyāyikas, inference with respect to the (aspect of) knowledge and knower (*mitimātramśe*) cannot be indirect knowledge due to the impossibility of mind being the cause. And suppose the two aspects are admitted to be produced from mind, then the aspect of probandum too could be argued to be produced from mind only.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the contention of the Pūrvapakṣin (T.C.I.v.9) that the knowledge of the thatness (*tattā jñāna*) as referring to the thatness is the cause of the recognition; and the knowledge of the probandum (*meya jñāna*) as referring to the probandum is the cause of the inference; and therefore recognition and inference need not become perceptual knowledges. According to them, the state of referring to the objects (*tadviṣayakatva*) of the knowledge is dependent on the causes of the knowledge itself (*svakāraṇādhīna*). And since recognition and inference cannot be produced from the causes of the knowledge itself, they cannot be indirect knowledges; thus the definition of perceptual knowledge overapplies to recognition and inference. Also since qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) such as 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*) is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) such as the staff, the same qualificative knowledge cannot be the direct knowledge; thus, the definition of perceptual knowledge underapplies to qualificative knowledge.

Final refutation of Prābhākaras' position

The Naiyāyikas finally refute the position of the Prābhākaras (T.C.I.v.10) that the perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) can be defined to be the knowledge not directly produced from another knowledge (*jñāna sākṣād ajanya*).

According to them, such a definition cannot apply to serially continuous perceptual knowledge (*dhārāvāhika pratyaya*), as the same is produced from only the earlier qualificative knowledges.

Definition of Perception: Sāṅkhyas' view

Other philosophers, apart from the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmsakas, too have shown a keen interenst in the analysis and definition of perceptual knowledge or perception. For instance, the Sāṅkhyas (Nyāya kośa) state that perceptual knowledge or perception is the imposition of individual objects (*prativiṣayādhyāsa*). According to them, one has the perceptual knowledge of an individual object such as the pot means one imposes the individual object such as the pot on the mind.

It should be observed here that the Sāṅkhyas' definition of perception as the imposition of individual objects is directly influenced by their definition of knowledge as the trasformation of intelligence; and views perception only as an imposition of objects on the intelligence.

Māyāvādins' view

The Māyāvādins seem to have been influenced by both the Sāṅkhyas and the Baudhas in their definition of perceptual knowledge. Thus, they define that perceptual knowledge (Pañcadāśi, 7.91.) is the manifestation of the object (*viṣaya sphuraṇa*) by the consciousness as delimited by the function of mind or mental psychosis (*antaḥ karaṇa vṛttyavacchinna caitanyena*). According to them, perceptual knowledge is the manifestation of object by consciousness means the object such as pot is manifested by the light of consciousness (*cidābhāsa*) and the intelligence (*buddhi*). Further, the Māyāvādins (Vedānta paribhāṣā 1.12) modify the definition of perceptual knowledge and state that perceptuality of knowledge (*pratyakṣatva*) is the identity of the consciousness delimited by the object (*viṣayāvacchinna caitanyābhinnatva*) with the knowledge delimited by the mental function of object (*tattadākāra vṛtty avacchinna jñāna*).

However, it should be observed here that the definition of perceptual knowledge by the Māyāvādins is a narrow sectorial one; and does not find wide acceptance among other schools of Indian philosophy.

Conclusions

The Naiyāyikas divided knowledge fourfold as perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge and verbal knowledge. They divided further percetual knowledge as twofold as eternal and non-eternal; also non -eternal as ordinary and extra-ordinary; and ordinary as determinate and indeterminate.

The analysis of non-external perception as ordinary and extra-ordinary and ordinary perception as determinate and indeterminate and the analysis of extraordinary perception as one produced from comprehensional relation characterized by universals marks truely the finest analysis of knowledge ever seen in any system in the history of philosophy.

Gautama's definition of perception as the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organ with object, but not produced from word, not deviating and of the form of determinate knowledge constitutes the very basis of Indian analysis of perceptual knowledge and is duly recognized to be so by almost all the philosophers.

Jayanta was of the opinion that perceptual knowledge is different from mental knowledge; and hence held that percetual knowledge is direct knowledge which is devoid of the property of the inferenceness and not existing in the mental knowledge. Thus Jayanta's objection is purely technical.

Bauddhas perceived perception to be revelation of the objects and hence defined perception as the knowledge that reveals the object. And this view is largely subscribed by some Prācya logicians as well.

Gangeśa viewed that perceptual knowledge is produced from sense organs; and hence the same, unlike inference etc, cannot have any other knowledge as its cause.

However, the Prābhākaras, owing their allergiance to the theory that inference etc. too are perceptual with respect to certain aspects, stated that perceptual knowledge is direct knowledge. However, it is open to debate as to whether only perceptual knowledge, or other knowledges such as inference too are direct knowledges.

Other philosophers, namely the Sāṅkhyas and the Māyāvādins, were guided by their peculiar theories of knowledge that perception is the imposition of objects and that it is the manifestation of objects; and hence presented the theories of perceptual knowledge which serve a limited purpose of sectarian analysis.

V.

B -Theory of Comprehensional Relation (Sannikarṣavādaḥ)

(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PERCEPTION OF SOUND)

Introduction

Indian philosophers have maintained distinction between material relation and comprehesional relation. While material relation such as contact is a relation between two material objects such as two substances, comprehensional relation such as contact is a relation between sense organ and object of comprehension. Material relation is called *samsarga* or *sambandha*, whereas comprehensional relation is called *sannikarṣa*.

The comprehensional relation is either the intra-operation (*avāntara vyāpāra*) or the peculiar or extra-ordinary cause (*kāraṇa*). Consider for instance, the indeterminate knowledge such as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*). Here, the sense organ is the extra-ordinary cause, the comprehensional relation is the intra-operation, and the intermediate knowledge is the effect. However, consider for instance, the determinate knowledge such as 'This is pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*). Here the comprehensional relation is the extra-ordinary cause, the intermidiate knowledge is the intra-operation and the determinate knowledge is the effect.

Such a comprehensional relation is two-fold as ordinary comprehensional relation (*laukika*) and extra-ordinary comprehensional relation (*alaukika*). While ordinary comprehensional relation is the cause of ordinary sense perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*), extra-ordinary comprehensional relation is the cause of extra-ordinary or mental preception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*).

Problem

While almost all the Indian Philosophers have recognized six types of comprehensional relations, Gangeśa provides fresh reason for admitting six types of relations. Also, he incidentally examines the issues involved with the perception and production of sound. Following is a brief account of Gangeśa's theory of comprehensional relation.

Six types of comprehensional relations

The ordinary comprehensional relation (*laukika*) (TC. i.V.11) is of six types as : i) contact (*saṃyoga*), ii) inherence in the connected (*saṃyukta samavāya*), iii) inherence in what inhers in the connected (*saṃyukta samaveta samavāya*), (iv) inherence (*samavāya)*, v) inherence in the inherent (*samaveta samavāya*) vi) and the relation of being qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāva*).

The comprehensional relation of contact of sense organ such as eye with the object such as the pot produces the preception of the pot in the case of 'This is pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) etc. and the same relation of sense organ such as mind with the object such as Soul produces the preception of Soul in the case of 'I am Soul' (*aham asmi*). Herer the rule is that Soul is connected with mind, mind is connected with organ and organ is connected with object and then determinate or indeterminate knowledge of object is produced.

The comprehensional relation of inherence in substance connected with organ such as eye produces the perception of qualities such as form in the case of 'Pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) etc. Here the rule is that all qualities etc. excepting sound and action etc. are inherent in the substance which is connected with the sense organ and the perception of qualities is produced from the inherence in the connected.

The comprehensional relation of inherence in the generic property which inhers in the substance connected with the sense-organ produces the perception of generic property such as the formness in the case of 'This is the formness' (*idamrūpatvam*) etc.. Here the rule is that generic property, is inherent in the quality, and the quality is inherent in the substance connected with organ; and hence generic property is perceived by the same sense organ which perceives individual.

The comprehensional relation of inherence of sound in the orifice of ear, wherein the sound of Indian lute etc. falls, produces the perception of sound in the case of 'Here falls the sound of Indian lute' (*iha vīṇāśabdo'sti*) etc. Here the rule is that the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear (*karṇāvachinna nabhas*), is auditory organ (*śrotra*) and the perception of all sorts of sounds is produced from the inherence in the orifice of ear.

The comprehensional relation of being qualifier and qualificand of the absence of the pot and ground produces the perception of the absence of pot in the ground in the case of 'Pot is absent in the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*). Here the relation of being qualifier and qualificand can be analysed to be the relation of being super-stratum and substratum as delimited by self-linking

relation (*svarūpasambandhāvacchinna ādhārādheyabhāva*) or merely the relation of being the qualifier (*viśeṣanatā*), and the relation of being the qualificand (*viśeṣyatā*). Now while the relation of being qualifier and qualificand is many types, the relation of being the qualifier produces the perception of the absence of sound (*śabdābhāva*) and the relation of being the qualifier connected with the sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) produces the perception of the absence of pot and that of inherence. (*samavāya ghaṭābhāva*).

Samyoga is the cause

Gangeśa admits contact (*samyoga*) as a comprehensional relation; however, he refutes the objection of the Pūrvapakṣin (TC. i.v. 12) that only the contact of the organ with the whole object (*avayavi samyoga*), as delimited by the large parts (*mahāvayavāvacchedena*), and not merely the contact of the organ with the object, is the cause of the perception of the substance such as the pot. According to him (TC. i.v.13), the contact of organ with the whole object as delimited by the large parts cannot be held to be the cause of the perception of substance, as the same is deviating from the perception of the soul which is devoid of any parts. The Naiyāyikas observe here that the already assumed cause (*klṛpta hetu*) such as the contact of the organ with the whole object, need not be abandoned due to the occasional failure of the same in the case of the perception of the substance with subtle parts etc.

Samyukta Samavāya is the cause

Further Gangeśa admits inherence in the connected (*samyukta samavāya)* as a comprehensional relation. However, he refutes the objection of the Pūrvapakṣin (T.C. i. v.14) that since the inherence in the substance connected with the organ (*samyukta samavāya*) is admitted to be the cause of the perception of form etc., the same, and not the contact of the organ with the object (*samyoga*), can be admitted to be the cause of the perception of whole object (substance) as well. According to him, the inherence in the substance connected with the organ cannot be the cause of the perception of the whole object (substance), as only the contact of the organ with the whole object (*avayavi samyoga*) needs to be the cause of the perception of the substance.

Also Gangeśa refutes the objection of the Pūrvapakṣin that the inherence in the substance connected with the organ need not be the cause of the perception of the qualities such as the odour (*gandha grāhaka*), as only the contact of the organ with the substratum of the odour (*āśraya samyoga*) can produce the perception of such qualities. According to him, the contact of the organ with the substratum of the odour can be the cause of perception of the odour only when the inherence of the odour is the qualifier (*viśeṣana*), but not when the same is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*); for, then the perception of odour of clothing would become necessary from the contact of the organ with the pot.

Svasamavāyisamyoga is not the cause

Gangeśa now refutes the position (T.C. i. v.15) that the contact of the organ with the substance having the inherence in itself (*svasamavāyi samyoga*) can be the cause of the perception of the odour; and the inherence in such a relation is merely the delimiter of the causality (*avacchedaka*). According to him, such a position is equal to the position that the inherence in the substance connected with the organ (*samyogi samavāya*), is the cause; and the contact in such a relation is merely the delimiter of the causality. Thus, both positions are only the two sides of the same coin and hence are not worth considering.

Objection

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection (T.C. i.v. 17) that in the Naiyāyikas' theory, the individual forms such as blue colour and yellow colour (*nīlapītādi*) are not beyond congizance; and since the forms of the organs are identical with the forms of substances, the organs would be required to be perceived from the organs only.

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection (T.C. i.v. 17) that in the Naiyāyikas' theory, individual forms such as blue colour and red colour need to be only single items due to the recognition of one black colour shade as another black shade (*tattvena pratyabhijñāna*).

Samyukta Samaveta Samavāya is the cause

Gangeśa admits the inherence in what inhers in the connected as a comprehensional relation. Hence, he now refutes the objection (T.C.i. v.16) that the inherence in what inhers in the substance connected with the organ (*samyukta samaveta samavāya*) cannot be the indirect comprehensional relation producing the perception of the formness due to the impossility of the state of being what inhers in the substance (*samavetatva*) in the formness. According to him, such an indirect comprehensional relation is very much needed for the production of the perception of the similarity (*sādṛśya*) of the form etc; and hence the same relation needs to be considered to be the cause of perception of the formness.

Objection : Samavāya is not the Cause

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection (T.C.i. v. 19) that only the sound, which is competent to be perceived (*yogya*), is perceived; and suppose any sound is held to be perceived by ear through the comprehensional relation of the inherence (*samavāya*), then all the sounds would be required to be perceived all the times as the inherence is eternal. Also, the sound cannot be admitted to be perceived by means of orifice of ear (*karṇa*), as the same orifice of ear cannot be distinguished from the ether (*nabhas*). Thus only the generic property of soundness (*śabdatva*) needs to be the common cause of the perception of the sound in general.

Naiyāyikas Reply : Samavāya is the Cause

The Naiyāyikas reply to the objection (T.C. i.v.20) that sound (*śabda*) is perceptual like other entities (*pratyakṣa*); and hence needs a comprehensional relation (*pratyāsatti*) such as the inherence as the means (*sādhana*) to produce the perception of itself.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the relation of inherence is overpervassive in occurrence (*atiprasakta*); and no other relation can qualify to be the means of perception. According to them, the relation of inherence as delimited by the orifice of ear (*karṇāvacchinna*) is non-overpervassive (*anati prasakta*); and hence can qualify to be the means of perception.

Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish that the comprehensional relation of inherence produces the perception of the sound that has its substratumness, described by the relation of inherence, in turn delimited by the orifice of ear.

Also they refute the argument that the inherence would become a relation of non-pervasive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) when the substratumness is delimited by the contact of hand. According to them, inherence never occurs in its substratum by another inherence and hence the same need not become a relation of non-pervasive occurrence.

Objection: Vīṇāvaccinna nabhas is śrotra

Indian philosophers have explained the concept of auditory organ (*śrotra*) on the basis of the capacity or competency of the organ to produce sound (*śabda*). Thus the Pūrvapakśin raises the objection (T.C. i. v.21) that the ether (*nabhas*), as delimited by the producer of sound such as Indian lute (*vīṇāvaccinna*), can be considered to be the auditory organ, as the same is proved to be producing sound in the statements '*vīṇāyām śabdaḥ*' etc.

The Pūrvapakṣin states that the heaviness in the assumption of various auditory organs, in the theory that the ether, as delimited by Indian lute etc., is the auditory organ, needs to be tolerated due to the authoritativeness of the substratumness of Indian lute etc. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin states that the continuous series of sounds such as high and low sounds can be explained by the imposition of the highness and the lowness on sounds.

Reply : Karṇāvacchinna nabhas is śrota

The Naiyāyikas, however, reply (T.C. i.v. 22) that only the ether (*nabhas*), as delimited by the orifice of ear (*karṇāvacchinna*), is the auditory organ (*śrotra*). According to them, only the means of direct perception (*sākṣāt pratīti sādhana*) that is connected with the body (*śarīra samyukta*) can be the auditory organ; and therefore only the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear, but not the ether, as delimited by the Indian lute etc.,. must be admitted to be the auditory organ. It should be noted that while the statement '*vīṇāyām śabdaḥ*' merely proves the Indian lute to be merely the substratum of sound, the statement '*karṇena vīṇānādam śṛṇomi*' proves the ether as delimited by the orifice of ear to be the means of hearing sound.

Further, the Naiyāyikas note that the Indian lute etc. are endless and also are not the parts of body; and therefore, the statement '*vīṇāyām śabdaḥ*' needs to be understood as referring to mere secondary substratum-hood for the Indian lute etc.

Many ga-sounds need not be perceived

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the objection (T.C. i.v. 23) that in the theory that the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear, is the auditory organ, many *ga*-sounds would be required to be perceived simultaneously, when many ga-sounds are produced in the orifice of ear. According to them, one sound, i.e. high pitch sound, impedes the perception of another sound, i.e. low pitch sound; and therefore perception of many *ga*-sounds simultaneously can be avoided. Also according to them, when all *ga*-sounds are similar in pitch, perception of many *ga*-sounds is allowed due to the non-perception of difference; and hence the same need not be avoided.

Production of Sound

As regards the production of sound (T.C. i.v. 24), the Naiyāyikas state that one sound does not produce another subsequent sound in the immediate atom region or range (*avyavahita paramāṇu deśa*), as then the same cannot be perceived in another region. Rather, the first ever sound (*ādya śabda*) produces the subsequent sounds existing in all directions after obtaining the cause of contact with all pervading gross-element of wind; and therefore, the subsequent sounds too produce yet further subsequent single sounds by sound undulation method (*śabda taraṅga*). As an alternative, however, the Naiyāyikas

suggest that the first sound produces ten different sounds in ten different directions like the nuclea Kadamba-glob (*kadamba golaka*) and ten different sounds produces further ten different series of sounds.

The Naiyāyikas justify the production of sound by the law of nuclea Kadamba-glob method (T.C. i.v. 25) on the ground that one first sound can produce ten different subsequent sounds at ten different directions due to the help of ten different winds (*aneka vāyu*) or due to the difference between different antecedent absences (*prāgabhāva bheda*); and this is despite the identity of totality of causes.

Conclusions

Indian philosophers have recognized six types of comprehensional relations, viz. contact, inherence in the connected, inherence in what inhers in the connected, inherence, inherence in the inherent and the relation of being qualifier and qualificand for facilitating perception.

Gangeśa establishes contact as a comprehensional relation by refuting the view that contact as delimited by large parts is the cause of perception of substance.

Further Gangeśa establishes inherence in the connected as a comprehensional relation by refuting the view that contact with the substratum of odour is the cause of the perception of odour.

Further Gangeśa establishes inherence in what inhers in the connected as a comprehensional relation by refuting the view that the state of being what inhers in the substance is impossible in the formness.

Further Gangeśa establishes inherence as a comprehensional relation by refuting the view that the generic property of soundness can be the cause of the perception of sound.

Incidentally, Gangeśa has explained that only ether as delimited by orifice of ear, and not ether, as delimited by Indian lute etc. is the auditory organ.

Gangeśa avoids the contingency of perception of many *ga*-sounds simultaneously; and also explains the production of sound by sound undulation method or by the nuclea *Kadamba-glob*.

VI
Theory of Inherence (Samavāya vādaḥ)

Introduction

The inherence (*samavāya*), unlike all other comprehensional relations (*pratyāsatti*), is a distinct relation and is admitted to be a separate category (*padārtha*). While contact (*saṁyoga*), which is a binary relation, is admitted to be a mere quality (*guṇa*), the inherence has been sanctioned a distinct status of a separate category. Thus Kaṇāda (Vaiśe Sū. Vii. 2. 26) defines the inherence as the relation between the cause and effect on account of which the cognition 'It inhers here' is produced (*ihedam iti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ*). For instance, the inherence is the relation between a pot and pothalves on account of which the cognition 'Pot inhers in pothalves' is produced. Thus, the relation between the substratum and the superstratum which is the cause of *iha pratyaya* is the inherence.

Praśastapāda, explaining the Sutra (vii. 2. 26), notes that the relation of substance with quality, action, generic property and particulars (*dravya guṇa karma sāmānya viśeṣāṇām*) is either the relation of cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇa bhūtānām*) or the relation of non-cause and effect (*akārya kāraṇa bhūtānām*). The experience 'Curd exists here in the vessal' (*iha kuṇḍe dadhi*) is observed to refer to the binary relation of contact between vessal and curd; similarly the experiences such as 'The clothing exists in the yarns or threads' (*iha tantuṣu paṭaḥ*), 'The substance, quality and action exist here in substance' (*iha dravye dravya guṇa karmāṇi*), 'The state of being exists here in the substance, quality and action' (*iha dravya guṇa karmasu sattā*), 'The substanceness, qualityness and the actionness exist here in the substance, the quality and the action (*iha dravya guṇa karmasu dravyatva guṇatva karmātvāni*); and 'The last particulars exist here in the eternal substances' (*iha nitya dravyeṣu antya viśeṣāḥ*) are observed to refer to the eternal relation of inherence. Further the eternal relation in such cases cannot be the contact; for, the relational adjunct and the relational subjunct are not proved to be separate (*ayuta siddha*); also for, no cause of action of either of the two, i.e. the relational adjunct and the relational subjunct, exists; also for, it is not observed to end in separation (*vibhāgānta*). Rather, such a relation is one single

relation of inherence (*samavāya*) due to the difference from the characteristics found in the existing produced thing (*bhāvaval lakṣaṇ bhedāt*).

Also Praśastapāda observes that such a relation of inherence is a distinct category from the categories such as substance etc. (*dravyādibhyaḥ padārthāntaram*); and it is eternal (*nitya*), as no cause can be established by any means (*pramāṇataḥ kāraṇānupalabdheḥ*). Also Praśasta pāda observes that the inherence exists in its own nature (*svātma vṛtti*); and is beyond the senses (*atīndriya*); and hence is to be inferred through intelligence (*buddhy anumeya*).

The Vaiśeṣikas hold (Vaiśe Sū. vii. 2. 26; vii. 2. 28) that the inherence is both single (*eka*) and eternal (*nitya*). The inherence is single (*eka*) means it has a distinguishing condition of category (*padārtha vibhājaka dharma*) which does not share the community of locus with the mutual absence of its substratum (*svāśrayānyonyābhāvāsamānādhikavaraṇa*). Also the inherence is eternal means it is not produced from any cause. And this fact can be established by the inference that 'The inherence is eternal (*samavāyo nityaḥ*); for, it is not produced from any cause (*akāraṇatvāt*)'. All the positive existing things (*bhāva*) are ruled to be produced from the inherent causes (*samavāyi kāraṇa*); however, the inherence cannot be produced from any canse, as then infinite regress would arise due to the assumption of inherent causes for inherent causes.

Problem :

The Naiyāyikas define the inherence as a relation between two things which cannot be proved separately (*ayuta siddha*) and hold that the same is not a generic property, but is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*). Also the Naiyāyikas consider the inherence as the comprehensional relation of quality, action and generic property etc. However, the Pūrvapakṣin objects that the inherence cannot be established and hence the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) needs to be the comprehensional relation. Further, other scholars propose that various relations, viz. the knownness (*jñātatā*), non-difference (*abheda*), difference cum-non-difference (*bhedābheda*) etc. can be the comprehensional relations of quality etc. Thus, the present article is meant to study all these positions and Gangeśa's refutations.

Samavāya is Ayuta siddha :

However, according to the Naiyāyikas, the most essential characteristic of the inherence is that it is a relation between the two things which are not proved to be separate, i.e. proved to be essentially inseparable or united (*ayuta siddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ*, Tarkabhāṣā, 1). For instance, the relation between the two things such as quality and quality-possessor (*avayavāyovinoḥ*), action and action-possessor (*kriyā kriyāvatoḥ*), generic property and individual (*jāti vyaktyoḥ*), and particulars and eternal substance (*nitya dravya-viśeṣayoḥ*) (Tarka saṁgraha, 79; Padārthamālā, p.38) is the inherence. Here, of the two things, one exists only as lodged in another.

Samavāyatva is not a jāti but Pratyakṣa :

The Naiyāyikas note (Nyāyakośa) that the inherenceness (*samavāyatva*) is not a generic property (*jāti*) due to the non-relation (*asambandha*) negating the generic property (*jāti bādhaka*). However, the non-difference or identity of individuals (*vyaktyabheda*), which negates the status of generic property, can be avoided in the inherence, as the Prābhākaras etc. admit the inherence to be various. Thus, only the non-relation negates the generic property-status for the inherencenesss.

The Naiyāyikas believe (Nyāyakośa) that the inherence is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*). And the perceptibility (*pratyakṣatva*) of the inherence can be established by the inference that 'The inherence is the object of the ordinary sense-perception (*laukika pratyakṣa viṣayaḥ*); for, it occurs in the competent substratum as a qualifier' (*viṣayatayā yogya vṛttitvāt*) (Vaiśe Sū Vivṛtti on vii. 2. 28). According to the Naiyāyikas, the relation of the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) is the cause of the perception of the inherence. For instance, the perception that 'The inherence of pot occurs here in the pothalves' (*iha kapāle ghaṭasamavāyaḥ*) is produced from the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organ.

However, it should be noted that the Vaiśeṣikas believe that the inherence is inferable (*anumeya*). And the infererability (*anumeyatva*) of the inherence can be established by the inferance that 'The inherence is transcendental (*samavāyo' tīndriyaḥ*); for, it is a non-inherent positive entity (*asamaveta bhāvatvāt*)' (Vaiśesū Vṛtti. vii. 2. 28). According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the perception of all the substrata of the inherence is the cause of the perceptibility of the inherence; however, all the substrata including the ether and the atoms are not perceptible; therefore, the inherence is only inferable.

Establishment of the Inherence :

The Naiyāyikas establish the inherence through the inference. Thus, Vallabhācārya (Nyāya līlāvati. p.54) states that the inference 'The qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa vyavahāraḥ*) referring to generic property etc. (*jātyādi gocaraḥ*) refers to the relation (*sambandha niyatas*); for, it is a non-contradictory qualificative knowledge referring to the positive entities (*bhāvamātra niyatābādhita viśiṣṭa vyavahāratvāt*)' establishes the inherence as the comprehensional relation of quality, action and generic property etc.

Also Laugākṣibhāskara (Nyāya Siddhāntamañjarī prakāśa, Pratyakṣa. p. 12) states, that the inherence gets established as being the constituent of the relation delimiting the causality (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka sambandha ghaṭakatvena*), as the parts such as blue form constitute the causes in the production of the whole such as the blue pot etc. through the relation of the state of being inherent in their substrata (*svāśraya samavetatva sambandhena*). And Dinakara bhatta (Dinakarī, Pratyakṣa, p. 39) supports the position of the Nyāya Siddhānta mañjarī prakāśa on the ground that the inherence gets established as being the constituent of the relation of causality, as the threads or yarns (*tantu*) are the causes of clothing only through the relation of inherence (*samavāya sambandhena*).

Objection that the Inherence cannot be the relation :

The Pūrvapakṣin objects (T.C. I. vi. 1), however, that since the inherence is not established, the same cannot constitute the comprehensional relation of quality, action, and generic property and their respective substrata. And the experience 'Clothing is white' (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) cannot establish the inherence as the comprehenal relation as the same may merely refer to the qualifier-and the qualificand - relationship (*viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa bhāva*).

Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that quality, action and generic property are experienced to relate to their respective substrata; and the qualificative knowledge referring to them necessitates the admission of the inherence as the comprehensional relation. According to him, the inherence cannot appear as the qualifier, in the qualificative knowledge, as the same is not known and also as the experience 'These two are inherent' (*samavāyinau imau*) is lacking.

Inference establishing the Inherence is untenable :

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes (T.C. I. vi. 1) that the inference "The pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) refers to the qualifier- and the qualificand relationship of the inherence; for, it is a qualificative knowledge' establishing the inherence. According to him, the probans is deviating in the case of the knowledge 'The ground is known, desired and made to be potless'.

Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that the inference (T. C. I. vi. 2) that "The qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭadhī*) such as 'The ground is known to be potless' refers to the relation of the inherence; can establish the inherence. According to him, such an inference cannot establish the inherence, as the same inherence cannot be the relation between the absence of the pot and the ground; also the same inference cannot establish relation in general, as that would amount to the establishment of the already established.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the Vaiśeṣikas' inference (Vaiśe Sū. vii. 2. 28) that 'The experience of existence here (*iha pratyaya*) regarding the substance, quality, action and generic property in their respective substrata such as 'Clothing exists here in the threads', 'The white colour exists here in the clothing', 'The movement occurs here' and 'The generic property of the clothingness exists here' is produced from the superstratum and substratum relationship; for, it is a valid knowledge of existence here'. According to him, the probans is deviating in the case of collective qualificative experience such as 'The absence of pot and the knowledge exists here in the ground' (*iha bhūtale ghaṭā bhāvo jñānam ca*).

Bhāṭṭas' Refutation that the Inherence is Indriya sambaddha ghaṭaka and establishment of Viśeṣanatā :

The Bhāṭṭas and others refute the position (T.C. I. vi. 3) that the inherence can be established as the constituent part of comprehensional relation of sense organ (*indriya sambandha ghaṭakatayā*) from the inference that 'The sound, the generic property and the form etc. (*śabda jāti rūpādiḥ*) are connected with sense organ (*indriya sambaddhāḥ*); for, they are percetible like pot (*pratyakṣatvāt ghaṭavat*)'; and that sense organ produces the knowledge of the objects which are connected with it. According to the Bhāṭṭas, the inherence is not neccessary to be admitted as the comprehensional relation, as the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) of the form of self-nature, is necessary to be admitted as the comprehensional relation. Also the Bhāṭṭas note that here self-linking relation means qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*); and sound can be known through the qualifierness of sense organ (*indriya viśeṣaṇatā*); and the property such as the soundness can be known through the qualifierness of the qualifier of sense organ (*indriya viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇatā*); the quality such as form can be known through the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*); and the generic property such as the formness can be known through the qualifierness of the qualifier connected with sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇatā*).

Refutation of Gurus' position that the Inherence is non-eternal:

Further the Bhāṭṭas refute (T.C. I. vi. 4) Guru's position that the obtainment of black and red colours, in the pot being baked, can be explained only by the origination and the destruction of the relation of the two colours, and not by the origination and the destruction of the two colours, as the colours are permanent; and such a relation of the colours is the inherence. According to them, only the forms such as the black and red colours need to have the origination and the destruction due to the experience 'The black colour is lost and the red colour is originated' (*śyāmam naṣṭam raktam*

utpannam). Also when the inherence has the origination and the destruction, the knowledge of the whole would become eternal, as the non-eternality can be explained in the case of the comprehensional relation of inherence. only

Siddhāntins' Establishment of the Inherence :

The Siddhāntin, i.e. the Naiyāyika believes that only the inherence which is eternal and single can be the relation; and hence establishes the inherence (T. C. I. vi. 5) on the ground that the inference, viz. 'The qualificative knowledges of quality, action and generic property (*guṇa kriyā jāti viśiṣṭa buddhi*) refer to the relation of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha viṣayā*); for, they are qualificative knowledges (*viśiṣṭa buddhitvāt*)' can prove the inherence as the comprehensional relation. However, fearing deviation of the probans, the Siddhāntin proposes that 'caused by the relation of the qualified' (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha nimittakaḥ*) as the probandum; and 'being the valid' (*satyatva*) as the qualifier of the probans.

Navyas' Inference :

The Navyas (T.C. I. vi. 6) state that the inference 'The direct perception of quality, action and generic property (*guṇa kriyā jāti sākṣāt kāraḥ*) is to be established from the relation (of quality etc. connected with what is connected) with sense organ (*indriya sambandha sādhyaḥ*); for, it is a produced perception (*janya pratyakṣatvāt*)' can establish the inherence as the comprehensional relation. Thus, only the consecutive inherence (*anugata samavāya*), which is the relation of the formness etc. with the form etc. connected with sense organ, gets established as the relation.

Viśeṣaṇatā is the Relation :

The Pūrvapakṣin holds (T.C. I. vi. 14) that only the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) or the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ (*indriya smabaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) can constitute the comprehensional relation conducive to the knowledge of sound and form etc.; and hence the inherence (*samavāya*) need not be the comprehensional relation. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the inherence (*samavāya*) and the connected-inherence (*samyukta samavāya*) are causes (*upajīvya*) of the qualifierness and the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs respectively on the ground that such relations are untenable. According to him, the inherence and the connected-inherence are the causes only in the very natures of the qualifierness and the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs. This theory of the Pūrvapakṣin stems from the belief that the qualifierness, being single and consecutive, can constitute the comprehensional relation of quality etc.

However, the Siddhāntin, the Naiyāyika, refutes the position on the

ground that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) is grasped only after the grasping of the inherence (*samavāya*) in the inference of the relations of sense-organs (*indriya sambandhānumiti*) as the objects of direct perception of sound etc. According to him, therefore, only the inherence, which is grasped earliar, and not the qualifierness, which is grasped later, is the comprehensional relation of quality etc.

The Naiyāyika believes (T.C. I. vi. 7) that the qualifierness and the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs, not being consecutive, cannot constitute the comprehensional relation of quality etc. Further, the Naiyāyika believes that the qualifierness not being consecutive can be the relation of only the absence. Otherwise, suppose the qualifierness is single and consecutive, then the qualifecative knowledge of absence of clothing would become necessary in the substratum of the clothing having the absence of pot.

Objection that Rūpinīrūpi vyavasthā becomes untenable :

One of the most serious objections raised by the Pūrvapakṣin against the inherence (T.C. I. vii. 8) is that 'the law of having form and not having form' (*rūpi nīrūpi vyavasthā*) would become untenable in the theory that the inherence is the comprehensional relation. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the inherence of form would become necessary even in the wind like in the pot, as the same is eternal and single; consequently the law that pot has form (*rūpin*) and wind has the absence of form (*nīrupin*) would become untenable.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection on the ground that dispite the presence of the inherence of form in the wind (*rūpa samavāya*), the constant absence of form (*rūpābhava*) exists in the wind; whereas it does not exist in the pot; and hence 'the law of having form and not having form' becomes tenable.

Jñātatā is not the Relation :

The Siddhāntin refutes the objection (T.C.I. vi. 9) that the knownness (*jñātatā*) can be the comprehensional relation of generic property etc., as the same knownness is known to exist in the present pot; whereas the same is known to be illusory in the past and future pots. According to him, the knowledge regarding the past and the future pots would become untenable in the event of the absence of the knownness in the past and future pots; and hence the same knownness cannot be the comprehensional relation.

Proposal that Abheda is the relation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now proposes (T.C. I. vi. 10) that only the non-difference or self nature (*abheda*) and not the inherence (*samavāya*) can be the comprehensional relation between the quality (*guṇa*) and the quality-

possessor (*guṇin*) such as the blue form and the pot. According to him, the experience of non-difference or self-nature (*abhedā nubhava*) between the blue colour and the pot in 'Pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) is non-contradictory; and suppose the knowledges such as 'Pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) and 'Person is a Staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*) refer merely to the relation of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha*), then the knowledges such as 'Pot is bluish' (*nīlī ghaṭaḥ*) and 'Person is staff' (*daṇḍo ghaṭaḥ*) would become necessary.

Further the Pūrvapakṣin notes that the delimiting property of the qualifierness and that of the qualificandness, i.e. the blueness and the potness, are known to exist in one and the same substratum; i.e. the pot; and therefore, the grammatical agreement between the qualifier and the qualificand is explained.

Refutation that Abheda is the relation :

The Siddhāntin, i.e. the Naiyāyika refutes the proposal (T.C. I. vi. 11) that non-difference or self-nature (*abheda*) can be the comprehensional relation. According to him, suppose the quality such as the form and the quality-possessor such as the clothing have the non-difference or self - nature (*abheda*) as the comprehensional relation, then even a blind would need to have the skin-perception of the white colour like the skin-perception of the clothing. Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument of the Pūrvapakṣin that dispite the non-difference, the co-usage (*saha prayoga*), viz. 'Clothing is white' (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) is made to indicate the difference between the property (quality) such as the white colour and the substance such as the clothing. According to him, suppose the property (quality) such as the white colour exists in the substance such as the clothing, then the same would be required to be perceived through the skin-perception; as otherwise the law of perceptiblility of properties would become untenable.

Mādhvas' view that Bhedābheda is the relation :

The Mādhvas (Pramāṇa Candrikā, p.52) propose that the quality, action and generic property (*guṇa karma sāmānyādi*) are related to their respective substrata through the difference - cum non-difference (*bhedābheda*); and while the quality etc. are related to the substrata that pervade through the non-difference, the same are related to the substrata that do not pervade through the difference. According to them (T.C. I. vi.12), the twin statements such as 'Clothing has white colour' (*paṭasya śuklam rūpam*) and 'Clothing is white' (*paṭaḥ śuklaḥ*) establish the difference cum- non-difference as the relation between quality etc. and their substrata. However, they note that the difference cum - non - difference does not have the form of mutual exclusion of each

other (*viraha rūpa*); and hence two mutually contradictory items neednot constitute the single comprehensional relation.

Refutation that Bhedābheda is the Relation :

However, the Siddhāntin, the Naiyāyika, refutes the Mādhavas' position that the difference - cum - non difference (*bhedābheda*) is the relation of the quality etc. According to him, the absence of an entity may exist in the substratum of the same entity. For instance, the mutual absence of the pot, as delimited by the black colour, may exist in the pot as delimited by the red colour. Thus, in the case of 'Pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*), the pot may have the difference from the blue colour, as the mutual absence of the blue colour exists in the pot as delimited by the potness. However, the pot may not have the non-difference from the blue colour, as the absence of the mutual absence is contrary in the pot as delimited by the potness.

Thus, the Naiyāyikas conclude that only the relation of inherence of the blue colour appears with the pot in the case of the qualificative knowledge such as 'Pot is blue' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*); and hold that the contingency of the usage 'Pot is bluish' (*nīlī ghaṭaḥ*) is only desired in the event of the relation of the inherence of the blue colour with the pot appearing as the object of the knowledge 'Pot is blue'. The term '*nīlaḥ*' in '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' can convey the possessor of blue colour either through the reinstatement of the lost genetive case ending or through the secondary signification.

Indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā is the relation of absence :

It should be noted that the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) is admitted to be the comprehensional relation of the perception of an absence. However, the Pūrvapakṣin objects (T.C. I. vi. 15) that the same qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ cannot be the comprehensional relation of absence, as then the absence of the competent waterness would become necessary to be perceived in the atoms, as the same are connected with the sense organs such as eye. Thus, he proposes that the qualifierness of what is connected with the object to be perceived by the sense-organ cannot be the comprehensional relation of absence.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection (T.C. I. vi. 16) on the ground that the absence of that entity, the presence wherein of which entity is contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same entity, is perceived there in the substratum through the contact of sense-organs (*indriya sambandha*); and thus, the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ gets established to be the comprehensional relation of absence.

Objection that Inherence is the relation of absence :

Some scholars object (T.C. I. vi. 17) here that only the inherence, and not the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs, can be the comprehensional relation of absence. According to them, the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa pratīti*), which establishes the inherence as the comprehensional relation of absence, is as strong as the knowledge that establishes the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ as the relation.

These scholars refute the argument that when the absence inhers, the same becomes the presence. According to them, such an argument is faulty, as the counter argument that when the presence inhers, the same becomes the absence is equally strong.

Also these scholars refute the objection that when the absence inhers, the destruction (*dhvamsa*) needs to be lost in the loss of the inhering substratum (*samavāyi nāśe*). According to them, the destruction cannot be lost dispite the loss of the inhering substratum, as otherwise the lost pot needs to re-emerge.

Also, these scholars refute the argument that mutual and constant absences (*anyo'nyātyantābhāvau*), when eternal and inherent, need to become generic properties (*jāti*). According to them, the absences cannot become the generic properties, as then the relative distinction of the largeness and the narrowness between the generic properties would become untenable.

Refutation of objection that the Inherence is the Relation of absence

Gangeśa, however, refutes the objection of Some scholars (T.C.I. vi. 18) that only the inherence, and not the qualifierness, can be the comprehensional relation of absence. According to him, when absence is held to be inhent in its substratum, the destruction of pot etc. needs to be lost in the loss of the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa nāśa*). On the other hand, when the absence is non-inherent and occurs through the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs, the destruction of pot etc. need not be lost dispite the loss of the substratum. Thus, only the qualifierness, and not the inherence, needs to be the comprehensional relation of absence.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that the destruction of pot etc., dispite being inherent, need not be lost in the event of the loss of its substratum due to the contingency of the re-emergence of the lost pot etc. According to him, no totality of causes (*sāmagrī*) stops from producing its effect merely because of the loss of the objective. Also when the destruction is inherent in pothalves, the same cannot occur in the ground. Thus, only the qualifierness, and not the inherence, needs to be the relation of absence.

Conclusions

The Vaiśeṣikas admitted the inherence as a separate category (*padārtha*); and defined it as a relation between the cause and effect etc. because of which the cognition 'It inhers here' is produced. Further, they held it to be both single and eternal.

The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, defined the inherence as a relation between the two things which are proved to be inseparable or proved to be united. Further, they held it to be a non-generic property and perceptual.

The Naiyāyikas hold that the inherence can be established to be the comprehensional relation of quality, action and generic property etc. as they occur through the inherence.

The Pūrvapakṣin objects, however, that the inherence cannot be the comprehensional relation, as the inference establishing the same is untenable. The Siddhāntin, the Naiyāyika, on the other hand, establishes that the inference, viz. 'The qualificative knowledges of quality etc. refer to the relation of qualifiers; for, they are qualificative knowledges' proves the inherence to be the comprehensional relation.

The objection that the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs can be the comprehensional relation conducive to the knowledge of sound etc.; and hence the inherence need not constitute the comprehensional relation is untenable; and the law of having form and not having form on the ground that the constant absence of form exists in the wind but it does not exist in the pot is warranted.

Further the knownness as the relation is refuted, as then the knowledge of the past and the future pots would become untenable.

The non-difference as the comprehensional relation of quality etc. is untenable, as then even a blind would need to have the perception of the white clothing etc.

The Mādhvas' view that the difference - cum - non - difference can be the comprehensional relation is contradictory, as the pot cannot have both the difference and the absence of the mutual absence of blue colour.

The qualifierness of what is connected with the sense-organs can constitute the comprehensional relation of only the absence; but it cannot constitute the relation of quality etc.

Finally the objection that the inherence should be the comprehensional relation of absence is untenable, as then destruction needs to be lost in the loss of the inherent cause and the substratum.

VII

Theory of Invalidity of Non-Perception

(Anupalabdhy aprāmāṇyavādaḥ) :

Introduction :

One experiences existence and non-existence of things (*bhāvā bhāvau*) at different times and places. For instance, one may experience the existence of a pot on the ground in the morning and the non-existence of pot on the ground in the evening or one may experience the existence of form in the substance and the non-existence of form in the wind. Thus, the non-existence of things (*abhāva*), like the existence of things (*bhāva*), is the object of knowledge. However, the question is how do we experience or come to know the non-existence of things? The Naiyāyikas follow the rule (Gautama Sūtra vṛtt. v. 1. 30) that the non-existence of a thing is known by the same sense-organ by which the existence of the thing is known (*yenendriyena yā vyaktiḥ gṛhyate tenaivendriyeṇa tadabhāvaḥ gṛhyate*); and hold that non-existence of things is known from sense-organs (*indriya*). For instance, consider the non-existence of pot and that of form. Since the existence of pot and that of form are known from the organ of eye, the non-existence of pot and that of form too are known from the organ of eye. The Naiyāyikas explain that the usage that the non-existence of things is known from non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is a secondary usage, as the non-existence of things is known from sense-organ (*indriya*) while being assisted by the knowledge of non-existence (Gautama Sūtra Vṛtti. v. 1. 30).

However, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas strongly oppose the position of the Naiyāyikas that the sense-organs produce the knowledge of the non-existence of things. According to them, the sense organs cannot be the means of knowledge of the non-existence of things (*abhāva dhī*), as the sense-organs are lacking in the comprehensional relation (*prāpti or pratyāsatti*) with the non-existence of things. Also, the Vedāntins (Vedānta paribhāṣā, Nyāyakośa) oppose the position of the Naiyāyikas. According to them, the positive and negative concomitances prove that the sense-organs are exhausted or weakened with the production of the knowledge of the substratum of non-

existence of things (*adhikaraṇa jñāna*); and hence the sense-organs cannot be the cause of the knowledge of non-existence, as they are rendered redundant in the production of the knowledge of non-existence.

Thus, both the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntins propose that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) be admitted to be a distinct means of knowledge (*māna*) and the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*hetu*). According to them, one experiences the non-existence of things means one comes to know the non-existence of things through non-perception. Therefore, non-perception is defined as the extraordinary cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) of the experience of the non-existence of things (*abhāvānubhava*) which is not produced from the means such as knowledge (*jñāna karaṇājanya*). For instance, the non-perception of the pot on the ground (*ghaṭānupalabdhi*) may be the means of the knowledge of the non-existence of pot on the ground (*ghāṭābhāva dhī*), as it is the extra-ordinary cause producing the knowledge of the non-existingness of the pot not produced from the means of knowledge of pot (*jñāna karaṇā janya*). It should be noted that the non-perception is competent of producing the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*yogya*); for, the counter positive could be imposed (*prasañjita pratiyogi*) on the assumption of the existence of the counter positive (*tarkita pratiyogi sattva*) such as 'Had counter positive of the non-existence of the pot been existent, it should have been obtained' (*yadi ghaṭaḥ syāt tarhi upalabhyeta*).

Further, the Buddhists such as Dharmakīrti admit non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as a means of knowledge (Nyāya bindu. 2. 11). According to them, non-perception is a form of probans (*liṅga*); and inferential knowledge of the absence of things such as pot is possible from non-perception.

Problem :

However, the Naiyāyikas strongly opposed non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as a distinct means of knowledge of non-existence of things (*pramāṇa*); and Gangeśa refuted the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedantins proposals by his arguments convincingly. Thus, the present article is intended to record the proposals of the Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntins and their refutations by Gangeśa.

Anupalabdhi is pramāṇa :

The Bhāṭṭas (T.C. I. vii. 1.) propose that the knowledge of non-existence of things(*abhāva graha*) is to be produced from only non-perception of competent counter-positives (*yogyānupalabdhi*) and not from the sense-organs (*indriya*), as the non-existence of the competent counter positive is not known in the presence of the competent counter positive (*yogyopalabdhi*). Thus, they admit non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as a separate means of knowledge of

non-existence of things (*pramāṇa*).

The Bhāṭṭas refute the claim of the Naiyāyikas that the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva graha*) can be produced from sense-organs, as the same are confirmed to be the means of knowledge of non-existence of things (*tadanuvidhānāt*). According to them, sense-organs are not connected with the non-existence of things (*prāpty abhāvāt*) and hence cannot produce the knowledge of the non-existence. It should be noted that sense-organs produce the knowledge of only those that are connected with them.

Indriya is not Pramāṇa :

The Bhāṭṭas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas (T. C. I. vii. 2) that sense-organs can be the means of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*pramāṇa*), and hence they are not rendered redundant by the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*adhikaraṇa dhī*), as the knowledge of the substratum is the operation (*vyāpāra*) of the sense-organs in producing the knowledge of non-existence. According to them, sense-organs are not established to be the means of the knowledge of non-existence of things; and hence the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things cannot be established to be the operation.

Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the argument that the sense-organs can produce the knowledge of non-existence of things with the help of the comprehensional relation of the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation; and hence they are the means of knowledge of non-existence. According to them, the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatā*), is not admitted to be the comprehensional relation; and hence sense-organs cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence with the help of the qualifierness; also according to them, non-existence is beyond the senses (*atīndriya*).

Abhāva jñāna is Paro'kṣa and Anupalabdha :

The Bhāṭṭas state (T.C.I. vii. 7) that the imperceptibility (*paro'kṣatva*) is not a generic property (*jāti*); rather, it is merely the state of being the knowledge different from the perceptual knowledge (*sākṣāt kāri bhinna jñānatva*); and the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva jñāna*) is imperceptible (*paro'kṣa*) and produced from non-perception of things (*anupalabdha*).

The Bhāṭṭas note here that the state of being produced from sense-organs (*indriya janyatva*) and the state of not being produced from sense-organs (*tadajanyatva*) are conducive to the perceptibility of things (*sākṣāt kāritva*) and the imperceptibility of things (*paro'kṣa tva*) respectively; however, the state of being produced from known means (*jñāta karaṇa tva*) and the state of being produced from unknown means (*ajñāta karaṇa tva*) are not conducive to the perceptibility and imperceptibility respectively.

Refutation of Kusumñjalīkāra's objection :

The Bhṭṭas establish non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as the means of knowledge of non-existence of things (*pramāṇa*) by refuting the Kusumāñjalīkāra's objection that only mind (*manas*), assisted by the mental experience of existence (*bhāvabhūta mānasa sahakṛta*), can be the producer of the external experience of things. According to them, (T.C. I. vii. 8), the existence (*bhāvatva*) is heavy and hence cannot be conducive to the production of external experience. Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the inference of Kusumāñjalīkāra that 'The knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva jñāna*) is to be established from the mind (*manas sādhya*); for, it is an external knowledge of non-existence of things (*bāhyābhāva jñānatvāt*)'. According to them, the non-existence of things cannot be known from sense-organs, as the same is only the non-existence of things.

Establishment of Anupalabdhi :

The Bhāṭṭas refute the proposal (T. C. I. vii. 9) that the illusion of non-existence (*abhāva bhrama*), occuring in the existing substratum (*bhāva vṛtti*), is produced from the defect in the means (*karaṇa doṣa*); and since the sense-organ is the cause of illusion of non-existence, the same sense-organ needs to be the cause of valid knowledge of non-existence of things as well. According to them, the defect is quite tenable in the non-perception as well; and hence there is no point in admitting only sense-organ as the means.

The Bhāṭṭas thus establish that the knowledge of the substratum as qualified by the non-existence of things known from non-perception (*anupalabdhy upanītābhāva viśiṣṭa buddhi*) such as 'The ground has the non-existence of pot' (*abhāvavad bhūtalam*) is produced from sense organs; however, the knowledge of the non-existence of things, as being on the ground, known from the sense-organ such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*), is produced from non-perception.

Naiyāyikas' Refutation of Anupalabdhi :

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as the means of knowledge of non-existence of things (T.C. I. vii. 10). According to them, the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*āśraya graha*), produced from sense-organ (*indriya*) that produces the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi grāhaka*), cannot function as the associate cause (*hetu*) in the knowledge of the non-existence of things from the non-perception (*abhāva grahe*), as the same is deviating in the case of the past knowledge of

non-existence of things. Also the knowledge of non-existence of form etc. in the wind etc. (*vāyvādau rūpādy abhāva*) is produced from the sense-organ such as eye, which produces the knowledge of form etc.,; however, the same is not produced from the means such as non-perception which is not known earliar.

Further the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that unknown non-perception (*ajñātānupalabdhi*) of the existence of form etc. (*rūpādy upalambha*) is the cause of producing the knowledge of non-existence of form etc. (*rūpādy anupalambha*). According to them, the non-existence of things cannot be known from the non-perception of the competent counter positive (*yogyā nupalabdhi*), as the knowledge of the existence of things (*upalambha*) is beyond the senses in the Mīmāmsakas' theory.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument (T.C. I. vii. 11) that the knowledge of non-existence of pot (*ghaṭābhāva dhī*) on the ground is produced from the unknown means such as non-perception (*ajñāta karaṇa*); for, it is being produced without the recollection of the probans etc. (*liṅgādy anusandhānam vinā jāyamānatvāt*). According to them, the knowledge of non-existence of form (*rūpādy abhāva pratīti*) too is produced in the wind etc. without the recollection of the probans etc.; and hence the state of being produced without the recollection of probans cannot establish non-perception as a means.

It should be noted that non-perception of existence of things (*anupalabdhi*) cannot be inferred from the inference of probans of absence of physical and oral activity (*kāya vāg vyavahārābhāva*). For, the absence of the physical and oral activity is deviating from the non-perception due to the perception of knowledge of indifference (*udāsīna jñāna*); and hence the same cannot constitute the probans.

Vedāntins' View :

The Vedāntins too believed that the non-existence of things needs to be known from non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). Thus, they state (T.C.I. vii. 3) that since only the non-weakened organs are established to be the means of knowledge of form etc., only the non-weakened sense-organs need to be admitted as the means of knowledge of non-existence of things; however since the sense-organs are weakened by producing the knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence of things (*adhikaraṇa jñāna*), the same cannot be established to be the means of knowledge of non-existence of things through the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation.

Also the Vedāntins state that the sense-organs cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things through any comprehensional relation such as the qualifierness. According to them, since the organ of eye produces

the knowledge of form only through the particular relation of the connected inherence (*samyukta samavāya*), the sense-organs can produce the knowledge of non-existence of things only through some particular relation; and the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation cannot be the relation, as the comprehensional relation needs to be distinct from self - nature (*svarūpa*).

Cakṣurindriya is not the cause :

The Vedāntins refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. vii. 4) that the sense organ such as eye (*cakṣur indriya*) is the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things by way of producing the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi jñāna*). According to them, the sense organ of eye cannot produce the knowledge of anything without the comprehensional relation, and hence the same eye, which becomes exhausted with the production of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things, cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things without comprehensional relation.

Also, the Vedāntins refute the objection of the Naiyāyikas (T.C. I. vii. 5) that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) cannot produce the knowledge of the non-existence of form in the wind (*vāyau rūpābhāva*), as the substratum of such a non-existence of form, i.e. the wind, cannot be known from the particular organ such as the eye which is supposed to produce the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi pratyakṣa*). According to them, the knowledge of the non-existence of form in the wind can be inferred from the non-perception (*anupalabdhi liṅgaka*).

Abhāva dhī is Indriya janyā :

However, the Naiyāyikas state (T.C.I. vii.6) that the knowledge of non-existence of pot on the ground (*abhāva dhī*) is to be produced from the sense-organ (*indriya janyā*); for, it is directly perceptible and the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), i.e. the self-linking relation can be the comprehensional relation. Also they object that when the knowledge of non-existence of things is imperceptible, the same knowledge cannot be produced from the unknown non-perception (*ajñātā nupalabdhi*) as the generic property of imperceptibility is to be facilitated from the known means. Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish that the knowledge of non-existence of things has the direct sense perceptibility (*sākṣāt kāratva*), as it is produced from the unknown organs.

Non-existence can be inferred :

The Naiyāyikas note (T.C. I. vii. 12) also that the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*) on the ground can be inferred from the probans (*liṅga*), viz. the absence of being known as possessing the pot (*ghaṭa vattayā jñātatvā bhāva*) or the non-perception of pot (*ghaṭānupalabdhi*); and hence non-perception

need not be a separate means of knowledge of non-existence.

The Naiyāyikas again note that the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*adhikaraṇa jñāna*), produced from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi grāhakendriya janya*), becomes the associate cause of the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) only in the case where the non-perception cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva dhī*) without the help of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things.

The Naiyāyikas further observe that the non-perception cannot be the probans (*liṅga*) either. According to them, when the non-perception is held to be the probans, the inference would be of the form that 'The wind is formless' (*nīrūpo vāyuḥ*) and not that 'The non-existence of form occurs in the wind' (*vāyau rūpābhāvaḥ*).

Reiteration of Anupalabdhi :

The Mīmāmsakas and other scholars raise again the argument (T.C.I. vii. 13) that Caitra, coming out from the house, may be asked as to whether 'Maitra was there in the house' (*tatra Maitra āsīt*); and then Caitra, understanding the non-existence of Maitra there through the non-perception, may reply that 'Maitra was not there in the house; thus, the non-existence of Maitra is to be known from non-perception; and therefore non-perception needs to be the means of knowledge of non-existence. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, the unknown non-perception cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence, as the non-perception of the competent counter positive is untenable in the far off house; and the known - non - perception (*jñātā*) cannot be admitted to produce the knowledge of non-existence, as then the infinite regress would become contingent.

Refutation of Argument :

The Naiyāyikas further refute the argument (T.C.I. vii. 14) that the unknown absence of the recollection of the house (*smaraṇābhāva*), which is recollected as possessing the competent Maitra (*smaraṇārha*), is the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of Maitra (*maitrābhāva grāhaka*) in the house. According to them, when the absence of the recollection of the house, in its own unknown nature, is held to be the cause of the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra, the doubt regarding the non-exitence of Maitra and the opposite knowledge of the existence of Maitra such as 'Whether Maitra was there or not' (*tatrāsīt na vā*) and 'Maitra was there some times' (*kadācit tatrāsīt*), would become untenable in the absence of the recollection of the house as possessing Maitra.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the position that the doubt of non-existence and the opposite knowledge of existence can be produced merely from the defect (*doṣa*); and hence only the totality of defects (*doṣa sāhitya*) constitutes the defectiveness of the means of knowledge (*karaṇa duṣṭatva*). According to them, when the absence of recollection of the house, as possessing Maitra, is held to be the cause of knowledge of non-existence of Maitra, the non-perception would cease to be the means of the knowledge of non-existence.

Knowledge of non-existences is perceptual :

Gaṅgeśa thus concludes (T.C.I. vii. 15) that the knowledge of non-existence of things is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*), as the experience (*anubhava*) such as 'I know the existence of pot' (*jānāmi*) is not produced from other means of knowledge such as inference (*liṅgādi*). Also he concludes that the recollection of the non-existence of competent counter positive can be useful only as probans (*liṅga*); and that the actual syllogism (*prayoga*) could be that 'The house has the non-existence of Maitra at that time (*tad geham tadā maitrā bhāva vat*); for, it is not being recollected as possessing Maitra (*tad vattayā asmaryamāṇatvāt*)'.

Conclusions

Indian philosophers recognized the fact that people experience non-existence of things like existence of things; and therefore, non-existence of things is required to be known from some means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The Bhāṭṭas propose a separate means of knowledge, called non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as the means of knowledge of the non-existence of things, as they believe that sense-organs cannot reach the non-existence of things due to the lack of any comprehensional relation.

Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the argument that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), i.e. the self-linking relation can be the comprehensional relation on the ground that the same is not recognized to be the relation. Thus, they establish that the non-existence of things is imperceptible and produced from non-perception.

Further, they refute Kusumāñjalīkāra's contention that mind can establish the knowledge of non-existence of things on the ground that sense-organs cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things; and thus they establish that non-perception is the means of knowledge of non-existence when assisted by the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence.

However, the Naiyāyikas believed that non-existence of a thing is perceived by the same organ by which the existence of the counter positive is

perceived; and hence they established that sense-organ is the means of knowledge of non-existence by refuting non-perception.

The Vedāntins, however, opposed the Naiyāyikas' thoery on the ground that sense-organs are weakened by producing the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things; and hence sense-organs cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things. Thus, they proposed that only non-perception needs to be the means of knowledge of non-existence of things, as the sense-organ such as the eye is exhausted with the production of the knowledge of the substratum of non-exitence of things.

However, the Naiyāyikas strongly opposed the Vedāntins' theory of non-perception on the ground that the sense-organs can produce the knowledge of non-existence of things such as such as Pot through the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation.

Alternately they proposed that the non-existence of things such as pot can be inferred from the non-perception, i.e. the probans. They believed that the unknown non-perception cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence, as the non-perception of the counter-positive is untenable; and the known non-perception cannot produce the knowledge of the non-existence, as then the infinite regress would become contingent.

Thus, Gangeśa concluded that the knowledge of non-existence of things is perceptual and produced from sense-organs.

VIII

Theory of Non-Existence of Things (Abhāvavādaḥ)

Introduction :

In India, the Vaiśeṣikas were the first to study ontology as a science and divide the universe into six categories (*padārtha*) as substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), generality (*jāti or sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and inherence (*samavāya*) (Vaiśe. i. 1. 4). Later on, however, they realized that all the six categories are positive in nature and there is need for admitting a distinct category which is negative in nature and is opposite of all the six categories. Thus, they have added non-existence of things (*abhāva*) as the seventh category (VaiśeSū. i. 2.1). This has lead categories (*padārtha*) to be divided into two main categories as exitence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) (Kiraṇāvali, 1.8). In the post Gautama period, the Naiyāyikas quitely adopted the Vaiśeṣikas' division of the universe and admitted the theory of non-existence of things and included the sixteen categories of the Nyāya (Nyāy Sūtra i.1.) into the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Non-existence of things may be defined as the category which is different from existence of things (*bhāva bhinna*, Siddhānta Candrodaya, 1. 4); or as the object of knowledge which is dependent on the knowledge of counter positive (*pratiyogi jñānādhīna jñāna viṣaya*). Consider for instance, the non-existence of the pot. It is different from the existence of the pot and also is the object of the knowledge dependent on the knowledge of counter positive, i.e. the pot.

The Mādhvas (Pramāṇacandrikā, p.49) perceived that non-existence of things is based on the knowledge and defined it as the object of knowledge such as 'It does not exist' (*nāstīti pratītiviṣaya*). The non-existence of the pot, for instance, is the object of the knowledge such as 'The pot does not exist' (*ghaṭo nāsti*).

The Navya - naiyāyikas such as Raghunātha (Dīdhiti, 2), on the other hand, viewed that non-existence of things is the very nature of non-existence of things and its substratum; and hence they defined that it as the self-linking relation regulating the knowledges such as 'This pot does not exist here' and 'This pot is not that clothing' (*idam iha nāsti, idam idam na bhavatitīti pratīti*

niyāmako svarūpa sambandhaḥ). For instance, the non-existence of the pot is the self linking relation which regulates the knowledges such as 'The pot does not exist here' and 'The pot is not clothing'.

Non-existence of things (Bhāṣāpariccheda, 12) is of two kinds as : i) relational non-existence (*samsargābhāva*) and ii) mutual non-existence (*anyo'nyābhāva*). The relational non-existence is further sub divided into three kinds as : i) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), ii) destruction (*pradhvamsābhāva*) and iii) absolute or constant non-existence (*atyantābhāva*). Antecedent non-existence has no beginning but has end as 'The pot, which is going to be produced, does not exist here in the pothalves'; destruction has a beginning but has no end as 'The pot is destruyed'; and absolute or constant non-existence can exist in all the three times, viz. past, present and future as 'The pot does not exist'. Mutual non-existence is one and has no subdivisions; and it is non-existence of identity as 'The pot is different from the clothing'.

Problem :

However, many of the philosophers in India have not admitted non-existence as a separate category of things. Foremost among the Philosophers who object to non-existence are the Mīmāmsakas. They observed (T.C.I. viii. 1) that there is no need for accepting a separate category of non-existence of things (*abhāva*); and argued that perception of what is ordinarily called 'non-existence of things' depends on the substratum or locus (*adhikaraṇa*); and the comprehensional relation (*sannikarṣa*) through which non-existence of things is perceived is nothing but contact (*samyoga*). According to them, the perception of the non-existence of the pot such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) does not presuppose any separate non-existnece of the pot; rather it depends on the substratum such as the ground and is carried through the contact. Also the Prābhākaras strongly opposed the theory of non-existence of things and proposed knowledge of substratum to be non-existence of things. In the following pages, we shall study the Mīmāmsakas' objections and the Naiyāyikas' reply to arrive at a conclusion.

Prācya Naiyāyikas' Reply that Non-existence is a Separate category :

The Prācya Naiyāyikas firmly believed (T.C. I. viii. 2) that a separate category of non-existence of things is absolutely necessary; also they belived that the perception of what is called 'non-existence of things' does not depend on the substratum and hence the non-existence of things needs to be a separate category form the empty substratum. According to them, the non-contradictory knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva buddhi*) such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) cannot be based on the substratum such as the ground, as then the same knowledge would become necessary even when the ground possesses the pot. Further, identity between non-existence of things and its substratum is not tenable, as then supers tratum - and - substratum relation (*ādhārādheya bhāva*) between non-existence of things and its substratum would become untenable.

Substratum is distinct from Non-existence :

The Prācya-naiyāyikas refute the argument of the Mīmāmsakas (T.C. I. viii. 3) that the substratum of non-existence of things (*abhāvāśraya*) has a distinct nature; however, the distinction is not merely the nature of being the substratum, as then the non-existence of the pot would become necessary even on the ground possessing the pot. According to them, only the distinct empty substratum such as the ground constitutes the substratum of non-existence of things; and hence the contingency of non-existence of the pot on the ground possessing pot can be avoided.

The Naiyāyikas observe that (T.C.I. viii. 4) non-existence of things exists where it is perceived to exist and it is perceived to exist where it exists. Also they refute the objection that the ground is not known to be the substratum of non-existence of the pot; rather, it is known to be merely the object of the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot (*tanmātra buddhi viṣaya*). According to them, even the ground possessing the pot is the object of knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot; and hence no distinction can be maintained between the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation with the mere ground having non-existence of the pot (*bhūtalendriya sannikarṣaja*) and the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation with the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtalendriya sannikarṣaja*).

Prācyas' conclusion : Nāstīti buddhi establishes Separate Non-existence of things :

The Prācya-naiyāyikas refute the argument (T.C.I. viii. 5) that the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*) produced from the counter positive (pot) (*pratiyogi janita*) is the non-existence of things (*abhāva*). According to them, the same knowledge of the substratum can be produced from even what is other then the counter positive in the case of the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavati*); and hence such a knowledge cannot constitute non-existence of things.

Also the Naiyāyikas observe that while the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) has its description dependent on the description of the counter positive (*pratiyogi nirūpaṇādhīna*), the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground does not have its description dependent on the description of the

counter positive. Also the Naiyāyikas state that knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things (*tanmātra buddhi*), dependent on the recollection of the counter positive (*pratiyogi smaraṇāpekṣa*), cannot constitute non-existence of things, as the knowledge of mere substratum is untenable in the case of darkness etc.

The Prācya-naiyāyikas further observe that when the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground is held to constitute the non-existence of things such as the pot, the re–emergence of the lost pot would become necessary in the case of the loss of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground. For, non-existence of non-existence constitutes existence of things such as the pot. Thus, the Naiyāyikas conclude that non-existence of things is a distinct category and the knowledge of non-existence of things such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' '*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*' constitutes the cause of the establishment of separate category of non-existence of things (*atiriktā-bhāva*).

Prābhākaras' Theory :

The Prābhākaras state (T.C. I. viii. 6) that knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*), which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala buddhi*), is the cause of the practice of non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva vyavahāra kāraṇa*). Also they state that the knowledge of the substratum, which constitutes the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things in the Naiyāyikas' theory, is the cause of the practice of non-existence of things in their theory.

Distinction between Non-existence and Substratum is not Tenable :

Further, the Prābhākaras state (T.C.I. viii. 7) that distinction between non-existence of things (*abhāva*) and the empty substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) is not tenable. According to them, even in the Naiyāyikas' theory that non-existence of things is distinct from its substratum, no means that can prove distinction between the two can be posited. When the counter positive such as the pot is present in the mind, the empty substratum such as the ground can neither be claimed to be identical with the counter positive nor be claimed to possess the counter positive.

Buddhiviśeṣa is due to Sāmagrīviśeṣa :

The Prābhākaras reject the objection of the Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. viii. 8) that knowledges (*buddhi*) differ due to the difference between their objects (*arthena*). According to them, objects are not the causes of difference between the knowledges; rahter, only the particular totality of causes (*sāmagrī viśeṣa*)

is the cause and produces the particular knowledge of things.

Ghaṭavad bhūtala bhinna bhūtala is Abhāva :

Also the Prābhākaras propose (T.C.I. viii. 8) that the substratum such as the ground, which is distinct from the substratum such as the ground possessing the counter positive pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala bhinna bhūtala*), is the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*); and the so-called difference (*bheda*) between the non-existence of things and the substratum is nothing but the very nature of the substratum of non-existence of things (*svarūpa*). And the knowledge of the substratum such as 'This ground is not the ground possessing the pot now' (*idānīm idam bhūtalam ghaṭavad bhūtalam na bhavati*) refers to the difference of the form of mutual absence of the substrata in the case of the Naiyāyikas, and the same refers to the very nature of substratum in the case of us, the Prābhākaras.

They note however, that the substratum such as the ground can differ from the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot at different times. According to them, the doubt such as 'Whether the pot exists on the ground or not' and the opposite knowledge such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' can be explained due to the non–ascertion of the state of being different from the one that possesses pot.

Abhāvatva cannot be defined properly :

One of the strongest of arguments put forward by the Prābhākaras against the separate category of non-existence of things is that the non-existenceness (*abhāvatva*) cannot be defined properly. According to them (T.C.I. viii. 9), it cannot be generic property (*jāti*), as it cannot cover mutual difference or absence constituting the non-existenceness; it cannot be the state of being what contradicts the existence (*bhāva virodhitva*), as the contradiction needs to be described by non-existence; it cannot be counter positiveness described by the existence (*bhāva pratiyogitva*), as the counter positiveness is of the form of absence of non-existence; it cannot be the state of having the counter-correlative (*sat pratiyogika tva*), as the inherence etc. too have counter correlative; it cannot be the state of being devoid of existence (*sattā śūnyatva*), as it has the form of non-existence.

The Prābhākaras refute that the non-existenceness is the state of having the constant absence of existence (*sattvā tyantābhāva vattva*). For, According to them, non-existence cannot be admitted in another non-existence. Also they refute that the non-existenceness can be the state of being devoid of the knowledge of existence (*sattā bhāva vidhuratva*); for, non-existence is known to be contradictory to existence.

Also they refute that the non-existenceness is the state of being distinct from existence (*bhāva bhinnatva*). According to them, the distinction cannot be properly explained. Further, when the distinction is admitted, the lack of generalization of non-existence would become contingent. Thus, they state that there is no need to admit a distinct category of non-existence.

Conclusion of Prima Facie view :

The Prābhākaras conclude their Prima facie view (T.C.I. viii. 10) that the nature of the substratum, which is different from the substratum possessing the counter positive (*pratiyogimad adhikaraṇa bhinnādhikaraṇa*), is the non-existence of things (*abhāva*). According to them, even the Naiyāyikas need to admit that the particular consecutive knowledge of substratum such as the ground (*anugata bhūtala buddhi viśeṣa*) is the cause of the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva jñāna kāraṇa*); and therefore, it is quite possible to admit that the same knowledge of substratum is both the object of knowledge of non-existence of things and the means of knowledge of non-existence of things due to the intrinsic manifestibility of knowledges.

The Prābhākaras refute the objection that when the knowledge of mere substratum such as the ground (*tanmātra buddhi*) is admitted to be the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*), expectancy for the knowledge of counter positive (*pratiyogi jñānāpekṣā*) would become unnessessary for the knowledge of non-existence of things, as the same is intrinsically manifested. According to them, the knowledge of the counter positive such as the pot is required for only the practice of non-existence of things such as the pot (*vyavahāra*), but not for the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot (*grahaṇa*).

Also the Prābhākaras refute the objection that in their theory, the re emergence of the already destroyed pot (*bhāvonmajjana*) would become necessary at the loss of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*adhikaraṇa vināśa*). According to them, loss or absence of the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground (*buddhy abhāva*) constitutes yet another knowledge of substratum; and hence such a contingency can be avoided.

Naiyāyikas' Siddhānta :

Gaṅgeśa now states (T.C.I. viii. 11) the Naiyāyikas' conclusive view (*siddhānta*) that a separate non-existence of things (*abhāva*) and not merely the substratum (*tanmātra*) is experienced in the case of the knowledge such as 'This is not a pot' (*ghaṭo na*), and 'This is not a clothing' (*paṭo na*) etc. Therefore, counterpositive is to be known from the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva vitti vedya*). Also mere empty substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) or

the knowledge of mere empty substratum (*tajjñāna*) cannot constitute non-existence of things (*abhāva*); for, the same knowledge of mere empty substratum is possible even without the knowledge of counter positive. (*pratiyogi jñāna*); and counterpositive does not become the object of knowledge of mere empty substratum (*tadvitti viṣaya*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection (T.C.I.viii. 12) of the Mīmāmsakas that in their theory, the practice of non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva vyavahāra*) requires the knowledge of counterpositive such as the pot; and therefore the counter positive such as the pot constitutes the object of the practice of non-existence of things such as the pot. According to them, the pot is expected to be the counter positive of only the non-existence of pot such as 'The pot does not exist here'; however, the same pot is not expected to be the counter positive of the practice of non-existence of the pot which comes into being only after the knowledge of non-existence of the pot.

Substratum does not constitute the Basis of Non-existence :

The Mīmāmsakas may object (T.C.I. viii.13) that only the substratum such as the ground constitutes the basis of the usage of non-existence of the pot (*prayogālambana*); and therefore, only the substratum, which is the basis of the usage of the word 'non-existence', is the non-existence of things. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the substratum such as the ground cannot be the basis of the usage of the word 'non-existence of the pot', as the knowledge and the usage (*pratīti prayogau*) such as 'The substratum such as the ground is the non-existence of the pot' (*bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) is absent; rather on the contrary, the knowledge and the usage such as 'The non-existence of the pot exists on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) is present.

Also the Naiyāyikas state that mere substratum such as the ground cannot constitute the non-existence of things such as the pot, as the superstratum - and - substratum relationship, experienced between the non-existence of things such as the pot and the substratum such as the ground, would become untenable due to the identity (*abheda*) between the non-existence of the pot and the ground.

Ghaṭavad bhūtala jñāna bhinna Bhūtalajñāna is not Abhāva:

The Naiyāyikas refute the position (T.C.I. viii. 14) that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñāna*), which is distinct from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground having the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala jñāna bhinna*) is the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*); and the same cannot be related to the substratum of ground through self-

linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*). According to them, such a position becomes untenable due to the untenability of the two options : viz. i) that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is the cause of the practice of the non-existence of the pot in its own form (*svarūpa sad*); and ii) that the same is the cause of the practice of non-existence in the form of the non-existence of the pot having the ground as the substratum (*bhūtalādhikaraṇa niṣedha rūpatayā*). For, in both the cases, the superstratum- and -the substratum relationship between the non-existence and its substratum is untenable.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground need not constitute the non-existence of things such as the pot in the case of the ground having the pot (*ghaṭavati*); and hence the practice of the non-existence of the pot need not be contradictory. According to them, the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground, as different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground having the pot, is untenable due to the non-manifestation of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground from the after knowledge or recognition of the substratum.

Consecutive practice of Non-existence is Untenable :

Also the Naiyāyikas observe (T.C.I. viii.15) that in the Mīmāmsakas' theory, consecutive practice of non-existence of things (*anugatābhāva vyavahāra*) would become untenable due to the non-consecutiveness of substrata such as the ground (*adhikaraṇ*) and their knowledges (*tajjñāna*). Whereas in the Naiyāyikas' theory, consecutive practice of non-existence of things is tenable due to the tenability of consecutive individual non-existences. For instance, consecutive practice of mutual absence such as 'Pot etc. are not clothing' is tenable with the help of single mutual absence of clothing; consecutive practice of constant non-existence such as 'The cowness does not exist in the pot etc.' is tenable with the help of single constant non-existence of the cowness; consecutive practice of destruction such as 'The pot is destroyed in the pot halves or on the ground' is tenable with the help of single destruction of the pot; and consecutive practice of antecedent non-existence such as 'The pot does not exist in the pot halves' is tenable with the help of single antecedent non-existence of the pot.

It should be noted that the Mīmāmsakas cannot explain even the four different types of non-existences due to the non-consecutive nature of individual substrata and their knowledges. Thus, distinct category of non-existence of things is necessary to explain four different types of non-existences.

Samaya viśeṣayoga of Bhūtala is not Abhāva :

The Naiyāyikas refute the position of the Mīmāmsakas (T.C.I. viii. 16) that the juncture of particular time (*samaya viśeṣa yoga*) belonging to the particular substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*), wherein others admit the non-existence of things such as the pot, is the non-existence of the pot; and hence even the knowledge of the superstratum- and- substratum relationship such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground now' becomes tenable. According to them, the juncture of particular time of the particular substratum such as the ground lacks in the competency for producing practice of non-existence of things such as the pot due to not having the counter positive pot.

Moreover, even the juncture of particular time, like the particular substratum such as the ground, is experienced to be the substratum of non-existence of things due to the knowledge 'The pot does not exist on the ground now'. Further the particular time (*samaya viśeṣa*) cannot be the state of being the substratum of non-existence of things; for, then they would need to admit non-existence of things; it cannot be the very nature of time; for, then the lack of generalization would result.

Pot halves etc. need to be the causes of practice of pot etc. :

The Naiyāyikas observe here (T.C.I.viii. 17) that suppose the particular juncture of time (*tattad samaya viśeṣa yoga*) produces the practice of non-existence of things such as the pot (*ghaṭābhāvādi vyavahāra*), then only individual substratum such as the pot halves (*kapālādi*), wherein the pot inhers, would be required to produce the practice of the effects such as the pot etc. (*ghaṭādi vyavahāra*); and thus the counter positive such as the pot would not be required to produce the practice of non-existence of things such as the pot at all.

Also the Naiyāyikas observe that mere substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*) or the knowledge of mere substratum such as the ground (*tad buddhi*) cannot be produced from the fall of hammer as they exist even without the fall of hammer. Thus, in the Mīmāmsakas' theory, the non-existence of things such as the pot cannot be produced from the fall of hammer. Also they observe that the position "Whatever is the destroyer in the Naiyāyikas' theory, is the destruction in their Mīmāmsakas' theory" is untenable. For, the fall of hammer is admitted to be the destroyer in the Naiyāyikas' theory; however, the same cannot be admitted to be the destruction in the Mīmāmsakas' theory. Thus, non-existence of things needs to be a separate category to facilitate the practice of non-existence of things.

Viśeṣaṇatā is the Comprehensional relation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection (T.C.I. viii. 18) that since the substratum such as the ground does not have any comprehensional relation

with the non-existence of things, the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot on the ground would not be tenable. According to them, the non-existence of things such as the pot is related to the substratum such as the ground through the comprehensional relation of self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandhena*). Also they state that the competence for producing qualificative knowledge of non-existence of things constitutes self-linking relation. Also they refute the position that when a comprehensional relation, distinct from knowledge and its object, is admitted between non-existence and its substratum, contingency of infinite regress would arise. Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish that only self-linking relation needs to be comprehensional relation between non-existence of things and its substratum.

Conclusion :

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas believed that the opposite of six positive categories is experienced by all; and hence the non-existence of things needs to be a separate seventh category.

However, the Mīmāmsakas strongly opposed the theory of non-existence of things on the ground that perception of non-existence of things is based on the empty substratum and does not presuppose any separate non-existence.

However, the Prācya Naiyāyikas believed that substratum is distinct from non-existence of things; and separate non-existence of things gets established on the basis of the knowledge of non-existence of things.

The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, argued that no real distinction between non-existence of things and its substratum is tenable; and the empty substratum of ground as distinct from the substratum possessing the counter positive pot is the non-existence of the pot; and concluded that knowledge of substratum can be both object and means of knowledge of non-existence of things.

The Navya-naiyāyikas such as Gangeśa believed that knowledge of mere empty substratum cannot constitute non-existence of things, as it is possible even without the knowledge of counter positive. Further, they believed that superstratum-and-substratum relationship between non-existence of things and its substratum would become untenable in the Mīmāmsakas' theory.

The most serious ontological problem in the Mīmāmsakas' theory is that the re-emergence of the lost or destroyed pot would be necessary in the loss of the knowledge of the substratum. Also the Mīmāmsakas cannot explain consecutive practice of non-existence of things. However, the admittance of self-linking relation as the comprehensional relation of non-existence with substratum is a testimony to the fact that non-existence is only nature of substratum.

I. IX
Theory of Causes of Perception (Pratyakṣa Kāraṇavādaḥ)

A. THEORY OF RELATION (Sannikarṣa Vādaḥ)

Introduction :

Causes of perception (*pratyakṣa kāraṇa*) are many. However, comprehensional relation, which is six types (T.C.I. ix. 1), is the cause of particular perception (*pratyakṣa viśeṣa*). For instance, the comprehensional relation of mind with the tactual surface and the soul is the cause of perception. While a person is in deep sleep, no knowledge of any object is produced in him, as there exists no relation of mind with the tactual surface, but he has the relation with only the soul. The mind abides at that time in the pericardium (*nadī*) which is without tactual surface (Satis Chandra Vidyābhūsan, 1971). When some object is known, the mind is in relation with both soul and surface.

Also in the case of perception of objects of senses, there is the union of mind with the senses and the intercourse of senses with the objects. For instance, in the perception of the object such as the pot, there is the union of mind with the sense of eye and the intercourse of the sense of eye with the colour or form of the object such as the pot.

Problem :

However, the problem is that comprehensional relation such as union of mind with senses and the intercourse of senses with the objects is not sufficient for producing perception. Besides comprehensional relation, contact of light with object, manifested or perceptible form, form of the eye, and the hugeness too constitute the causes of perception. Thus, in the following pages, we shall explain the Naiyāyikas' theory of causes of perception.

Contact of Light with object is cause :

A special type of connection or contact of light with the object of sense also constitutes the cause of perception. For instance, the connection or contact of light with the front side of the pot, rather than with its back side, constitutes the cause of perception of the pot.

However, Gaṅgeśa (T.C.I. ix. 1) rules that only the particular type of contact of light (*āloka samyoga viśeṣa*) with the object (*viṣaya*), but not with the eye (*cakṣus*), is the cause of perception. According to him, the eye existing in light does not perceive the object; rather the eye existing in the darkness perceives the object existing in light.

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that this way, the pot connected with light (*āloka samyukta*) from the otherside too would be required to be perceived by the eye. Also he refutes the proposal that the contact of light with the pot (*ghaṭāloka samyoga*) on the parts facing the eye is the cause of perception of the pot. According to him, then even the contact of light with the eye (*cakṣurāloka samyoga*) on the parts facing the eye would need to be the cause of perception. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the proposal that the contact of the eye with the pot (*cakṣur ghaṭa samyoga*) is the cause of the perception of the pot kept on the ground having the contact with the light (*āloka samyoga sannihite*). According to him, only the contact of the light with the eye (*cakṣurāloka samyoga*) needs to be the cause of the perception of the pot kept on the ground having the contact of the eye with the pot.

However, Gaṅgeśa refutes the objection. According to him, the contact of light with the object of sense (*viṣayā loka samyoga*) is established to be the cause of perception of objects of sense by positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya vyatirekābhyām*); and hence the visual perception of the pot can be explained by the contact of the light with the pot; thus, the contact of the light with the eye (*cakṣurāloka samyoga*) need not be the cause of perception. The others among the Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. ix. 2) however, hold that when both the contact and the light (*āloka samyogayoḥ*) are admitted to be the causes of perception (*hetu*), the contact of light with the object of senses gets automatically established to be the cause of perception. Also when the contact of light and the contact of the object of sense, as delimited by the parts facing the eye, are the causes of perception, the contact of light with the objects of senses too gets established to be the cause of perception.

Udbhūta rūpa is the cause :

Manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*) of an object also constitutes the cause of perception. For instance, the perceptible form of the object such as the colour constitutes the cause of perception. A meteor, which is obscured in the midday blaze, cannot be perceived. Similarly, a fire, which exists in the latent condition in the frying pan, is not perceptible.

The Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. ix. 2) now propose that even the perceptible or manifested form (*udbhūta rūpa*) of light constitutes the cause of the perception (*vyañjaka*) of a thing by positive and negative concomitances (*anvayi vyatirekitvāt*).

Further the Naiyāyikas refute the Pūrvapakṣin's proposal that the perceptible form of light is only the delimiting property of the causality of light (*tejaḥ kāraṇatā vacchedaka*). According to them, both light and perceptible or manifested form need to be considered as the causes of perception due to the positive and negative concomitance of each other.

Cakṣuso rūpa is Vyañjaka :

The Sampradāyavids (T.C.I. ix. 3) hold that the form of the eye (*cakṣuso rūpa*) is the manifesting condition (*vyañjaka*) of the object of sense, as it is the form of the manifesting light (*vyañjaka tejo rūpa*).

Further, the Sampradāyavids hold that perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*) existing in the object of sense is the associate cause (*sahakārin*) of perception. According to them, eye etc. are devoid of crucial factor of direct perception; and hence even the perceptible form needs to be the cause of perception of object.

Here the Sampradāyavids refute the objection that the manifestedness (*udbhūtatva*) may be admitted in the hugeness (*mahat tva*); and the same may be the cause of the perception of objects. According to them, odour and touch too have the manifestedness; and hence the same manifestedness constitutes merely the general quality.

Also the Sampradāyavids refute the objection that only the non-manifestedness (*anudbhūtatva*) is the generic property; and is conducive to the non-perception of things. According to them, the non-perceptibility of objects (*apratyakṣatā*) is caused by the absences of the causes of perception (*pratyakṣa kāraṇa viraha*); and therefore only the causes of perception needs to have the generic property.

The Siddhātin Gaṅgeśa, however, proposes (T.C.I. ix. 4) that neither the manifestedness (*udbhūtatva*) nor the non-manifestedness (*anudbhūtatva*) constitutes the generic property (*jāti*); rather, only the state of having the generic property pervaded by the formness (*rūpatva vyāpya jātimattva*) is the manifestedness (*udbhūtatva*); and the absence of such a state (*tadabhāva*) is the non-manifestedness (*anudbhūtatva*).

Further, the Siddhāntin refutes the position that the formness (*rūpa tva*) is the justification for admitting the generic property of the formness, as pervaded by the whiteness (*tadvyāpya jāti*), to be the cause of perception. According to him, when such a generic property of the formness becomes the

cause of perception (*prayojaka*), the perception of white form becomes contingent.

Impediment to the Perception :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection (T.C.I. ix. 5) that this way, the fire (*vahni*), existing in the frying pan, would be required to be perceived, as the frying pan has the perceptible or manifested form. (*udbhūta rūpa*).

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the particular contacts pertaining to the frying pan constitute the impediment to the perception. According to him, the frying pan etc. are to be manifested by the light; and therefore nothing should impede the perception of fire in the frying pan etc.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the fire in the frying pan can be perceptible; however, since the fire and the frying pan are very clear, they are not perceived distinctly.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the objection (T.C.I. ix. 6) that the manifested or perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*) is absent in the fire of manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*); and hence the knowledge of heat (*ūsma budhi*) cannot be tenable in the fire without the law of light associated with heat. According to him, both form and touch are obtained in fire from the perception and the touching (*darśana sparśanābhyām*). Further, the lightness (*tejastva*) is not an impediment (*bādhaka*) to the production of touch in the fire. According to him, the production and non-production of qualities are due to the relation of difference between the instrument and the causes.

Hugeness is the Cause :

The Siddhāntin notes (T.C.I. ix. 6) that the state of having many substances and the hugeness (*mahattvāneka dravya vattva*), as associated with perceptible form, is not the determining cause (*tantra*); rather, only the hugeness (*mahattva*), is the cause of perceptibility of substance (*dravya cākṣuṣatve*).

The Siddhāntin (T.C.I. ix. 6) refutes the argument that in the case of heap of hair existing far too away (*dūrastha keśa rāśi*), the hugeness is lackin g and yet the perception occurs; and hence just the hugeness need not constitute the cause. According to him, in the case of objects existing at too much of a distance, even the state of having connection with many substances (*aneka dravya sambandhi tva*) can be admitted to be the cause of perception; and also the contact with similar substances (*sajātīya samyoga*) can be admitted to be the cause of hugeness and thus perception need not become untenable in such a case.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that suppose the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) and the hugeness (*mahat tva*) constitute mere natural competency (*svarūpa yogyatā*), then the same cannot have the causality. According to him, the excellence in perception (*pratyakṣotkarṣa*) depends on the excellence in the state of having the perceptible form and the hugeness; and hence both of them can have the causality.

Conclusions :

Causes of perception are admitted to be many in the Nyāya. However, Gangeśa deels with only certain causes of perception in his 'Theory of causes of perception'. Firstly, he recognizes the comprehensional relation of mind with the tactual surface and the soul and also the union of mind with the sense and the intercourse of sense with the objects as the cause.

Further, Gangeśa establishes that contact of light with object, and not the same with the eye, constitutes the cause of perception. Also Gangeśa establishes that manifested or perceptible form of object constitutes the cause of perception of object. Further, even the manifested or perceptible form of light constitutes the cause of perception.

The Sampradāyavids hold that the form of the eye is the manifesting condition of the object of sense; whereas the perceptible form of the object is the associate cause of perception.

Also the Siddhāntin, Gangeśa, refutes the objection that the fire existing in the frying pan would be required to be perceived as the pan has the perceptible form; he maintains that fire and pan, being very clear, cannot be perceived distinctly.

Finally the Siddhāntin explains that besides the hugeness, even the state of having connection with many substances can be the cause of perception; and hence the heap of hair existing too far away need not be perceived.

It should be observed that obstackles impede the production of perception. For instance, too much distance and too much proximity constitute obstackles to perception. Therefore, absence of obstackles such as too much distance and too much proximity too constitute causes of perception.

B. Theory of Perception of Wind
(Vāyu pratyakṣa vādaḥ) :

Introduction :

The Vaiśeṣikas, the ancient ontologists of India, analysed wind (*vāyu*) as one of the five great elements (*pañca mahā bhūta*) and as the fourth substance (*caturtha dravya*). They established wind on the ground that the quality of neither hot nor cold touch (*anuṣṇāśīta sparśa*) needs to subsist in a substance; and the same substance is wind (Tarka Saṅgraha Dīpikā, xiii). Thus, the wind can be defined as the substratum of neither hot nor cold touch.

Kaṇāda (Vaiśe Sū. ii. 1.4) defines wind as the substance which has touch but has no form (*rūpa rahita sparśavān vāyuḥ*). Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya, 1. 4) too explains the same as one which has touch but has no form. Here the first epithet, i.e. the state of having the touch is meant to distinguish wind from the last five substances such as ether; whereas the second epithet, i.e. the state of not having the form is meant to distinguish wind from the first three substances such as earth.

As an alternative, however, wind (Sarvadarśana saṅgraha, p.218) can be defined as the possessor of the property pervaded by the substanceness (*dravyatva vyāpa jātimat*), which is inherent in the skin organ (*tvag indriya samaveta*). This definition clearly distinguishes wind from other substances.

Wind is two types as eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*). Eternal wind is atomic (*paramāṇu rūpa*) and non--eternal wind is product (*kārya rūpa*). It is further divided three fold as body (*śarīra*), organ (*indriya*) and mass (*viṣaya*). Body exists in the aerial world; organ is the sense of touch comprehending touch; and mass is the cause of shaking of tree etc. (*vṛkṣādi kampana*).

Wind, though one, acquires different names such as vital air, owing to different situations. Wind circulating within body are five: The wind situated in the breast is Prāṇa; the wind situated in the rectum is Apāna; the wind situated in the navel is Samāna; the wind situated in the throat is Udāna; and the wind situated in the whole body is Vyāna.

Problem :

However, the touch in wind is neither hot nor cold (*anuṣṇāśīta*)

(Tarkasangraha dīpikā, xiii); and hence is different from the touch in light (*tejas*) and water (*āpaḥ*). Thus, wind occupies somewhat middle position between perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) substances; and hence a hot discussion has been carried out by the Prācya-naiyāyikas and the Navya-naiyāyikas as to whether the wind is perceptible or not. While the Prācyas (Vaiśe Sū .II. 1.9) held that wind is imperceptible and hence is to be inferred, some Navyas (T.C.I. ix. 7) held that wind is perceptible. However, Gaṅgeśa seems to follow the Prācyas in this respect. Thus, the present article is meant to explain Gaṅgeśa's theory of imperceptibility of wind in the Tattva Cintāmani.

Pūrvapakṣa : Wind is perceptible (Pratyakṣa) :

The Pūrvapakṣin, i.e. a section of the Navyasholds (T.C. I. ix. 7) that wind is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) even without the manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*); and hence the state of having the manifested or perceptible form is not the determining cause of perception (*tantra*). He holds that the cognition viz. 'Wind blows' (*vāyur vāti*) arises after the operation of sense organ of touch (*tvag indriya vyāpāra*); and hence the perceptibility of wind cannot be denied. According to him, the cognition viz. 'Wind is cold' (*śīto vāyuḥ*) proves the perceptibility of wind due to the perception of particular quality such as touch.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin notes that the state of not being perceptible by means of eye (*acākṣuṣatva*) is not an impediment to the state of being perceptible by means of the sense of touch (*spārśanatve*), as the eye produces merely the visual perception of substance and the sense of touch produces the knowledge of touch.

Siddhānta : Wind is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) :

The Siddhāntin, i.e. Gaṅgeśa establishes wind to be imperceptible by refuting the position that wind is perceptible (T.C.I. ix. 8). According to him, the state of having manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*), while having the hugeness (*mahattve sati*), cannot be the cause of perception of substance, as then the yellow substance existing in the eye etc. would be required to be perceptible.

Refutation of Siddhānta :

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the Siddhānta that wind is imperceptible. According to him (T.C.I. ix. 9), only the state of having the manifested or perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśavattva*), and not the state of having the manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattva*), can be admitted to be the cause of perception of substance; and since the same is present in the wind, wind is perceptible. Also this way, ray (*prabhā*) need not become imperceptible, as the ray constitutes only the form of light.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that both the state of having the manifested or perceptible form and the state of having manifested or perceptible touch together constitute the cause of perception due to the lack of determining or governing factor (*vinigamakābhāva*). According to him, such a position involves heaviness; whereas his theory that the state of having the perceptible form is the cause of perception by means of sense of eye and the state of having the perceptible touch is the cause of perception by means of sense of touch is econominal.

Spṛśāmi is valid in the case of Wind :

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the objection that (T.C.I. ix. 10) if the wind substance constitutes the object of direct perception (*sākṣātkāra viṣaya*) produced from the external organ of sense (*bahir indriya janya*), such as the sense of touch (*spārśana*), then it would be required to be the substance of manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*); and hence it cannot be the object of perception. According to him, the substance (*dravya*) is the producer of perception only as being inherent in the possessor of form (*rūpavat samavetatvena*), and not as being the substance constituting the object of direct perception.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin observes that the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) such as 'I touch' (*spṛśāmi*) is produced in the case of wind like in the case of pot; and hence wind is perceptible by possessing perceptible touch.

Only Udbhūta Sparśa is Tantra :

The Pūrvapaksin refutes the argument (T.C.I.ix. 11) that even the manifested or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*), like the manifetsted or perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*), is the cause (*tantra*) of perceptibility of any substance by means of sense of touch (*spārśanatve*), as the perceptibility of substance by sense of touch is observed in the case of the substance having the perceptible form. According to him, the perceptibility of substance by means of sense of touch is absent in the case of ray of sun etc.; and therefore, only the state of having the manifested or perceptible touch is the cause of perceptibility of wind by means of sense of touch. Thus, the state of having the manifested or perceptible form is redundant in the perceptibility of substance by means of sense of touch.

Further the Pūrvapakṣin notes that both touch and its manifestation (*sparśo tadudbhavaśca*) are the causes of perceptibility of substance by means of sense of touch; but form and its manifestation are not the causes by means of sense of touch. According to him, the absence of perception by means of sense of touch is not experienced in the absence of manifested form.

Navīnas' view : Wind is Imperceptible :

The Navīnas hold (T.C.I. ix. 12) that mere perceptible touch does not constitute the cause of perceptibility of touch in the wind; for, then even the number existing in the hot vapour needs to become perceptible due to having perceptible touch. Therefore, both the state of having perceptible touch and the state of having perceptible form need to constitute the causes of perceptibility of substance by external sense organ due to mutual deviation of each other. Thus, wind needs to be imperceptible. Also, this way, the established conclusion of the Naiyāyikas that wind is imperceptible does not get violated.

Sampradāyavids view : Wind is Imperceptible :

The Sampradāyavids too hold (T.C.I. ix. 13) that wind is imperceptible. According to them, when only the state of having perceptible touch is held to constitute the cause of perception of substance, the separation from the earliar region and the contact with the next region would become imperceptible in the case of moving row of birds, as the circle of rays (*prabhā maṇḍala*), belonging to the earliar and the next regions, is imperceptible due to not having perceptible touch.

Further the Sampradāyavids refute the argument that the inference of movement of row of birds (*gaty anumāna*) can be tenable from the inference of contact and separation. According to them, the inferential probans is impossible to establish due to the imperception of the earlier and the next regions. Thus the inference of movement is untenable.

Explanation of Śīto vāyuḥ :

The Pūrvapakṣin now objects (T.C.I.ix. 14) that when wind is merely inferable, the invalid knowledge of superimposition (*āropa*) that 'Wind is cold' (*śīto vāyuḥ*) cannot refer to the cold touch in the wind, as the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), i.e. the wind is not competent of possessing cold touch.

However, the Sāmpradāyavids refute the objection. According to them, the superimposition of the cold touch, grasped as existing in the water, by way of being a contradictory property of the wind (*vāyu vaidharmyeṇa*), can be produced on the wind on account of the defect in sense organ (*doṣa māhātmyāt*). Thus, the Sampradayavids reiterate that wind is only inferable, but not perceptible.

Establishment of Vāyur vāti and Vāyuḥ śīto vāti :

The Pūrvapakṣin again objects (T.C.I. ix. 15) that the knowledge 'Wind blows' (*vāyur vāti*) would become untenable, after the operation of the sense

of touch (*tvag vyāpāra*), as the contact and the separation, constituting the probans of such a knowledge, are imperceptible.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection on the ground that the act of striking against the body (*abhighāta*) can be inferred through the particular happiness and the sorrow produced from the striking; According to him, when the state of being produced from the stream possessing cold touch occurs in the act of striking against the body, the act of blowing of wind can be inferred from the stream.

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that the qualificative knowledge 'Cold wind blows' (*vāyuḥ śīto vāti*) becomes untenable. According to him, the knowledge of the wind, as qualified by the cold touch, is mental, whereas the knowledge of the act of blowing is inferential; and hence the cross-connection of the generic properties (*jāti saṅkara*) results in the qualificative knowledge.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection on the ground that the act of blowing (*karman*) is inferred in the wind recollected as qualified by the cold touch (*śīta viśiṣṭatvena*); and hence the inferential qualificative knowledge of the act of blowing of the wind becomes tenable.

Udbhūta Rūpavattva is the Cause :

The Siddhāntin notes that since the causality of the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) is established in the case of the perceptibility of substance produced from the external organ, the same state of having the perceptible form, pervading the probandum, and delimited by the property of the subject or by the probans, constitutes the impeding condition of the inference establishing the perceptibility of wind. Therefore, wind cannot be perceptible.

Soul is Perceptible :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection (T.C.I. ix. 16) that the soul (*ātman*), like the wind (*vāyu*), becomes imperceptible, as the state of having the perceptible form constitutes the cause of perceptibility of substance.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the soul, unlike the wind, is perceptible, as the recognition of identity (*abheda pratyabhijñāna*) that 'The same I, who has perceived the pot, touch the pot' proves the perceptibility of the soul.

Inference proves Imperceptibility of wind :

Gaṅgeśa now concludes (T.C.I. ix. 16) that the inference 'The wind is not perceived by the external organ of sense (*vāyuḥ bahirindriyāpratyakṣaḥ*); for, it is a formless substance (*dravyatvāt*)' proves the imperceptibility of wind. Also he refutes the objection that the state of being the substratum of perceptible touch (*pratyakṣa sparśāśra yatva*) constitutes the impeding condition of the inference proving the imperceptibility of wind. According to him, the perceptible touch does not constitute the probans; and hence the said condition cannot pervade the probandum in the inference.

Conclusions

The touch in wind is neither hot nor cold; and hence wind occupies somewhat middle position between perceptible and imperceptible substances.

The Pūrvapakṣin, a section of the Navyas held wind to be perceptible as 'Wind blows' proves; and according to him, only the perceptible cold touch, and not the perceptible form, is the cause of perception of wind.

However, Gaṅgeśa established wind to be imperceptible on the ground that only the state of having perceptible form, while having the hugeness, is the cause of perception of substance; and since wind is devoid of perceptible form, the same is imperceptible.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin disagrees with the Siddhāntin on the ground that only the state of having the perceptible touch, and not the state of having perceptible form, is the cause of perception of substance; and since the same is present in the wind, it is perceptible.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin holds the view that since the recognition 'I touch' is produced in the wind, the same is perceptible by possessing perceptible touch.

Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes that even perceptible touch, like perceptible form, is the cause of perception. Further he notes that both touch and its manifestation, but not form and its manifestation, are the causes of perceptibility of substance.

However, the Navinas establish the conclusion, viz. imperceptibility of wind on the ground that mere perceptible touch does not constitute the cause of perceptibility of wind.

The Sampradāyavids, on the other hand, established the imperceptibility of wind on the ground that the separation and contact would become imperceptible in the case of admitting the state of having the perceptible touch to be the cause of perception.

The Sampradāyavids explain the superimposition "Wind is cold" on the basis of defect in the sense organ.

The Siddhāntin Gaṅgeśa explains the knowledge 'Wind blows' on the ground that the act of blowing can be inferred.

Finally Gangeśa establishes the imperceptibility of wind on the ground that only the state of having the perceptible form is proved to be the cause of the perceptibility of substance. Thus, Gangeśa concludes his theory of imperceptibility of wind by stating that the inference '*vāyuḥ bahir indriya pratyakṣaḥ vāyutvāt*' proves the imperceptibility of wind.

C. Theory of Lightness of Gold (Suvarṇa taijasatvavādaḥ) :

Introduction :

The Vaiśeṣikas analysed light (*tejas*) as one of the five great elements (*pañca mahābhūta*) and the third substance (*tṛtīya dravya*). They established light on the ground that the quality of brilliant form (*bhāsvara rūpa*) and hot touch (*uṣṇa sparśa*) need to subsists in a substance; and the same substance is light (Vaiśe Sū. ii.1.3). Thus, the light can be defined as the substratum of brilliant form and hot touch.

As a matter of fact, the lightness (*tejastva*), which is established to be the generic property delimiting the causality of the cause of hot touch (*uṣṇa sparśa samavāyi kāraṇatāvacchedaka*), can be the real definition of light. However, the Vaiśeṣika, Kaṇāda, defines the light (Vaiśe Sū. ii. 1.3) as the substance, which has the brilliant form and hot touch. Also the Sānkhyas (Nyāyakośa) define the light as the third gross element (*tṛtīya mahābhūta*) which is produced from the subtle element of form associated with the subtle element of sound and touch (*śabda sparśa tanmātra sahitaḥ*).

Light is of two kinds (*dvividha*) as eternal (*nitya*) and non-eternal (*anitya*). (Tarka Sam.12). Eternal light is atomic in nature (*paramāṇu rūpa*) and non-eternal is of the nature of product (*kārya rūpa*). Light is divided again as of three kinds (*trividha*) as body (*śarīra*), organ (*indriya*) and mass (*viṣaya*). Body is found to exist in the solar region (*āditya loka*); organ, which is sight (*cakṣus*) and perceives colour (*rūpagrāhaka*), exists in the forepart of black pupil of eye (*kṛṣṇa tārāgra vartin*) and mass, is four fold as earthly (*bhauma*), heavenly (*divya*), gastric (*audarya*) and mineral (*ākaraja*). The earthly mass is fire (*vahni*) etc.; the heavenly mass is lightening produced from water (*abindhana vidyut*) etc.; the gastric mass is that which causes digestion of what is eaten (*bhuktasya pariṇāma hetu*) and the mineral mass is gold (*suvarṇa*) and other metals.

The most important point of debate is the classification of mass of light into four fold as : i) earthly in the form of the common fire and the light of the glow warm; ii) celestial in the form of lightning, sunlight, and moon light; iii) gastric in the form of the instrument of digestive power of food; and iv) mineral in the form of gold and other metals. While the first two kinds are

real fires, the last two kinds are not real fires and hence need to be justified as light. The gastric juice is called fire because it consumes food like fire and produces heat in the body. The last kind of mineral will be discussed in the following pages.

Problem :

However, scholars differed as regards the last kind of mass of light or gold. The Naiyāyikas have spent much of their energy in justifying the gold and other kind of metals as light. Gold is held to be light, because it cannot be earth, water, wind or any of the last five substances. Gold is not earth, because the fluidity is not destroyed even in contact with extreme heat of fire; whereas the fluidity of earth such as ghee is desroyed in extreme heat of fire. Gold is not water, because the fluidity is occasional; whereas the fluidity of water is natural and inherent in it. Gold is not wind, because it has form; whereas wind does not have any form. Gold cannot be any of the last five substances as they are totally different.

Here some scholars have held that gold can be a mixture of earth and light (*miśrita vastu*). According to them, gold can be earth, as it is the substratum of non-fluid yellow form (*adruta pīta rūpa*); and it can be light, as it is the substratum of fluidity not destroyed by the contact with heat of fire (*agnisamyoge anucchidyamāna dravatva*).

However, the Naiyāyikas establish gold to be light by inference (Muktā vali. p. 81). According to them, the inference "That gold is light (*suvarṇam taijasam*); for, it has the fluidity not destroyed by extreme heat of fire in the absence of any impediment (*asati pratibandhake atyantāgni samyoge anucchidyamāna dravatva tvāt*)" proves gold to be light. In the following pages of this article, we shall discuss Gangeśa's theory of lightness of gold.

Gold is not Earth :

Gold (T.C.I. ix. 17-18) has yellow form (*pīta rūpa*) which does not manifest itself and others unlike the form of fire which manifests itself and others. According to Gangeśa, this is so, because the form of gold is overcome by others; whereas the form of fire is not overcome by others. However, Gangeśa notes the difference that dispite gold having its own form overcome by others and not manifesting itself and others, it is light and not earth. According to him, the yellow form of gold, which remains not destroyed even in contact with extreme heat of fire, cannot belong to any substance except light. The contact with extreme heat of fire is ruled to be producing different form in the case of things belonging to earth; and since it does not do so in the case of gold, the same gold belongs to light and not to earth.

Inference proving Gold to be Light :

Gangeśa states that (T.C.I. ix. 19) the inference "The yellow gold (*pītam suvarṇam*) is connected with the liquid substance impeding the origination of form distinct from the yellow form (*pītarūpātirikta rūpotpatti pratibandhaka drava dravya samyuktam*); for, it is the non-substratum of the form distinct from the yellow form (*pītarūpātirikta rūpānāśrayatvāt*) while having the contact with fire day and night" proves gold to be light.

Also Gangeśa clarifies that gold cannot have the earthness (*pṛthīvītva*) due to the arificial liquidity. According to him, mere liquid earthen substance (*drutapadārtha*) cannot be held to be an impediment to the change of form, as then the impediment to the change of form would become contingent even in the case of earthen clarified butter.

Gangeśa notes that gold has the perceptible form (*rūpavat*) by being the perceptible substance (*pratyakṣa dravyatvena*); whereas it has the lightness (*tejastva*) by being the substance other than earth and water (*pṛthivī jalānyatvena*). Also he notes that the liquidity or fluidity existing in the yellow part of gold (*pīta bhāga dravatva*) does not get destroyed, while coming into contact with heat of fire, as it is impeded by the liquidity of light (*druta tejas*).

Udayana's Position : Druta tejas is Rūpa parāvṛtti pratibandhaka :

Udayanācārya (T.C.I. ix. 20) refutes the objection that suppose liquid light (*druta tejas*) is the impediment to the change of form of distinct class (*rūpaparāvṛtti*), then even the clothing, existing in the middle of gold, would not have the change of form. According to him, liquid light impedes the change of form only in the case of the yellow substance being experienced as gold.

Further, Udayana notes that the ordinary gold is not experienced to have the nature of being impediment to the change of form by means of knowledge establishing the substance (gold) (*dharmi grāhaka māna*). Thus according to Udayana, only liquid light is the impediment to change of form.

Navinas' View : Gold is not water :

After establishing gold as light and not earth, Gangeśa now establishes gold as light, but not water by explaining Navinas' view. According to the Navīnas (T.C.I. ix. 21), the liquid gold (*druta tejas*), which is the substratum of perceptible liquidity (*pratyakṣa dravatvādhikaraṇa*), and is not destroyed by the contact with extreme heat of fire, belongs to the category of light (*taijasa*), but not to the category of water and earth, as it possesses undestructible form.

Further the Navinas point out that gold is not water (*jala*), as it is not the substratum of natural liquidity (*sāmsiddhika dravatvānadhikaraṇa*), but is only the substratum of artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatvādhikaraṇa*).

Light (*tejas*) has no natural Liquidity (*dravatva*) :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection (T.C.I. ix. 22) that since one experiences yellow gold as liquid (*pītam dravam*), the gold, i.e. light cannot remain to be non-liquid (*adrava*). However, the Navīnas refute the objection on the ground that the natural liquidity (*sāmsiddhika dravatva*) is absent in the yellow gold, i.e. light; and hence the knowledge of yellow gold, i.e. light as liquid is illusion.

Others' view : Liquidity is produced :

The Others (*anye*), however, propose (T.C. I. ix. 23) that liquidity (*dravatva*) is produced in gold, i.e. light in the presence of supporting element of heat of fire (*upaṣṭhambhaka*). According to them, experience of liquidity (*anubhava*) of gold cannot be denied. Also they note that since no loss of liquidity is produced in the case of gold by the contact with extreme heat of fire, the liquid substance of gold (*drava dravya*) needs to be admitted as an impediment to the loss of liquidity.

Further the Others (*anye*) hold that the liquid can be established to be gold by the inference that "The substratum of liquidity, i.e. gold (*dravatvādhikaraṇam*) belongs to light (*taijasam*); for, it is the substratum of impermanent or artificial liquidity (*anitya dravatvādhāratvāt*)". Thus liquidity is produced in gold, i.e. light.

Final establishment of lightness in Gold :

Others (*anye*) finally hold (T.C.I. ix. 24) that the inference that "The lightness (*tejastva*) exists in the liquid gold (*druta vṛtti*); for, it constitutes the generic property directly pervaded by the substanceness existing in the substance possessing form (*rūpa vad vṛtti dravatva sākṣād vyāpya jātimattvāt*)" can establish the lightness in the gold; and hence gold is light.

Avoidance of Impeding condition :

The Pūrvapakṣin now objects (T.C.I. ix. 25) that the state of existing in light in general (*tejomātra vṛttitva*) constitutes the impeding condition (*upādhi*) of the inference establishing the lightness in gold.

However, the Others refute the objection on the ground that the liquid lightness (*druta tejastva*) can be established in the gold by the stronger probans contradicting the opposite non-lightness in the gold; and hence the so called impeding condition cannot pervade the probandum.

Vyatirekin and Anvayavyatirekin inferences :

Also Gangeśa provides negative (*vyatirekin*) and positive-negative (*anvaya vyatirekin*) inferences which can establish the lightness in the gold. According to him (T.C.I. ix. 27), the negative inference that "The golden atoms (*paramāṇavaḥ*) producing gold (*suvarṇārambhakāḥ*) are not earthen (*na pārthivāḥ*); for, they are the substrata of the liquidity, not destroyed by the extreme heat of fire (*anucchidyamāna dravatvādhikaraṇatvāt*)" and the positive - negative inference that "The gold (*suvarṇam*), produced from light atoms (*taijasārabdham*), is golden (*taijasam*); for, it is produced from the atoms which are the substrata of liquidity (*dravatvādhikaraṇa paramāṇvārabdhatvāt*)" establish the lightness in gold due to the possession of liquidity.

Ekadeśin's view : Gold is a Distinct Substance :

Nevertheless, Gangeśa refers to the Ekadeśin's view which regards gold to be a distinct substance (T.C.I.ix. 28). According to the Ekadeśin, the inference that "The substratum of liquidity, i.e. gold (*dravatvādhikaraṇam*) is not light (*na tejaḥ*); for, it is a yellow substance (*pīta tvāt*)" proves the lack of lightness in gold; and hence it is a distinct substance.

Further Ekadeśin refutes the argument that gold, by being the possessor of yellow form (*pīta rūpa*), while being what is other than water and earth, constitutes light. According to him, such a state of possessing yellow form while being what is other than water and earth is useless as far as proving gold to be light. Otherwise, even wind, being the possessor of touch, while being what is other than light, would need to constitute earth.

Also the Ekadeśin clarifies that even the Naiyāyikas need to admit that the substance, which is the substratum of natural liquidity, is not necessarily earth. Therefore, even the yellow gold, which is the substratum of artificial liquidity, is not necessarily what is other than earth, i.e. light.

Conclusions :

Classification of mass of light four fold into earthly, celestial, gastric and mineral has been a matter of great controversy in ancient India.

Also the identification of gold, i.e. last kind of mass of light, with light has provoked sharp reactions from scholars.

While the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas considered gold to be mixture of earth and light, or mere light, other philosophers in India strongly opposed the view.

Gangeśa establishes that gold is light and not earth, as it has the yellow form not destroyed by contact with extreme heat of fire. Also he establishes

that gold can have only the lightness and not the earthness, as it has artificial liquidity.

Udayana notes that liquid light impedes the change of form in gold and hence gold is light.

The Navinas establish gold to be light, and not water, on the ground that it possesses artificial liquidity. The Navinas further explain that yellow gold is non-liquid naturally and the experience of gold as liquid is false. Whereas the Others held that liquidity can be produced in gold due to heat of fire.

The Others finally establish gold to be light on the basis of inference; and Gangeśa provides both negative and positive-negative inferences to prove the lightness in the gold.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that Gangeśa was not probably averse to the view that gold is a distinct substance; and hence concludes his 'Theory of lightness of gold' with the view of the Ekadeṣin who considers gold to be a distinct substance.

I. X.
Theory of Atomic Nature of Mind (mano' ṇutva vādaḥ)

Introduction

Mind (*manas*), which is admitted to be the ninth substance among the nine substances (Vaiśe Sū. i. 1. 5), is held to be the internal sense-organ (*antar indriyam*) which produces the cognition of particular qualities such as the happiness (pleasure) (*sukhādy upalabdhi sādhanam,* Gautama Sūtravṛtti, i. 1.16). Thus, mind can be defined as the internal organ which produces the obtainment of qualities of soul such as the happiness etc.

Kaṇāda (Vaiśe Sū. vii. 1. 23), however, defines mind as one without touch but atomic in nature (*nissparśam aṇu,*). This definition, although very important from the point of view of dimension of mind, does not shed much light on the function of mind. Among the five intangible substances, viz. ether time, space, soul and mind, only the last mind, by having a limited dimension, can move; and hence has movement; however, the first four, i.e. ether, time, space and soul being all - pervassive, cannot move; and hence cannot have movement. Thus, mind has movement (*kriyāvat*) but has no touch (*nissparśam*).

Etymologically speaking, mind (*manas*) means the instrument of thought (*manyate anena, karaṇārthe asun*); and hence mind can be taken to be the organ through which one thinks. However, mind can be said to be much more than mere instrument of thought. Thus, Keśavamishra states (Tarkabhāṣā, p. 32) that mind is the direct cause of internal experiences of particular qualities (*antar indriya*) and also the promter of external sense organs in the perception of external objects (*sarvendriya pravartaka*).

It should be observed, however, that the Naiyāyikas have generally ignored the first aspect of mind, i.e. the state of being the instrument of thought and highlighted the other two aspects of mind, i.e. the state of being the direct cause of internal experience of particular qualities and the state of being the promter of external organs in the perception of external objects.

Thus, Vātsyāyana (i. 1. 9) establishes that mind is the internal organ (*antaḥ karaṇa*), which produces the cognition of internal qualities such as the happiness etc. and also it is the organ which produces the cogntion of all the objects (*sarva viṣaya*) through the other organs. However, according to the Naiyāyikas, while mind is independent (*svatantra*) in producing the cognition of internal qualities such as the happiness etc., it is dependent on other sense organs (*para tantra*) in producing the cognition of external objects such as form, smell etc. However, it should be noted that while the external sense-organs are capable of producing the cognition of external objects, mind is capable of producing the cognitions of both internal and external objects.

Mind being intangible and corporeal is only inferable (*anumeya*). The mode of inference is based on the ground that mind is the cause of certain perception of qualities which cannot be explained in any other way. Thus, the form of inference is 'The perception of the particular qualities such as the happiness (*sukhādi sākṣātkāraḥ*) is to be established by a particular instrument (*karaṇa sādhyaḥ*); for, it is a direct perception which is to be produced (*janya sākṣātkāratvāt*)'. Thus, mind gets established from the inference as the instrument of direct internal perception of the qualities such as the happiness.

However, Kaṇāda (Vaiśe Sū. iii. 2.1) holds that the presence and absence, i.e. production and non-production of direct perception of objects (*jñānasya bhāvā bhāva*) can be the proof of the existence of mind, as the same are produced by the conjuction and the disjunction of mind with the soul and sense organs. However, Gautama (Nyāy Sū. i. 1. 16) insists that the knowledges of internal particular qualities such as the happiness are successive and not simultaneous; and hence the non-production of knowledges of internal qualities simultaneously together too can constitute the proof of existence of mind. It should be noted here that knowledges of external objects such as smell, form etc. can be produced simultaneously provided that the sense organs such as nose, eye etc. are connected with several objects simultaneosly. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, mind can be inferred to be the cause of direct perception of qualities and the associate cause of direction perception of external objects.

Summing up kaṇāda's and Gautama's definitions of mind, Annambhaṭṭa (Tarka saṅgraha., 18) holds that mind is the instrument of the obtainment of the qualities such as the happiness etc. (*sukhādy upalabdhi sādhana*); and being limited to each soul, is countless, automic and eternal (*pratyātma nityatatvāt anantam paramāṇu rūpam nityam ca*). According to Annambhaṭṭa, mind needs to be distinguished from external organs (*bahirindriya*) such as eye etc. While mind, being internal organ (*antarindriya*), produces the cognition of particular

qualities of soul such as the happiness, external organs such as eye etc. produces the cognition of only external objects such as form etc. Here the term 'happiness etc.' (*sukhādi*) stands for all the particular qualities of soul (*viśeṣa guṇa*) that reside in the soul by inherence. Also the term '(internal) organ' (*indriya*) excludes the soul as well as the conjuction of mind with soul from being mind; for, soul being agent of cognition, needs to be excluded from mind, and conjunction of mind with soul, being the operation (*vyāpāra*), needs to be excluded from mind. Echoing the same sentiment, Jayanta (Nyāy mañ. 1. 14) states that mind, being the substratum of the contact of itself with soul (*saṁyogā śrayatvena*), is the cause of cognition of qualities and hence differs from soul.

However, it should be noted that, while the Naiyāyikas admitted mind to be a sense organ (*indriya*) because of its instrumentality in producing the cognition, the Vedāntins deny such a status of an organ for mind because of its higher status than the objects and the external organs of sense.

Here, in the definition of mind, the Phrase 'being limited to each soul' (*pratyātma niyata*) is meant to convey the idea that mind produces the enjoyment of things inherent in individual soul (*tattad ātma samaveta bhoga janaka*) and also that it produces the enjoyment of those things not inherent in individual souls (*tattad ātmāsamaveta bhoga janaka*).

Also here the term 'endless' (*ananta*) means mind differs according to each body of soul (*pratiśarīra*); and in support of this theory, the Vaiśeṣikas (Upaskāra, iii. 2.3) state that only successive knowledges of qualities, but not simultaneous knowledges of different qualities, are produced from mind, through its contact with soul. Thus mind is endless means, it is distinct according to the distinction of bodies.

Also the Naiyāyikas admit that mind is automic in nature (*aṇu*). According to them, mind needs to be automic, as otherwise it cannot function as a connecting link between sense organs and soul. Since soul is all pervassive (*vibhu*), only an automic mind can have connection with soul, and can be the non-inherent cause of cognition (*jñānā sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Also suppose both soul and mind are all pervassive (*vibhu*), then two all pervassive entities would be required to be connected with each other to produce the cognition of qualities etc. Further, when two all pervassive entities, being connected together, produce the cognition of qualities, the cognition so produced would become permanent. Again, due to the experience that 'The pleasure occurs in the feet, but pain occurs in the head', the experience of qualities needs to be regional (*prādeśika*). Thus, to facilitate non-permanent and regional experience of qualities, mind needs to be automic in nature and the contact

between mind and souls is occasional and voluntary. Further, it should be noted that suppose mind were all pervassive and not automic in nature, then the contact between mind and soul would be continuous; and hence sleep and cessation of knowledge would become untenable due to the untenability of existence of mind in the intestine (*purītat*) near the heart without contact with soul.

Also the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas consider mind to be eternal (Vaiśe Sū. iii. 2.2). According to them, wind can be admitted to explain the substanceness and the eternality of mind.

Problem :

Howerver, the Mīmāmsakas have strongly opposed the Naiyāyikas' view that mind is automic in nature (*aṇu*) and established that it is all pervassive (*vibhu*). According to them (Nyāy Mañ. 1. 14), the inference 'Mind is all pervassive (*mano vibhu*); for, it is a touchless substance (*nissparśa dravyatvāt*) like ether (*ākāśavat*)' can establish mind to be all pervassive. Also according to them (Upaskāra, iii. 2.1), as an alternative, the inferences 'Mind is all pervassive (*mano vibhu*); for, it constitutes the substance devoid of particular qualities (*viśeṣa guṇa śūnya dravyatvāt*)' and 'Mind is all pervassive (*mano vibhu*); for, it is the substratum of contact constituting non-inherent cause of knowledge like Soul (*jñānāsamavāyikāraṇa samyogādhāratvāt ātmavat*)' can establish mind to be all pervassive.

The Naiyāyikas such as Gangeśa have justified the automic nature of mind by all means and refuted the Mīmāmsakas' claim of all pervassiveness of mind. In the following pages, we shall explain Naiyāyikas' justification of automic nature of mind.

Establishment of Mind :

Gangeśa (T.C.I. x. 1) establishes mind (*manas*) as a sixth sense-organ (*indriya*) on the ground that the perceptual knowledge of the particular special qualities (*viśeṣa guṇa*) such as happiness (*sukhādi*) needs to be produced only from the distinct sixth sense-organ of mind, and not from the regular external senseorgans such as eye; and also it should be noted that therefore, the definition of perceptual knowledge, viz. knowledge produced from sense-organs (*indriya janya jñāna*, Nyāy Sū. i.1.4), justifies mind to be sixth sense-organ.

Mimāmsakas' Objection : Mind is All pervassive :

The Mīmāmsakas, on the other hand (T.C.I. x. 2), hold that mind, which is being established as sixth sense-organ, needs to be unique substance devoid of touch (*nissparśa*), and devoid of parts (*niravayava*), but all pervassive

(*vibhu*), as it is a substance not producing another substance (*dravyāntara*), eternal (*nitya*) and the substratum of contact (*samyogāśraya*) functioning as the non-inherent cause of knowledge (*jñānāsamavāyi kāraṇa*).

Mind need not be Automic :

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument (T.C.I. x. 4) that the rule of regionality (*prādeśikatva niyama*) of the effect such as the happiness of all pervassive cause (*vibhu kārya*) is dependent on the non-inherent cause, i.e. the contact of mind (*asamavayi kāraṇa*); and hence mind needs to be automic in nature (*aṇu*). According to them, the rule of regionality cannot be explained properly and hence is not valid; and thus mind need not be automic in nature (*aṇu*).

Asamavāyin requires Nimitta :

The Mīmāmsakas point out (T.C.I. x.5) that the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyin*) such as the contact of mind with soul requires the instrumental cause (*nimitta*) such as the sandle wood paste to produce the effect such as the knowledge of happiness (pleasure), as it is produced in the body and bodily parts as delimited by sandle wood paste etc.

Therefore, they state that even in the theory of all pervassiveness of mind (*vaibhave*), the state of belonging to the less and more regions of the body (*nyūnādhikadeśatā*) can be admitted to occur in the special qualities such as the happiness in accordance with the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood paste, but not in accordance with the non inherent cause, such as the contact of mind with soul. Therefore the special qualities occuring in the regions of bodily parts can be delimited by the instrumental cause of sandle wood paste etc.

Various Qualities are desired :

Further, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that (T.C.I. x.6) a delimiting condition needs to be admitted as the governing condition to facilitate the production of only one of many qualities in one body region at a time. According to them, simultaneous production of knowledges of various qualities such as the happinenss (pleasure) and sorrow is only desired in the case of the presence of various instrumental causes such as sandle wood paste and burning in various parts of body.

Mind is All pervassive but not Automic :

The Mīmāmsakas point out (T.C.I.x. 7) that the presence of the instrumental causes such as the sandle wood paste and burning cannot be the governing cause (*tantra*) of the effects (knowledges of qualities), as then

the non-inherent cause such as the contact of mind with soul would become non-conducive (*aprayojaka*). Also they point out that the effort (*prayatna*) pervades the parts of the body, as delimited by which parts, the desire for the production of the action arises. Thus, mind (*manas*) can be admitted to be all pervassive (*vibhu*) and need not be automic (*aṇu*) in nature.

Nimittāvacchedena Ātmamanas saṁyoga is the Cause :

On the other hand, Others (*anye*) hold (T.C.I. x.8) that only the contact of mind with soul (*ātmamanas saṁyoga*) as delimited by the instrumental cause (*nimittāvacchedena*), and not the same contact in general, constitutes the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*) of the production of the knowledge of special qualities; and therefore the qualities such as the happiness (pleasure) may be obtained only in the regions of the body as delimited by the instrumental cause.

Qualities can be Regional :

Further the Mīmāmsakas refute the position (T.C.I. x.9) that an all-pervassive and non-delimiting thing (*vyāpakam anavacchinnam*) cannot constitute the organ of sense; and therefore only the delimiting thing can be the conducive condition producing the knowledge of qualities; however, body and its parts etc. cannot be such conditions; and thus only the subtle sense organ (*sūkṣmam indriyaṁ*) needs to be the condition and so only the automic mind, and not the all-pervassive mind, gets established to be the conducive condition. According to them, dispite the fact that all-pervassive mind has all entire body as its substratum, the special qualities such as the happiness (pleasure) can be explained to have regionality (occurance in parts of body) due to the instrumental causes.

Mind is Atomic (Aṇu) :

The Naiyāyikas, however, state (T.C.I. x. 10) that dispite the connection of different sense-organs with different objects, only the knowledge of one object is produced by one organ at a time due to the non-association of mind with all the organs; and therefore, mind needs to be the governing factor (*adhiṣṭhāyaka*) of what knowledge of object is produced due to its association. Thus the all-pervassiveness (*vibhutva*) of mind is contradicted by the means establishing the mind (*dharmi grāhaka māna*); and so mind is only atomic.

Further the Naiyāyikas state that even when mind is all-1pervassive, the delay in the production of the knowledges of all the objects (*vilamba*) cannot be explained due to the delay in the trascendental merit (*adṛṣṭa vilamba*). According to them, when all the causes that are other than the contact of mind with sense organs are present, even the transcendental merit needs to be present; and therefore, only the contact of mind, and not merit, can produces the perception of objects.

Also the Naiyāyikas state that the order in the production of knowledges of different objects cannot be due to the desire to know the particular object (*bubhutsā vaśat*). According to them, the desire to know the particular object cannot constitute the cause of production of knowledges, as the knowledge can arise even in the absence of desire to know object.

Manasamyogaviśeṣa cannot be the Cause :

Further the Naiyāyikas state (T.C.I. x.11) that the argument that the contact of mind with particular sense-organ (*manas samyoga viśeṣa*) cannot be the cause of the knowledge of particular object (*viṣaya viśeṣa graha*). According to them, the particularity cannot be defined properly.

Further the Naiyāyikas state that the proposal that a means of knowledge such as eye (*jñāna karaṇa*) produces only a single knowledge of the object at one place; and hence the position that simultaneity of different knowledges of different objects can be avoided is untenable. According to them, different knowledges of different objects is equal to the collective knowledge of many objects (*samūhālambana*); and hence cannot be avoided. Thus mind need to be atomic in nature.

Manas is Karaṇadharma :

Now some propose that (T.C.I. x. 12) the sense organ such as eye (*cakṣuṣādi*) does not produce the knowledge of its object such as form along with other organs (*sambhūya*), as no sense organ has the competency (*sāmarthya*) in the production of the knowledge of all the objects. Also each sense organ, competent of producing the knowledges of its own object, cannot produce the knowledge of its object by including the knowledge of the objects of other sense-organs. For, the rule is that different means of knowledges of different objects (*bhinna viṣaya pramāṇa*) do not produce the knowledges of their objects together with other organs.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the proposal. According to them, though sense-organs do not have the capacity for producing the knowledges of different objects together with each other, the knowledge of different objects can be a collective knowledge of objects (*ārthaḥ samājaḥ*). Mind (*manas*), as the property of means of knowledge of objects (*karaṇa dharmatvena*), produces only one action of knowing different objects (*tāvad gocarām ekām kriyām*) in the presence of totality of causes of knowledges of different objects (*pratyeka jñāna sāmagrī*).

Bubhutsā is not the cause :

Some observe here (T.C.I. x. 13) that since the mind can produce the knowledges of more than one object at a time, a governing factor (*niyāmaka*) is necessary to avoid the contingency of knowledges of many objects at time.

However, they state that the desire to know the particular object such as one sound (*bubhutsā*) cannot be an impediment (*pratibandhaka*) to the perception of other objects such as other sounds. Also, when the desire to know a particular object such as a particular sound is admitted to be the cause of knowledge of a particular object, either the knowledge of all objects (qualities) or the absence of knowledge of any object (quality) would become contingent in the case of the desire to know all the objects (qualities), due to the strength and the impedance of the totalities of causes of each other.

Knowledge of Particular sound is Untenable :

The Mīmāmasaksas object here (T.C.I. x. 14) that in the theory of atomic nature of mind (*aṇutve*), either the knowledge of all sounds (*sarveṣām jñāna*) or the absence of the knowledge of any sound (*ajñāna*) would become contingent in the case of the recitation of ten songs by ten people and the desire to know all the songs; and thus the knowledge of only one sound would become untenable.

Also they reject the argument that the particular contact of ear with mind (*viśeṣa*) can be admitted to be the impediment to the perception of all the sounds other than the particular one. According to them, even in their theory of all-pervassiveness of mind, invariable concomitance of mind with only one song is tenable when particular contact of organ with mind is admitted to be the cause of perception of particular sound.

Bubhutsā and praṇidhāna are causes :

However, Other Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. x. 15) suggest that in the case of the visual and other perceptions of objects, the desire to know the particular object (*bubhutsā*) and the close attentive listening of the object (*praṇidhāna*) are admitted to be the causes of perception through the contact of mind with sense organs; and hence mind becomes connected with *bubhutsā* and *praṇidhāna* in the ear; and thus only the particular sound desired to be known, and not any other sound, can be perceived.

Here, the Mīmāmsakas refute the suggestion on the ground that in the case of the recitation of twenty songs, the desire to know all of them, and the close attentive listening of them, mind becomes connected with both *bubhutsā* and *praṇidhāna* in the ear as delimited by all the twenty songs; and hence the perception of all the twenty songs becomes contingent simultaneously.

Knowledge of twenty songs is Upekṣā jñāna :

Also the Naiyāyikas suggest (T.C.I.x.16) that in the case of the perception of the sound desired to be known (*bubhutsita*) even as the noice sound (*kolāhala*) is heard, the perception of the noice sound amounts to the knowledge of neglect of the desired sound (*upekṣā jñāna*) due to the contact of ear with noice sound; in the same way, in the case of the recitation of twenty songs, the perception of all the twenty songs would amount to the knowledge of neglect of the desired sound (*upekṣājñāna*).

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the suggestion on the ground that knowledge of neglect may not be admissible in the case of the recitation of twenty songs, as the experience is that 'I have not heard any sound other than the desired one'.

Bubhutsā and Praṇidhāna are Causes in Nānāśabda saṁyoga:

However, the Naiyāyikas reply (T.C.I. x. 17) that desire to know particular object (*bubhutsā*) and close attentive listening (*praṇidhāna*) are the causes of perception of desired sound and impediments of other sounds only in the case of close association of various sounds (*nānā śabda samyoge*).

Also they propose that the sound desired to be known (*bubhutsita*) is perceived even as noice sound (*kolāhala*) is being heard; and hence the other sounds not desired to be known become the objects of perception only as noice sounds. Also therefore, the individual generic properties such as the *ka*-ness etc. are not perceived in the case of other sounds.

Śrotra is competent for Nānāśabdagraha :

The Naiyāyikas now refute the position (T.C.I. x. 18) that the ear is competent for the perception of only one sound, but not competent for the perception of various sounds in the case of the hearing of various sounds other than noice sound; and hence the desire to know a particular sound needs to be the governing factor (*vinigamikā*) of the perception of sound. According to them, difference in the qualities of happiness etc. is experienced (*sukhādi vailakṣaṇya*) in the hearing of similar songs sung by many; and hence ear needs to be competent for the perception of various sounds. (*nānā śabda graha*)

Five knowledges are untenable :

The Mīmāmsakas raise the objection (T.C.I.x. 19) that five different knowledges (*pañca jñānāni*) of five qualities such as form, touch, odour, taste and sound are untenable in the case of the eating of large circular cake in the theory of atomic nature of mind (*aṇutve*); and also an order (*krama*)

cannot exist in the perception of different qualities; and hence both five different knowledges and one single knowledge need to be explained due to the expansion and contraction of mind (*saṅkoca vikāśa*). However, suppose an unseen merit is admitted to be the cause of expansion and contradiction of mind, then only the merit, and not the mind, would become the cause of the perception of two types of knowledges. Thus, mind cannot be admitted to be atomic in nature.

Bubhutsā does not constitue Hetu :

The Mīmāmsakas also refute the proposal of the Naiyāyikas (T.C.I.x. 20) that the desire to know the qualities (*bubhutsā*) constitutes the expansion and contradiction of mind. According to them, then all the people would be required to have all the five knowledges of five qualities provided that they have the desire for knowing all the five qualities and also the close attention of mind. According to them, an ordor or sequence occurs in the five knowledges.

Further the Mīmāmsakas refute the claim that in their theory recognition (*anu vyavasāya*) that 'I experience odour, taste, form, touch and sound simultaneously' (*gandha rasa rūpa sparśa śabdān pratyemi*) would become untenable due to the absence of simultaneous contact of mind with five organs. According to them, recognitions are five and not one; however, the order or sequence is not perceived due to the subtleness of time.

Explanation of Recognition :

Here, the Naiyāyikas suggest that (T.C.I. x. 21) the recognition that 'I experience five qualities simultaneously' (*yugapat pratyemi*) can be tenable as the experienceness can be imposed (*anubhavatvā ropa*) on the recognition of five qualities (*pañca jñāna viṣaya*); and hence mind can be automic in nature.

They state that in the theory of all-pervassiveness of mind (*vibhutve*), the experience of the qualities such as the happiness would become untenable due to the absence of contact of all-pervassive mind with all-pervassive soul. Also suppose the contact of all-pervassive mind with all-pervassive soul is admitted, then the separation too would become established mutually; and hence both contradictory connection and separation would become necessary always.

Objection : Vimśatikriyāḥ are untenable :

However, the Mīmāmsakas object (T.C.I.x.22) that when mind is atomic in nature, the effort causing bodily movements (*ceṣṭāhetu prayatna*) would occur only in atomic regions (*aṇu deśa*) or in body-regions (*śarīra deśa*); however, it would not occur in both the body and body part-regions (*śarīra tadavayava deśa*); and therefore the law of movement of body - parts (*kriyā niyama*) would not be tenable due to the absence of governing factor.

Also consequently, they state that since twenty efforts are not tenable in the parts of the body simultaneously, twenty movements (*vimśati kriyāḥ*) would not be tenable in the twenty fingers of a body simultaneously. Also since the collective knowledge of movements (*samūhālambana*) such as 'The twenty fingers are moving' (*aṅgulayaḥ calanti*) is untenable, the recognition (*anu vyavasāya*) of movements of twenty fingers too would become untenable. Thus the dance (*nāṭya*) of the form of collection of many movements of bodily parts (*karma samūha*) such as eyes, eye brows, hands, feet etc. would become imperceptible. Therefore mind needs to be atomic in nature.

Reply : Vimsati kriyāḥ are tenable :

The Naiyāyikas reply (T.C.I.x.23) here that the desire to perform the action (*cikīrṣā*) constitutes the governing factor of the production of action (*niyāmikā*) and the action is produced from the effort regarding which desire exists. Therefore, the movements of bodily parts (*śarīra kriyā*) too can be produced from the efforts occuring in the atomic regions and produced from the desire. Thus, mind can be atomic in nature.

Also the Naiyāyikas propose the alternative theory that the effort is produced in the body of the person (*tad avacchedena*) desiring the action as delimited by the body; and hence the movement of the body - parts (*śarīra kriyā*) is produced only from the effort as delimited by the body (*śarīrāvacchedena*); thus the movements of twenty fingers can be tenable simultaneously from the effort occuring in the atomic regions.

Thus, the mind is atomic in nature (*aṇu*) and the qualities of soul such as the happiness (pleasure) are grasped by the atomic mind.

Conclusions :

Gautama has admitted mind as an internal sense organ which produces the cognition of particular qualities such as the happiness (pleasure).

However, Vātsyāyana has established mind to be the organ which produces the cognition of external objects through external organs as well.

Kaṇāda, however, defined mind as one without touch, but atomic in nature. Also according to him, mind is inferable.

Annambhaṭṭa adds further that mind, being limited to each soul, is countless, atomic and eternal.

However, while the philosophers of other schools have more or less admitted mind to be an eternal sense-organ, they have objected to the atomic nature of mind. Thus, the Mīmāmsakas have argued that mind is all pervassive.

The Mīmāmsakas held that mind is devoid of parts and is all-pervassive, as it does not produce any thing else. Further they held that instrumenta causes such as sandle wood paste can explain the regionality of effects.

The Naiyāyikas admitted mind to be atomic in nature to facilitate it being a connecting link between soul and sense-organs.

Gangeśa justifies atomic nature of mind on the ground that otherwise production of knowledge of particular objects cannot be explained.

Gangeśa stipulates that mind is a property of means of knowledge; also he admits that desire to know a particular object and close attentive listening can be the causes in the perception of a particular sound in the case of close association of various sounds.

Further the Naiyāyikas suggest that the perception of the noice sound (*kolāhala*) amounts to the knowledge of neglect (*upekṣā jñāna*) in the case of perception of desired sound. Thus, ear is competent for the perception of various sounds.

The Naiyāyikas explain the recognition 'I experience five qualities simultaneously' by imposing the experienceness on the recognition of five qualities.

Further the Naiyāyikas explain the twenty movements in the twenty fingers of body from the efforts occuring in the atomic regions of body; and hence they establish mind to be atomic in nature.

XI
Theory of Re-Cognition (Anuvyavasāya vādaḥ) :

Introduction :

Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra (I. 1. 15) uses the terms cognition (*buddhi*), understanding (*upalabdhi*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) as synonyms. Also Annambhaṭṭa in his Tarka Saṅgraha (34) agrees that cognition (*buddhi*) is knowledge (*jñāna*); however, he states that cognition is the special instrumental cause of all functions or uses (*sarva vyavahāra hetu*). Philosophers all over the world are unanimous in their opinion that knowledge produces certain practical functions or uses (*vyavahāra*). For instance, the knowledge of a pot (*ghaṭa jñāna*) such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) produces the practical function or use of the pot in the form of bringing of water (*jalāharaṇa*) etc. However, lack of knowledge of a pot (*ajñāna*) does not produce any practical function or use of the pot. In other words, knowledge of a certain object such as a pot produces the action (*kriyā*) or activity (*pravṛtti*) of people; and makes them use the object in accomplishing the bringing of water etc.; whereas the lack of knowledge of a certain object such as a pot does not produces any action or activity in people; and does not make them use the object in accomplishing the bringing of water etc. Thus, Indian philosophers and epistemologists have recognized the significance of knowledge in producing the use of object.

Problem :

However, the question is how does a cognition or knowledge produce practical function or use of itself. Does it produce practical function or use all by itself (*svataḥ*) or with the help of others (*parataḥ*). In other words, does a cognition or knowledge produce practical function or use of itself independently without the help of others or does it do so depending upon others? Some Indian philosophers, especially the Mīmāmsakas proposed, in this regard, that cognition or knowledge produces practical function or use of the self (knowledge) all by itself; i.e. the function or use is accomplished by the knowledge itself; and hence it does not require the help of others. They held that the simple first knowledge refers to the self (knowledge) as its object and is associated with the power conducive to use of the self (knowledge).

And they based their theory on the belief that knowledge is self-conscious or self manifest.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas held that the simple first knowledge (*jñāna or vyavasāya*) such as 'This is pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is different from second mental knowledge or recognition (*mānasa or anu vyavasāya*) such as 'I know this as pot' (*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*); and hence it cannot refer to the self (knowledge) as its object and needs second mental knowledge or recognition to refer to it. Also the Naiyāyikas proposed that the form such as 'I know this as silver' does not manifest in the first knowledge; and hence the knowledge such as 'I know this as silver' constitutes only recognition. Thus, first knowledge need not be self-conscious or self manifest (*sva prakāśa*) to facilitate the reference to the self. In the following pages, we shall discuss the Mīmāmaskas' and the Naiyāyikas' views to explain the theory of recognition.

Mīmāmsakas' Objection Jñāna is Svavyavahārahetu :

The Mīmāmsakas (T.C.I. xi. 1) hold that the existing simple (first) knowledge (*vartamāna jñāna*) such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is known all by itself (*svayam*); and hence is not known by means of another mental knowledge or recognition (*mānasa*). Rather, the simple first knowledge produces the use of the self (knowledge) (*sva vyavahāra hetu*) all by itself; and hence it does not require another mental knowledge or recognition (*jñānāntara*) for the use of the self, as the use is not in conformity with the presence and the absence of another mental knowledge. The Mīmāmsakas thus object that the assumption of second mental knowledge or recognition is heavy and unnecessary as the use of the self (knowledge) is quite tenable by the first knowledge itself.

However, the Mīmāmsakas admit that the use of the object such as the pot *(ghatādi vyavahāra)* requires the help of the second mental knowledge or re-cognition. According to them, the use of the object such as the pot is not possible by itself and needs the knowledge of the object. Further, the past and future knowledges require the second mental knowledge or re-cognition for the use of the self, as the first knowledge is absent at the time of the use of the self (past and future knowledge).

Further, the Mīmāmsakas note that the desire (*icchā*) etc. require the help of the knowledge for the use of the self (desire etc.). According to them, the uses are ruled to be produced from the knowledge and hence the use etc. of desire etc. cannot be produced by the self (desire etc.) only.

Jnāna is Svaviṣayaka :

The most important aspect of the Mīmāmsakas' theory of knowledge (T.C.I.xi. 2) is the theory of reference to the self (*knowledge*) (*sva viṣayatva*).

According to them, the existing first knowledge (*vartamāna jñāna*) refers to the self (knowledge), all by itself, as its object (*sva viṣayaka*). Also the knowledge, which is associated with the power conducive to the use of the self (knowledge) (*sva vyavahārānukūla śakti*), refers to the self (knowledge) as its object (*tad viṣaya*). Thus, the knowledge such as 'This is a pot', which is associated with the power coducive to the use of the self (knowledge), refers to the self (knowledge) as its object.

Svaviṣayatva is Svabhāvaviśeṣa :

It should be noted here (T.C.I. xi. 3) that the Mīmāmsakas admit that the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*) constitutes the very nature of the knowledge (*svabhāva viśeṣa*). Thus, the knowledge, which refers to the self (knowledge) as its object (*svīya jñāna*), is competent of producing the use of the self (knowledge), like the knowlegde, which refers to the pot as its object (*ghaṭīya jñāna*), is competent of producing the use of the object, i.e. the pot.

Svaviṣayatva is Svaprakāśatva :

The Mīmāmsakas (T.C.I.xi. 4.) firmly believe that the simple first knowledge is the cause of the use of the self (knowledge) (*svavyavahāra hetu*) only as being the knowledge, which is to be used (*vyavahartavya jñānatvena*), and not as being the second mental knowledge or recognition (*jñānāntaratvena*). Thus, they establish their theory that the first knowledge is the cause of the use of the self (knowledge) (*svavyavahāra hetu*) by refuting the theory that the use of the self (knowledge) needs to be obtained from the second mental knowledge or recognition.

The Mīmāmsakas' theory of the reference to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*) is based on their all important belief of the self-consciousness of the knowledge (*sva prakāśatva*). The Mīmāmsakas hold that the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*) is the state of being self-conscious or self-manifested (*sva prakāśatva*); and hence the same state does not mean the state of not requiring another second mental knowledge (*jñānāntarānapekṣatva*). Otherwise, since the impression of the first knowledge (*jñānasya samskāra*), as referring to the self as its object, becomes absent, the recollection of the object (*smaraṇa*) would become untenable.

Triputīpratyakṣa Vāda :

The Triputīpratyakṣavādins among the Mīmāmsakas, who hold the doctrine of triangular perception (Triputī pratyakṣa vāda) (T.C.I.xi.5), state that each knowledge is self manifest or self-conscious; and knowledge

manifests in the form that 'I know this' (*idam aham jānāmi*), which describes the knower (*jñātṛ*), knowable object (*jñeya*) and the knowledge (*jñāna*). According to them, the knower is perceived as the soul agent (*ātman kartṛ*), the knowable object is perceived as the grammatical object (*karman*) and the knowledge is perceived as the action (*kriyā*). Thus each knowledge is experienced as triangular (*tripuṭī*) as referring to the knower, the knowable and the knowledge.

The Tripuṭipratyakṣavādins too hold that the first knowledge does not require another second mental knowledge (*jñānāntarā napekṣa*) for producing the use of the self (*sva vyavahāra*), as the knowledge is self-conscious or self-manifest (*sva prakāśa*) and the same can be proved by perception (*pratyakṣa*).

Paraprakāśakatva is Untenable :

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. xi. 6) that the simple first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) such as 'This is pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is produced first; and then the second mental perception or recognition 'I know this as pot' (*idam aham jānāmi*) is produced subsequently; and that the use of the first knowledge needs to be caused from the second mental knowledge or recognition. According to them, when the use of the first knowledge is tenable to be produced from the self consciousness of the first knowledge itself (*svaprakāśa tva*), the assumption of the second mental knowledge or recognition (*anu vyavasāya*) is quite unnecessary and heavy. Thus the Mīmāmsakas establish that knowledge is self-conscious (*sva prakāśa*) and the self-consciousness of knowledge can be established by exclusive specification (*pariśeṣa*); and the very nature of knowledge would become untenable in the case of the knowledge being conscious by other knowledge (*paraprakāśakatve*).

Pratyakṣa is not Mānasa :

Further, the Mīmāmsakas state that the simple perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) cannot be mental (*mānasa*). According to them, when perceptual knowledge, which is not desired to be known (*ajijñāsita*), is mental knowledge, it would involve ceaselessness; and when perceptual knowledge, which is desired to be known (*jijñāsita*), is mental knowledge, the inference of non-mental nature would become contradicted.

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. xi. 7) that the inference that 'The first knowledge (*jñāna*) is mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*); for, it is the particular quality of soul (*ātma viśeṣa guṇatvāt*)' or that 'The knowledge produced from eye (*cakṣur janya jñānam*) does not constitute the object of knowledge produced from eye (*na cakṣur janya jñāna viṣayam*); for, it constitutes the perception (*pratyakṣatvāt*)' proves the knowledge to be mental. According to them, when the first knowledge is to be manifest by another mental knowledge or recognition (*paraprakāśatve*), the very nature of knowledge becomes unestablished.

Svaviṣayatva is Svavyavahāraśaktatva :

The Mīmāmsakas describe (T.C.I. xi. 7) the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*) as the state of being competent of producing the use of the self (knowledge) (*sva vyavahāra śaktatva*). According to them, the knowledge refers to the self (knowledge) as its object means it (knowledge) is competent of producing the use of the self (knowledge). And such a state is not contradictory even if the first knowledge is not produced from the comprehensional relation of the knowledge of itself (*sva sannikarṣā-janyatve*) or if it is not produced from the knowledge itself (*svājanyatve*).

Mīmāmsakas' Theory of Perception :

The Mīmāmsakas (T.C.I. xi. 8) hold that the present or the simple first knowledge (*vartamāna jñāna*) has a reference to the self as its object (*sva viṣaya*), as the same is the very nature of the knowledge (*svabhāva viśeṣa*). Further they propose that the first knowledge, which is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organs (*indriya sannikarṣa*) and independent of another knowledge, is perception (*pratyakṣa*); and hence all knowledges (*sarva jñāna*) are perceptions in respect of their own selves (*svātmani*).

However, the Mīmāmsakas opine that qualificative perception (*viśiṣṭa pratyakṣa*) is not produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*), as mere inditerminate knowledge without a qualifier is refuted. Also they hold that qualificative knowledge, being determinate, is not produced from another knowledge; and the same is perception.

Naiyāyikas' Refutation of Svaprakāśatva :

The Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. xi. 9), who admit a second knowledge or re-cognition (*anu vyavasāya*) as distinct from the simple first knowledge (*vyavasāya or jñāna*), refute the position that perception (*pratyakṣa*) can be the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that proves the first knowledge to be self-conscious (*sva prakāśa*), as the first knowledge is not established to have the form such as 'I know this as silver' (*idam aham jānāmi*). According to them, the form of the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is only that 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*) and not that 'I know this as silver' (*idam rajatam iti jānāmi*); and such a simple first knowledge merely refers to the object silver (*rajata viṣayaka*); however, it does not refer to the self (knowledge) as its object

(*sva viṣaya*); and hence it is not the cause of activity (*pravṛtti hetu*). However, the form of the second mental knowledge or recognition (*anu vyavasāya*) is that 'I know this as silver' (*idam rajatam iti jānāmi*), which is obtained after the first knowledge, and such a recognition refers to the first knowledge as its object (*jñāna viṣayaka*); and hence it is the cause of activity (*pravṛtti viṣaya*).

Further the Naiyāyikas refute the argument of the Mīmāmsakas that infinite regress (*ānantya*) would occur in admitting a separate recognition to refer to simple first knowledge as its object. According to them, when recognition is not admitted and only a first knowledge is admitted, the same first knowledge would be required to be self conscious or self-manifest (*svaprakāśa*) to refer to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayaka*)'; and hence the form of the first knowledge would have to be 'I know this as silver' (*idam aham jānāmi*) which is contradictory. Therefore, first knowledge cannot be admitted to be self conscious or self-manifest (*sva prakāśa*) by having the form 'I know this as so and so' (*idam aham jānāmi*).

Jñāna is not Svaviṣayaka :

The Naiyāyikas (T.C.I. xi. 10) state that the state of having the inherence of activity (*kṛteḥ samavāyitva*) is the agenthood (*kartṛtva*); the state of having the effect of the action inherent in what is other than the object (*para samaveta kriyājanya phala śālitva*) is the object hood (*karmatva*); and the state of being the verbal root-meaning (*dhātvarthatva*) is the actionhood (*kriyātva*). According to them, since the epistemological form such as 'I know this as silver' (*idam rajatam jānāmi*) does not manifest in the first knowledge due to the absence of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs, the knowledge of the form such as 'I know this as silver' constitutes only the second mental knowledge or recognition (*anuvyavasāya*), but not the first knowledge (*vyavasāya or jñāna*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument of the Mīmāmsakas that since the use of the simple first knowledge (*vyavahāra*) is to be accomplished from the first knowledge referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayaka jñāna*), the same first knowledge needs to refer to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣaya*); and also since the self (knowledge) (*ātman*) constitutes the object of the first knowledge (*tad viṣaya*), all first knowledges refer to the selves (knowledges) as their objects. According to the Naiyāyikas, the first knowledge (*sva*), not being the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs producing the self (*sva janakendriya sannikarṣānāśraya*), cannot refer to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣaya*). Also according to them, an effect (*kārya*) cannot be produced without the cause (*kāraṇam*); and hence the first knowledge, which does not produce the perception (*pratyakṣājanaka*), cannot refer to the perception as its object (*pratyakṣa viṣaya*). Further the first knowledge, which is perceptual in nature (*pratyakṣa*), is the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs; and therefore, it is the effect to be produced from the relation of mind (*manas sannikarṣa janya*); and hence is mental (*mānasa*).

Form of Inference estalishing Anuvyavasāya :

The Naiyāyikas (T.C.I.xi. 11) state that the inference such as "The first knowledge produced from sense-organ (*indriya janya jñāna*) is not the substratum of reference to the self (first knowledge) as its object (*naitat jñāna viṣayāśrayaḥ*); for, it is not the substratum of the comprehensional relation producing the simple first knowledge (*etat jñāna janakendriya sannikarṣānāśrayatvāt*)" establishes that visual perceptual knowledge (*cākṣuṣa jñāna*) is not the object of first knowledge produced from eye; rather, therefore, it is the object of second mental knowledge or recognition.

Further the Naiyāyikas state that the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti jñāna*) such as "The first knowledge which is knowable, is the object of mental knowledge (*jñānam prameyam*)" refers to the self (first knowledge) as the object of re-cognition (*sva viṣaya*) through the comprehensional relation of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva pratyāsatti*). Also the Naiyāyikas state that the knowledge of the lord (*Īśvara jñāna*), which is self-conscious (*sva prakāśa*), proves that the first knowledge cannot be self conscious and hence only the recognition can refer to the first knowledge as its object.

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection that when first knowledge is held to be manifest by the other, i.e. recognition (*para prakāśatve*), the same first knowledge cannot be established to be knowledge (*jñāna*) due to the infinite regress. According to them, all the knowledges, such as second knowledge or recognition etc. do not have the necessary knowability (*avaśya vedyatva*); and hence they need not become manifest by yet other recognitions; and thus the infinite regress does not become contingent.

Avaśyavedyatva cannot be the cause of Svaprakaśatva :

The Naiyāyikas now refute the objection of the Mīmāmsakas (T.C.I. xi.12) that all the knowledges (*vitti*) are proved to have the necessary knowability (*avaśya vedyatva*) by the law of concomitance that 'Knowledge is only perception' (*jñānam pratyakṣam*) due to being competent particular quality of soul (*ātma viśeṣa guṇa*); and hence the first knowledge, being knowledge, needs to have self-consciousness (*svaprakāśatva*). According to them, such a law of invariable concomitance is not established; and hence cannot prove self-consciousness of first knowledge.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the objection that first knowledge can be proved to have the self-consciousness (*sva prakāśatva*) by the inference of exclusive specification (*pariśeṣānumāna*), as the infinite regress (*anavasthāna*) would become contingent in the case of the manifestation of first knowledge by the other knowledge, i.e. recognition (*para prakāśe*). According to them, when the inference proves the self-consciousness of first knowledge, even the Mīmāmsakas' theory faces the fault of infinite regress, as even the inference proving the self-consciousness needs to be manifest by yet another inference.

Tenability of the Theory of Recognition :

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument (T.C.I.xi. 13) that mind (*manas*), being dependent on the knowledge (*jñāna sāpekṣa*), cannot produce the first knowledge; and hence second mental knowledge or recognition cannot be perceptual with respect to first knowledge; thus only first knowledge needs to be self-conscious and does not require another second mental knowledge or recognition (*jñānāntara*) in the case of reference to the self (knowledge). According to them, first knowledge cannot be both dependent and independent on another knowledge in the case of reference to the self as its object.

Further the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that knowledge (*vitti*), which is not to be known (*vedya*), is non-existent (*asatī*); and hence the first knowledge which does not refer to the self as its object, is non-existent. According to them, a series of knowledges referring to the first knowledge as its object (*tad vitti vittidhārā*) is not necessary; and hence only first knowledge can be admitted to be known by some other knowledge, i.e. recognition.

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection that the knowledge, which is different from both the first knowledge and recognition, i.e. 'This is pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) and 'I know that this is pot' (*ghatam aham jānāmi*), is absent; and hence the Naiyāyikas theory of recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) is untenable. According to them, recognition is to be described by its own object (*viṣaya nirūpya*); however, it is not to be described by a series of its objects (*tad viṣaya paramparā nirūpya*). Thus, the recognition is admitted to be the knowledge of knowledge (*jñāna jñānatvena*); and hence the theory of re-cognition is not untenable.

Tadvyavahāraśaktatva is not Tadviṣayatva :

The Naiyāyikas (T.C.I.xi. 14) refute the argument that the state of being competent of producing the use of the self (knowledge) (*tad vyavahāra śaktatva*) constitutes the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*tad viṣayatva*). According to them, such a view would involve mutual dependence (*anyo'nyā śraya*), as the knowledge of the state of being competent of producing the use of the self (knowledge) arises only after the knowledge of the causality of the use of the self (knowledge) (*tad vyavahāra śaktatva grahe*); and the state of being competent of producing the use of the self constitutes the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*tad viṣaya tva*); and hence untenable.

The Naiyāyikas refute the position that the knowledge of object (*jñāna*) is the cause of activity towards its object. According to them, then the knowledge of silver, though invalid, needs to be the cause of activity towards silver.

Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the Guru's position that knowledge (*jñāna*) produces the use and the imperssion of its object (*vyavahāra smaraṇa*) by including the self (knowledge), as knowledge produces the impression with respect to the object of activity produced from itself (*svajanya vyavahāra viṣaye*). According to them, knowledge produces the activity and the impression with respect to only its object; and hence it cannot produce the activity and the impression with respect to both the object and the self (knowledge).

Justification of Viśiṣṭabuddhi :

The Mīmāmsakas pose the objection here (T.C.I. xi. 15) that when perceptual knowledge (*jñāna*) is held to be mental (*mānasa*), qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭa buddhi*) or recognition such as 'I know this as pot' (*aham jānāmi*) would become untenable, as the qualificand (*viśesya*) is absent at the time of the indeterminate knowledge produced from the indeterminate knowledgeness (*jñānatva nirvikalpaka janya*); and hence the qualificative perception of the qualifier (*pratyakṣa*) cannot be produced.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the qualificative cognition of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva viśiṣṭa buddhi*) is produced in the second or after-knowledge only at the loss of the first knowledge (*jñāna nāśa kṣaṇe*), as the qualificative cognition is present only at the second moment prior to the loss of simple first knowledge (*pūrvakṣaṇe*).

Also in the case of qualificative cognition such as 'I know this as pot' (*jānāmi*), only a gross condition (*upādhi*), as existing, is perceived; however, the particular moment (*kṣaṇa*) is not perceived due to being beyond the senses. Thus, qualificative cognition of knowledge or recognition (*jñāna viśiṣṭa buddhi*) is produced in the soul, as the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) exists there.

Alternative Explanation of Viśiṣṭabuddhi :

Gangeśa refutes the position of some (T.C. I. xi. 16) that qualificative cognition of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva viśiṣṭa buddhi*) appears in the latter

first knowledge (*vyavasāyāntara*) produced at the loss of the former first knowledge (*ādya vyavasāya*). According to him, the cause of the latter first knowledge is absent; and hence such an assumption is untenable.

Also Gaṅgeśa suggests an alternative explanation of the qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭa buddhi*) that both the knowledge (*jñāna*) and the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) appear only in the indeterminate knowledge; and therefore the qualification of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the knowledge (*jñāne*) and the knowledge appears in the soul (*ātmani*); thus, the qualification of the qualified (*viśiṣṭa vaiśiṣṭya*) means that the qualifier appears in the qualified and another qualifier appears in the first qualifier.

Anuvyavasāya or Viśiṣṭa buddhi are both Saprakāra and Niṣprakāra :

Gaṅgeśa (T.C.I. xi. 17) concludes his theory of recognition (*anuvyavasāya vāda*) by stating that first knowledge (*jñāna or vyavasāya*), like absence (*abhāva*), needs to be the object of qualificative cognition or recognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna viṣaya*), but cannot be the object of an indeterminate first knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*). According to him, qualificative cognition or recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) is to be produced from the first knowledge referring to the qualifier such as the object (*viṣaya rūpa viśeṣaṇa viṣayaka vyavasāya sāddhya*). Also the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) appears only in the recognition. Thus, re-cognition is qualificative in certain aspect (*saprakāraka*) and non-qualificative (*niṣprakāraka*) in certain other aspect; and hence has a dual nature like man-lion.

Gaṅgeśa clarifies further that the qualification of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the re-cognition; however, it does not appear in the after-inference (*anuminomi*), as the inferenceness is absent in the re-cognition.

Conclusions :

Cognition or knowledge is admitted to be the instrument cause of certain functions or uses of the object such as the pot. Thus, the cognition or knowledge such as 'This is pot' produces the practical functions or uses of the pot in the form of bringing of the water etc.

However, epistemologists posed the question as to how does knowledge produce the use of the self (knowledge)? Does it produce the use all by itself or with the help of others.

The Mīmāmsakas proposed that knowledge produces the use of the self (knowledge) all by itself; and hence does not require the help of others.

The Mīmāmsakas justified their theory by holding that simple first knowledge refers to the self (knowledge) as its object; and it is associated with the power conducive to the use of the self. Further, they held that the state of referring to the self as its object is the very nature of knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas' theory of the reference to the self (knowledge) as its object is based on their belief of the self-consciousness of knowledge; and hence they have proposed that the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object means the state of being self-conscious.

Others admitting a doctrine of triangular perception held that knowledge such as 'I know this' describes the knower, knowable object and knowledge.

The Mīmāmsakas strongly opposed the Naiyāyikas' theory that the use of the first knowledge such as 'This is pot' needs to be produced from the second mental knowledge or re-cognition such as 'I know this as pot'. Also they refuted that perceptual knowledge can be mental. Further, they proposed that knowledge, which is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organs and independent of another knowledge, is perception.

The Naiyāyikas, however proposed that first knowledge such as 'This is pot' is distinct from second mental knowledge or recognition such as 'I know this as pot'; and they held that first knowledge cannot refer to the self (knowledge) as its object and needs second mental knowledge or recognition to refer to it. Thus, first knowledge need not be self-conscious to facilitate the reference to the self (knowledge) by itself.

The Naiyāyikas firmly believed that the epistemological form 'I know this as silver' does not manifest in the first knowledge; and hence the after knowledge such as 'I know this as silver' constitutes only recognition; and consequently the first knowledge cannot refer to the self as its object.

The Naiyāyikas established that inference establishes recognition as referring to the first knowledge as its object and invariable concomitance establishes the first knowledge as the object of recognition.

The Naiyāyikas explained that the necessary knowability of all knowledges does not prove the self-consciousness of first knowledge. Also they explained that the first knowledge produces the impression and the activity with respect to only its object and hence cannot include the self (knowledge).

Further the Naiyāyikas stated that qualificative cognition of the knowledgeness is produced in the second or after-knowledge or recognitiononly at the loss of the first knowledge; or alternately the knowledgeness appears in the knowledge and the knowledge appears in the soul. Thus Gaṅgeśa established that first knowledge is the object of quaificative cognition or recognition.

XII

Theory of Indetrminate Knowledge (Nirvikalpaka vādaḥ)

Introduction

Perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is produced from comprehensional relation of senses (*indriya sannikarṣa*) with objects. (Tarka Saṅgraha, 34) and involves two different stages. When an object like pot is brought before us, the organ of sight comes into contact with the object of pot, and then carries its image of pot to the mind which conveys it to the soul. Such an image is then converted into simple knowledge (*buddhi*) such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*). The simple knowledge, being the property of the soul, becomes combined with the ego (*ahaṅkāra*) and results into the complex knowledge such as 'I know that this is a pot' (*ayam ghata iti jānāmi*), this complex knowledge is called after - knowledge or recognition (*anuvyava sāya*), as it follows simple first knowledge

Perceptual knowledge or perception (*pratyakṣa*) may be two kinds : viz. non-reflective, i.e. abstract or indeterminate (*nirvikalpa*) and reflective, i.e. concrete or determinate (*savikalpaka*). Indeterminate knowledge is immediate and determinate knowledge is mediate in character.

On the intercourse or comprehensional relation of sense organs with the object, an indeterminate simple knowledge, which is non-reflective, but immediate, is produced. It is super sensous; and hence not cognizable by any senses including mind. It is devoid of any connection with name and generic property (*nāma jāti*) and hence involves no relation and specification. (Bhāṣā pariccheda, 59).

Thus, indeterminate knowledge is a simple perception of the mere subject 'pot' and that of the generic property 'potness'; and does not involve any relation between the subject 'pot' and the generic property of 'potness'. The knowledge of mere pot and that of the potness are of the nature of 'This is something'; and it is absurd that they can involve any relation between the pot and the potness.

Annambhaṭṭa (Tarkasaṅgraha Dīpikā, 34) defines indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) as a knowledge (*jñāna*), which is devoid of reference

to the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya sambandha rahita*). According to him, indeterminate knowledge is a simple knowledge having the knowledgeness (*jñānatva ghaṭita*), but devoid of the reference to the qualifierness of the potness and the qualificandness of the pot; and hence refers to the mere nature of the object, viz. the pot (*vastu svarūpa*) such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*).

It should be noted that indeterminate knowledge is devoid of the reference to the qualifierness and the qualificandness means that it does not involve any qualification (*vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi*); and hence is non-qualificative knowledge.

The Vedāntins (Vācaspatya) too hold that indeterminate knowledge is a knowledge, which is devoid of the relation of qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣya viśeṣaṇa sambandha rahita*); however, they claim that it has the indivisible form (*akhaṇḍākāraka*); and refers to the only nature of the Brahman (*brahmaikātma viṣaya*); and hence it is without the division of the knower and the object known (*jñātṛ jñeya vibhāga śūnya*).

The Sāṅkhyas (Sāṅkhya Kau., 27) hold that non-sensual (*alaukika*) and simple first perceptual knowledge (*ālocana*) is indeterminate knowledge. According to them, the simple first knowledge, which is equal to the knowledge of the child (*bāla vijñāna sadṛśa*) and produced from the unknown object (*mugdha vastu ja*), is indeterminate. And second or after-knowledge, which possesses the reference to the qualifying property (*dharma*) and the generic property (*jāti*) etc., is determinate knowledge.

The Bauddhas, especially the Vaibhāṣikas, (Sarvadarśana saṅgraha, p. 44) believe that only indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) is valid (*pramāṇa*), and determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) is invalid. According to them, the knowledge, which is devoid of assumptions (*nirvikalpa*), is valid (*pramāṇa*) and the knowledge, which is full of assumptions (*savikalpa*), is invalid (*apramāṇa*). Thus, only the indeterminate knowledge such as 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) or 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*), which is devoid of any assumption of the qualifier and the qualificand (*kalpanāpoḍha*), etc., is valid; whereas any other knowledge such as 'I know that this is a pot' (*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*), which is full of assumptions of the qualifier and the qualificand etc. (*kalpanā jñāna*), is invalid.

Problem

However, Gaṅgeśa, in his Nirvikalpaka vāda (T.C.I. xii), has discussed the nature of indeterminate knowledge and the difference between determinate and indeterminate knowledges in great detail. Also he has established that the qualificative perception such as 'This person is a staff-

holder' is partly indeterminate; and that first ever perception such as 'This is a cow' is both determinate and indeterminate. Further, he has discussed the nature of simple and adventitious qualifiers and presented various definitions of simple and adventitious qualifiers. Thus, we shall present a brief account of Gaṅgeśa's theory of indeterminate knowledge and also the theory of simple and adventitious qualifiers.

Nirvikalpaka is Nāmajātyādi yojanā rahita :

Gaṅgeśa too divides perceptual knowledge or perception (*pratyakṣa*) as two fold as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) (T.C. I. xii. 1.); and holds that indeterminate knowledge is devoid of association of name, generic property etc. (*nāma jātyādi yojanā rahita*), not involving the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhī*) and without a qualifier (*niṣprākāraka*). For instance, the knowledge 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*) is an indeterminate knowledge as it is devoid of association of name, generic property etc., and does not involve any qualification due to the lack of any qualifier.

Inference is Proof of Indeterminate knowledge :

The Naiyāyikas (Nyāya Siddhānta Dīpikā, p.34) hold that inference proves the existence of indeterminate knowledge. For instance, the inference "The qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānam*) is to be produceded by the knowledge of the qualifier to be produced (*janya viśeṣaṇa jñāna pūrvakam*); for, it is a qualificative knowledge to be produced (*janya viśiṣṭ jñānatvāt*), like the qualificative knowledge such as 'This person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣa iti vat*)". proves the existence of indeterminate knowledge. According to them, the qualificative knowledge such as 'This person is a staff-holder', being a qualificative knowledge, is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier staff (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*); and the same knowledge of the qualifier is an indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) (Tarka kaumudi, 1.8), as it lacks of any relation with the qualificand.

Gaṅgeśa too admits (T.C.I. xii.2) that inference is the proof of inderminate knowledge. According to him, perception (*pratyakṣa*) cannot constitute the proof of inderminate knowledge, as the same indeterminate knowledge is beyond senses. Also, qualificative knowledge (*vikalpa*), produced from the experience, cannot be the proof of indeterminate knowledge, as the qualificative knowledge is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier.

Viśeṣaṇa jñāna is the cause of Viśiṣṭa jñāna :

It should be noted (T.C.I. xii. 2) that qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*); and hence the same constitutes the cause of qualificative knowledge; and this fact

is proved by the inference such as 'The qualificative perception like 'This is a cow' (*gaur iti pratyakṣam*) is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*); for, it is a knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñānatvāt*).

Gangeśa refutes the argument that the knowledge of the quaifier cannot constitute the cause of qualificative knowledge (perception), as the previously unknown qualifier too can appear in the perception due to the comprehesional relation of competent sense organ (*yogyendriya sannikarṣa*). According to him, establishment of probandum (*sādhya prasiddhi*), recollection of word-meaning (*padārthopasthiti*), knowledge of the expressedness (*vācyatva jñāna*) and experience of the thatness (*tattā jñāna*) are the causes of inference, verbal congnition, analogical understanding and re-cognition respectively; and hence knowledge of the qualifier such as the probandum gets automatically established to be the cause.

Refutation of objection that Viśeṣaṇa jñāna is not cause :

Gangeśa refutes the objection (T.C.I.xii.3) that knowledge of fire (*vahni jñāna*), as being knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*), is not the cause of qualificative inference such as 'Mountain has fire' (*parvato vahnimān*); and hence only the knowledge of something, as having the delimitor of the qualifierness as its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka prakāratvena*), is the cause of qualificative knowledge. According to him, when the particular knowledges of the two entities have the cause-and -effect relationship, the general knowledges of the two too become established to have the cause-and-effect relationship; and hence the knowledge of the qualifier in general gets established to be the cause of qualificative knowledge (perception) in general.

Objection that Inference is not tenable :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection (T.C.I. xii. 4) that the state of being produced from the knowledge of the immediate qualifier (*avyavahita viśeṣaṇa jñāna janyatva*) cannot be the probandum, as the qualificative knowledge can be tenable even from the remembarence of the qualifier. Thus, the inference establishing the qualificative knowledge from the knowledge of the qualifier is not tenable.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that since the remembarence of the qualifier is absent in the immediate qualificative perception of form etc., the determinate qualificative knowledge cannot be produced from the mere remembarence of the qualifier. According to him, neither the knowledge of the white colour, as qualified by the white colourness, nor the same knowledge as not qualified by the white colourness, is produced from the knowledge of the mentally present qualifier (*pratyutpanna viśeṣaṇa*). Thus, the infernece

establishing qualificative knowledge from the knowledge of the qualifier is not tenable.

Ādyaviśiṣṭānubhava is from Viśeṣaṇa jñāna :

The Siddhantin, however (T.C.I. xii. 5), states that the first ever qualificative experience (*ādya viśiṣṭānubhava*) at the waking state is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*); and hence the perceptual knowledge (*ālocana*) of the qualifier is the manifestor of the qualificative experience.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that since the impression is not manifested dispite the presence of the knowledge of the qualifier, the same knowledge of the qualifier cannot be the manifestor. According to him, the manifestation of the impression (*saṃskārodbodha*) occurs after the knowledge of the qualifier; and hence the same knowledge of the qualifier must be admitted to be the cause.

Objection :

However, the Pūrvapakṣin objects again (T.C.I. xii. 6) that the knowledge to be distinguished (*avacchedya*) in the case of the inference "The qualificative perception such as 'This is a cow' is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier; for, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge" is a non-quailficative knowledge; and hence it is useless.

Also he objects that the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier and the qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya jñānatva*), as it is deviating in the case of perception. Also he objects that such a state cannot be the state of being the object of exclusion from what is other than that (*atad vyāvṛtti viṣayatva*), as the same is not established in the qualificative perception "This is a cow".

Siddhānta : Gauriti pratyakṣa is Indeterminate :

The Siddhāntin replies (T.C. I. xii. 7) that the first ever perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) such as 'This is a cow' (*gaur iti*) is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier, i.e. the cowness (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna janya*); as it is the qualificative knowledge to be produced (*viśiṣṭa jñānatvāt*); and hence it is partly qualificative knowledge.

Also the Siddhāntin clarifies that the first ever perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' is also non-qualificative knowledge due to the absence of the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñānābhāva*); and hence it is partly indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*).

Gotvavaiśiṣṭya does not appear in Gaur iti jñāna :

The Siddhāntin refutes (T.C.I.xii.8) that the knowledge of the cowness (*gotva jñāna*) is produced in the perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' from the knowledge of the cowness, as one and the same knowledge of the cowness cannot be the delimitor of the producerness and that of the producedness.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that in the perceptual knowledge 'This is cow', the qualification of the qualifier, the cowness (*gotva vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the cow. According to him, only the cowness (*gotva*), and not the qualification of the cowness (*gotva vaiśiṣṭya*), can appear in the qualifier in such a perception.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the qualifier, the cowness appears in such a perception, as qualified by its property of the cowness-ness (*gotva tva*). According to him, such a property remains unknown there. Also suppose such a property becomes known, then the same too would be required to be qualified by yet another property, i.e. the cowness-ness-ness; and hence, the infinite regress would become contingent. Further it should be noted that all the qualifiers need not appear to be qualified by the qualifying properties; and hence the cowness need not appear as qualified by the cowness-ness.

Viśeṣaṇa is Sārthaka :

The Siddhāntin notes (T.C.I. xii. 9) that the relation (*sambandha*), which constitutes the relation of one entity with another entity, is the quailfication (*vaiśiṣṭya*) of that entity; and hence the qualified entity appears as excluded from other non-qualified entities. For instance, in 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*), the relation of the staff with the person is the qualification of the person; and hence the qualified person of staff-holder appears as excluded from non-staff-holders.

However, the Siddhāntin notes that the qualificative perception such as 'The person is a staff-holder' is partly indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*), as the totality of causes of qualificative knowledge is absent there.

Nirvikalpaka is not tenable in Abhāva :

The Siddhāntin states (T.C.I. xii. 10) that indeterminate knowledge is not tenable in the case of absence (*abhāva*). According to him, the knowledge of the counter positive and that of the substrtum (*pratiyogyadhikaraṇa jñāna*) constitute the causes of the knowledge of absence (*tad buddhi*); and therefore, the totality of causes of qualificative knowledge, consisting of those two knowledges, cannot produce indeterminate knowledge of absence.

Also the Siddhāntin notes that the knowledge of absence such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghato nāsti*), wherein the ground is the grammatical qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the absence of the pot is the grammatical qualificand, is produced first; and then the qualificative knowledge such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of pot' (*ghaṭā bhāvavad bhūtalam*); wherein the ground is the actual qualificand, is produced.

Conclusion : Gaur iti pratyakṣa is both Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka :

Gaṅgeśa concludes now (T.C.I.xii.11) that first perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' (*gaur iti pratyakṣa*), like re-cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), is both indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) with respect to the knowledgeness and the qualification of the cowness.

Also he notes that the delimitors of knowledges such as the indeterminateness (*nirvikalpakatva*) and the determinateness (*savikalpakatva*) are not generic properties (*jāti*), as then the cross-connection with the visual perceptionness (*cākṣuṣatva*) would arise.

Prakāra is Two kinds as Viśeṣaṇa and Upalakṣaṇa :

Knowledge (*jñāna*) is two types as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*); and determinate knowledge involves qualifiers. Thus, Gaṅgeśa divides (T.C.I. xii. 12) qualifying entity (*prakāra*) also two fold as simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). According to him, the distinction of qualifying entity as simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) is real and must be admitted to explain determinate and qualificative knowledges.

Objection :

However, the Pūrvapakṣin objects to the two fold division of the qualifying entity (*prakāra*) as simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and adventitious qualifier (*uapalakṣaṇa*). According to him, the staff, which is present while being exclusive in 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*), may be the simple qualifier; and the Kurus, who are absent while being exclusive in 'The land is Kurukṣetra by the Kurus' (*kuruṇā kṣetram*), may be the adventitious qualifier; however, both the crow, which is present while being exclusive in 'The building, which has crow raoming above, is the house of Devadatta' (*kākavad devadattagṛham*) and the braided hair, which is absent while being exclusive, in 'He is an ascetic by braided hair' (*jaṭābhiḥ tāpasaḥ*), are only adventitious qualifiers; and hence such a division is not tenable.

Viśeṣaṇa is not merely Vyāvartaka :

The Pūrvapakṣin now refutes (T.C.I. xii. 13) the view that simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is exclusive (*vyāvartaka*), while existing in a qualificand (*viśeṣya vṛttitve*) and sharing community of locus with the exclusion of what is to be known (*pratyāyya vyāvṛtti samānādhi karaṇatve*), through delimitation of qualification (*viśeṣyatvāvacchedena*) or through exclusion (*vyāvṛttyā*). According to him, such a difinition of the simple qualifierness involves over application in the case of adventitious qualifier such as braided hair in 'He is an ascetic by braided hair' (*jaṭābhiḥ tāpasaḥ*).

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the view that the simple qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) is the state of having the same case ending as that of the word expressing the qualificand (*viśeṣya samāna vibhaktikatva*). According to him, such a sate is overapplicable in the case of adventitious qualifier such as 'crow' (*kākavad*) due to having the same case ending.

Kākavattva too is the Object of qualificative knowledge :

The Siddhāntin proposes now (T.C.I.xii. 14) that the simple qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇa tva*) is the state of being the object of qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa dhī viṣayatva*) while being exclusive (*vyāvartakatve*); and that the qualificative knowledge refers to only the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), but it does not refer to the simple qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*), as then the doubt regarding the simple qualifier and the adventitious qualifier would become untenable.

The Siddhāntin notes here that only the adventitiously qualified aggregate (*upalakṣita*), i.e. the building, and not the state of possessing the crow (*kākavattva*), is the object of qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa dhī viṣaya*) in 'The building having the crow above is the house of Devadatta' (*kākavad devadatta gṛham*). According to him, the reference to the aggregate, i.e. the building (*samsthānopasthiti*) is produced by another cause; and hence the speaker intendes to relate such an aggregate, i.e. building, to the house of Devadatta.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position. According to him, the rule prescribing non- object hood to the adventitious qualifier is not correct. The adventitious qualifier-word (*kākavat*) first refers to the expressed meaning, i.e. that which has crow roaming above; and then refers to the adventitiously qualified, i.e. the building. Thus, only an-indication needs to be admitted in the adventitiously qualified building there. Thus, the state of possessing the crow too is the object of qualificative knowledge.

Viśeṣaṇa cannot be Pratyāyya vyāvṛtti Samānādhikaraṇa :

The Siddhāntin proposes here (T.C.I. xii. 15) that the exclusion from what is other than what it is (*atad vyāvṛtty*) constitutes the qualifiedness or qualification (*vaisiṣṭya*); and hence the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is that which has community of locus with the exclusion from what is to be known (*pratyāyya vyāvṛtti samānādhikaraṇa*), while being the object of the knowledge of the cause of qualificative knowledge.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the definition. According to him, the exclusion from what is other than the blue lotus (*atad vyāvṛtti*) is not referred in the qualificative knowledge such as 'The lotus is a blue lotus' (*nīlam utpalam*) when what is other than the blue lotus (*nīla*) is not described; also such an exclusion is contradictory to the recognition such as 'I know the pot to be the blue pot' (*nīlam jānāmi*); and hence the simple qualifier cannot have the community of lotus with the exclusion.

Sākṣāt sambaddha is Viśeṣaṇa :

Śivāditya Miśra (T.C.I. xii. 16) proposes that the exclusive qualifier (*vyāvartaka*), which is directly related to the qualificand (*sākṣāt sambaddha*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and the exclusive qualifier, which is in directly related to the qualificand (*paramparā sambaddha*), is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). For instace, the exclusive staff, which is directly related to the person in 'The person is a staff-holder', is the simple qualifier; and the exclusive crow, which is indirectly related to the house in 'The building, which has the crow roaming, is the house of Devadatta', is the adventitious qualifier. Also Mishra proposes that that which is directly related is the qualifier and that which is other than directly related is the non-qualifier. For instance, the staff, which is directly related, is the qualifier; and the staff-ness, which is other than directly related, is non-qualifier.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes Shivāditya Mishra's position. According to him, the form (*rūpa*) in 'Handsomely formed cow moves' (*rūpavān calati*) is merely an adventitious qualifer, dispite directly relating to the cow; also the redness (*lohita*) in 'Crystal is red' (*lohitas sphaṭikaḥ*) is the simple qualifier, dispite indirectly relating to the crystal. Thus, that which is directly related cannot be admitted to be the simple qualifier.

Viśeṣya sambaddha vyāvartaka is Viśeṣaṇa :

Yet Others too state (T.C.I. xii. 17) that that which is directly related (*sākṣād anvita*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and that, which is related as manifesting the relational adjuct (*anvaya pratiyogy upasthāpaka*), is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). According to them, the staff which is directly related to the person, is the simple qualifier; and the crow which is related, as manifesting the relational adjunct such as the aggregate of builiding, is the adventitious qualifier.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes such a position as well. According to him, then, the term 'adventitious qualifier' (*upalakṣaṇa*) would become merely indicative (*lākṣaṇika*) by indicating the relational adjunct; also the counterpositive (*pratiyogi*) would not be adventitious qualifier due to not manifesting any relational adjunct.

Yet Others propose here that, that which is exclusive as related to the qualificand (*viśeṣya sambaddam vyāvartaka*), is the simple qualifier; and that, which is exclusive, as not related to the qualificand (*viśeṣyā sambaddha vyāvartaka*), is the adventitious qualifier.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes even such a proposal. According to him, in such a case the form too would become the simple qualifier in 'Taste exists in the pot possessing form'; and also the staff would become merely the adventitious qualifier in 'The staff-holder was there'.

Conclusion : Pratyāyya vyāvṛttyadhikaraṇatve sati vyāvartaka is Viśeṣaṇa:

The Naiyāyikas state (T.C.I. xii. 18) that in the perception such as 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*), the exclusion of the non-staff-holder (*adaṇḍa vyāvṛtti*) is known in the staff-holder (*daṇḍa vati*); and hence the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known (*pratyāyya vyāvṛtty adhikaraṇatā*) of the person is delimited by the simple qualifier, i.e. staff and not by the personness. On other hand, in the knowledge of adventitious qualifier such as 'The building having the crow roaming above is the house of Devadatta' (*kākavad devadatta gṛham*), the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known of the house of Devadatta is delimited by the possesson of the aggregate (*samsthāna vattva*) and not by the adventitious qualifier, i.e. crow.

Thus, the Naiyāyikas conclude that the exclusive factor (*vyāvartaka*), which is the delimitor of the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known (*pratyāyya vyāvṛtty adhikaraṇatāvacchedaka*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and the exclusive factor, other than that (*tad anyat*), is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*).

Udayana's Justification :

Udayana justifies (T.C.I. xii. 19) the Naiyāyikas' conclusion that that which is exclusive, while having community of locus with it (*samānādhikaraṇa*), is the simple qualifier; and that which is exclusive, while not having community of locus with it (*vyadhikaraṇa*), is the adventitious

qualifier. Thus, he states that the simple qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) is the state of conveying the exclusion resident in only the substratum of itself (*svādhikarāṇa mātra vṛtti vyāvṛtti bodhakatva*); whereas the adventitious qualifierness is the state of conveying the exclusion even resident in the non-substratum of itself (*svānadhikaraṇe*).

Alternative definitions

However, Gangesha presents some alternative definitions of qualifier and adventitious qualifier (T.C.I. xii. 20). According to him, that which is the delimitor of what relates to the one relating to the qualificand (*yasya viśeṣaṇānvayinā anvayaḥ tad avecchedaka*), may be the simple qualifier; and that which is other than that (*tad anyad*) may be the adventititous qualifer.

Also according to him, the property (*dharma*), which constitutes the relational adjunct of the relation with the object of speaker's intention (*tātparya viṣayānvaya pratiyogin*) may be the simple qualifier; and that which is other than that (*tad anyad*) may be the adventitious qualifier.

Conclusions

Perceptual knowledge or perception, which is produced from the comprehensional relation of senses, may be a simple knowledge such as 'This is a pot' or a complex recognition such as 'I know that this is a pot'.

Again such a perception may be divided twofold as indeterminate knowledge and determinate knowledge.

Indeterminate knowledge, as Viśvanātha holds, is devoid of connection with any name and generic property; and hence involves no relation and specification.

Annambhaṭṭa held that indeterminate knowledge is devoid of reference to the qualifier and the qualificand and hence is a non-qualificative knowledge.

However, the Sāṅkhyas held that indeterminate knowledge is equal to the knowledge of the child and is produced from unknown object. Whereas, the Buddhists held that only indeterminate knowledge, being devoid of any assumption of qualifier etc., is valid and determinate knowledge, full of assumptions, is invalid.

Gangeśa too divided perception twofold as indeterminate and determinate and held indeterminate knowledge to be devoid of any association with name and generic property and qualifier.

Like many Naiyāyikas, Gangeśa too admits inference to be the proof of indeterminate knowledge, as other means cannot constitute the proof.

Since qualificative knowledge is produced from the knowledge of qualifier, the Siddhāntin Gangeśa established the knowledge of qualifier as the cause of qualificative knowledge.

Further, the Siddhāntin Gangeśa established that first ever qualificative experience is to be produced from the knowledge of qualifier; and hence perceptual knowledge of qualifier is the manifestor of qualificative experience.

The Siddhāntin clarifies that the perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' (*gaur iti pratyakṣa*), is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier of the cowness; but it is at the same time partly non-qualificative due to the absence of the knowledge of the qualifier; and hence it is partly indeterminate.

Gangeśa further clarifies that in such a perception, the qualification of the qualifier of the cowness does not appear in the cow, as the qualification of the cowness cannot appear there.

Gangeśa established that qualificative perception such as 'The person is a staff-holder' is partly indeterminate; but indeterminate knowledge is not tenable in the case of absence. Also he established that *gaur iti pratyakṣa* is both determinate and indeterminate.

Gangeśa divided qualifying entity two fold as simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*), to explain determinate and qualificative knowledges.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin objected that simple qualifier and adventitious qualifier cannot be defined as exclusive factors while being present and absent respectively. Also he objected that simple qualifier and adventitious qualifier cannot be held to be the object and non-object of qualificative knowledges respectively.

Śivāditya Mishra proposed that the exclusive qualifier directly related to the qualificand is simple qualifier; and the exclusive factor indirectly related to the qualificand is adventitious qualifier.

However, the Naiyāyikas concluded that the exclusive factor, which is the delimitor of the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known is the simple qualifier; and the exclusive factor which is other than that is the adventitious qualifier.

Further Gangeśa suggested alternative definitions such as the property, constituting the relational adjunct of the relation with the object of speaker's intention, is the simple qualifier and that which is other than that is the adventitious qualifier.

XIII
Theory of Determinate Knowledge
(Savikalpaka vādaḥ)

Introduction :

While indeterminate perception or knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) is a perception of subject and its generic property as separate from each other without any mutual relation between them, determinate perception or knowledge (*savikalpaka*) is a perception of subject and its generic property etc. as connected with each other through the relation of inherence of them. Consider, for instance, the indeterminate perception 'This is something' (*idam kiñcit*). It is a perception of the subject 'this' and its generic property 'the potness' as separate from each other without any relation between them. Also consider, for instance, the determinate perception 'This is a pot'. (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*). It is a perception of the subject 'this' and its generic property, as connected with each other through the relation of inherence. Thus, while determinate perception is a perception of the subject (pot) and its generic property (potness) etc. as separate from each other, determinate knowledge is a perception of the subject (pot) and its generic property (potness) etc. as related to each other.

Also after knowledge or re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) such as 'I know that this (pot) is that pot' (*so'ayam ghaṭaḥ iti jānāmi*) too is a type of determinate knowledge. For, recognition is a mental perception of the knowledge of the generic property (potness) etc. abiding in the subject (this pot).

Savikalpaka is Viśiṣṭa jñāna :

Generally speaking, determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) is a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) referring to the qualifier and the qualification of the qualificand (*vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi saprakārakam jñānam*, Tarkasaṅgraha Dīpikā, 34). Consider, for instance, the perceptual knowledge such as 'This one is a Brahmin' (*ayam brāhmaṇaḥ*). It is a determinate knowledge, as it is a qualificative knowledge referring to the qualifier such as the Brahminness and the qualification of the qualifier such as the Brahminness. Here the term 'referring to the qualification' (*vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhin*) means referring to the relation of the qualifiers such as the name and generic property etc. with the qualificand (*nāma jātyādi viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya sambandhāvagāhin*). Consider for instance, the qualificative knowledge 'This one is a Brahmin' (*ayam brāhmaṇaḥ*). Here, the qualificative knowledge refers to the qualification of the Brahminness means it refers to the relation of inherence of the Brahminness with the Brahmin. Also the term 'referring to the qualifier' (*saprakārakam*) means it has a reference to the qualifierness of something (*kiñcin niṣṭha prakāratāśālin*). Here in the same qualificative knowledge, the knowledge refers to the qualifier means it has a reference to the qualifierness of the Brahminness.

Savikalpaka is Prakāratānirūpaka :

Knowledge is determinate (*savikalpaka*) means it describes the qualifierness of the object. Thus, the determinate knowledge is the knowledge which describes the qualifierness of the object (*prakāratā nirūpaka*) (Nyāya Bodhinī., 1. p. 11). For instance, consider 'This is a cow' (*iyam gauḥ*). Here, the knowledge 'This is a cow' is determinate; as it describes the qualifierness of the object 'cow'.

It should be noted here that when determinate knowledge describes the qualifierness of the object, it describes even the objectness of the object (*viṣayatā nirūpaka*). Thus, while determinate knowledge describes both the qualifierness and the objectness of the object, indeterminate knowledge describes neither the qualifierness nor the objectness of the object.

Savikalpaka is Eight types :

The Mādhvas (Nyāya kośa) hold that determinate knowledge is the perception referring to the particular form of an object (*viśiṣṭākāra pratyakṣa*) and admit the same to be of eight types as: i) perception of substance; ii) perception of quality; iii) perception of action; iv) perception of generic property; v) perception of particularity; vi) perception of inherence; vii) perception of name and viii) perception of absence. For instance, the perception of substance is 'The person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*). The perception of quality is 'The pot is white' (*ghaṭaḥ śuklaḥ*). The perception of action is 'That Rāma goes to the forest' (*rāmo vanam gacchati*). The perception of generic property is 'This is a cow' (*iyam gauḥ*). The perception of particularity is 'The *atoms* are particulars' (*viśiṣṭāḥ paramāṇavaḥ*). The perception of inherence is 'The yarns inhere in the clothing' (*paṭa samavāyianaḥ tantavaḥ*). The perception of name is 'This one is (named as) Devadatta' (*ayam devadattaḥ*). And the perception of absence is 'The ground has the absence of pot' (*ghaṭābhāva vad bhūtalam*).

Savikalpaka is Samprajñāta :

Also the Yogaśāstrajñas (Upaskāra. viii. 1.2) hold that determinate knowledge is a particular type of mental construction (*samādhi viśeṣa*) and is known as clear consciousness (*samprajñāta*). According to them, determinate knowledge is a clear or accurate understanding of things as they are.

Savikalpaka is Jñātṛ jñeya bheda sahita

The Māyāvādins hold that determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) is the knowledge which makes a distinction between the knower (*jñātṛ*) and the knowable (*jñeya*). Consider for instance, 'This is a piece of silver' (*idam rajatam*). It is a determinate knowledge, as it makes a distinction between the knower, i.e. the soul and the knowable, i.e the silver. Thus, according to the Māyāvādins, the knowledge which distinguishes the knower and the knowable is determinate; and the knowledge, which does not distinguish them, is indeterminate.

Savikalpaka is not Valid :

Among all the Indian philosophers, only the Buddhists (Siddhānta Candrikā, 1. p. 22) hold that determinate knowledge is neither perception nor valid. According to them, the determinate knowledge such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) refers to the object as associated with certain name such as the pot and certain generic property such as the potness (*nāma jātyādi*). And the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), which is ultimately real (*sat*), cannot be associated with any unreal name and generic property. Thus, determinate knowledge, which associates the object with unreal name and property through the senses, cannot be valid.

Problem :

Gangeśa provides with a brief definition of determinate knowledge as qualificative knowledge at the very beginning of the Savikalpaka vāda. He establishes dterminate knowledge to be perception. Also he establishes after knowledge or recognition as part of determinate knowledge and includes it under determinate knowledge. However, the Pūrvapakṣin objects the inclusion on the ground that re-cognition constitutes two separate knowledes. And Gangeśa rightly refutes all the objections of the Pūrvapakṣin and justifies the inclusion of recognition under determinate knowledge. Further, he comes up with precise definitions of the 'thatness' (*tattā*) and the 'thisness' (*idaṁtva*) constituting the characteristics of recognition. In the following pages, we shall examine all these issues to arrive at a definite conclusion.

Savikalpaka is Viśiṣṭa Pratyakṣa and includes Pratyabhijñā :

Gangeśa defines (T.C.I. xiii. 1.) determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) such as 'This is a cow' (*ayam gauḥ*) as a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). Also he clarifies that such a determinate knowledge constitutes perception (*pratyakṣa*), as the objects such as the generic property etc. are real (*paramārtha sat*) and is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organs with objects (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*).

Further Gangeśa holds that determinate knowledge includes even after-knowledge or recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) such as 'I know that this is a cow' (*so'yam gauḥ*) in it. It should be noted that re-cognition describes the identity of the cow qualified by the 'thatness' (*tattā*) with the cow qualified by the 'thisness' (*idamtā*).

Pratyabhijñā is Ekajñāna and Aparokṣa :

However, the Pūrvapakeṣin opposes (T.C.I. xiii. 2) the inclusion of the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) under determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*). According to him, while the determinate knowledge such as 'This is a cow' (*ayam gauḥ*) is single, the recognition such as 'I know that this cow is that cow' (*ayam gaur iti jānāmi*) cannot be single, as both the perceptiblity (*apārokṣya*) and the non-perceptiblity (*pārokṣya*) are experienced in the this ness-aspect (*idam aṁśe*) and the thatness-aspect (*tattāmaṁśe*) of recognition. Thus, determinate knowledge cannot include re-cognition.

However, the Siddhāntin, Gangeśa refutes the objection. According to him, since recognition is produced from the sense-organs, it needs to be only perceptual; and also both the perceptuality and the non-perceptuality need not exist in the recognition. Also relation of one with certain time of an entity (*ekakāla sambandha*) need not necessitate absence of relation with another time (*kālāntara sambandha*), as then relation of one with various times and spaces would become untenable.

Tattā is not Atītasamayasambandha :

Since both the thatness (*tattā*) of object and the thisness (*idamtva*) of object are experienced in the case of recognition, Gangeśa presents (T.C.I. xiii.3) various primafacie definations of the thatness and refutes them. According to him, the thatness of object (*tattā*) involved in recognition cannot be the relation with what exists in the past time (*atīta samaya sambandha*), as the remembrance and the recognition, referring to the future objects, too describe the thatness. Also the knowledge and the designationof the thatness (*tattā dhī vyapadeśa*) are absent in the pot etc. which are being experienced in the inference delimited by the past time.

Also Gangeśa refutes the definition that the thatness is the quality existing in the past object (*tad vṛtti guṇa*). According to him, the thatness is known, at times, in the knowledge of the quality of past object (*tad avagame*) and at times in the non-knowledge of the quality of past object; and hence it cannot be the quality existing in the past object.

Tattā is not Atītānubhava viṣayatva :

Further, Gangeśa refutes the definition (T.C.I. xiii. 4) that the thatness is the state of being the object of past experience (*atītānubhava viṣayatva*). According to him, such a state may be grasped in the inference; but the knowledge and the designation of the thatness (*tattā dhī vyapadeśa*) are absent in the inference; and hence the thatness cannot be such a state.

Tattā is not Atīta dharma vaiśiṣṭya :

Again Gangeśa refutes (T.C.I. xiii. 5) that the thatness is the state of being the object qualified by the past property (*atīta dharma vaiśiṣṭya*) such as the past time or past knowledge. According to him, then the description of the thatness would become necessary even in the case of the experience of the property at the present time, as the experience can actually refer to the past property.

Idantā is Tanmātraguṇādika :

Further Gangeśa refutes (T.C.I. xiii. 6) that the thisness of the recognition (*idantā*) is the quality etc. existing merely in the object (*tanmātra vṛtti guṇādika*). According to him, the designation 'this one' (*idam iti*) is not made dispite the knowledge of the quality existing in the object through inference or perception. Hence such a quality etc. cannot constitute the thisness.

It should be noted that the thisness cannot be the state of being the object of perception (*pratyakṣa jñāna gocaratva*). For, then the thisness would become non-visual (*a cākṣuṣa*). Also the knowledge and designation of 'this one' (*idam iti buddhi vyapadeśa*) are absent in the case of inference of the this one in the past.

Tattā and Idantā are not Akhaṇḍopādhis :

Some scholars maintain (T.C.I. xiii. 7) that both the thatness and the thisness (*tattendantā*), manifested by remembrance and experience respectively (*smṛty anubhavopanīta*), are indivisible imposed properties (*akhaṇḍopādhi*); and hence only the thisness appears to be the thatness due to the impression of the thisness (*idantā samskāra*).

Also they refute the position that the thatness cannot be imposed on the thisness. According to them, the imposition of the thatness on the thisness is real in the case of the recognition such as 'This one is that one'.

However, Gangeśa refutes the position. According to him, the imposition of the thatness on the thisness is not tenable without the reference to the thisness prior to the remembrance of the thatness. Thus, Gangeśa establishes that the this one such as the (pot) is merely remembered as the that one (pot) in the recognition.

Pronoun *tat* is used :

The Naiyāyikas reply here (T.C.I. xiii. 8) that the time or the property (*kālo dharmāntaram*), which is referred to as the object (*viṣaya*) present in the experience (*anubhave*), functions as the object of past tense in the remembrance. That is why, dispite that the direct experience and the remembrance have one and the same thing as the object, the demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*) is used in the sense of the object in the remembrance; and the recognition produced from the impression is the cause of the use of pronoun 'that' (*tat*). Thus, the same demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*) is used in the sense of the object in the recognition; and the other demonstrative pronoun 'this' (*idam*) is used in the sense of the object in the direct perceptual knowledge.

It should be noted here that the difference between the direct perceptual knowledge and the recognition is due to the presentness and the pastness of the object and not due to the actual difference between the objects. Thus, the remembrance such as 'This (pot) is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) is not produced from the direct perceptual experience such as 'This (*pot*) is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*); and hence the direct perceptual experience is not the cause of remembrance.

Tattā is Atītatva :

Gangeśa now states (T.C. I. xiii. 9) the conclusion that the thatness of recognition (*tattā*) is the pastness (*atītatva*) of the property appearing in the experience such as 'This is a pot'; and also that the state of being qualified by the property (*yaddharma vaiśiṣṭya*), though not experienced, is the object of remembrance.

Gangeśa notes that the remembrance of the thatness (*tattā smṛti*) is possible from the impression referring to the object qualified by the thisness (*idantā viśiṣṭa gocara samskāra*). According to him, the impression needs to be assumbed as referring to the object qualified by the thatness for facilitating the causality of the experience with respect to the remembrance. Further according to him, remembrance does not have the form such as 'This is a pot'

(*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) and also experience does not have the form such as 'This (pot) is that pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*), as remembrance and experience refer to one and the same object.

Also Gangeśa explains that experience and remembrance need not become identical due to referring to one and the same object. The co-usage of experience and remembrance such as '*ayam ghaṭaḥ*' and '*sa ghaṭaḥ*' need to be explained by referring to the particular (distinct) properties such as the thisness and the thatness of the object.

Smṛti refers to the Vartamānatva :

Gangeśa states (T.C.I. xiii. 10) that the remembrance refers to the presentness of object (*vartamānatva*), as it does not refer to either the past or the future objects. Also the impression does not constitute the operation in the reference to the presentness.

Also Gangeśa notes that the person desirous of fire undertakes the activity for acquiring fire from the ascertainment of fire at present. Hence the activity for fire would be untenable, in the case of the doubt regarding the fire. Thus, only the ascertainment of fire at present leads to the activity for acquiring fire.

Smṛti is Ayathārthā :

Now Gangeśa explains (T.C.I. xiii. 11) that the object of remembrance such as 'This (pot) is that pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*), which is qualified by the thatness (*tattā viśiṣṭa*), appears to have the presentness (*idantā*). Also the activity for the pot arises only from the remembrance of the existence of the pot such as 'That (pot) exists in the house' and not from the doubt regarding the existence of the pot.

Further Gangeśa notes that the presentness of the thatness - qualified item constitutes the object of remembrance by referring to the thatness–qualified item as its object. Now since both the qualifier and the qualificand of the remembrance do not possess the presentness, the remembrance is only invalid (*ayathārthā*).

Conclusions :

Determinate perception or knowledge (*savikalpaka*) is a perception of subject and its generic property etc. as connected with each other.

Also determinate knowledge is a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) referring to the qualifier and the qualification of the qualificand.

And knowledge is determinate means it describes the qualifierness of the object.

While the Mādhvas held that determinate knowledge is eight types, the Yogaśāstrajñas held it to be a particular type of mental construction. Further the Māyāvādins held it to be the knowledge which makes a distinction between knower and knowable; and the Buddhists held it to be neither perception nor valid.

However, Gangeśa strongly defended determinate knowledge to be qualificative knowledge which is perception. Also he includes recognition under determinate knowledge by refuting the objection that recognition is not a single perception.

Gangeśa defined the 'thatness' of the object of recognition as the pastness of the the property and the 'thisness' of the object as the quality etc. existing in the object by refuting various Pūrvapakṣa–definitions. And therefore pronouns 'that' (*tat*) and 'this' (*idam*) are used to denote the objects of recognition. Further he held that remembrance refers to the non-existing presentness of object; hence it is invalid.

I.1.

तत्त्वचिन्तामणिः।

प्रत्यक्षखण्डे मङ्गलवादरहस्यम्।

I.i.1. गुणातीतोऽपीशस्त्रिगुणसचिवस्त्र्यक्षरमयः
त्रिमूर्तिर्यः स्वर्ग–स्थिति–विलयकर्म्माणि तनुते।
कृपापारावारः परमगतिरेकस्त्रिजगतां
नमस्तस्मै कस्मैचिदमितमहिम्ने पुरभिदे॥ १॥

I.i.2. अन्वीक्षानयमाकलय्य गुरुभिर्ज्ञात्वा गुरूणां मतं
चिन्तादिव्यविलोचनेन च तयोः सारं विलोक्याखिलं।
तन्त्रे दोषगणेन दुर्गमतरे सिद्धान्तदीक्षागुरु–
र्गङ्गेशस्तनुते मितेन वचसा श्रीतत्त्वचिन्तामणिम्॥ २॥

I.i.3. यतो मणेः पण्डितमण्डनक्रिया प्रचण्डपाषण्डतमस्तिरष्क्रिया।
विपक्षपक्षे न विचारचातुरी न च स्वसिद्धान्तवचोदरिद्रता॥ ३॥

I.i.4. इह खलु सकलशिष्टैकवाक्यतया अभिमतकर्म्मारम्भसमये तत्समाप्तिकामा मङ्गलमाचरन्ति।

I.i.5. तत्र यद्यपि मङ्गलस्य कारणता नान्वयव्यतिरेकगम्या, विनापि मङ्गलं प्रमत्तानुष्ठितसमाप्तेः। न च तत्र जन्मान्तरीयतत्कल्पनं, अन्योन्याश्रयात् लोकावगतकारणेनान्यथासिद्धेश्च।

नापि मङ्गलं सफलं अविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् दर्शवदिति फलसिद्धौ प्रारिप्सितसमाप्तेस्त–दानीमपेक्षितत्वेन नियमेनोपस्थितत्वात् फलान्तरस्यातथाभावात् विश्वजिन्न्यायेन फलकल्पने गौरवात् परिशेषानुमानेन तत्कारणताग्रहः।

व्यभिचारेण कारणत्वस्याभावात् उपायसहस्रेणापि ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्।

I.i.6. तथापि तथाविधशिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतिरेव मङ्गलस्याभिमतहेतुत्वे मानम्।

न च व्यभिचारः। निष्परिपन्थिश्रुत्या मङ्गलं समाप्तिसाधनमिति प्रमापिते तत्रापि तयैव लिङ्गेन जन्मान्तरीयतदनुमानात्। तच्चेदमारब्धकर्म्माङ्गं, कर्म्मार्थितया शिष्टैस्तत्पूर्व्वं क्रियमाणत्वात्। फलान्तराभावे सतिफलवत् कर्मप्रारिप्समानेन नियमतस्तत्पूर्व्वं क्रियमाणत्वाच्च दर्शे प्रयाजादिवत्।

आचारमूलकश्रुत्यनुमानाभ्यां तदर्थितया तत्कर्त्तव्यत्वबोधनात् तत्फलकत्वबोधनाच्च। दर्शारम्भसमये नियमेन क्रियमाणायाअप्यारम्भणीयायास्तदर्थितया अक्रियमाणत्वात् फलान्तरश्रवणाच्च प्रधानत्वमिति न तया व्यभिचारः।

I.i.7. ननु मङ्गलमलौकिकं लौकिके नाङ्गं भवति, लोकावगतकारणत एव तदुपपत्तेः। अतएव गृहरथादौ आरे भग्ने इन्द्रबाहुर्बद्धव्यः, पायसं ब्राह्मणो भोजयितव्य इत्यत्र तदुभयं नाङ्गं, किन्तु नैमित्तिकं, तद्वदिदमप्यारम्भसमयनिमित्तकमस्तु विश्वजिन्न्यायात् स्वर्गफलमिति चेत्। न। तस्यापूर्व्वरूपोपकारजनकाङ्गविषयत्वात्। अयं तु प्रतिबन्धकाभावरूप उपकारः, तस्य च लोकावगतकारणसहकारितैव, प्रतिबन्धके सति तस्मात्तदनुत्पत्तेः। अपूर्वन्तु न तथा, विघ्नध्वंसद्वारा चेदमङ्गं न त्विड़ो यजतीत्यादिविधिबोधितप्रयाजाद्यङ्गयागवददृष्टद्वारा,। मङ्गलजन्यादृष्टं विनापि स्वतः सिद्धविघ्नविरहवत आरब्धनिर्वाहात्। न चैवं विघ्नध्वंसद्वारापि नेदमङ्गं तत्रैव व्यभिचारादिति वाच्यं सति विघ्ने तद्ध्वंसद्वारा तस्याङ्गत्वात्। न चैव प्रायजादेरपि दुरितध्वंस एव द्वारं। कल्प्यदुरितध्वंसतः अपूर्व्वस्य तघुत्वात्।

I.i.8. वस्तुतस्तु प्रायशो विघ्नसंशये तन्निश्चये वा नियमेन शिष्टानां मङ्गालाचारेण विघ्नाभाव एव द्वारत्वेनाभिमतः। निर्विघ्नं समाप्यतामितिकामनया तत्करणपक्षे श्रुतित एव द्वारत्वनिर्णयः।

किञ्चापूर्व्वद्वारत्वे लौकिकाङ्गत्वविरोधः, क्लृप्तकारणादेव तदुत्पत्तेरिन्द्रबाहुबन्धनवत्। ननु विघ्न सन्देहे कथं तन्नाशार्थं प्रवृत्तिः, दुरितध्वंसार्थिप्रवृतौ तन्निश्चयस्य हेतुत्वात् प्रायश्चित्तवदिति चेत्। न।

विघ्नसंशये निश्चये वा नियमेन शिष्टानां मङ्गलाचारात् विघ्नज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं। तादृशाचारा–नुमितविधिनापि विघ्नज्ञानवानारब्धसमाप्तिकामोऽधिकारी बोध्यते। प्रायश्चित्ते तु तन्निश्चयवान् तथैव विधिबोधनात्। अतएवाधिकारिविशेषणं विघ्न इति तत्सन्देहे कथं प्रवृत्तिः वैदिके अधिकारनिश्चयादेव प्रवृत्तेरित्यपास्तं। यतः प्रधानाधिकारिण एवाङ्गेऽधिकारो, न स्वतन्त्रः, अङ्गत्वभङ्गप्रसङ्गात्।

I.i.9. न च प्रधाने प्रारिप्सिते दुरितमधिकारिविशेषणं, विरोधात्। किन्तु समाप्तिकामना, सा तु निश्चितैव।

यत्त्वन्यत्र निश्चिताधिकारकर्तृकत्वेऽपि मङ्गलं सन्दिग्धाधिकारकर्तृकमेव, विघ्नसन्देहवतां शिष्टानामाचारानुमितवेदेन तथैव बोधनादिति। तन्न। विघ्नवत्त्वेनाधिकाराभावात् क्वचित्तन्निश्चयेऽपि प्रवृत्तेश्च। अपिच शङ्कितानिष्टवारणार्थमपि प्रवर्तन्ते परीक्षकाः। यथा सर्पादिदंशजन्यविषसंशये तन्नाशाय भेषजपानादौ। किञ्च फलस्य संशयेऽप्युपायत्वनिश्चयाद् यथा कृष्यादौ प्रवृत्तिः तथा मङ्गलेऽपि। यदि च वृष्ट्यादौ सति कृष्यादितोऽवश्यं फलमिति तर्कात्तत्र प्रवृत्तिस्तदा सति विघ्ने मङ्गलादवश्यं फलमिति तर्कादत्रापि प्रवृत्तिः।

I.i.10. ननु स्फ्यस्य भक्ताश्लेषनिमित्तकेज्यायामिष्टित्वेन दर्शधर्म्मत्वे सत्यतिदेशागतपूर्व्वदिनकर्त्तव्यदेवतावाहनस्याङ्गस्य स्फ्याश्लेषद्वारसंशयेऽननुष्ठानमुक्तं, यथा कृष्णले द्वारबाधे। अतो विघ्नसंशयात्तद्ध्वंसद्वारसंशये कथं मङ्गलानुष्ठानमिति चेत्। न। नैमित्तिके हि निमित्त वानधिकारी यथा भिन्ने जुहोतीत्यत्र पात्रभदेवान्। तथेहाश्लेषवानधिकारीति पूर्व्वदिने आश्लेषनिश्चया भावात् युक्तमननुष्ठानं।

अपि चेज्याकर्त्तव्यतानिश्चये तदङ्गानुष्ठानं। न चाश्लेषसंशये तन्निश्चयः पूर्व्वदिने। अतः प्रधानेऽधिकाराभावान्नाङ्गेऽधिकारः नावाहनं पूर्व्वदिने। यदि च यदि न स्यादितिन्यायेन कुर्य्यात्तदा अनधिकृतकर्तृत्वेन निष्फलं स्यात्। स्फ्याश्लेषे सतीज्याकर्त्तव्यतानिश्चयेपि नावाहनं, पूर्व्वदिनस्याङ्गस्याभावादितीज्यायां आवाहनबाध एव। मङ्गले तु विघ्नज्ञानवानधिकारीत्युक्तं तच्च संशयेऽप्यस्ति। प्रधाने कर्त्तव्यतानिश्चयोऽस्त्येवेति द्वारसन्देहेऽपि युक्तमनुष्टानम्।

I.i.11. भविष्यद्विवाहादावाभ्युदयिकेऽपि तज्ज्ञानवानधिकारी, तथैवाचारात्। नन्वङ्गानां प्रधानविधिविधेयत्वं। न च ग्रन्थादिसमाप्तौ प्रधानविधिरस्ति। न च तत्कर्त्तव्यताबोधकस्य लौकिकप्रमाणस्य शास्त्रमेकदेशो युज्यते। तस्य तन्निरपेक्षत्वादिति चेत्। न । अपूर्व्वजनकाङ्गानां तथात्वात्। आचारानुमितश्रुत्या प्रधानविधिं विनापि तदङ्गत्वविधानाच्च।

अपि च प्रधानकर्त्तव्यताबोधकबोध्यकर्त्तव्यताकत्वं प्रयोजकं, तच्चेहाप्यस्ति, प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य सकलकार्य्यहेतुत्वेन लौकिकप्रमाणस्यापि तत्सापेक्षत्वात्। ननु यागादिवत् प्रधानदेशकालान्वयस्तदङ्गे मङ्गले स्यादिति चेत्। न। असाधारणेऽपूर्व्वजनके चाङ्गे तदन्वयात्।

अतएव बद्धशिखत्वादौ न प्रधानदेशकालान्वयः।

I.i.12. न च दुरिताभावे स्वतः सिद्धे साङ्गमङ्गलानुष्ठानं निष्फलमिति तद्वेदाप्रामाण्यं। लोकावगतकारणे हि दुरिते सति वेदेन तस्य तद्ध्वंस जनकत्वं बोध्यते, न तु तदुल्लङ्घ्य। अतएव तत्त्वज्ञानवतो भोगार्थं निषिद्धानुष्ठानं दोषाभावान्नाधर्म्मजनकमिति न तद्वेदाप्रामाण्यम्। प्रमाणान्तरात् स्वतः सिद्धदुरिताभावावगतौ मङ्गलाकारणे नित्यवदनुष्ठानं शिष्टानां भज्येतेति चत्। न। विघ्नज्ञानवतो नित्यवदनुष्ठानादिति सम्प्रदायः॥

I.i.13. मैवम्, मङ्गलं विनापि प्रमात्तानुष्ठितसमाप्तेः। न च तेन विनापि सिध्यतस्तदङ्गम्। न च जन्मान्तरीयं तत्, जन्मान्तरीयग्रन्थादिकमुद्दिश्य शिष्टैस्तदकरणात्। ननु यथा पुत्रेष्टौ कर्मसाद्गुण्ये ऐहिकफलाभावे आमुष्मिकं फलं, तथा साङ्गेपि मङ्गले यत्र न फलं तत्रामुष्मिकफलमिति चेत्। न। तत्र पुत्रमात्रस्य कामनाश्रवणात्। इह तु प्रारिप्सितसमाप्तिकामनया मङ्गलाचार इति तथैव वेदानुमानत्। कारीरीवदासन्नसमयारब्धसमाप्तिः फलम्। नन्वासन्नसमयस्तत्सम्बन्धो वा न मङ्गलजन्य इति समाप्तिमात्रं जन्यं। तच्चैहिकामुष्मिकसाधारणमिति चेत्। न। आसन्नसमयस्य स्ववृत्तिसमाप्त्युपलक्षकत्वात्। अन्यथा कारीर्य्यपि नासन्नसमयफला स्यात्। तस्माद्व्यभिचारान्न तदङ्गमिति।

I.i.14. अन्ये तु मङ्गलं प्रधानं, अदृष्टद्वारा आरब्धकर्मसमाप्तिः फलं, तत्कामोऽधिकारी। क्वचित्तु फलाभावः कर्म्मादिवैकल्यात्कारीरीवत्। न चान्यदापि करणम्। नियतकालीनतादृशाचारेण फलवत्कर्मारिप्समानस्तत्समाप्तिकामी मङ्गलमाचरेदिति श्रुत्या आरम्भसमयकर्त्तव्यताबोधनात्। यथा अग्नावैष्णवमेकादशकपालं चरुं निर्वपेद्दर्शपूर्णमासावारिप्समान इति श्रुत्याऽरम्भणीयेष्टेः प्रधानायाः दर्शारम्भसमयकर्त्तव्यत्वम्। कामनोपाधिकार्यत्वेऽप्यारम्भसमये नियतमनुष्ठानम्, आरब्धकर्मसमाप्त्यर्थिनोऽपायत्वेनावश्यन्तदनुष्ठानात्। न च काम्यत्वे परिसमाप्तिकामनां विना फलवत्कर्मारम्भेऽपि तदनुष्ठानं न स्यादिति वाच्यम्। समाप्तं कर्म फलायालमिति फलार्थिनः समाप्तौ कामनावश्यंभावादिति।

I.i.15. तन्न। कारीरीजन्यातिशयवद्विहितप्रधानजन्यातिशयत्वात्, मङ्गलजन्यापूर्वस्यापि फलसम्पादकाशेषकारणसम्पादकतया, आरब्धकर्म्मसमाप्त्यवश्यम्भावापत्तेः, फलावश्यम्भावनिश्चयं विना वैदिककर्माननुष्ठानात्। न चैवं; भूयसि साङ्गेऽपि मङ्गले क्वचिदारब्धसमाप्त्यभावात्। न च तत्रामुष्मिकं फलम्, ऐहिकमात्रफलत्वात् वैदिककर्मणः, फलावश्यम्भावेनागन्तुकदुरितेनाप्यप्रतिबन्धात्। किञ्च यथा कारीर्य्यादिकमग्रिमपरुषव्यापारं विनैव फलहेतुः तथा मङ्गलमपि तेन विनैव हेतुः स्यात्। न चैवं। लोकावगतकारणत्वात्तदपेक्षेति चेत्तर्हि स एव हेतुरस्तु किमनेन।

I.i.16. आरब्धकर्म्मजनकदृष्टकारणसम्पत्तौ पुत्रेष्टिवत्तत्समाप्तिसाधनत्वं श्रुत्या बोध्यत इति चेत्। न। तत्र दृष्टकारणसम्पत्तौ पुत्रानुत्पादाददृष्टद्वारा पुत्रेष्टेस्तज्जनकत्वमस्तु। न च कर्म्मनिर्व्वाहे दृष्टसकलहेतुसम्पत्तौ विलम्बो येन मङ्गलजन्यादृष्टापेक्षा स्यात्। अपि च मङ्गलं विनापि प्रमत्तनास्तिकानुष्ठितसमाप्तेर्न तत्तत्र कारणम्। जन्मान्तरीयपुण्यसम्पत्तिस्तत्र हेतुरिति चेत्। न । तथापि व्यभिचारात्। क्वचित् पुण्यसम्पत्तिः क्वचिन्मङ्गलं हेतुरिति व्रीहि-यववद्विकल्प एवेति चेत्तर्हि तत्सम्भावनया नियतं मङ्गलानुष्ठानं न स्यात् यवप्रयोगे व्रीहेरिव विकल्पे चोभयस्याशास्त्रार्थत्वात्।

I.i.17. ननु विधिवाक्यं न फलनियतपूर्व्वसत्त्वं बोधयति, किन्तु मङ्गलात् फलावश्यम्भावमिति चेत्। न। इष्टसाधनत्वस्य विध्यर्थत्वात्। अथान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तद्ग्रहे व्यभिचारो दोषाय, न त्वागमेन तद्ग्रहे। तदुक्तमागममूलत्वाच्चास्यार्थस्य व्यभिचारो न दोषायेति। अतएव यागादेः स्वर्गसाधनतेति चेत्। न। नियतपूर्व्वसत्त्वस्य ग्राह्यस्याभावादागमेनापि बोधयितुमशक्यत्वात्। यागजनितस्वर्गे कारीरीजनितवृष्टौ च जातिविशेष एवास्ति।

I.i.18. अपरे तु मङ्गलस्यारब्धनिर्व्वाहकत्वं विघ्नसंसर्गाभावद्वारा, तथैव प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य हेतुत्वात्। स चाभावः सतोविघ्नस्य ध्वंसोऽनागतस्यानुत्पादश्च कर्म्मनिर्व्वाहसमयस्थायी। विघ्नकारणविनाशद्वारा प्रागभावस्य साध्यत्वं। यस्मिन् सत्यग्रिमक्षणे यस्य सत्त्वं यद्व्यतिरेके चासत्त्वं तदेव तस्य तज्जन्यत्वं, न त्वसतः सत्त्वं गौरवात्। अस्ति च विघ्नकारणनाशे सति विघ्नप्रागभावस्य तथात्वम्। तावति समये दुरितानुत्पादश्च न साक्षान्मङ्गलजन्य इत्यदृष्टद्वारा तथा। एवं निर्व्विघ्नं

समाप्यतामिति कामनया तदाचारोऽपि सङ्गच्छते। अतएव यत्र विघ्नाभावः स्वतः सिद्धः तत्र मङ्गलस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वेन वेदाप्रामाण्यमिति निरस्तम्। अनागतविघ्नाभावस्य तत्रापि साध्यत्वात्। सर्व्वे विघ्नाः शमं यान्तीति यत्र विनायकस्तपाठादौ श्रुतमस्ति तत्र तत एव प्रमत्तानुष्ठितसमाप्तेः, अनादौ संसारेऽवश्यं तदाचारात्, तथा च तेन समं मङ्गलस्य विकल्प एव। यत्र च साङ्गे मङ्गले सत्यपि न फलं तत्र विघ्नभूयस्त्वादिति।

I.i.19. तन्न। विघ्नानुत्पादस्य व्यापारत्वे मानाभावात्, संसर्गाभात्वेन हेतुत्वात्। तथैव व्यापारत्वं तच्च प्रागभावेप्यस्तीति चेत्। न। अत्यन्ताभावस्यापि व्यापारत्वापत्तेः। स्वतः सिद्धस्य न हेतुत्वं यदि तदा प्रागभावेपि तुल्यम्। किञ्च यत्र मङ्गलं न तत्र नियमेन विघ्नकारणमस्ति,येन तन्नाशद्वारा प्रागभावस्य साध्यत्वम्। एवमपि यत्र विघ्नानुत्पादोपि स्वतः सिद्धस्तत्र मङ्गलमकिञ्चित्करमेव,। विघ्नध्वंसानुत्पादयोरारब्धनिर्व्वाहकालावस्थायिनोर्मङ्गलादेवोत्पत्तेर्न तदर्थमदृष्टद्वारता। मङ्गलस्य विकल्पेनान्वये शिष्टैर्नियमतो मङ्गलानुष्ठानं न स्यादित्युक्तम्। किञ्च प्रधानत्वे साङ्गमङ्गलमात्रं न समाप्तिहेतुः, तस्मिन् सत्यपि तदभावात्। प्रचितं तथेति चेत्। न। अप्रचितादपि फलसत्त्वात् नोभयम्, अनुनगमात्। गुरुकर्म्मारम्भे प्रचितमल्पकर्म्मारम्भेऽल्पमिति चेत्। न। क्वचित्तादृशादपि फलासत्त्वात् वैपरीत्येऽपि फलसत्त्वाच्च। एतेन बहुविघ्नशङ्कया बहुतरं अल्पविघ्नशङ्कया अल्पतरञ्च हेतु, तादृशाचारेण तादृशश्रुत्युन्नयनादिति निरस्तम्। तादृशादपि प्रारिप्सितासमाप्तेः वैपरीत्येऽपि समाप्तेश्च। बहुत्वस्य त्रि-चतुरदिभावेन अल्पत्वस्य चैक-द्वयदिरूपतया अननुगमेन तादृशशिष्टाचारेण तादृशश्रुत्या बोधयितुमशक्यत्वाच्च; तस्मान्मङ्गलं नाङ्गं न वा प्रधानमिति पूर्व्वपक्षसंक्षेपः।

I.i.20. सिद्धान्तस्तु। आरब्धकर्म्मसमाप्तौ मङ्गलं नाङ्गं न वा प्रधानमहेतुत्वात्। किन्तु प्रायश्चित्तवत् प्रधानं विघ्नध्वंसः फलम्। आरब्धकर्म्मनिर्व्वाहे विघ्नो माभूदितिकामनया तदनुष्ठानात्, विघ्नसंशये निश्चये वा शिष्टानां तदाचरणाद्विघ्नाभावस्याकाङ्क्षितत्वाच्च। यदि च निर्व्विघ्नं समाप्यतामितिकामनया तदाचरणं, तदापि नागृहीतविशेषणान्यायेनाहं स्वर्गी स्यामित्यत्र स्वर्गइव विघ्नाभाव एव फलम्। न समाप्तिरुभयतो व्यभिचारात्। समाप्तिस्तु विघ्नरूपप्रतिबन्धकाभावे सति लोकावगतस्वकारणादेव। प्रचिताप्रचितदेवतास्तुत्यादिसाङ्गमङ्गलात् विघ्नध्वंसो भवत्येव। अतो वैदिके फलनिश्चयान्मङ्गले प्रवृत्तिः। न च वेदाप्रामाण्यम्। समाप्त्यभावश्च क्वचित् प्राचीनविघ्नभूयस्त्वात् क्वचिन्मङ्गलान्तरोत्पन्न-विघ्नात्, क्वचिल्लोकावगतकारणाभावात्। प्रारिप्सितविघ्नध्वंसश्च न मङ्गलं विना।

I.i.21. न च प्रायश्चित्तेन शङ्कितविघ्नविनाशः। विघ्नसंशये तदनुपदेशात्। न च कामनोपाधिकर्त्तव्यत्वे नियतमनुष्ठानं न स्यादिति वाच्यं। आरब्धकर्म्मकारणप्रतिबन्धकाभावोपायत्वेनावश्यं तदनुष्ठानात्। तेन विना प्रतिबन्धकाभावेऽसति कर्म्मानुत्पत्तेः। न च प्रधानत्वे नान्यदापि तत्करणम्। नियतसमयशिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुत्या कर्म्मारम्भसमये तत्कर्त्तव्यत्वबोधनात्, दर्शारम्भसमये आरम्भणीयावत्। विघ्नसंसर्गाभावश्च समाप्तिहेतुः। स च क्वचित् स्वतःसिद्धः क्वचिन्मङ्गलसाध्यः। अतएव मङ्गलं

विनापि जन्मान्तरानुवर्त्तमानविघ्नात्यन्तभावात् प्रमत्तनास्तिकानुष्ठितसमाप्तिः। न चानध्यवसायः। शङ्कितविघ्नवारणार्थं प्रवृत्तिरतो यावद्विघ्नशङ्कं तदाचरणात्। अतएव तच्छङ्कया मध्येऽपि तदाचरन्ति। गुर्व्वारम्भेऽपि बहुविघ्नशङ्कया बहुमङ्गलाचरणम्। यथा च विघ्नसंशयेऽपि प्रवृत्तिस्तथोक्तमेव।

I.i.22. स्यादेतत् मङ्गलमाचरेदिति विधौ किं मङ्गलत्वं, न तावद्देवतास्तुत्यादित्वम् अननुगमात्। नापि प्रारिप्सितप्रतिबन्धकविघ्नोपशमहेतुक्रियात्वम् विघ्नोत्सारणासाधारणकारणत्वं वा, क्रियाविशेषस्य तदसाधारणकारणस्य वा स्तुत्यादेर्वेदाद्विशिष्टापरिचये प्रवृत्तिविषयालाभात्। नापि निर्विघ्नं समाप्यतामिति कामनया शिष्टाचारविषयत्वम्, वेदस्याचारानुपजीवकत्वात्, वेदादाद्याचारानुपपत्तेश्च अन्योऽन्याश्रयात्। नापि तत्कामनया वेदविहितत्वम्, प्रारिप्सितकर्म्मनिर्व्वाहकत्वे सति कर्म्मारम्भकाले विहितवैदिककर्म्मत्वं वा, तादृशवेदान्तराभावात्। नापि स्मृत्यादौ मङ्गलत्वेनोत्कीर्त्तितत्वम्। वेदस्य स्मृत्यनुपजीवकत्वात्, स्मृतिकर्तुरेव वेदादाद्याचारानुपपत्तेश्च। उच्यते। मङ्गलमाचरेदिति न विधिः, किन्तु निर्व्विघ्नसमाप्तिकामो देवतास्तुतिमाचरेदित्यादि प्रत्येकमेव विधिः। तथैव शिष्टाचारात्। तदुपजीव्य निर्व्विघ्नमारब्धं परिसमाप्यतामिति कामनया तद्विघ्नोपशमहेतुत्वेन वा वेदविहितत्वं मङ्लत्वमित्यधिगम्य देवतास्तुति-नमस्कारादिषु मङ्गलव्यवहारः शिष्टानामिति।

I.i.23. अतएव दुरितनाशकमपि गङ्गास्नानादि न मङ्गलम् तथाऽविधानात्। "मङ्गलाचारयुक्तानां नित्यञ्च प्रयतात्मनाम्। जपतां जुह्वताञ्चैव विनिपातो न विद्यते" इत्यनेन बोधितादर्शदर्शनादेः पृथगेव मङ्गलत्वं, न तु विघ्ननिवर्तकतया, तत्र नानार्थतैव। अन्यथा ग्रन्थारम्भे नमस्कारतुल्यतया तत्करणप्रसङ्गः। अथशब्दो विघ्ननिर्वकत्वान्मङ्गलमेव। "ओङ्कारश्चाथशब्दश्च द्वावेतौ ब्रह्मणः पुरा। कण्ठं भित्वा तु निर्यातौ तेन माङ्गलिकावुभौ" इति स्मृतेः न च शुभसूचकत्वमेव तस्य, शास्त्रारम्भे महर्षिणा तदनुपादानप्रसङ्गात्। गुणवत्तया ज्ञापनं स्तुतिः, यमुद्दिश्य यस्य स्वापकर्षबोधनानुकूलो व्यापारविशेषः स तस्य नमस्कारः। व्यापारे च कायिक-वाचिक-मानसिकरूपे विशेषो जातिविशेष एवानुभवसाक्षिकः, करशिरःसंयोगमात्रे तदव्यवहारात्। भवतोऽहमपकृष्ट इत्यादिवचने तदव्ययवहाराच्च। यद्वा। कायिकादौ प्रत्येकमेव विधिकल्पनं अतो नानार्थनैव। यत्तु। बुद्धिविशेषपूर्वकत्वज्ञानं विना कायिकादौ न तद्व्यवहार इति स एव वाच्योऽन्यत्र लक्षणेति। तन्न। कायिकादिव्यापारविशेषमनवगम्य बुद्धिविशेषपूर्व्वकत्वाज्ञानात्।

I.i.24. स्वीकृतवेदप्रमाणभावः शिष्टः। आचारे च वेदानिषिद्धत्वमविगीतत्वं विशेषणं देयं। यद्वा अलौकिकविषयशिष्टाचारत्वमेव हेतुः। शिष्टाचारत्वञ्च भ्रमाजन्याचारत्वं। आस्तिक-नास्तिकयोरगम्यागमनचैत्यवंदनादावाचारजनकज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वात्, बलवदनिष्टानुबन्धित्वादिष्टा-साधनत्वाच्च। लोके च पाषण्डव्यावृत्तशिष्टव्यवहारो वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमनिबन्धनः। तैर्थिकत्वेपि शिष्टाशिष्टव्यवहारो वेदनिषिद्धाकर्तृत्व-तत्कर्तृत्वनिबन्धनः। यद्वा वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृत्वे सति यो यदा वेदानिषिद्धाकर्त्ता स तदा शिष्टः, तत्कर्त्ता त्वशिष्टः। अतएव वेदानिषिद्धाकर्तृत्वेऽपि

बौद्धो न शिष्टः। पापजनकत्वज्ञानं विना वेदनिषिद्धकर्तृत्वं यस्य नास्ति स शिष्ट इति तु न तैर्थिकस्यापि कस्यचित् पापजनकत्वज्ञानं विना वेदनिषिद्धकर्तृत्वात्।

I.i.23. यत्तु रागद्वेषहीनः शिष्टः। स च सर्व्वज्ञत्वान्मन्वादिरेव, अविगीततदाचारादेव वेदानुमानमिति। तन्न। एवं हि मन्वाद्याचारादर्शिनामाधुनिकानां मङ्गले प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात्। आधुनिकानामाचारेण मन्वाद्याचारमनुमाय तेन च वेदमनुमाय बालः प्रवर्त्तत इति चेत्; तर्हि यादृशाचारेण मन्वाद्याचारानुमानं स एव वेदानुमापकोऽस्तु, किमनुमितानुमानेन। आधुनिकानामपि शिष्टत्वेन व्यवह्रियमाणत्वाच्च। तथा च स्मृतिः "यस्मिन् देशे य आचारः पारम्पर्य्यक्रमागतः। श्रुति-स्मृत्यविरोधेन सदाचारः स उच्यते"॥ सर्व्वज्ञस्य मङ्गलस्य मङ्गलाचारे मानाभावाच्च। मन्वादिप्रणीतस्मृतौ मङ्गलं दृश्यते इति चेत्। तन्न स्मृतिकर्तुरसर्व्वज्ञत्वेऽपि वेदादर्थं प्रतीत्य स्मृतिप्रणयनसम्भवात्। यत्तु शिष्टाचारत्वेन कर्त्तव्यतैवानुमीयतां किं वेदेनेति तत्र वक्ष्यामः।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे इति मङ्गलवादः समाप्तः

I.II.

अथ प्रामाण्यवादः।

A. ज्ञप्तिवादः

I.ii.1. अथ जगदेव दुःखपङ्कनिमग्नमुद्दिधीर्षुरष्टादशविद्यास्थानेष्वभ्यर्हिततमामान्वीक्षिकीं परमकारुणिको मुनिः प्रणिनाय। तत्र प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यर्थं प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः इत्यादावसूत्रयत्। तेष्वपि प्रमाणाधीना सर्व्वेषां व्यवस्थितिरिति प्रमाणतत्त्वमत्र विविच्यते।

I.ii.2. ननु प्रमाणादीनां तत्त्वं प्रतिपादयच्छास्त्रं परम्परया निःश्रेयसेन सम्बध्यते इति न युक्तं, प्रमाणतत्त्वावधारणस्याशक्यत्वात्। तद्धि प्रमातत्त्वावधारणाधीनं; तच्च स्वतः परतो वा न सम्भवति, वक्ष्यमाणदूषणगणग्रासात्। अथ किं प्रामाण्यज्ञानेन, प्रवृत्तिमात्रे तस्य व्यभिचारात्, बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्ये प्रवृत्तिश्चावश्यकार्थनिश्चयादेव। न च यत्संशय-व्यतिरेकनिश्चयौ यस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकौ तन्निश्चयस्तद्धेतुरनुमितौ व्याप्तेरिवेति वाच्यम्। तत्सन्देहे सत्यर्थसन्देहेनार्थानिश्चयादेवाप्रवृत्तेः तत्र तयोरप्रतिबन्धकत्वादिति चेत्। न। प्रामाण्यसंशयानन्तरं इदं इत्थमेवेत्यवधारणस्य निष्कम्पप्रवृत्यङ्गस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चयाधीनत्वात्।

I.ii.3. ननु स्वत एवास्तु तन्निरूपणं। तथाहि तत्र विप्रतिपत्तयः। ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं तदप्रामाण्याग्राहक-यावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यं न वा। तज्ज्ञानविषयकज्ञानाजन्यज्ञानग्राह्यं न वा। परतः पक्षे ज्ञातएव ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यग्रहः, स्वतस्त्वे प्रामाण्यवत एव ज्ञानस्य ग्रहात्। स्वाश्रयग्राहकेण गृह्यत एव न वा, स्वाश्रयेण गृह्यत एव न वेति प्रत्येकमेव वा। यत्तु योगजधर्म्मसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्या स्वाश्रयप्रामाण्यं तेनैव गृह्यत इत्यंशतः सिद्धसाधनमतो योगजधर्म्माद्यजन्यत्वं विशेषणमिति। तन्न। परं प्रत्यसिद्धेः, प्रामाण्यमात्रपक्षत्वे प्रामाण्यं स्वाश्रयेण गृह्यत एवेत्युद्देश्यप्रतीतेरसिद्धेश्च नांशतः सिद्धसाधनम्। यद्वा घटोऽयमिति ज्ञानप्रमाण्यं एतज्ज्ञानग्राह्यं न वा। एतज्ज्ञानग्राहकमात्रग्राह्यं न वेति।

I.ii.4. तत्र यद्यपि विशेष्यावृत्यप्रकारकत्वमगृहीतग्राहित्वं वा। सर्व्वधीयथार्थत्वपक्षेऽनुभव-त्वजातेरभावेन स्मरणान्यज्ञानत्वं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वं वा प्रामाण्यं। स्वस्य न तेन नैव न वा अनुव्यवसायेन ग्रहणयोग्यम्। विशेष्यावृत्त्यप्रकारकत्वादेर्विशेषणस्य प्रागनुपस्थितौ तद्वैशिष्ट्यस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्। नापि ज्ञानातीन्द्रियत्वे ज्ञानानुमित्या तद्गृह्यते। ज्ञानमात्रलिङ्गस्य प्राकट्यादेस्तद्व्यभिचारात्। नापि प्रमाहितज्ञातताविशेषात्, तस्य प्रथमं दुर्निरूपत्वात्। अन्यथा अप्रमाहितज्ञाततया अप्रामाण्यस्यापि स्वतोग्रहापत्तिरिति। तथापि तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं तद्वति तद्वैशिष्ट्यज्ञानत्वं वा प्रामाण्यं। तन्निश्चयादेव निष्कम्पव्यवहारात् लाघवात् नान्यद्गौरवात्।

I.ii.5. तच्च ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यमेव। तथा हि विशेष्ये तद्धर्म्मवत्त्वं तद्धर्म्मप्रकारकत्वञ्च व्यवसायस्यानुव्यवसायेनानुमित्या स्वप्रकाशेन वा गृह्यते। विषयनिरूप्यं हि ज्ञानमतो ज्ञानवित्तिवेद्यो विषय इति व्यवसाये भासमाने धर्म्म-धर्म्मिवत्तद्वैशिष्ट्यमपि विषयः, व्यवसायरूप-प्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात्। सम्बन्धितावच्छेदकरूपवत्तया ज्ञायमाने सम्बन्धिनि ससम्बन्धिकपदार्थ-निरूपणमित्यनुव्यवसायस्य रजतत्वावच्छिन्नत्वेन पुरोवर्त्तिविषयत्वाच्च। अन्यथा पुरोवर्त्तिनं रजतञ्च जानामीति तदाकारः स्यान्न तु रजतत्वेन पुरोवर्त्तिनमिति। अत एवाप्रमापि प्रमेत्येव गृह्यते, अनुव्यवसायस्य भ्रमविषयवैशिष्ट्यविषयत्वात्। न च न प्रामाण्यं प्रथमतो ज्ञातमिति न तदारोपः स्यादिति वाच्यम्। प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वेन ज्ञानवित्तिवेद्यत्वात् अभावप्रतीतौ प्रतियोगित्वाभावत्वयोरिव। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वमप्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायते; तदभाववत्त्वस्य भ्रमानुल्लिखितत्वेनानुव्यवसायाविषयत्वात्। नचैवमनुव्यवसायस्य यावद्व्यव-सायविषयकत्वे भ्रान्तभ्रान्तिज्ञसङ्कर इति वाच्यम्। बाधानवतारदशायां तस्येष्टत्वात्। तदवतारे तस्यैव प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्, उपनायकभ्रान्तेरभावाच्च। अतएवान्यभ्रान्तिज्ञस्य न भ्रमः।

I.ii.6. अथ तद्वत्त्वं न धर्म्म-धर्म्मिवैशिष्ट्यमात्रं, किन्तु तस्य विशेषणताविशेषः। स च व्यवसाये भासते नानुव्यवसाये, मनसो बहिरस्वातन्त्र्यादिति चेत्। न। व्यवसायोपनीतत्वेन विशेषण-विशेष्ययोरिव विशेषणताविशेषस्यापि तद्विषयत्वात्, विशेषणताया निराकरिष्यमाणत्वाच्च। एतेनास्वप्रकाशे न स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहः, धर्म्मग्रहे तद्धर्म्माग्रहात्। शब्द-गन्धवत् योग्यत्वात्तद्ग्रहेऽपि ज्ञानं प्रमाणमितिधीर्न स्यात्। स्वप्रकाशेऽपि स्वमात्रसाक्षिणः स्वधर्म्मग्रहेऽसामर्थ्यात्। सामर्थ्ये वा अप्रामाण्यमपि गृह्णीयात्। परप्रकाशे लिङ्गेन मनसा वा जायमानं ज्ञानं न भ्रमव्यावृत्तं प्रामाण्यं गृह्णीयात् व्यभिचारात्। न च यत्र यदस्ति तत्र तद्गृह्यते। अप्रामाण्यस्यापि स्वतोग्रहापत्तेः, अनुव्यवसायस्यानुमितेर्वा विपयाजन्यत्वाच्चेति निरस्तम्।

I.ii.7. तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं तद्वति तद्वैशिष्ट्यज्ञानत्वं वा प्रामाण्यं व्यवसायस्येति स्वेनानुव्यव-सायेनानुमित्या वा तद्ग्रहत्। तद्विषयत्वस्य तत्प्रकारत्वस्य च ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वात्। यदि च प्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायेत तदा प्रामाण्यज्ञानेऽपि तदनुमापकलिङ्गपक्ष-व्याप्त्यादिज्ञानेषु च स्वविषयनिश्चयार्थं प्रामाण्यस्य परतो ज्ञेयत्वे फलमुखी कारणमुखी चानवस्था स्यादिति, प्रामाण्यं न ज्ञायेतैवेति परिशेषादपि स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहः इति पूर्वः पक्षः।

अथ प्रामाण्यवादे सिद्धान्तरहस्यम्।

I.ii.8. सिद्धान्तस्तु प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतो ग्रहेऽनभ्यासदशोत्पन्नज्ञाने तत्संशयो न स्यात्। ज्ञानग्रहे प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात्। अनिश्चये वा न स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहः। ज्ञानाग्रहे धर्म्मिज्ञानाभावात् न संशयः। ननु कोटिस्मरणादिना संशयपूर्व्वक्षणे व्यवसायविनाशान्न तद्विशेष्यको मानसः संशय इति चेत्। न। ज्ञानोपनीते व्यवसाये प्रामाण्यसंशयात्।

I.ii.9. ननु धर्मिज्ञानं न संशयहेतुः, कोटिज्ञान-विशेषादर्शन-धर्मीन्द्रियसन्निकर्षात् प्रामाण्यसंशयरूप

एव ज्ञानग्रह उत्पद्यत इति चेत्। न। ज्ञानातीन्द्रियत्वे तज्ज्ञानं विना तद्धर्मिकमानससंशयानुपपत्तिः, लिङ्गञ्च न संशयजनकं तस्य निश्चायकत्वात्। ज्ञानस्य मानसत्वे च प्रामाण्यज्ञानवत्तत् सामग्र्यपि संशयप्रतिबन्धिका तन्निश्चायकत्वात्।

अन्यथा विशेषदर्शनकालेऽपि संशयापत्तेः। अथ धर्म्मिणि विशेषादर्शनदशायां एककोटिस्मरणे तदारोपः कोटिद्वयस्मरणे संशय इति निश्चयसामग्रीतः संशयसामग्री बलवतीति कोटिद्वयस्मरणे संशय एव स्यात् न तु निश्चय इति चेत्। न। विरुद्धोभयारोपसामग्रीद्वय- समाजादुभयारोप एक एव भवति स एव संशयः, न त्वेकारोपसामग्र्या अपरारोपसामग्रीप्रतिबन्धः अविरोधात्। न चोभयारोपसामग्र्या एकनिश्चयसामग्रीप्रतिबन्ध इति वाच्यम्। प्रत्येकारोपसामग्र्य-तिरिक्तायास्तस्या अभावात्। न च सामग्रीद्वयात् कार्यद्वयं, समूहालम्बनवदुपपत्तेः। तस्मात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चयसामग्रीसत्त्वात् न तत्संशयः स्यात्। धर्म्मिज्ञानं च संशयहेतुः, अन्यथा संशये धर्म्मिनियमः कोट्युत्कटत्वञ्च न स्यात्।

I.ii.10. अथ पीतः शङ्ख आदर्शे मुखमित्यादिभ्रमो विशेषदर्शनेऽपि यथा दोषान्तरात् तथा निश्चतेऽपि प्रामाण्ये दोषान्तरात् तत्संशय इति चेत्। न तद्वदेवात्रापि प्रवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। साक्षात्कारिभ्रमे साक्षात्कारिविशेषदर्शनं विरोधि। दिङ्मोहादौ तथा, दर्शनात्। तच्च न, पित्तादिना प्रतिबन्धात्। न च जात्यैव कश्चिद्दोषोऽस्ति।

न च प्रामाण्यसंशयाद्विषयसंशयवत् प्रामाण्यज्ञाने प्रामाण्यसंशयात् प्रामाण्यसंशय, इति वाच्यम्। प्रामाण्यज्ञानेऽपि स्वतः प्रामाण्याग्रहे तत्संशयानुपपत्तेः।

I.ii.11. ननु ज्ञानमात्रं न विरोधिबुद्धिनिवर्त्तकं, भ्रमोत्तरं बाधकज्ञानोदयात्, किन्त्वनन्यथासिद्धं। अतएव तेन विनापि तज्ज्ञानं सम्भवतीति अन्यथासिद्धतया शङ्कितं तन्निश्चयं परिभूय ज्ञानविषयत्वाद्विषये यथा संशयस्तथा प्रामाण्ये तन्निश्चयस्यान्यथासिद्धिशङ्कया तं परिभूय भवति संशयः। न च व्यवसायस्य ज्ञानत्वे घटविषयकत्वे च यथानुव्यवसायविषयत्वान्न संशयस्तथा प्रामाण्येऽपि न स्यात् अनुव्यवसायस्य प्रमात्वनियमादिति वाच्यं। अज्ञाने अविषये च ज्ञानत्वविषयत्वयोर-नुव्यवसायेनाग्रहनियमात्, तद्विषयत्वमनन्यथासिद्धं प्रामाण्यविषयत्वञ्च तेन विनापि सम्भवतीति तत्र संशय इति चेत्। मैवं। भ्रमत्वमन्यथासिद्धत्वं। ततश्च प्रामाण्यनिश्चये भ्रमत्वसंशयेन तद्विषये प्रामाण्यसंशय इति फलितोऽर्थः। भ्रमत्वसंशयश्च तज्ज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां न सम्भवतीत्युक्तत्वात्। एवमन्यत्रापि भ्रमत्वसंशयात् न विषये संशयः, स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहे भ्रमत्वसंशयाभावात्।

I.ii.12. न च वाच्यम् प्रामाण्यसंशयान्न विषये संशयः, मानाभावात्। ज्ञानविषयत्वात् समानधर्म्मादेव तदुपपत्तेः। न चैवं सर्वत्र विषयसंशये तन्निश्चयोच्छेदः, प्रामाण्यसंशयेऽपि तुल्यत्वादिऽति। वाच्यम्। तस्यासार्व्वत्रिकत्वात् भ्रमत्व संशयं विना निश्चिते विषये संशयानुत्पत्तेरानुभविकत्वाच्च। अथ तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं प्रामाण्यं, तच्च ज्ञानग्राहकेण गृहीतमेवेति न तत्संशयः। न चास्मिन् निश्चितेऽपि प्रामाण्यसंशयात् न तत्प्रामाण्यमिति वाच्यम्। एतन्निश्चयादेव

निष्कम्पव्यवहारदिति चेत्।, अस्तु तावदिदं प्रामाण्यम्, तथाप्यनुव्यवसायानन्तरं व्यसायस्य प्रामाण्येऽर्थस्य तद्वत्त्वे च संशयस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वान्नार्थतद्वत्त्वं तस्य विषयः।

I.ii.13. ननु व्यवसायस्येदन्त्व-रजतत्वविशिष्टेदंविषयत्वे अनुव्यसाय एव मानं, तथा च यावद्व्यवसायोल्लिखितप्रकारविशिष्ट एव धर्म्यनुव्यवसाये भासते। अन्यथा विषयांशे तस्य निर्विकल्पकत्वे इदं रजतं जानामीति तदाकारो न स्यात्। अतो धर्मिणीदन्त्व-रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यमनुव्यवसायेन गृहीतमिति धर्मिणि स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहवद्रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्येऽपि स्वतः प्रामाण्यज्ञानमवर्जनीयं अतएव धर्म्यंशे न कदापि प्रामाण्यसंशय इति चेत्। मैवं। इदं रजतञ्च जानामीति नानुव्यवसायः बहिर्विशेष्यके मनसोऽस्वातन्त्र्यात्। किन्त्विदं इदन्त्वेन रजतत्वेन जानामीति। तत्रेदन्त्व-रजतत्वे प्रकारकत्वेन भासेते तत् प्रकारकज्ञानवत्त्वञ्चात्मनि भासते। अन्यथा प्रकारवाचि तृतीयार्थासम्भवः। रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यस्य तदर्थत्वे व्यबसायेऽपि तृतीया- र्थोल्लेखापत्तिः। तथा च धर्मिणीदन्त्वरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयत्वे तादृश्ज्ञानवत्त्वे चात्मनोऽ- नुव्यबसाय एव मानमिति न विषये तस्य निर्विकल्पकत्वं। अत इदन्त्व-रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यं पुरोवर्त्तिनि नानुव्यवसायविषय इति न स्वतः प्रामाण्ययग्रहः। तस्मादनभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञानप्रामाण्यं परतो ज्ञायते सांशयिकत्वादप्रामाण्यवदित्याचार्य्याः।

I.ii.14. ननु स्वग्राह्यत्वेऽपि कदाचित्परग्राह्यत्वात्, स्वस्याप्यन्यापेक्षया परत्वात्, भट्टमते च परग्राह्यत्वात्सिद्धसाधनं। न च ग्राह्यप्रामाण्यापेक्षया परत्वं, ग्राह्यापेक्षया परत्वं, ग्राहकस्यापि ग्राह्यप्रामाण्यत्वेन तदपेक्षया परत्वाभावात्, स्वग्राह्यप्रामाण्यापेक्षया परत्वे अप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात्। उच्यते। अनभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञानप्रामाण्यं न स्वाश्रयग्राह्यं, स्वाश्रयातिरिक्तग्राह्यं वा। स्वाश्रये सत्यपि तदुत्तरतृतीयक्षणवृत्तिसंशयविषयत्वात् अप्रामाण्यसंशयाजन्यसंशयविषयत्वाद्वा, अप्रामाण्यवत्। अर्थे निश्चितेऽपि न तन्निश्चयानन्तरतृतीयक्षणेऽर्थसंशयो न वा प्रामाण्यसंशयं विनेति नार्थे व्यभिचारः। विवादपदं न यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राह्यं, स्वाश्रयनिश्चये सति तदुत्तरतृतीयक्षणे-ऽप्रामाण्यसंशयं विना वा सन्दिह्यमानत्वात् अप्रामाण्यवत्। यद्वा अनभ्यासदशापन्नैतज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यं एतत्प्रामाण्यसंशयपूर्वकालीनैतज्ज्ञाननिश्चयाविषयः, एतज्ज्ञाननिश्चयानन्तरं सन्दिह्यमानत्वात् अप्रामाण्यवत्। न च स्वपदस्य प्रामाण्य-मात्रपरत्वात्तदाश्रयाग्राह्यत्वे न बाधः, स्वपदस्य सम्बन्धिपरत्वेन समभिव्यावहृतपरत्वात्। अन्यथा स्वस्य परत्वात्परस्य च स्वत्वात् तदेतत्त्वस्य तदेतदन्यत्वस्य च स्व-परसाधारणत्वात् स्वतः परतोवेति संशयो न स्यात्। प्रामाण्यस्य स्वग्राह्यत्वे बाधात्परिशेषेणान्यथाग्राह्यत्वं परतो ग्राह्यत्वामिति कश्चित्।

I.ii.15. प्रथमं च प्रामाण्यज्ञानं व्यतिरेकिणा। ननु प्रामाण्यप्रसिद्धिं विना व्याप्त्यग्रहात् कथमनुमानम्,। अथ व्याघातदण्डभयेन प्रमा-तद्विषयसिद्धौ तद्दृष्टान्तेन ज्ञेयत्वादिना वह्नेः प्रमाविषयत्वमनुमे-यम्,। ततश्च सामान्यतस्तत्सिद्धौ न साध्याप्रसिद्धिः,। विशिष्यानिर्णयान्नान्वयित्वासाधारण्ये। न च प्रामाण्यं नानुगतं किन्तु प्रतिज्ञानं विषय-प्रकारभेदाद्भिन्नं, तथा च वह्निज्ञानस्य वह्न्यवृत्ति-प्रकारानवच्छिन्नत्वादिकं साध्यं तच्चाप्रसिद्धमिति वाच्यं। वह्निज्ञानस्य विशेष्यावृत्तिप्रकारा-

नवच्छिन्नत्वादिकं साध्यमानं पक्षधर्म्मताबलेन वह्निविषयकप्रमात्वे पर्य्यवस्यतीति चेत्।, तर्हि प्रथमं कस्यापि स्वार्थं प्रामाण्यानुमानं न स्यात्। प्रामाण्यनिषेधरूपस्य परकीयव्याघातस्य तदा अनुपस्थितेः, स्वयं प्रामाण्यनिषेधस्य तद्धीपूर्व्वकत्वात्, प्रामाण्यमपरिज्ञाय प्रामाण्यनिषेधेन परकीयव्याघातस्याप्यज्ञानाच्च। प्रवृत्तिसंवाद-विसंवादाभ्यां तद्धेतुज्ञानवैचित्र्यानुमानेऽपि यथोक्तरूपप्रामाण्यस्य विशेष्याप्रतीतेरिति। उच्यते। प्राग्भवीयसंस्काराद्विशेष्यावृत्त्यप्रकारकत्वं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं वा प्रामाण्यमात्रं स्मृतं, वह्निज्ञानादौ साध्यमानं सर्व्वनाममहिम्ना पक्षधर्म्मताबलाद्वह्निज्ञानस्य विशेष्यावृत्त्यप्रकारकत्वादौ पर्य्यवस्यति। स्वतः प्रामाण्यनिषेधे प्राथमिकप्रामाण्यज्ञानस्यान्यथोपपादयितुमशक्यत्वादिति संप्रदायविदः।

I.ii.16. वयन्तु ब्रूमः। प्रथममप्रामाण्याभाव एव प्रामाण्यं व्यतिरेकिणा साध्यम्, तत एव निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तेरुपपत्तेः। तदेव वा सिध्यत् पक्षधर्म्मताबलेन तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वादिकमादाय सिध्यति, तदनन्तरं अर्थाद्वा सिध्यतीति वक्ष्यते। तथा हि-अयं वह्नित्वेनानुभवो वह्नित्वाभाववति वह्नित्वप्रकारको न, अवह्निवृत्तिप्रकारको न, विशेष्यावृत्तिप्रकारको न, वह्नित्वप्रकारकत्वे सति वन्ह्यविशेष्यको न, वह्नित्वसव्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नो न, वन्ह्यवृत्तिप्रकारको न वा, दाहसमर्थविषयकप्रयत्नजनकत्वे सति वह्नित्वप्रकारकनिश्चयत्वात्, दाहसमर्थविशेष्यक वह्नित्वप्रकारकनिश्चयत्वाद्वा, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा वन्ह्यप्रमा।

I.ii.17. तत्र बाधानन्तरं स्मृत्युपनीते भ्रमे वह्नित्वाभाववति वह्नित्वेन मम ज्ञानं वृत्तमित्यप्रामाण्यं मनसैव परिच्छिद्यते मानान्तरेण वेति सर्व्वसिद्धम्। एवं वन्ह्यप्रमायां वह्नित्वाभाववति वह्नित्वप्रकारकत्वादिसमर्थ प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वाभावयोर्व्याप्तिग्रहेऽप्रामाण्यव्यापकहेत्व भावाभावरूपाद्धेतोरप्रामाण्याभावरूपं साध्यं सिध्यति। यद्व्यापकतया हेत्वभावो गृहीतस्तदभाव एव हेतुना साध्यते। यत्र त्वभावस्य व्यापकता हेत्वभावस्य ज्ञायते तत्र साध्यप्रसिद्धिरङ्गं तां विना तदज्ञानात्।

यत्र तु भावव्यापकता हेत्वभावस्य तत्र न तदङ्गम्, तेन विनापि व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेर्ग्रहात्। अतएवेतरव्यापकता आकाशत्वाभावस्य गृहीतेत्याकाशत्वेनाप्रसिद्ध एवेतरान्योन्याभावः सिध्यति। विशेषणज्ञानं विना कथं प्रामाण्यविशिष्टानुमितिरिति चेत्, प्रथमं न कथञ्चित्। ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यमित्यनुमित्यनन्तरं तेनैव हेतुना तत्रैव प्रामाण्यविशिष्टानुमितिः, अभावाविशेष्यक-प्रतीत्यनन्तरमभाववद्भूतलमिति ज्ञानवत्। एवञ्चेदं वह्नित्वप्रकारकज्ञानं तद्वति तदभाववति वेति संशयानन्तरं तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकत्वव्यतिरेकः सिध्यन् तद्वति तत्प्रकारकतामादाय सिध्यति, तृतीयप्रकाराभावेन तेन विना साध्यस्योपसंहर्तुमशक्यत्वात् ज्ञाननित्यत्ववत्।

I.ii.18. यद्वा-इदं वह्नित्वप्रकारकज्ञानं वह्नित्ववद्विषयकं वह्नित्वाभाववदविषयकत्वे सति सविषयकत्वात् यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा वन्ह्यप्रमेति व्यतिरेक्यन्तरात्तत्सिद्धिः। अतिरिक्तविषयतापक्षे अयं वह्नित्वेनानुभवोऽवह्निवृत्तिवह्नित्वप्रकारकविषयताको न, वह्नित्वासमानाधिकारणवह्नित्व-प्रकारकविषयताको न, विषयताश्रयावृत्तिप्रकारको न वेति साध्यं। वह्निवृत्तिवह्नित्वप्रकारक-

विषयताकत्वं विषयताश्रयवृत्तिप्रकारकत्वं वा अर्थात् सिध्यति। न तु प्रथमं, साध्याप्रसिद्धेः। वह्निभ्रमे च विषयताश्रयो न वह्निः, विषयताया विशेष्यवृत्तित्वादिति भ्रमत्वेन न सिद्धसाधनम्।

I.ii.19. अन्ये तु–वह्निभ्रमे या विशेषणवृत्तिर्विषयता सा विशेष्यवृत्तिविषयताया अभिन्नेति न सा वह्नित्वासमानाधिकरणधर्म्मानवच्छिन्नेति न सिद्धसानमिति। न च मणिज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यानुमाने मणिप्रभायां मणिभ्रमेण प्रवृत्तस्य मणिप्राप्तौ मणिगोचरप्रयत्नजनकमणित्वप्रकारकनिश्चयत्वमनैकान्तिकमिति वाच्यम्। मणिप्रभाविषयज्ञानेन भिन्नविषयतया मणिगोचरप्रयत्नानुत्पादात्। मणिप्राप्तिस्तु नान्तरीयकत्वात्। ज्ञानप्रयत्नयोरसमानकालत्वेऽप्यनुभवस्मरणयोरिव मनसा कार्य्यकारणभावग्रह इति नासिद्धिः। अभावसाध्यके च निर्व्विकल्पकस्य प्रथमं सपक्षत्वेनानिश्चयान्नासाधारणयं। तथायं पृथिवीत्यनुभवः पृथिवीत्वाभाववति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारको न, विशेष्यावृत्तिप्रकारको न, पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकत्वे सति पृथिव्यविशेष्यको न, पृथिवीत्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नो न, पृथिव्यवृत्तिप्रकारको न वा गन्धवद्विशेष्यकपृथिवीत्वप्रकारकनिश्चयत्वादिति व्यतिरेकी। पृथिवीत्वभ्रमः पृथिवीत्वाभाववति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारक इति न भ्रमत्वेन सिद्धसाधनं, न वा गन्धवद्विशेष्यक इति न व्यभिचारः। पृथिवीत्ववति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकत्वादिकमर्थात् सिध्यति। विषयतापक्षे अयं पृथिवीत्वेनानुभवः अपृथिवीवृत्तिपृथिवीत्वप्रकारकविषयताको न, पृथिव्यवृत्तिपृथिवीत्वप्रकारकविषयताको न, पृथिवीत्वासमानाधिकरणपृथिवीत्वप्रकारकविषयताको न, विषयताश्रयावृत्ति प्रकारको न वेति साध्यं। पृथिवीत्वसमानाधिकरणपृथिवीत्वप्रकारकविषयताकत्वादिकं अर्थात् सिध्यति।

I.ii.20. अन्ये तु–पृथिवीत्वासमानाधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नविषयताकत्वाभावः साध्यः गन्धासमानाधिकरणाप्रकारकगन्धसमानाधिकरणप्रकारकविषयताप्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वात्। तेन संशयव्यवच्छेदः। निश्चयत्वं वा विवक्षितमित्याहुः।

शीता पृथिवीत्यनुभवः पृथिव्यंशे प्रमैव। भ्रम–प्रमारूपे च समूहालम्बने न व्यभिचारः, अंशे तस्यापि प्रमात्वात् विशेष्यभेदेन विषयताभेदाच्च। न च प्रकारभेदेन विषयताभेदः, मानाभावात्।

I.ii.21. यत्त्वियं पृथिवीत्यनुभवः पृथिवीत्वसमानाधिकरणधर्म्मावच्छिन्नपृथिवीविशेष्यकविषयताकः, पृथिवीत्वव्यधिकरणधर्म्मानवच्छिन्नपृथिवीविशेष्यकविषयताकः, पृथिव्यवृत्तिधर्म्मानवच्छिन्नपृथिवीवृत्तिविषयताको वा, गन्धासमानाधिकरणधर्म्माप्रकारकविषयताप्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वात् अगन्धवदवृत्ति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकविषयताकत्वात्, गन्धसमानाधिकरणविषयताप्रतियोगिज्ञानत्वाद्वेति। तन्न। साध्याप्रसिद्धेः। किंत्वर्थादेव तत् सिध्यति। एवं यत्प्रकारव्याप्यतया यद्गन्धस्नेहसमर्थ प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वकरचरणादिकमवगतं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वमेव प्रामाण्ये लिङ्गम्।

I.ii.22. ननु वह्निज्ञानस्य दाहसमर्थविषयत्वं न दाहसमर्थोऽयमिति व्यवसायगम्यं, ज्ञानविषयतयोस्तदविषयत्वात्। नापि तदनुव्यवसायगम्यं, पुरोवर्त्तिदाहसामर्थ्यस्य तदगोचरत्वात्।

व्यवसायोपनीतदाहसामर्थ्यस्य च भाने तदसामर्थ्यात्। अन्यथा व्यवसायोपनीतस्य पुरोवर्त्तिनि वह्नित्वस्य अनुव्यवसायविषयत्वे स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहापत्तेः। एवं पृथिवीजलज्ञानयोर्गन्धस्नेहवद्विषयकत्वग्रहोऽप्यनुपपन्न इति। उच्यते। वह्नित्वप्रकारकानुव्यवसाये सति तत्र विषये दाहसामर्थ्यज्ञानानन्तरं स्मृत्युपनीते वह्निव्यवसाये स्मृत्युपनीतदाहसमर्थ्यविषयकत्वम्। एवं जल–पृथिवी–ज्ञानयोः स्मृत्युपनीतयोः ज्ञानोपनीत–स्नेहगन्धवद्विषयकत्वं मनसा परिच्छिद्यते। गन्धादिमत्येव मम पृथिवीत्वाद्यनुभव इति तत्र गन्धादिमत्त्वपरिच्छेदानन्तरमनुभवात्। स्मृत्युपनीते धूमादौ व्याप्तिपरिच्छेदवत् चक्षुषा चन्दने सौरभज्ञानवच्च। तर्हि पृथिवीत्वज्ञाने गन्धवद्विशेष्यकत्ववत् चक्षुषा गन्धवति पृथिवीत्वोपनयानन्तरमियं पृथिवीति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकानुभवे उपनीते पृथिवीत्ववति पृथिवीत्वप्रकारकत्वं, तथा तत्रैव ज्ञाने घटत्वप्रकारकताविरहवत् पृथिव्यवृत्तिप्रकाराभाववत्त्वं विशेष्यावृत्तिप्रकाराभाववत्त्वं वा प्रामाण्यं मनसैव परिच्छिद्यतामिति स्वतएव प्रामाण्यग्रह इति चेत्। न। ज्ञानान्तरोपस्थापितज्ञानवृत्तिप्रामाण्यग्रहे परतस्त्वानपायात्।

I.ii.23. यावज्ज्ञानग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वं यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राह्यत्वं, तज्ज्ञानविषयकजन्यज्ञानाजन्यजन्यज्ञानग्राह्यत्वं वा स्वतस्त्वं। तदन्यथाग्राह्यत्वन्तु परतस्त्वम्। मनसा चैवं प्रामाण्यग्रहस्याभ्युपगमे तज्ज्ञानविषयकजन्यज्ञानजन्यज्ञानग्राह्यत्वान्न परतस्त्वहानिः। व्यतिरेक्यनन्तरं तज्जातीयत्वेनान्वयिना प्रामाण्यानुमानं। यथेदं शरीरज्ञानं प्रमा कर–चरणवति शरीरज्ञानत्वात् स्वशरीरज्ञानवत्। न च कर–चरणान्तरवति कर–चरणान्तरवत्त्वज्ञाने व्यभिचारः, शरीरांशे तस्य प्रमात्वात्।

I.ii.24. एतेन कर–चरणवति शरीरज्ञानत्वादित्यत्र कर–चरणवत्त्वं नोपलक्षणं, व्यावृत्तोपलक्ष्याभावात्। न च विषयतया ज्ञानविशेषणं, कर–चरणवत्त्वप्रकारकशरीरज्ञानत्वस्य व्यभिचारात्, शरीरमिति ज्ञाने तदसिद्धेश्च। विषयविशेषणत्वे कर–चरणवद्विषयकशरीरज्ञानत्वस्य व्यभिचारात्, शरीरभ्रमस्यापि वस्तुतः करादिमद्विषयकत्वात्। नापि कर–चरणादि शून्ये यच्छरीरत्वेन ज्ञानं तदन्यत्वे सतीति विवक्षितम्, शून्य इत्यत्र विषयत्वं सप्तम्यर्थ इति कर–चरणशून्यविषयकशरीरज्ञानान्यशरीरज्ञानत्वादित्यर्थः, तथाचासिद्धिः शरीरज्ञानस्य तच्छून्यशरीरत्वादिविषयकत्वनियमात्। न वा करचरणशून्ये यच्छरीरत्वेन ज्ञानं न भवतीति विवक्षितं, तृतीयार्थविषयत्वे उक्तदोषादन्यस्यासम्भवादिति निरस्तम्। कर–चरणवद्विशेष्यकशरीरत्वप्रकारकज्ञानत्वस्य हेतुत्वात्, शरीरभ्रमे च कर–चरणवतः शरीरस्य विशेषणत्वात्। विषयतापक्षे करचरणादिशून्यनिष्ठशरीरत्वप्रकारक–विषयताप्रतियोगित्वशून्यत्वे सति शरीरज्ञानत्वादिति हेतुः।

I.ii.25. ननु न गृहीतप्रामाण्यं ज्ञानं परप्रामाण्यनिश्चयरूपं अनवस्थानात्। नापि ज्ञायमानप्रामाण्यं, स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहापत्तेः। अतोऽगृहीतप्रामाण्यमेव ज्ञानं परप्रामाण्यनिश्चयरूपमास्थेयं। तथा च व्यवसायोऽप्यगृहीतप्रामाण्य एव स्वविषयं निश्चाययतु किं विषयनिश्चयार्थं तत्प्रामाण्यनिश्चयेन। अथ व्यवसायस्याप्रामाण्यदर्शनान्न तन्मात्रादर्थनिश्चयः। तर्हि प्रामाण्यानुमितेरप्यप्रामाण्यदर्शनान्न

ततोऽपि प्रामाण्यनिश्चय इति चेत्। न ब्रूमः ज्ञानप्रामाण्यनिश्चयादेवार्थनिश्चय इति। किन्तु यत्राप्रामाण्यशङ्का नास्ति करतलामलकादिज्ञाने तत्र व्यवसाय एवार्थनिश्चय इति। तत एव प्रवृत्तिर्निष्कम्पा। यत्रानभ्यासदशायामप्रामाण्यसंशयेनार्थनिश्चयं परिभूयार्थसंशयः, तत्र प्रामाण्यनिश्चयाधीनज्ञानादर्थं निश्चित्य निष्कम्पं प्रवर्त्तते नान्यथेति सर्व्वानुभवसिद्धं। अतएवागृहीतप्रामाण्यमेव ज्ञानं परप्रामाण्यं निश्चाययति अप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्काभावात्। यत्र तु प्रामाण्यज्ञाने अप्रामाण्यशङ्कया प्रामाण्यसंशयः तत्र प्रामाण्यज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयादेव प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः। एवं यावदप्रामाण्यशङ्का तज्ज्ञानप्रामाण्यनिश्चयादेव तन्निश्चयः।

I.ii.26. न चैवमनवस्था, चरमज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानाभावेन कोटिस्मरणाभावेन विषयान्तरसञ्चारेण वा प्रामाण्यसंशयानवश्यम्भावात्। अन्यथा भट्टमते प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानानुमितिग्राह्यत्वेनानवस्था स्यात्। गुरुमते च प्रामाण्यस्य स्वग्राह्यत्वं न, स्वग्राह्यस्वरूपप्रामाण्याभ्यां बहिर्भूतत्वात्। किन्तु परग्राह्यत्वे अनवस्थानात् परिशेषानुमानेन प्रमाणान्तरेण वा ग्राह्यं, तथा च तत्प्रामाण्यस्यापि स्वग्राह्यत्वमन्येनैवेत्यनवस्थैव। यत्तु व्यवसायस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चयादेव प्रवृत्तेर्न तस्यापि प्रामाण्यानुसरणमिति नानवस्थेति। न च प्रामाण्यसंशयादौचित्यावर्जितो विषयसंशय इति वाच्यं। निश्चिते संशयाभावात्। अन्यथा स्वतोग्रहेऽपि तत्संशयेऽनवस्थेति। तदसत्। यदि प्रामाण्यसंशयान्न विषये संशयो निश्चितत्वात् तदा विषयनिश्चयार्थं प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो व्यर्थः प्राथमिकविषयनिश्चयादेव निष्कम्पप्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः। न हि विषयसंशयमनादृत्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः प्रवृत्तिहेतुरित्युक्तं। अन्यसंशयादन्यत्र निश्चिते कथं संशय इति चेदनुभवं पृच्छ। येन स्वसाक्षिकमेव प्रामाण्याप्रमाण्यसंशयस्य विषयसंशयहेतुत्वनुमतं। ज्ञान विषयत्वमपि प्रामाण्यसंशयमासाद्य विषयसंशायकं।

I.ii.27. ननु लिङ्ग-पक्ष-व्याप्त्यादीनां ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यावधारणेऽनवस्था, अनवधारणे हेत्वसिद्धिः। अथ लिङ्गादिज्ञानं स्वविषयावधारणे कर्त्तव्ये स्वप्रामाण्यज्ञानं नापेक्षते, अनुमानमात्रोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्। लिङ्गादिनिश्चयस्य च स्वकारणधीनस्य सर्व्वसिद्धत्वादिति चेत्। न। प्रामाण्यसंशयेन लिङ्गसन्देहात्। न हि न लिङ्गज्ञाने प्रामाण्यसंशयः, अविरोधादिति। उच्यते। अप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्काभावे लिङ्गादिज्ञानस्यैवार्थनिश्चायकत्वात्, तत्कलङ्केतूक्तैव गतिः। यत्तु व्यवसाये क्वचिदप्रामाण्यशङ्का भवति क्वचिन्नेति त्वयापि वक्तव्यम्। एवं बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्ये स्वर्गसाधनं याग इति ज्ञानं न गृहीतप्रामाण्यं प्रवर्त्तकं, प्रामाण्यानुमितेः पूर्व्वमेव तस्य विनाशात् किन्तु तज्ज्ञानसमानविषयकमप्रामाण्यशङ्काशून्यज्ञानान्तरमेव। नन्वेवं बहुवित्तव्ययायाससाध्ये निष्कम्प्रवृत्तावनुपयोगित्वात् निष्फलं प्रामाण्यज्ञानमिति किं तदुपायानुसरणेनेति चेत्। न। स्वर्गसाधनं याग इति ज्ञानप्रामाण्ये निश्चिते तत्समानविषयकज्ञानान्तरे अप्रामाण्यशङ्का न भवतीति ज्ञानान्तरमगृहीतप्रामाण्यमपि स्वार्थनिश्चयरूपं निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिं जनयतीत्यप्रामाण्यशङ्काप्रतिबन्धद्वारा निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तावुपयुज्यते प्रामाण्यज्ञानमिति न निष्फलम्।

ii.28. यत्त्वनुमानस्य निरस्तसमस्तविभ्रमाशङ्कस्य स्वत एव प्रामाण्यग्रह इत्युक्तम्। तद्धूमवति

वह्निज्ञानत्वमनुमितेः प्रामाण्यनियतमनुव्यवसायेनोपनीतं अतो विशेषदर्शनान्न तत्राप्रामाण्यशङ्केति, प्रामाण्यनिश्चयादेवाप्रामाण्यशङ्काविरहात् अर्थं निश्चित्य निष्कम्पव्यवहार इत्यभिप्रायः। वस्तुतस्तु परतः पक्षे न क्वचिदपि प्रामाण्यग्रहः प्रवर्तक इति। एवमनुव्यवसायस्य प्रामाण्यनियतत्वान्न प्रामाण्यशङ्का। न ह्यजानन् जानामीति प्रत्येति। न वा घटज्ञाने पटं जानामीति। भ्रमेऽप्यनुव्यवसायेन रजतत्वादिकं व्यवसायप्रकारत्वेनोल्लिख्यते तच्च तथैव। यत्त्वभ्यासदशायां झटिति प्रचुरतरनिष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् प्रामाण्यं स्वतएव गृह्यते अन्यत्र तु परत इति तन्न। विषशेष्यनिष्ठात्यन्ताभाव-प्रतियोगि प्रकारानवच्छिन्नत्वादिकं प्रामाण्यं स्वतो ग्रहीतुमशक्यमिति परत एव गृह्यते। झटितिप्रवृत्तिस्तु कर-चरणादिमति शरीरज्ञानत्वादेर्विशेषस्यानुव्यवसायेन ग्रहादप्राण्यशङ्काशून्याद् व्यवसायादेव, न प्रामाण्यज्ञानं प्रवर्त्तकमित्युक्तम्। झटिति तत्समवधानन्तु स्वकारणाधीनं। न हि पिपासूनां झटिति प्रचुरतरा समर्था च प्रवृत्तिरम्भसीति, पिपासोपशमनशक्तिरस्य प्रत्यक्षेति।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणो प्रत्यक्षखण्डे प्रामाण्यवादे ज्ञप्तिवादः॥ ०॥

B. अथ प्रामाण्यवादे उत्पत्तिवादः।

I.ii.29. उत्पद्यतेऽपि प्रमाप्रामाण्यं न तु स्वतः ज्ञानसामग्रीमात्रात्। तज्जन्यत्वेनाप्रमापि प्रमा स्यात्। अन्यथा ज्ञानमपि सा न स्यात्। ज्ञानसामग्र्यां दोषानुप्रवेशादप्रमेति चेत्तर्हि ज्ञानविशेषवदप्रमा प्रमाविशेषः स्यात् ज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वात्। तस्मात् प्रमाप्रमयोर्वैचित्र्यात् गुणादोषजन्यत्वम्। अथ यत्र गुण-दोषौ विना तयोरभावस्तत्र ज्ञानसामग्रयेव नास्ति तत्सत्त्वे ज्ञानमात्रोत्पत्त्प्रिसङ्गादिति चेत्। न। विशेषविनाकृतसामान्यकार्य्याभावात्। तत्सामग्रीमादायैव हि सामान्यसामग्री तां विना नास्त्येव वा। अन्यथा कार्य्यविशेषे कारणविशेषोच्छेदः।

I.ii.30. ननु यथैकजातीयसामग्रीसत्त्वेऽपि घटयोर्भेदो यमजयोर्वैधर्म्यञ्च तथा प्रमाप्रमयोर्भेदो वैधर्म्यञ्च भविष्यति। अथानुगतव्यवहारात् प्रमात्वमनुगतमिति प्रमामात्रे अनुगतो हेतुर्वाच्यः अनुगतकार्य्यस्याननुगतादनुत्पत्तेरिति चेत्। न। प्रमात्वस्योपाधित्वेन कार्य्यतावच्छेदकत्वे मानाभावात्। कार्य्यमात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्त्वस्य नीलघटत्व-घटज्ञानत्वादौ व्यभिचारात्। अथ प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेतुजन्या जन्यज्ञानत्वात् अप्रमावदिति चेत्। न। प्रमाया ज्ञानत्वेन तद्धेतुजन्यतया साध्ये बाधात्। ज्ञानाजनकजन्यत्वे विरोधात्। अप्रामायां तदसिद्धेः। व्यर्थविशेषणत्वात् व्यावर्त्याप्रसिद्धेः। किञ्च यत्किञ्चिज्ज्ञानहेत्वपेक्षया सर्वतद्धेत्वपेक्षया वा अतिरिक्तत्वे इन्द्रियादिभिः सिद्धसाधनात्। नापि ज्ञानसामान्यसामग्र्यतिरिक्तसामग्रीजन्येति साध्यम्, पूर्ववत् सिद्धसाधनात् विरोधाच्च। न च सामान्य-विशेषयोः सामग्रीद्वयं। प्रमाया ज्ञानभिन्नत्वापत्तेः अन्यथा सामग्रीभेदासिद्धिः तस्य कार्य्यभेदकल्प्यत्वात्। एतेन ज्ञानसामान्यहेत्वतिरिक्तहेतुजन्येति साध्यं प्रत्युक्तं। सकलज्ञानाभिप्राये चेन्द्रियादिभिः सिद्धसाधनं। ज्ञानत्वाभिप्राये हेत्वसिद्धिः।

I.ii.31. नापि ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नकार्य्यत्वान्यकार्य्यत्वप्रतियोगिककारणजन्येति साध्यम्। ज्ञानत्वस्य नित्यवृत्तितया कार्य्यत्वानवच्छेदकत्वात्। अथ यद्धर्माश्रयस्यासतः सत्त्वं हेत्वधीनं तत् कार्य्यतावच्छेदकं, ज्ञानंत्वञ्च तथा। न चासत इत्यधिकं, व्योमादिसाधारणसत्त्वमात्रस्य हेत्वनियम्यत्वादिति चेत्। न। यदालिङ्गितस्य स्वरूपं हेत्वधीनं तत्कार्य्यतावच्छेदकं, लाघवात्, ज्ञानत्वन्तु न तथा। अनित्यज्ञानत्वेति करणे इन्द्रियादिभिर्यथायथं सिद्धसाधनं, तेषां प्रत्येकं ज्ञानमात्राहुतेत्वात्। एतेन प्रमात्वम् ज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नकार्य्यतानिरूपितकारण-ताभिन्नकारण-ताप्रतियोगिककार्य्यतावच्छेदकं ज्ञानत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यधर्म्मत्वात् अप्रमावदिति निरस्तम्। प्रमात्वस्य नित्यवृत्तित्वात्। अनित्यप्रमात्वं तथा कार्य्यमात्रवृत्तिधर्म्मत्वादित्यपि नीलघटत्वादिना व्यभिचारि। अनित्यप्रमा प्रमाप्रमोभयहेतुभिन्नहेतुजन्या जन्यत्वात् अप्रमावदिति चेत्। न। दोषस्य पित्तादेः स्वविषयप्रमाहेतुत्वेनाप्रमायां साध्याप्रसिद्धेः। घटदृष्टान्तत्वे तयैव व्यभिचारात्। शङ्खाद्यंशे पीतः शङ्ख इति ज्ञानस्यापि प्रमात्वात्, कारणव्यक्तिभेदजन्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनाच्च।

I.ii.32. अथ प्रमा अप्रमाव्यावृत्तधर्म्मावच्छिन्नकार्य्यत्वप्रतियोगिककारणजन्या अप्रमाविजातीयकार्य्यत्वात् घटवत्। यदि प्रमा अप्रमात्वासमानाधिकरणरूपनिरूपितकार्य्यत्वप्रतियोगिककारणजन्या न स्यात्, अप्रमा स्यादिति चेत्। न। अप्रमाव्यावृत्तधर्म्मावच्छिन्नकार्य्यत्वं संयोगस्य तत्प्रतियोगिक-कारणमिन्द्रियादीति तज्जन्यत्वेन सिद्धसाधनात्। अप्रमासाधारणव्यक्तिजन्यत्वञ्चाप्रमातादात्म्ये प्रयोजकमिति तर्कोऽप्यप्रयोजकः। अथानित्यप्रमा प्रमाप्रमान्यतरप्रतिबन्यकजन्या प्रमाप्रमान्य-तरत्वात् अप्रमावत्। चाक्षुषप्रमा चाक्षुषभ्रमाजनकजन्या अनित्यप्रमात्वात् रासनप्रमावदिति चेत्। न। प्रमाजनकासाधारणब्यक्तिभेदस्याप्रमाप्रतिबन्धकत्वेन चाक्षुषभ्रमाजनकत्वेन च सिद्धसाधनात्। एतेन प्रमा स्वविरोध्यनुभवप्रतिबन्धकजन्या अनित्यानुभवत्वात्। दूरात्पुरुषस्य स्थाणुतया ज्ञाने सन्निधौ च भूयोऽवयवेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षस्य विरोधिस्थाण्वनुभवप्रतिबन्धकत्वं पुरुषज्ञानजकत्वञ्च दृष्टम्, अप्रमायां पित्तादेर्लिङ्गादिभ्रमस्य च तथात्वमिति निरस्तं। प्रमाजनकत्वव्यक्तिविशेषस्याप्रमाप्रतिबन्धकत्वं प्रमाजनकत्वञ्चास्तीति सिद्धसाधनादिति न प्रमायामतिरिक्तगुणसिद्धिः। किञ्चाप्रत्यक्षप्रमादौ अनुगतस्यार्थान्तरस्य गुणस्याभावः इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादीनाञ्चाननुगमः। न च जात्यैव गुण-दोषौ। प्रमाजनकत्वं गुणत्वं भ्रमजनत्वं च दोषत्वमतिप्रसक्तं, तन्मात्रजनकत्वञ्चासिद्धमिति।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे प्रामाण्यवादे उत्पत्तिवादपूर्व्वपक्षः।

I.ii.33. अथ उत्पत्तिवादसिद्धान्तः।

उच्यते। एवमप्रमापि स्वत एवस्यान्न तु परतः, प्रमावदसाधारणकारणादेव तदुत्पत्तौ दोषस्य तत्राहेतुत्वात्। अथ ज्ञानसामग्रीसत्त्वेऽपि विशेषादर्शनादिपित्तादेरनुविधानादप्रमाया दोषो हेतुरिति चेत्तर्हि विशेषदर्शन-पित्ताद्यभावादितस्तत्रेव विषये प्रमा तदभावान्नेति प्रमायामागन्तुककारणापेक्षेति कथं न परतस्त्वम्। अपि च नियमगर्भः कार्य्य-कारण-भावः नियमश्च न व्यक्तेरेव व्यभिचारादतिप्रसङ्गाच्चेति नियमनिरूपकमनुगुणमनुगतमास्थेयम्। एवञ्चाप्रमायामिव प्रमायामपि

तद्व्यावृत्तं कारणमनुगतमास्थेयं। किञ्च यत्कार्य्यं यत्कार्य्यविजातीयं तत्तत्कारण-विजातीयकारणजन्यं यथा घटविजातीयः पटः, अन्यथा कार्य्यवैजात्यस्याकस्मिकतापत्तेः, घटज्ञानजातीयमपि कार्य्यं तद्विजातीयकार्य्य-कारणविजातीयघटेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिजन्यमिति न व्यभिचारः। एवञ्चानित्यप्रमा अप्रमाकारणविजातीयकारणजन्या अप्रमाविजातीयकार्य्यत्वात् घटवत्। एवञ्चानुगतस्य प्रमाहेतुत्वे प्रमा स्वविरोध्यनुभवप्रतिबन्धकजातीयजन्या जन्यानुभवत्वात् अप्रमावदित्यादावपि न सिद्धसाधनं।

I.ii.34. अपि चानित्यप्रमात्वं कार्य्यतावच्छेदकं बाधकं विना काय्यमात्रवृत्तिधर्म्मत्वात् अप्रमात्ववत्। नीलघटत्वं तु विशिष्टं न कार्य्यतावच्छेदकं, प्रत्येकानुगतप्रयोजकद्वयादेव विशिष्टसिद्धेरार्थः समामजः। घटज्ञानत्वादौ तु बाधकम्। अस्तु वा तत्राप्यनुगतभोजकादृष्टहेतुकत्वम्। अन्यथा कार्य्यमात्रे नादृष्टं हेतुः स्यात्। एवमनित्यप्रमात्वं अनित्यज्ञानत्वावच्छिन्नकार्य्यत्व-प्रतियोगिककारणताभिन्नकारणताप्रतियोगिककार्य्यतावच्छेदकम् अनित्यज्ञानत्वव्याप्यकार्य्यता-वच्छेदकधर्म्मत्वात् अप्रमात्ववत् इत्यनित्यप्रमायामप्रामाव्यावृत्तानुगतहेतुसिद्धिः। अन्यथानुगतकार्य्यानुपपत्तेः। तथा अनित्यप्रमात्वम् अप्रमाकारणतानवच्छेदकरूपावच्छिन्न-कारणताप्रतियोगिककार्य्यतावच्छेदकं, भ्रमावृत्तिकार्य्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् घटत्ववत्। चाक्षषप्रमात्वं चाक्षुषाप्रमाकारणतानवच्छेदकरूपावच्छिन्नकारणताप्रतियोगिककार्य्यतावच्छेदकं, चाक्षुषभ्रमावृत्तिकार्य्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् घटत्ववत्। अनित्यरजतप्रमात्वं रजताप्रमाकारणता-वच्छेदकरूपानवच्छिन्नकारणताप्रतियोगिककार्य्यतावच्छेदकं, रजतभ्रमावृत्तिकार्य्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् घटत्ववत्। अन्यथा नियामकं विना चाक्षुषादिरजतज्ञानं किञ्चिद्रजतवृत्तिप्रकारकं किञ्चिद्रजता-वृत्तिप्रकारकमिति नियमो न स्यात्। ज्ञानसामग्र्यास्तुल्यत्वात्।

I.ii.35. यत्तु प्रमाया असाधारणकारणजन्यत्वे साध्ये प्रमान्यत्वमुपाधिः। न च पक्षेतरत्वम्, तव ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमान्यत्वमुपाधिः। न च पक्षेतरत्वम्, तव ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वात्पक्षस्य व्यावर्त्त्य-त्वात्। उभयसिद्धव्यावर्तकत्वं तन्त्रम्, न तु व्यावर्त्त्यस्य उभयसिद्धिः गौरवात्। व्यतिरेकेऽसाधारणत्वञ्च पक्षेतरत्वस्यानुपाधित्वे बीजं, तच्चात्र नास्ति भगवज्ज्ञानस्य त्वत्सम्मतस्य सपक्षत्वादिति। तन्न। विपक्षवाधकबलेन हेतोः साध्यव्याप्यत्वेनोपाधेः साध्याव्यापकत्वात्। नन्वस्तु प्रमायां दोषाभावो हेतुः आगन्तुकभावानपेक्ष्य ज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वं। यत्त्वभावो न कारणं, किन्तु दण्डत्वादिवत्कारणतावच्छेदकत्वेन सामग्रीभेदोपलक्षक इति। तन्न। जपा कुसुमादिसन्निधौ न प्रमा तदसन्निधौ स्फटिकादौ प्रमोत्पत्तेरनन्यथासिद्धत्वेन हेतुत्वादिति चेत्। न। भूयो ऽवयवेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षविशेषदर्शनादिसमवधाने प्रमा, तदभावे त्वप्रमेति प्रमायांगुणोऽ-प्रमायांतदभावो हेतुरित्येव किं न स्यात्।

I.ii.36. अथासदर्थविषयकत्वे सदर्थविषयकहेत्वभावो न प्रयोजकः, ज्ञाने सदर्थविषयतानियमेन तदसम्भवात्। सदर्थविषयकत्वेऽसदर्थविषयकारणाभावो हेतुः सम्भवति, प्रमायाः सदर्थमात्रविषयत्ववदप्रमायामसदर्थमात्रविषयत्वाभावादिति चेत्। तर्ह्यप्रमायाः सदर्थविषयता

न स्यात् हेत्वभावात्। सदर्थमात्रविषयत्वे असदर्थविषयहेत्वभावो हेतुरिति चेत्, तर्हि गुण एव तत्र हेतुः तदभावस्त्वसदर्थविषयत्वे प्रयोजक इत्यस्तु। ननु गुणाभावस्य साधारणत्वात्तदेव सत्यमसत्यञ्च न स्यात्, गुण-तदभावयोरेकत्रासत्त्वादिति चेत्। न। दोषाभावेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्, क्वचित् कश्चिद्दोष इति गुणेऽपि समानम्। गुणाभावादसन्मात्रविषयकमपि ज्ञानं स्यादिति चेत्। न। दोषादप्यसन्मात्रविषयकज्ञानापत्तेः। सर्वत्र विषये दोषो न सम्भवतीति गुणाभावेऽपि तुल्यं।

I.ii.37. अथ विशेषदर्शनादिर्गुणस्तदभावश्चाननुगत इति न तौ प्रमाप्रमाहेतू किन्तु दोष-तदभावाविति चेत्, तर्हि पित्तादिर्दोषस्तदभावश्चाननुगत इति तावपि न तत्र हेतू स्वप्रमायां स्वाभावस्य व्यभिचारश्च। अथ दोषत्वं नैकं, न हि तत्तद्भ्रमहेतुत्वं तत्, आत्मादौ गतत्वादननुगमाच्च। नापि भ्रममात्रहेतुत्वं, पित्तादेरननुगतत्वेन तदभावादसम्भवाच्च। नापि प्रमाहेत्वभावप्रतियोगित्वं, अन्योन्याश्रयात् पित्तादेः स्वप्रमाहेतुत्वाच्च। नापि स्वप्रमाभिन्नप्रमाप्रतिबन्धकत्वम्, एवं हि प्रत्यक्षप्रतिबन्धकस्य सल्लिङ्गपरामर्शस्य दोषत्वादनुमितिः प्रमा न स्यात् भ्रमश्च स्यात्। क्वचित् कश्चिद्दोष इति, तर्हि गुणेऽपि तुल्यम्।

I.ii.38. स्यादेतत्। प्रमां भ्रमञ्चाकुर्वति ज्ञानहेतुस्तोमे मण्डूकवासाञ्जनदोषात् वंशोरगविभ्रमः, तदभावे वंशप्रमेति तत्र दोषाभावः प्रमाहेतुरित्यन्यत्रापि तथा क्लृप्तत्वात्। मण्डूकवसा नयन एव दोषः न त्वचीति तत्र दोषाभावात् त्वचा वंशप्रमैव। गौरोऽहमित्यभेदभ्रमहेतुदोषसंस्कारसत्त्वेपि मम शरीरमिति प्रमेति चेत्। न विशेषादर्शनस्य तत्र हेतुत्वं न तु संस्कारस्य, तदसत्त्वे तदसिद्धेः। न च दूरे चक्षुषः सन्निकर्षेऽपि केशादौ सजातीयसंयोगे प्रमा, तदभावे नेति तत्र संयोगरूपो गुणः प्रमाहेतुरित्यन्यत्रापि गुणजन्यतेति वाच्यं। तावद्देशवर्त्तिकेशसाक्षात्कारे स हेतुः तेन विना तदभावात्। तवापि तावद्दूरप्रमायां स हेतुः, सन्निकृष्टकेशप्रमायास्तेन विनापि भावात्। तत्रापि वा दोषाभावः कल्प्यो दोषजन्यत्वे अप्रमात्वापातात्। ननु विशेषदर्शनं प्रमाहेतुः, विशेषादर्शनस्य दोषत्वे तदभावस्य हेतुत्वादिति चेत्, तर्हि दोषाभावत्वेन स हेतुर्न तु गुणत्वेन भावत्वेन वा।

I.ii.39. किञ्च विशेषदर्शनप्रतिबन्धका पित्तादयो दोषाः आवश्यकत्वात्, विशेषादर्शनम्। न च तेषामननुगतत्वेन विशेषदर्शनप्रतिबन्धकतयानुगमे लाघवात् विशेषादर्शनमेव हेतुरिति वाच्यम्। क्वचित् कश्चिद्दोष इत्यनुगमात्। अन्यथा पित्तादितोऽप्यप्रमा न स्यात् अननुगमात्। मण्यादेरिवाननुगमेप्यदोषत्वाच्च। तदभावाकूटस्य हेतुत्वात्। सर्वत्र विशेषादर्शनमेव हेतुः पित्तादेरननुगमेन तत्रोपक्षयादिति चेत्। न। पित्ताद्युत्कर्षेण भ्रमोत्कर्षात्। पित्तादेरदोषत्वे च विशेषप्रमैव कुतो न भवति, विशेषस्य विशेषान्तरादर्शनादिति यदि तदा अनवस्थैव। किञ्च विषेषदर्शनं न प्रमामात्रे न वा प्रत्यक्षप्रमायां हेतुर्व्यभिचारात् तत्रैव तद्धेतुत्वेऽनवस्थापाताच्च। अथ प्रत्यक्षे इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षो गुणः अप्रमांशे तदर्थस्यासत्त्वेन सन्निकर्षाभावात् दोषो हेतुः। न च प्रमांशेऽपि स एव हेतुः, अदोषत्वप्रसङ्गात् प्रमांशस्याप्रमात्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। साक्षात्कारित्वञ्चेन्द्रिय-सन्निकर्षजन्यत्वादिति चेत्। न। ज्ञाने विषयरूपस्यांशस्येन्द्रिय-तद्दोषाजन्यत्वात्, अप्रमांशे चेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेन साक्षात्कारित्वं न स्यात्। दोषस्य तद्धेतुत्वे अतिप्रसङ्गोऽननुगमश्च।

प्रमायां प्रमाप्रमायाञ्च याथार्थ्यप्रयोजकमस्त्यप्रमायां दोषवदिति चेत्। न। दोषाभावस्य सत्वादिति।

I.ii.40. उच्यते। प्रमामात्रे च नानुगतो गुणः, किन्तु तत्तत्प्रमायां भूयोऽवयवेन्द्रियसन्निकर्ष-यथार्थलिङ्ग-सादृश्य-वाक्यार्थज्ञानानां यथायथं प्रत्येकमेव गुणत्वं अन्वय-व्यतिरेकात्। तत्तदप्रमायां पित्तादि-लिङ्गभ्रमादीनां दोषत्ववत्प्रत्यक्षे विशेषदर्शनमपि गुणः तदनुविधानात्। ननु विशेषदर्शनहेतुरेव तद्धेतुरस्तु तद्व्यतिरेकादेव तदभावोपपत्तेः, अन्यथा विशेषदर्शनमेव तत्र कुतो न स्यात्। तत्रापि तदपेक्षायामनवस्थानादिति चेत्। एवं व्याप्यविषयकव्यापकप्रत्यक्षनियमे अनुमिताविव पुरुषप्रत्यक्षे प्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यात्। करादिमति पुरुषज्ञानत्वस्यानुव्यवसायेन निश्चयात्। तवापि विशेषदर्शनं विना कथं व्यापकप्रत्यक्षमिति चेत्। न। संशय-विपर्य्ययोत्तरप्रमायां तस्य हेतुत्वात्। ममापि तद्धेतुस्तत्रैव हेतुरिति चेत्। न। कर-चरण-चिवुकादीनां प्रत्येकं विशेषत्वेन तद्धेतूनामननुगततया तादृशप्रत्यक्षे अहेतुत्वात्। तद्दर्शनेषु च व्याप्यदर्शनत्वमनुगतमस्ति।

I.ii.41. नन्वेवं संशयोत्तरं व्याप्यज्ञाने सत्यनुमितिः स्यान्न प्रत्यक्षमनुमितिसामग्र्या बलवत्त्वादिति चेत्। अन्यत्र तथात्वेऽप्यत्र प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्या बलवत्त्वात्। तत्र पुरुषं पश्यामीत्यनुव्यवसायात्। अतएव विशेषदर्शनजन्यत्वेन ज्ञातं बाधकं। तद्दर्शनजन्यं बाध्यम्। अन्यथा बाध्य-बाधकव्यवस्था न स्यात्। न च प्रमा बाधिका, करभ्रमजन्यपुरुषज्ञानस्यापि स्थाणुज्ञानबाधकत्वात्। नापि विपरीतबाधकत्वेन बाधकत्वं, बाध्यतुल्यत्वात्। अनन्यथासिद्धं बाधकमिति चेत्। न। विशेषदर्शनजन्यत्वस्यैव तदर्थत्वात्। न च पीतः शङ्ख इत्यत्र विशेषदर्शनेऽपि श्वैत्यप्रमा नेति न तद्धेतुः, यद्विशेषदर्शनं हि भ्रमविरोधि तद्भावः प्रमाहेतुः, प्रत्यक्षभ्रमे च प्रत्यक्षविशेषदर्शनं विरोधि, दिङ्मोहे गौरोऽहमिति भ्रमे च तथा दर्शनात्, तच्च तत्र दोषान्नास्ति। अपि च लिङ्ग-सादृश्य-वाक्यार्थभ्रमदोषाभावमात्रान्नानुमित्यादिरिति सत्यपरामर्शादिगुणसिद्धिः। एवं प्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वेन वेदेऽपि प्रमा वाक्यार्थयथार्थज्ञानगुणजन्येति तदाश्रयेश्वरसिद्धिः।

I.ii.42. ननु प्रत्यक्षादावस्तु गुणजन्यत्वं, वेदे तु भ्रमाद्यभावचतुष्टयं प्रमाहेतुः। लोके च भ्रमाद्यभाव एव प्रमोत्पत्तेरिति चेत्। न। तत्र लाघवाद्वाक्यार्थयथार्थज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वेन भ्रमाद्यभावानामन्यथासिद्धत्वात्। आप्तस्य भ्रमाद्यभावमात्रेण वाक्यार्थज्ञानं विना तादृशवाक्याभावाच्च। अन्यथा तवापि तत्र वक्तृज्ञानानुमानं न स्यात् तस्याहेतुत्वात्। अस्तु वोभयमपि हेतुः विनिगमकाभावात्। तथापि वेदे गुणसिद्धिः। न च नित्यनिर्दोषत्वाद्दृष्टादेव वेदे प्रामाण्योपपत्तौ नापरिदृष्टनित्यज्ञानादिसर्वज्ञकल्पना गौरवादिति वाच्यं। प्रमाणवतः फलमुखगौरवस्यापि स्वर्गादाविवादोषत्वात्, पर्वू कारणताग्रहसमये फलानुपस्थित्या गोरवाज्ञानात्, लोके नित्यत्वाभावाच्च। अथ वेदे कर्त्रस्मरणादेर्बाधकात् लोकेऽपि निर्दोषत्वेनैव प्रमाहेतुत्वं वेदे तु नित्यत्वेनैव वक्तुरभावेऽपि निर्दोषत्वमवधार्य्यत इति चेत्। न। बाधकस्य बहुशो निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात्, भ्रान्तप्रतारकवाक्ये, घटोऽस्तीति वाक्ये पटोऽस्तीति दोषजन्यवाक्ये च संवादात् प्रमाणे तदभावाच्च। किञ्च दैववशसम्पन्नं चैत्यं वन्देतेत्यादिकं शुक-बालादिवाक्यमप्येवं प्रमाणं स्यात् वक्तृदोषाभावात् प्रमाणानपेक्षत्वेन वेदतुल्यत्वाच्च।

I.ii.43. ननु तवापि शुकादि-भ्रान्तप्रतारकवाक्यं कथं प्रमाणं गुणाजन्यत्वात्। न च गुणाजन्यत्वात् वक्तृतात्पर्य्याविषयत्वाच्च तदप्रमाणं, संवादेन साध्ये बाधात्। यत्तु भ्रान्त-प्रतारकवाक्ये योग्यतैव नास्ति, वक्तृज्ञातवाक्यार्थाबाधो हि योग्यता, भ्रमविषयश्च बाधित इति। तन्न। घटवति घटो नास्तीति भिन्नविषयतया भ्रमस्याहेतुत्वात्। किञ्च वाक्यार्थाबाधो योग्यता लाघवात्, वाक्यार्थश्च तत्राबाधित एव। नच शुक-बालादिवाक्यादर्थबोध एव न भवति किन्त्वेवमयं वदतीत्येवंप्रकारा प्रतीतिरिति वाच्यं। आकाङ्क्षादेरन्वयबोधसामग्र्याः सत्त्वेऽनुभवानपलापात्संवादेन यथार्थत्वानुभवाच्च। एवं धूमभ्रमाद्वह्निमत्येव वन्ह्यनुमितिर्न प्रमा स्यात्, यथार्थलिङ्गज्ञानाजन्यत्वात्। न च वन्ह्यन्तरमेव तत्र विषयः, प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। गोत्वाद्येकव्यक्तिके तदभावाच्च। नापि तत्रान्यतादात्म्यारोपः, संसर्गारोपात्; लिङ्गोपधानांशेभ्रमत्वेऽपि साध्यांशे प्रमात्वादिति।

I.ii.44. उच्यते। भ्रान्त-प्रतारकवाक्ये शुकादिवाक्ये च प्रमाणशब्दत्वेनाप्तोक्तत्वात् वेदवदीश्वरस्यैव यथार्थवाक्यार्थज्ञानं जनकं तस्य कार्यमात्रे कर्तृत्वात्। शुकादि वाक्यस्य च वेदतुल्यता दोषाभाववादिनापि वाच्या। नन्वेवं शब्दाभासोच्छेदः तस्यापीश्वरवक्तृकत्वादिति चेत्। न। तद्वाक्यार्थस्यासत्त्वेन भगवज्ज्ञानागोचरत्वात्। एवं लिङ्गाभासजन्यप्रमायामपि वह्निव्याप्यवत्व-ज्ञानमीश्वरस्यैव जनकमिति सम्प्रदायविदः।

I.ii.45. अत्र ब्रूमः। शाब्दप्रमायां लोके वक्तुर्यथार्थवाक्यार्थज्ञानं न गुणः, किन्तु योग्यतादिकं यथार्थतज्ज्ञानं वा लाघवादावश्यकत्वाच्च। भ्रम-प्रमाद-विप्रलिप्साजन्ये वाक्ये विसंवादिनि न यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानं, वाक्यार्थस्य बाधितत्वात्। एवं करणापाटवादन्यस्मिन्वक्तव्येऽन्याभिधाने विसंवादिनि। संवादिनि तु प्रमाणमेव। योग्यतादिज्ञानमेव क्वचिन्नास्ति। नन्वेवं नानार्थादन्यपरात्तात्पर्य्यभ्रमे तं विनैव वा यथार्थयोग्यतादिज्ञाने सति संवाद्यपरशक्यज्ञानमपि प्रमेति, तत्रापि तद्वाक्यं प्रमाणं स्यादिति चेत्। न इष्टत्वात्। तात्पर्य्यविषये च तद्वाक्यं न तदा प्रमाजनकमिति न प्रमाणं। एवं वेदेऽपि यथार्थयोग्यताज्ञानमेव गुण इति न वैदिकप्रमाया गुणजन्यत्वेनेश्वरसिद्धिः।

I.ii.46. स्यादेतत्। वेदे वक्तुर्यथार्थवाक्यार्थज्ञानमपि गुणः, लोके प्रमाणशब्दं प्रति तादृशस्य ज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात्। अत एव तव लोके वक्तृज्ञानानुमानं। एवं च वेदो वाक्यार्थगोचर-यथार्थज्ञानवत्स्वतन्त्रप्रणीतः प्रमाणशब्दत्वात् गामानयेति वाक्यवदितीश्वरसिद्धिः। मैवम्। प्रमाणशब्दत्वं हि वाक्यार्थयथार्थज्ञानपूर्वकतां विनापि सम्भवति आवश्यकयोग्यतादिसत्त्वात् यथार्थतज्ज्ञानाद्वेत्युपपादितमतोऽ-प्रयोजकमेतदिति। तथापि लोके वाक्यार्थज्ञानं प्रमाणवाक्ये कारणं गृहीतमिति तेन विना कथं तदिति चेत्। न। प्रवृत्त्याद्यर्थं हि प्रयोज्यस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानमु-द्दिश्यैतादृशपदेभ्यो वाक्यार्थं ज्ञास्यतीति बुद्ध्या वाक्यप्रयोग इत्यन्यथासिद्धं प्रथमं वक्तुर्वा-क्यार्थज्ञानं। न तु तादृशपदावलीप्रयोगे तस्य हेतुत्वम्। तादृशपदसमूहस्य प्रत्येकपदहेतोरेव शुकादिवदुपपत्तेः।

I.ii.47. अथ तात्पर्य्यविषये वेदः प्रमाणं, तात्पर्य्यञ्च तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चारणं। नचास्मदादेर्वेदं

विनातीन्द्रियवेदार्थगोचरज्ञानं, येन तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरणं भवेत्। नच वेदादेव तत्, अन्योऽन्या-श्रयात्। अतः सकलवेदार्थदर्शिना यस्य वेदस्य यदर्थप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चारणं कृतं स तत्र प्रमाणमिति तादृशेच्छैव गुणस्तज्जन्या वेदार्थप्रमेति तदाश्रयस्वतन्त्रपुरुषधीरेवासिद्धेति चेत्। मैवं मीमांसादिसकलाङ्गसाचिव्याद्वेदवाक्यार्थज्ञानवताध्यापकेन तत्तदर्थप्रतीतीच्छया वेद-स्योच्चारणमिति वेदार्थयथार्थविदस्तत्तदर्थे तात्पर्य्यमस्त्येव। एवं पूर्वपूर्वतादृशाध्यापकेन तत्तदर्थप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वं तत्परत्वमवगम्योत्तरोत्तरेषां वेदार्थप्रत्यय इत्यनादिस्तात्पयपरम्परेति किमीश्वरेण,। तर्हि वेदार्थानभिज्ञापकेनोच्चारितवेदस्य न तदर्थप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चारणमिति तात्पर्य्याभावान्न प्रमाणं न वा ततोऽर्थनिश्चय इति चेत्। न। अनादौ संसारे तस्य वेदस्य कदाचित् केनचित् मीमांसाद्यधीनवेदार्थज्ञानवता तत्प्रतीतीच्छयोच्चारणं कृतं तावतैव तत्परत्वमिति।

I.ii.48. प्राभाकरास्तु प्रामाण्यं स्वत एव उत्पद्यते ज्ञायते चेति। तथाहि-निष्कम्पप्रवृत्त्यङ्गं स्मृत्यनुभवसाधारणं यथार्थत्वमेव प्रामाण्यं, तच्च ज्ञानमात्रसामग्रीजन्यं न तु गुणं दोषाभावं वापेक्षते। सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वेनाव्यभिचारात्। अयथार्थस्तु व्यवहारः तस्यैव बाध्यत्वात्। ज्ञानन्तु न बाध्यते बाधकाभिमतज्ञानतुल्यत्वात्। ज्ञाने चायथार्थत्वव्यपदेशो विपरीत-व्यवहारजननोपाधिकः। अथ यथार्थत्वस्य प्रामाण्यत्वे रजतज्ञानं शुक्तौ कथमप्रमाणं, अप्रमाण्यञ्च कथं परत उत्पद्यत इति चेत्। न। अयथार्थत्वं नाप्रमाण्यं सर्वधियां यथार्थत्वात्। किन्तु विपरीतव्यवहारप्रवर्तकत्वम्। तच्च ज्ञानसामग्र्यामधिकदोषानुप्रवेशात् दोषहेतुकासंसर्गाग्रहाद्वा, उत्पन्ने ज्ञाने दोषसहकाराद्वा धर्म-धर्मिणोरसंसर्गाग्रहरूपमेकत्वासंसर्गाग्रहसहितं परत उत्पद्यते। न तु ज्ञानमात्रसामाग्रीतः प्रमायामतिप्रसङ्गात्। उन्नीयते च विपरीतव्यवहारजनकत्वं बाधकात्। तस्य तेन तदनुव्यवसायेन वा ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। ज्ञानस्वरूपे च न दोष-तदभावो हेतुः व्यभिचारात्। ज्ञानायथार्थत्वेऽपि यथार्थत्वं ज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यमेव, न तु गुणात् दोषाभावाद्वा, विपर्ययादेरपि धर्म्यंशे यथार्थत्वात्, असदर्थविषयता दोषात्, इन्द्रियाणामसन्निहितेऽसदर्थे सामर्थ्याभावात्।

I.ii.49. ननु दोषमात्रं न कारणं, किन्तु तदपेक्षा ज्ञानसामग्रीति यथार्थत्वे दोषाभावसापेक्षा सा हेतुरिति चेत्। न। सैव सामग्र्यसदर्थांशे दोषसापेक्षेति तदंशे ज्ञानमयथार्थं, सदर्थांशे दोषनिरपेक्षेति तदंशे यथार्थं, न तु सैव तत्रैव ज्ञाने दोष- तदभावसापेक्षा, विरोधात्, अयथार्थ-यथार्थत्वे दोष-तद-भावौ नान्तरीयकौ। यथार्थत्वञ्च ज्ञानोल्लिखितप्रकारवत्त्वमर्थस्य, यद्धर्म्मवत्त्वमर्थस्य तत्प्रकारक-ज्ञानत्वं वा। इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमर्थस्य रजतत्वं स्वस्य रजतत्वाश्रयविषयकत्वं यथार्थत्वरूपं प्रामाण्यं स्वप्रकाशत्वेन स्वयंमेव परिच्छिन्दत् स्वार्थनिश्चयरूपं। तदतिरिक्तञ्च न प्रामाण्यं मानाभावात्।

I.ii.50. अस्तु वा तदपि स्वतो ज्ञायतां परतो वा मा वा ज्ञायि किं तन्निरूपणेन प्रवृत्तावनुपयोगात्। अर्थं हि निश्चित्य प्रवर्त्तत इत्यावश्यकार्थनिश्चयादेव प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः। अथार्थनिश्चयादेव प्रवृत्तिरिति सत्यं, किंन्त्वेवंरूपोऽयमर्थं इति निश्चयो ज्ञानप्रामाण्यग्रहाधीन इति चेत्। न । सर्वं हि ज्ञानं

रजतरूपोऽयमर्थ इत्याद्याकारं स्वार्थनिश्चयरूपमेवोत्पद्यते, का तत्र परापेक्षा। अतएवार्थतथात्वं स्वयमेव परिच्छिद्यत इति स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहः। यदि च तज्ज्ञानं न स्वार्थनिश्चरूपं तदा प्रामाण्यज्ञानमपि न प्रामाण्यनिश्चयरूपं, न वा तदधीनं ज्ञानान्तरमपि स्वार्थनिश्चयरूपमिति व्यर्थमर्थनिश्चयार्थं प्रामाण्यनिरूपणं , प्रामाण्यज्ञानेऽपि स्वविषयनिश्चयार्थमन्यापेक्षायामनवस्था। किञ्च परतः पक्षे गृहीतप्रामाण्यस्य परस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चायकत्वेऽनवस्था। अतो यथा ज्ञानान्तरमगृहीतप्रामण्यमेव परप्रामाण्यनिश्चयरूपं। यदा तु तत्प्रामाण्यजिज्ञासा तदा तस्यापि प्रामाण्यमगृहीतप्रामाण्येनैव परेण निश्चीयत इति नानवस्था,। तथा अर्थज्ञानमपि अनिश्चितप्रामाण्यमेवार्थनिश्चयरूपमविशेषात्। न ह्युत्पन्ने ज्ञाने अर्थसंशयः किमेवमनेवं वेति। अथ ज्ञानमर्थनिश्चयरूपमपि स्वमगृह्णत्कथं स्वप्रामाण्यं गृह्णीयादिति चेत्। तर्हि स्वप्रकाशत्वे विवादः, अर्थस्य तथाभावरूपं प्रामाण्यं स्वत एव गृह्यत इति त्वयाप्यनुमतम्।

I.ii.51. अथ स्वतः प्रामाण्यग्रहे अनभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञाने इदं प्रमा न वेति संशयो न स्यात् निश्चिते तदभावात्। अत एवाप्रमात्वशङ्कया अर्थेऽपि किमेवमनेव वेति संशयात्, न ज्ञानमात्रात्करतलामल-कादावप्यर्थनिश्चयो, व्यभिचारादिति चेत्। न। न ह्यत्र ज्ञाने सत्यत्वासत्यत्वसंशयः, सर्वज्ञानानां सत्यत्वात्। किन्तु अगृहीतभेदं ज्ञानद्वयमेकं वा ज्ञानमित्याकारो ज्ञानं प्रमा न वेति संशयः, स च कारणदोषसंशयात्, स च ज्ञानान्तरान्निवर्त्तते। नन्वनुभूतित्वं प्रमात्वं तच्च स्मृत्यन्यज्ञानत्वम्। स्मृतित्वञ्च संस्कारासाधारणकारणकत्वमिति स्वतो न गृह्यते संस्कारादेरग्रहात्। अत एव न स्वत एव उत्पद्यते स्मृतिसाधारणत्वादिति चेत्। न। प्रवृत्त्यौपयिकं हि प्रामाण्यमर्थतथात्वनिश्चयत्वम्, तच्च स्वत एव गृह्यते उत्पद्यते च, न त्वनुभूतित्वसहितं गौरवात्। तवापि संवादादिना प्रवृत्तेः प्रामाण्यं यथार्थत्वमेवानुमीयते, न त्वनुभूतित्वे सति, सति स्मृतौ व्यभिचारात्। स्मृत्यनुभवयोरप्रमा-प्रमाव्यपदेशस्तान्त्रिकाणां सापेक्षत्व-निरपेक्षत्वनिबन्धनः,"यथार्थानुभवोमानमनपेक्षतयेष्यते" इति तैरभिधानादिति।

I.ii.52. अत्र ब्रूमः। प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो निष्कम्प्रवृत्तिहेतुः न तत्संशय इत्यनुभवसिद्धम् त्वदनुमतञ्च। तच्च प्रामाण्यं नार्थतथात्वनिश्चयरूपम्। अनभ्यासदशापन्नज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशेनानुव्यवसायेन वार्थतथात्वनिश्चयत्वग्रहेऽपि निष्कम्प्रवृत्त्यभावात् प्रामाण्यसंशयाच्च। सर्वधियां यथार्थत्व-नियमेनार्थतथात्वनिश्चयत्वस्य स्वरूपतो विषयतश्चागृहीतभेदज्ञानद्वयरूपभ्रम-साधारणत्वात्। तस्मान्न भ्रमसमानाकारादिदं रजतमिति ज्ञानान्निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिः, किन्तु तद्व्यावृत्ताकारात्। अथ तत्र प्रामाण्ये न संशयस्तस्यार्थतथात्वनिश्चयत्वरूपस्य निश्चयात्। किन्त्वगृहीतभेदं ज्ञानद्वयं विशिष्टज्ञानं वेति संशयः, स एव निष्कम्प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकोऽपि अतस्तस्य ज्ञानान्तरान्निवृत्तौ निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिरिति चेत्। तर्हि यस्य संशयो व्यतिरेकनिश्चयश्च यत्प्रतिबन्धकस्तन्निश्चयस्त-द्धेतुरिति व्याप्तेः, भ्रमव्यावृत्तस्य विशिष्टज्ञानत्वस्य निश्चयः प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्न त्वर्थतथात्वस्य, भ्रमसाधारण्यात्, तस्मिन् सत्यप्यप्रवृत्तेश्च। तत्संशयाभावसहितस्यार्थतथात्वनिश्चयस्य प्रवर्तकत्वे गौरवात्।

I.ii.53. किञ्च प्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानं विघटयत एव ज्ञानस्य तत्र प्रतिबन्धकत्वम्। न चेह तथा, संशये सत्यपि तस्य सत्त्वात्।

अपि च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वमेव प्रामाण्यं भ्रमव्यावृत्तम्। लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां भ्रमव्यावृत्ते प्रामाण्यव्यवहारात् तदतिक्रमे प्रमात्वस्य पारिभाषिकत्वापत्तेः। तस्मात् भ्रमव्यावृत्तत्वात् निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् प्रामाण्यसंशयनिवर्त्तकत्वाच्च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वमेव प्रामाण्यम्। नन्वस्तु तथा, तदेव स्वतोगृह्यते इति चेत्। न। अगृहीतासंसर्गधर्म-धर्मिविषयैकज्ञानत्वं भ्रमव्यावृत्तं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वम्। तत्तु स्वतो ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते, अगृहीतासंसर्गादेः प्रागनुपस्थितेः सामग्रीविरहात्। स्वप्रकाशता हि स्वमात्रसाक्षिणी, अन्यथानभ्यासदशापन्नेऽपि तस्य स्वतो ग्रहादप्रामाण्यसंशयो न स्यात्। अत एव न ज्ञानसामग्रीत एव प्रामाण्यमुत्पद्यते, भ्रमस्यापि तथात्वापत्तेः।

I.ii.54. नव्यास्तु-अविद्यमानभेदस्याग्रहः प्रामाण्यं। स चात्यन्ताभावः, कदापि तस्य ज्ञानाभावादत्यन्ता-भावरूपतया स्वतः सिद्धत्वेन प्रामाण्यं स्वत इत्युच्यते। विद्यमानभेदस्याग्रहोऽप्रामाण्यं, स चाग्रहः प्रागभावः अग्रे भेदस्य ग्रहात्। भेदग्रहे प्रसक्ते न स जायते दीषादित्युत्तरकालसंसर्गरूपस्य तत्परिपालनस्य दोषजन्यत्वेनाप्रामाण्यं परत उत्पद्यते। विसंवादि-संवादिविचित्रव्यवहारोऽपि विद्यमानाविद्यमानभेदाग्रहरूपविलक्षणहेतुक एव। व्यवहारोपयुक्तन्तु प्रामाण्यं यथार्थत्वमेव, तच्च ज्ञानहेतुमात्रहेतुकं। अप्रामाण्यं दोषात्। अनभ्यासदशापन्ने प्रामाण्यसंशयोऽपि विद्यमानाविद्यमानभेदाग्रहकोटिद्वयावलम्बी, स एव निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धक इति।

I.ii.55. तन्न। निष्कम्प्रवृत्तिहेतुर्हि प्रामाण्यं ग्राह्यं, न त्वन्यत्, निष्प्रयोजनत्वात्। तच्च यद्यपि अविद्यमानभेदाग्रहरूपं, तदा तन्न स्वतो ज्ञातुं शक्यते। अविद्यमानभेदग्रहस्य तत्प्रतियोगिनोऽसत्त्वात् प्रागनुपस्थितेश्च। अनभ्यासदशायां ज्ञाने ज्ञातेऽप्यविद्यमानभेदाग्रहे संशयाच्च। एतेनौत्सर्गिकः संसर्गग्रह एव प्रामाण्यं, संसर्गाग्रह एवाप्रामाण्यमिति निरस्तम्। संसर्गग्रहत्वस्य स्वेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। शक्यत्वे वानभ्यासदशायामपि तद्ग्रहे तत्संशयो न स्यात्। तस्मात् भ्रमव्यावृत्तं निष्कम्पप्रवृत्तिहेतः प्रामाण्यमगृहीत संसगधर्म-धर्मिविषयैकज्ञानत्वरूपं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वं, संसर्गज्ञानत्वं वा, अविद्यमानभेदाग्रहत्वं वा, स्वतो ज्ञातुं न शक्यते, किन्तु विशेषदर्शनादिजन्य---------- ज्ञानादवधार्य्यत इति वज्रलेपायितं परतः प्रामाण्यं इत्युत्पत्तिवादः।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्ययायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे प्रामाण्यवादे उत्पत्तिवादः।

I.III.

अथ प्रमालक्षणम्।

I.iii.1. अथ किं तत् प्रामाण्यम्। न तावज्जातिः, योग्यव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वेन प्रत्यक्षत्वे प्रमात्वसंशयानुपपत्तेः, प्रमात्वस्यानुमेयत्वाच्च। साक्षात्त्वादिना सङ्करापत्तेश्च। बीजसाम्येन गुणेऽपि तस्य दोषत्वात्। तारत्वादेरुत्कर्षरूपतया जातित्वनियमे चानन्यगतिकतया च नानात्वात्। प्रमात्वनानात्वे त्वननुगमः।

I.iii.2. किञ्चैवमप्रमाया अंशे प्रमात्वं न स्यात्, जातेर्व्याप्यवृत्तितानियमात्। न चेष्टापत्तिः, अंशे संवादिनि च समूहालम्बने प्रमात्वाप्रमात्वयोरनुभूयमानत्वेन एकशेषस्य कर्त्तुमशक्यत्वात्। अथ विपर्ययस्यांशे न प्रमात्वं कि न्तु स्मृतिवद्यथार्थत्वमेवेति चेत् तर्हि यथार्थानुभवत्वमेव प्रामाण्यमावश्यकत्वात्। न च तदपीति वक्ष्यते।

I.iii.3. अथ भावाऽभावो वा नाव्याप्यवृत्तिरितिनियमं तिरस्कृत्याबाधितानुभवबलात् संयोगतदभाव-योरव्याप्यवृत्तित्वम्, तथा जातिर्व्याप्यवृत्तिरेवेति व्याप्तिमभिभूयानुभवबलादेव प्रमात्व-तदभावयोरव्याप्यवृत्तित्वमस्तु। न च यदव्याप्यवृत्ति तन्न व्याप्यवृत्ति, यच्च व्याप्यवृत्ति न तदव्याप्यवृत्तीति व्याप्तेः प्रमात्वस्य नोभयरूपत्वमिति वाच्यं। संयोगात्यन्ताभावे व्यभिचारात्। न च तस्याभावद्वयं मानाभावात्। गुण-दोषयोरेकत्र सत्त्वे अव्याप्यवृत्तित्वं गुणमात्रसत्त्वे व्याप्यवृत्तित्वमित्यन्यथोपपत्तेश्च। अन्यथा प्रमात्वस्योपाधेरऽप्यत्यन्ताभावसामानाधिकरण्यं न स्यात् सामान्यत्वात् न स्याच्चोभयरूपत्वमिति। मैवं। अवच्छेदकभेदं विना विरुद्धयोरेकत्रा-समावेशादप्रतीतेश्च। न च विषय एवांशरूपः प्रमात्ववृत्तावच्छेदकः, तद्विषयत्वस्य भ्रमेऽपि सत्त्वात्।

I.iii.4. ननु विशेष्यावृत्त्यप्रकारकत्वं, विशेष्यावृत्तिप्रकारकत्वञ्च प्रमात्वदभावयोर्वृत्तावच्छेदकमस्त्विति चेत्। तर्हि तयोरेव प्रमाप्रमाव्यवहारजनकत्वमस्तु आवश्यकत्वात् प्रथमोपस्थितत्वाच्च, किं जात्या। न च तदपीति वक्ष्यते।

I.iii.5. नापि यथार्थागृहीतग्राहित्वं लोकसिद्धप्रमात्वं, धारावाहिकबुद्ध्व्यव्याप्तेः। न च प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्त्तमानार्थग्राहित्वेन स्वाश्रयक्षणविशिष्टस्तम्भादिग्राहकत्वेनागृहीतग्राहित्वं लोकसिद्धमन्यथैक-समये ज्ञानयौगपद्यप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्। क्षणानामतीन्द्रियत्वात्, स्थूलोपाधिमादाय वर्त्तमानत्वग्रहात्, स्वरूपसत्क्रमिकक्षणोत्पत्तिकत्वेन ज्ञानायौगपद्यात्। न च स्तम्भादिषु प्रतिक्षणं गुण-कर्माद्युत्पत्तिरस्ति येन तदादायागृहीतग्राहित्वं स्यात्। वेदात् क्रमोत्पन्नवेदार्थगोचर-धारावाहिकबुद्ध्व्यव्याप्तेश्च।

I.iii.6. नापि यथार्थानुभवत्वं। ज्ञाने घटत्वादिना यथाशब्दार्थसादृश्याभावात्, सादृश्यमात्रस्य भ्रमेऽपिगतत्वात्। न च गुणजन्यानुभवत्वं, दोषाभावजन्यानुभवत्वं वा, तयोरननुगतत्वात् प्रमाप्रमानिरूप्यत्वाच्च। नाप्यबाधितानुभवत्वं, बाधस्य विपरीतप्रमात्वात्। नापि संवाद्यनुभवत्वं, ज्ञानान्तरेण तथोल्लिख्यमानत्वस्य संवादित्वस्य भ्रमसाधारणत्वात्। नापि समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकानु-भवत्वं, उपेक्षाप्रमायामव्याप्तेः, तद्योग्यतायाः प्रमानिरूप्यत्वात्। नापि तत्त्वानुभवत्वं, अवस्तुनोऽभानात्। भाने वा भ्रमसाधारणयात्।

I.iii.7. नापि विशेष्यनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिधर्मप्रकारकानुभवत्वं, संयोगादिप्रमायामव्याप्तिः अभावे व्याप्यवृत्तित्वविशेषणे संयोगादिभ्रमेऽतिव्याप्तिः तदत्यन्ताभावास्यैकत्वात्। नापि विशेष्यवृत्त्यन्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकधर्माप्रकारकानुभवत्वं, अव्याप्यवृत्तिप्रमानुपग्रहात्। मूले वृक्षः कपिसंयोगाभाववान्नाग्रे इत्यबाधितानुभवात् संयोगवदन्योन्याभावस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्। भेदाभेद एवं स्यादिति चेत् अनुभवमुपालम्भस्व, यद्बलादवच्छेदभेदेनात्यन्ताभाववदन्यो-न्याभावस्याप्यव्याप्यवृत्तित्वमुपेयं। अतएव पक्के इदानीं न श्याम इति धीः समयभेदादविरुद्धा, तत्रैव तदन्योन्याभावमवलम्वते।

I.iii.8. नापि विशेष्यावृत्त्यप्रकारकानुभवत्वं, एकैकविशेष्यावृत्तिनानाप्रकारकसमूहालम्बनाऽव्याप्तेः। न च प्रकारस्यैकविशेष्यवृत्तितया न विशेष्यावृत्तित्वमिति वाच्यं, प्रमाप्रमारूपसमूहालम्बनाति-व्याप्तेः। न च यावद्विशेष्यावृत्तित्वं विवक्षितं, एकैकविशेष्यवृत्तेर्यावद्विशेष्यावृत्तित्वेन समूहालम्बनाव्याप्तेः, एकविशेष्यके यावदर्थाभावाच्च। अथ विषयताया आश्रयो विशेष्यः, ज्ञानं तत्प्रतियोगि, भ्रमे च शुक्तिवृत्तिर्विषयता व्यधिकरणेन रजतत्वेनावच्छिद्यते, रजतवृत्तिस्तु समानाधिकरणेन रजत्वेन, विषयता च विषये न ज्ञानाहिता ज्ञाततारूपा विवक्षिताऽपसिद्धान्ताद-सिद्धेः, अतीतानागतप्रमाया तदभावाच्च। किन्तु ज्ञानस्य विषये विशेषणताविशेषः कश्चित्। परज्ञानं ज्ञानत्वेन तद्विषयं च घटत्वेन जानतो घटमयं जनाति न वेति संशयाद्विषयज्ञान-स्वरूपातिरिक्तस्य स्वाश्रय-स्वाभावादिविशेषणता-विशेषस्यावश्यं स्वीकारात्। अन्यथा घटत्वेन ज्ञातोऽयमर्थ इति तृतीयार्थासम्भवः, प्रकारत्वमपि विशेषणताविशेष एव, न तु विषयत्वमति-प्रसङ्गात्।

I.iii.9. एवञ्च विषयतासमानाधिकरणप्रकारकानुभवः, प्रकारसमाधिकरणविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवो वा, स्वसमानाधिकरणधर्मप्रकारकविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवो वा, स्वसमानाधिकरणधर्मा-वच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवो वा प्रमेति चेत्। न। निर्विकल्पकाव्याप्तेः, विषयतासमानाधि-करणेदन्त्वप्रकारकभ्रमस्यापि प्रमात्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। भ्रमस्तत्रांशे प्रमैवेति चेत् तर्हि अनुभवत्वमेव प्रमात्वं व्यर्थमधिकं। अनुभव एव क्वचिदंशे भ्रमः प्रमा चेति चेत्। न। उक्तलक्षणे तादृशालाभात्।

I.iii.10. अथ स्वव्यधिकरणधर्मानवच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोगयनुभवः प्रमा, समूहालम्बने च प्रतिविशेष्यं विषयताभेदादेकवृत्तिर्विषयता नापरवृत्तिनावच्छिद्यते, अतो नाव्याप्तिरिति चेत्। न।

भ्रमांशप्रमायामव्याप्तेः। न हि या विषयता व्यधिकरणधर्मेणावच्छिद्यते सा तदनवच्छिन्ना, विरोधात्। नापि प्रकारव्यधिकरणविषयत्वाप्रतियोग्यनुभवः प्रमा, प्रकारव्यधिकरणविषयताप्रतियोगिनि तदप्रतियोगित्वस्याभावेन भ्रमांशप्रमाव्याप्तेः। नापि स्वव्यधिकरणधर्मवच्छिन्नविषयत्वा-प्रतियोग्यनुभवः, स्वाधिकरणावृत्त्यप्रकारविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवो वा प्रमा, तत एव। भ्रमे विषयतायाः स्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नत्वात् स्वाधिकरणावृत्तिप्रकारकत्वाच्च। नापि स्वसमानधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकधर्मानवच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवः प्रमा, भ्रमांशप्रमाव्याप्तेः, अन्योऽन्याभावस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वेनाव्याप्यवृत्तिप्रमायामव्याप्तेश्च।

I.iii.11. यत्तु—प्रमात्वाप्रमात्वयोर्विरोध एवेति भ्रमो न प्रमेति। तत्तुच्छं। अंशभेदमादायोभयस्यानुभवात्। अन्यथा भ्रमस्योभयबहिर्भावापत्तेः। एतेन स्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारकं ज्ञानं भ्रमस्तदन्योऽनुभवः प्रमा, भ्रमो धर्म्यंशे न प्रमेति निरस्तं। नापि प्रकाराधिकरणावृत्त्यप्रकारकविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवः, प्रकारानधिकरणावृत्तिविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवो वा प्रमा। प्रमेयमिदमिति ज्ञाने प्रकारान-धिकरणस्याप्रसिद्धेः। किञ्च रजतत्वप्रकारकविषयताया रजतवृत्तित्वनियमात् रजतत्वावच्छिन्नैव रजतभ्रमे रजतवृत्तिविषयता, अतो रजतभ्रमोऽपि रजते प्रमा स्यात्।

I.iii.12. अथ रजत-पुरोवर्त्तिनोरेकैव विषयता, सा च प्रकारानधिकारणवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नैवेति चेत्, तर्हि धर्म्यंशेऽपि तज्ज्ञानं प्रमा न स्यात्। व्यधिकरणप्रकारकत्वस्य तुल्यत्वात्। धर्म्यंशे तु प्रमात्वे रजतेऽपि प्रमा स्यात्। अथ रजतांशे धर्म्यंशे च तज्ज्ञानं प्रमैव वैशिष्ट्यांशे न प्रमेति चेत्। न। वैशिष्ट्यस्य पूर्वज्ञानाविषयत्वेनाप्रकारत्वात्। वैशिष्ट्यवृत्तिविषयतायां रजतत्व-पुरोवर्त्तिनोः प्रकारत्वेन भ्रमस्य वैशिष्ट्यांशे प्रमात्वाप्रमात्वापातात्।

I.iii.13. नापि स्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारानवच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोग्यनुभवः प्रमा। प्रमेयमिदमिति ज्ञाने प्रमेयत्वप्रकारकविषयतानाश्रयस्याप्रसिद्ध्याव्याप्तेः। न च संयोगित्वादिना प्रमेयत्व-प्रकारकविषयताव्यतिरेको घटादौ प्रसिद्ध इति वाच्यम्। प्रतियोगितावच्छेदरूपवत्त्वेन प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्याभावधीहेतुत्वात्। किञ्च यत्किञ्चिद्व्यधिकरणप्रकारानवच्छिन्नत्वं भ्रमसाधारणं, प्रकृतज्ञानव्यधिकरणप्रकारानवच्छिन्नत्वं निर्विकल्पकाव्याप्तं, तस्य निष्प्रकारकत्वादिति।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे प्रमालक्षणपूर्वपक्षः।

I.iii.14. उच्यते। यत्र यदस्ति तत्र तस्यानुभवः प्रमा। तद्वति तत्प्रकारकानुभवो वा।

यत्र यन्नास्ति तत्र तस्य ज्ञानं तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानं वा अप्रमा। तदन्यत्वे सत्यनुभवत्वमेव वा प्रमात्वम्। तत्प्रकारकत्वञ्च तद्वैशिष्ट्यविषयकत्वं, तद्विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं वा।

I.iii.15. ईश्वरस्य तद्विशिष्टविषयं ज्ञानं न तु तत्प्रकारकम्। निर्विकल्पकञ्च प्रमाप्रमाबहिर्भूतमेव व्यवहारानङ्गत्वात्। अव्यपदेश्यपदेनतदुपग्रहस्य नाम-जात्यादियोजनारहितमपि प्रत्यक्षमस्तीत्यत्र

तात्पर्यम्। इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमिदन्त्ववतितदनुभवत्वात् प्रमा, रजतत्वाभाववति तत्प्रकारक-ज्ञानत्वादप्रमा, अंशे समूहालम्बनञ्च नाप्रमा। एकप्रकाराभाववत्यपि तदप्रतीतेः।

I.iii.16. नन्वेवमव्याप्यवृत्तिभावाभावयोरेकत्र प्रमाप्रमा-च स्यात्, तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वादिति चेत्। न। भिन्न-भिन्नावच्छेदेन हि वृक्षे संयोग-तदभावौ, न वृक्षमात्रे, विरोधादननुभवाच्च। तथा च यत्र वृक्षे संयोगो न तत्र तदभावः, यदवच्छेदेन यत्र यदस्तीति वा विवक्षितं। गोत्वादेरपि सास्नाद्यवच्छेदेन वृत्तेः। पाकरक्ते श्यामोऽयमिति धीः प्रमैव कदाचित्तत्र तत्सत्त्वात्, इदानीं श्याम इति तु अप्रमैव। न च यत्तद्भ्यां लक्षणोऽननुगमः, न हि प्रमा सर्वत्र प्रमा, किन्तु क्वचित्; तथाच किं ज्ञानं कुत्र प्रमेति तत्तद्विशेषस्य लक्ष्यत्वेन यत्तद्भ्यामेव लक्षणं युक्तं।

I.iii.17. अन्ये तु अनुभवत्वमेव प्रामाण्यं। भ्रमेऽप्यंशमादाय प्रमाव्यवहारात्। रजतादिप्रमाऽप्रमा च विशिष्य लक्षणीया, रजतत्ववति तदनुभवः तदभाववति तदनुभवो वेत्यादिना। नन्वनुभवत्वस्य प्रमाप्रमासाधारण्येन तज्ज्ञानस्य न निष्कम्पप्रवृत्त्यङ्गत्वमिति चेत्। सत्यं। विशेषविषयप्रमाया एव प्रवर्त्तकत्वात्। अतिरिक्त-विषयतापक्षे विषयताश्रयावृत्त्यप्रकारकानुभवः प्रमा। केवलान्वयिनि विषयताश्रयावृत्तिरवृत्तिरेव प्रसिद्धः। यद्वा यत्प्रकारिका या विषयता तत्प्रकारसमानाधिकरणविषयताकः, स्वप्रकारसमानाधिकरण-विषयताको वानुभवः प्रमा। यत्प्रकारिका या विषयता तत्प्रकारव्यधिकरणविषयताकं, स्वप्रकारव्यधिकरणविषयताकं वा ज्ञानं भ्रमः। प्रकारभेदेनैकत्र विषयताभेद इति लक्षणद्वयसमावेशात् प्रमा-भ्रमसङ्करः।

I.iii.18. यद्वा विशेष्यनिष्ठात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगिप्रकारकविषयताप्रतियोगी, विशेष्यनिष्टात्यन्ताभाव प्रतियोगिप्रकारानवच्छिन्नविषयत्वप्रतियोगी वा, विषयतासमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियो-गिप्रकारकविषयत्वप्रतियोगी वा, विषयतासमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिप्रकारा-नवच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोगी वानुभवः प्रमा। स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रकारानवच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोगि ज्ञानं, स्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोगि ज्ञानं वा भ्रमः। इदं रजतमितिभ्रमे च विषयताद्वये व्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नत्व-तदनवच्छिन्नत्वयोः विषयत्वप्रतियोगित्व-तदप्रतियोगित्वयोरविरोधात्, समूहालम्बने च विषयताभेदान्न प्रमाप्रमालक्षणेऽव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्ती। वस्तुतस्तु विशेषणताविशेषो नास्त्येव मानाभावात्। सामान्यतो ज्ञाने ज्ञाते तस्य क्वचिद्विशेषणतेति सामान्यतो विशेषणताज्ञानेऽपि घटमयं जानाति न वेति सन्देहतादवस्थ्यात्। तस्माद्घट-तज्ज्ञानयोः स्वरूपग्रहेऽपि तदीयत्वं तद्विषयत्वं न गृहीतमिति तद्विषयत्वे सन्देहः। तदीयत्वञ्च सम्बन्धं विना तत्सम्बन्धस्वभावत्वं। तदुक्तं। "प्रकाशस्य सतस्तदीयतामात्रनिबन्धनः स्वभावविशेष-स्तद्विषयत्वं" इति।

I.iii.19. सम्बन्धं विना कथं तदीयत्वं, सम्बन्धस्यैव स्वभावत्वात्। यथा तवैव विशेषणतायां, अन्यथानवस्थानात्। अन्यत्रापि स्वरूपसम्बन्धे एषैव गतिः, अन्यथा सामान्येनाभाव-समवाययो-र्ज्ञानेऽधिकरणे ज्ञाते तयोः संशयो न स्यात्। अधिकरण-तदुभयस्वरूपाणां ज्ञातत्वात्। तत्राप्यभाव-

समवाययोर्विशेषणताविशेषो न गृहीत इति चेत्। न। सामान्यतस्तद्ग्रहेऽपि संशयात्।

I.iii.20. यत्तु समूहालम्बन-विशिष्टज्ञानयोर्विशेषानुभवाद्विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणताविशेषो विषय इति। तन्न। विशेषणतामादायापि समूहालम्बनसम्भवात्। तत्रापि विशेषणातान्तरस्वीकारेऽनवस्था। समूहालम्बनात्तु विशिष्टज्ञानस्य विशेषः कारणकृतः कार्यकृतः प्रकारकृतो वा। प्रकरोऽपि विशेषणताविशेषः स च धर्मिण्येवास्त्विति चेत्। न तमादायाऽपि समूहालम्बनसम्भवात्।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे प्रमालक्षणसिद्धान्तः।

इति प्रमालक्षणम्

I. IV.

अथान्यथाख्यातिवादः

I.iv.1. ननु सर्वज्ञानानां यथार्थत्वात् प्रमाणलक्षणे (विशेषणस्य) व्यावर्त्याप्रसिद्धेर्विशेषणवैयर्थ्यम्, अन्यथाख्यातौ मानाभावात्।

तथा हि—रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वं रजतत्वप्रकारकानुभवविषयत्वव्याप्यं रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषय-मात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वात् रजतमात्रवृत्तिधर्मवत् इत्यन्यथाख्यातिव्याप्यं सिध्यतीत्यप्रासकालत्वम्, रजतमात्रवृत्तित्वं चोपाधिः।

शुक्तिवृत्तिज्ञानविषयता रजतत्वप्रकारिका रजतार्थिताजन्यप्रवृत्तिविषयवृत्तिविषयतात्वात् रजतवृत्तिविषयतावदित्यत्र रजतवृत्तित्वमुपाधिः। रजतत्वम् अरजतवृत्तिज्ञानविषयतावच्छेदकम् अरजतविषयप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानप्रकारत्वात् शुक्तित्ववदित्यत्र रजतावृत्तित्वमुपाधिः।

रजतत्वप्रकारिका ज्ञानविषयता अरजतवृत्तिः अरजतनिष्ठात्यन्ताभाव[भावा] प्रतियोगिनी वा अरजत-विषयप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानविषयतात्वात् शुक्तिवृत्तिविषयतावदित्यत्र रजतावृत्तित्वमुपाधिः।

I.iv.2. विषयताया निरस्तत्वाच्च। विवादपदं रजतज्ञानं शुक्तिविषयकं शुक्तौ प्रवर्तकज्ञानत्वात् शुक्तिज्ञानवदित्यत्र ज्ञायमानेष्टभेदाग्रहे कारणतावच्छेदकं रजतज्ञानं न प्रर्वतकमित्यसिद्धिः।

शुक्ती रजतज्ञानविषयताश्रयः रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिविषयत्वात् रजतवदित्यत्र रजतत्वमुपाधिः। शुक्तौ रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिः स्वधर्मिकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानसाध्या रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिवदित्यत्र रजतविषय-त्वमुपाधिः, स्वपदार्थाननुगमश्च। तत्परित्यागे तु रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तिधर्मिकरजतत्वप्रकारक ज्ञानेनोभय-सिद्धेन रजतस्मरणेनार्थान्तरम्।

I.iv.3. उच्यते। रजतार्थिजन्या शुक्तौ प्रवृत्तिरिष्टप्रवृत्तिविषयविषिष्टज्ञानसाध्या प्रवृत्तित्वात् शुक्तौ शुक्त्यर्थिप्रवृत्तिवत्।

न चेष्टविषयप्रवृत्तित्वमुपाधिः साधनविशेषितत्वात्।

यद्वा रजतेच्छाजन्यशुक्तिविषयप्रवृत्तिजनकरजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानं शुक्तिविशेष्यकं शुक्तिप्रवृत्तिप्रयोजक-ज्ञानत्वात् शुक्तौ शुक्त्यर्थिप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानवत्। अवच्छेदकत्वेऽपि प्रयोजकत्वान्नासिद्धिः।

हेतुत्वमपि तस्य साधयिष्यामः। तथाविधमिदं ज्ञानं वा रजतत्वप्रकारकं रजतेच्छाजन्यप्रवृत्ति-हेतुज्ञानत्वात् सत्यरजतज्ञानवत्।

न च ग्रहणस्मरणयोर्विशिष्टस्य ज्ञानस्य वा पक्षत्वे बाध आश्रयासिद्धिर्वा। उभयसिद्धेन शुक्तिनिष्ठप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वेन पक्षत्वात्। अन्यथा साध्यतदभाववतः पक्षत्वेनानुमानोच्छेदः।

समवायातीन्द्रियत्ववादिनं प्रति अगृहीतासंसर्गकधर्मधर्मिविषयकमेकंज्ञानमेव विशिष्टज्ञानं सिध्यति।

न चैवमुभयख्यातिः, नान्यथाख्यातिरिति वाच्यम्। व्यधिकरणप्रकारकज्ञानस्य तत्त्वात्।

न च विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्यजनकत्वमुपाधिः। तथाविधे इदंज्ञाने रजतज्ञाने च त्वन्मते साध्याव्यापकत्वात्।

नापि दोषाजन्यत्वम्, परस्य ज्ञानमात्रे तथात्वात्। अन्यथा तयोरेव साध्याव्यापकत्वात्। न चाप्रयोजकत्वम्। इष्टपुरोवर्तिविशिष्टज्ञानस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात्।

I.iv.4. अत्र प्राभाकराः—अप्रयोजकमिदम्। स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहादेव प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेः किं विशिष्टज्ञानेन। परेणाप्यारोपनियमार्थं तदभ्युपगमात्। न च रजते प्रवृत्तिं प्रति विशिष्टज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात् इहापि तत्सिद्धिः, प्रवृत्तिमात्रे भेदाग्रहे सतीष्टपुरोवर्त्तिज्ञानस्य लाघवेन हेतुत्वात्, न तु सदपि विशिष्टज्ञानं तन्त्रं, गौरवात्।

न च रजते इष्टपुरोवर्त्तिभेदग्रहस्याप्रसिद्धया कथं तदभाव इति वाच्यम्। पुरोवर्त्तिनिष्ठे भेदे रजतप्रतियोगित्वज्ञानविषयत्वाभावस्य पुरोवर्त्तिनिष्ठभिन्नत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयत्वाभावस्य वा हेतुत्वात्। न चाभेदव्यवहारो व्यवहर्तव्यधीसाध्यो न तु तदभावाग्रहात्, अन्यथा भेदाग्रहात् भेदव्यवहारापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। इच्छादीनां ज्ञातपुरोवर्त्तिमात्रविषयत्वात्। अभेदाभिलापोऽपि ज्ञातभेदस्यासंसर्गाग्रहादिति नाज्ञाते व्यवहारः।

I.iv.5. ननु पीतः शङ्खो न श्वेत इति भेदज्ञानेऽपि श्वेताभेदानुमित्या श्वेतार्थिप्रवृत्तेरभेदधीस्तद्धेतुरिति चेत्—न। तवापि पीतः शङ्खः इत्यभेदज्ञानात् पीतार्थी न प्रवर्तते, भेदानुमितेरिति भेदाग्रह एव तद्धेतुः स्यात्। भ्रमत्वेन ज्ञातमभेदज्ञानमकिंचित्करमिति यदि, तदा भ्रमत्वेन ज्ञातं भेदज्ञानमपि तथा।

I.iv.6. यद्वा इष्टभेदाविषयकं ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम्। न चाभेदानुमिताविष्टभेदो विषयः। अत एत पूर्वं भेदप्रत्ययेऽपि स प्रत्ययो न भेदग्राहीति दिङ्मोहप्रतिबिम्बादिप्रत्ययाः।

नन्वेवं रजतेऽपि विशिष्टज्ञानं न सिध्येत् प्रवृत्तेर्भेदाग्रहादेवोपपत्तेः। इदं रजततया जानामि रजततया ज्ञातमिदमित्यनुभवः शुक्तावपि तुल्यः। न च शुक्तौ रजतत्वबाधात् सोऽप्यसंसर्गाग्रहः बाधस्यापि

विशिष्टज्ञानत्वे मानाभावादिति चेत्—न। हि रजतस्य न स्मृतिः प्रागननुभवात्।

ग्रहणं च तस्य धर्मिविषयकं योग्यधर्मियोगेन रजतत्वजातिग्रहादित्यर्थसिद्धं धर्मधर्मिविषयकमेकं ज्ञानम्। न च रजतत्वस्य शुक्त्यनुभवविषयत्वे हेतुरस्ति। न च प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् संस्कारेन्द्रिये हेतू। तयोरत्र भिन्नविषयकत्वात्।

I.iv.7. एकदा स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितविरुद्धानेकभेदाग्रहे संशयः।

(न च) [न तु] क्रमेणोपस्थितानेकभेदाग्रहो, येन स क्रमिकविपर्ययद्वयरूपः स्यात्। अन्यथा तवाप्यप्रतीकारात्। न च संशयानन्तरं विपर्ययदशायामुभयभेदाग्रहे संशयः, एकभेदाग्रहे अन्यथाख्यातिः, दोषमहिम्ना ह्येकस्य न स्वातन्त्र्येणोपस्थितिः किं त्वभावविशेषणतयेति तद्भेदाग्रहोऽप्यकिंचित्करः। न च संशयानन्तरं धूमभ्रमादस्ति क्वचिद्वह्न्यर्थिप्रवृत्तिर्न तु तेन विना। न च तस्य स्वतन्त्रोपस्थित-वह्न्यसंसर्गाग्रहो द्वारम्, संशयानुरोधेन तस्य प्रागपि सत्त्वाद्वह्न्यनुमितिर्द्वारमिति वाच्यम्। लिङ्गभ्रमस्य हि निर्वह्नित्वस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणोपस्थिति-प्रतिबन्धकत्वेन नियमतः स्वतन्त्रवह्निस्मृतिर्द्वारमिति न संशयान्यथाख्याती। न च पर्वतस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे वह्नेश्च स्मरणे प्रत्यक्षभ्रमान्न विशेष इति साक्षात्करोमीति स्यात् न त्वनुमिनोमीति वाच्यम्। लिङ्गज्ञानानन्तरभावित्वप्रतिसन्धानाप्रतिसन्धानाभ्यामुभयसंभवात्।

I.iv.8. एवं स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितानिष्टभेदाग्रहोऽपि निवर्तकः। तेनेदं रजतं न शुक्तिरित्यभावप्रतियोगित्वेना-निष्टोपस्थितेस्तद्भेदाग्रहो न निवर्तकः।

शुक्त्यभावासंसर्गाग्रहश्च नकारस्यार्थ इति नान्यथाख्यातिः।

अनिष्टाभेदग्रहस्य निवर्तकत्वे च रजत एव नेदं रजतमिति कृत्वा न निवर्तेत, अन्यथा अन्यथा-ख्यात्यापत्तेः। अत एव रजत एव नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानेऽपि न प्रवृत्त्यन्यथाख्याती रजतभेदासंसर्गाग्रहात्।

ननु रजतरङ्गयोरिमे रङ्गरजते इत्यत्र प्रत्येकमुभयभेदाग्रहे युगपत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्यातामिति चेत्—न। एवंविधभ्रमे मानाभावात्। कार्योन्नेयधर्माणां यथाकार्यमुन्नयनात्। क्रमोत्पन्नज्ञानयोर्भेदाग्रहादे-कत्वाभिमानः। अन्यथा तवापि स्वतन्त्रोभयभेदाग्रहात् प्रत्येकं रजतं रङ्गं वेति संशयः स्यात्। यदेव वा तत्र विपर्ययनियामकं तत एव प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्याताम् तद्धेतोरेवेति न्यायात्।

I.iv.9. यत्तु—'प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधात्मा बाधोऽख्यातौ न युज्यते।
साधयत्यन्यथाख्यातिं बाध एव हि नः स्फुटम्॥'

इति। तद्विपरीतम्। परस्परविरुद्धत्वाविशेषेण बाध्यत्वाव्यवस्थितेः। विरुद्धार्थकतयोत्पन्नत्वं च तुल्यम्। पूर्वेणापि क्वचित्परस्य बाधात्। तस्मादभेदाग्रहात् प्रसञ्जितो व्यवहारो भेदग्रहात् बाध्यत इति युक्तम्।

उपेक्षाभ्रमे च शब्दप्रयोगो बाध्यः। तदीयतामात्रस्वभावत्वात् तद्विषयत्वस्य। कथं रजतीयमात्रज्ञानमरजतीयं स्वभावव्याघातात्। न चोभयीयम्, समूहालम्बनापत्तेः। तदुक्तम्—

'अन्यस्य ह्यन्यथाभानं प्रतीत्यैव पराहतम्।
परस्मिन् भासमाने तु न परं भासते यतः॥' इति।

विषयं विनैव तदाकारं ज्ञानमिति साकारवादः। ज्ञानायथार्थत्वे च ज्ञानमात्रस्य तच्छङ्कया न निष्कम्प्रवृत्तिः। न च दोषाजन्यत्वादिना विश्वासः। भ्रमादविश्वासे प्रवृत्त्यभावापत्तेः। नापि तज्ज्ञानात्। ज्ञानत्वेन तत्राप्यविश्वासात्। तदुच्यते—

'अहो बत महानेष प्रमादो धीमतामपि।
ज्ञानस्य व्यभिचारित्वे विश्वासः किंनिबन्धनः॥' इति।

I.iv.10. भ्रमस्य च सन्मात्रविषयकत्वेनायथार्थता। असद्विषयकत्वेऽसत्ख्यातिः। न च तत्र हेतुरस्ति। शब्दस्याप्तोक्तस्य निर्दोषस्य लिङ्गस्य चाहेतुत्वात्। न च शब्दानुमानाभासात्सा। योग्यतादिमत्तया शब्दस्य लिङ्गवत्तया पक्षस्य ज्ञानाच्छाब्दानुमिती। न चाभासो तज्ज्ञानमस्ति, हेत्वभावादेव। किं त्वगृहीतासंसर्गज्ञानद्वयम्। तत्र इन्द्रियस्य संबद्धग्राहकत्वात्। न च प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत्, उक्तोत्तरत्वात्। न च दोषवशादसंबद्धेऽपि विजातीयं कार्यम्। दोषस्याजनकत्वात्। न हि दुष्टात् कुटजबीजाद्यवाङ्कुरः। भस्मकं च न दोषः। किं तु वह्नेरुद्भवः। तस्य च दाहसामर्थ्यं दृष्टमेव। रसार्जनं तु न भवति, भक्ष्यदाहात्। दवदहनदग्धवेत्रबीजं च नष्टमेव।

तद्भस्मनः कदलीजनकत्वम्। तदुक्तम्—

साकारवादादसतो न भानात् संविद्विरोधादथ हेत्वभावात्।
धियामनाश्वासभयाच्च नेष्टा यतोऽन्यथाख्यातिरतो यथार्था॥

I.iv.11. तस्माद्विवादपदं ज्ञानं न व्यधिकरणप्रकारकं, ज्ञानत्वात् सत्यज्ञानवत्। भेदाग्रहजन्यरजतत्वप्रकारक-शुक्तीच्छायां प्रतियोगिप्रसिद्धिः। ज्ञानत्वं स्वव्यधिकरणप्रकारावच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोगिवृत्ति न भवति ज्ञानमात्रवृत्तिधर्मत्वात् प्रमात्ववत्।

न च चक्षुश्चाक्षुषसत्यज्ञानातिरिक्तज्ञानजनकं, इन्द्रियत्वात् रसनवदिति प्रतिरोधः, अप्रयोजकत्वात्। चाक्षुषज्ञानातिरिक्तज्ञानजनकत्वोपाधेः अन्यथाख्यातेरपि धर्म्यंशे सत्यत्वात् तुल्यन्यायतया व्यापकेऽपि व्यर्थविशेषणत्वाच्च।

एवं [च] स्वरूपतो विषयतश्चागृहीतभेदं ज्ञानद्वयमेव विसंवादि प्रवृत्तिहेतुः। तदुक्तम्—

'संनिहितरजतशकले रजतमतिर्भवति यादृशी सत्या।

भेदानध्यवसायादियमपि तादृक् परिस्फुरति॥'

इति। व्यवहारमात्रस्य भेदाग्रहजन्यत्वेऽपि तस्य संवादतदभावाभ्यां ज्ञाने यथार्थत्वायथार्थत्वव्यपदेशः। अत एव लोके उष्णं जलमिति ज्ञाने नायथार्थत्वव्यपदेशः। उपेक्षाज्ञाने तु तव्द्यपदेशस्तद्योग्यत्वात्।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ

प्रत्यक्षखण्डे अन्यथाख्यातिवादपूर्वपक्षः

अथान्यथाख्यातिवादसिद्धान्तः

I.iv.12. सिद्धान्तस्तु—सत्यस्थले प्रवृत्तिमात्रं प्रतीष्टपुरोवर्त्तिज्ञाने हेतुतया व्यवस्थितेऽतिप्रसङ्गवारणार्थं विषयतया वैशिष्ट्यमेव कारणतावच्छेदकं कल्प्यते लाघवात्। कारणताग्रहसमये ज्ञानवित्तिवेद्यतया शीघ्रोपस्थितिकत्वात् बाधकाभावाच्च।

I.iv.13. (ननु) [न तु] स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहः कारणम्, तादृशभेदाग्रहत्वं च कारणतावच्छेदकं, गौरवात् कल्पनीयोपस्थितिकत्वाच्च। विशिष्टज्ञानेऽपि हेतुत्वेनावश्यकत्वात्, भेदाग्रह एव हेतुरिति चेत्—न।

विशिष्टज्ञाने तद्धेतुत्वस्य तत्कल्पनोत्तरकल्प्यत्वेन प्रवृत्तिकारणताग्रहसमये तदनुपस्थितेः।

I.iv.14. न चैवं मिथ्याज्ञानकल्पने गौरवम्। प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिसमये सिद्ध्यसिद्धिपराहतत्वेन फलमुखगौरवस्यादोषत्वात्। प्रमाणवतस्तस्य न्याय्यत्वात्।

एवं च विसंवादिप्रवृत्तिरपि विशिष्टज्ञानसाध्या प्रवृत्तित्वात् सत्यप्रवृत्तिवत्। क्लृप्तकारणं विनानुपपत्तेः अनन्यथासिद्धतया प्रवृत्त्या समानीतविशिष्टज्ञानबलात् तत्कारणं सदोषमिन्द्रियाद्येव। सर्वतो बलवती ह्यन्यथानुपपत्तिः।

I.iv.15. न च भेदग्रहात् प्रवृत्त्युपपत्तिरपि। विपरीतचतुष्के युगपत् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यापत्तेः।

न च तत्र मानाभावः। इमे रङ्गरजते इति सत्यज्ञानवत् रजतरङ्गयोः प्रत्येकभ्रमसामाग्र्यारेकदा सत्त्वेन तादृशभ्रमोत्पत्तेरानुभविकत्वात्। अन्यथा समूहालम्बनोच्छेदे द्वित्वाद्यप्रत्यक्षतापत्तेः। इमे रङ्गरजते इति शब्दाभासादेवंविधभ्रमसंभवाच्च।

मम दोषमहिम्ना रजतरङ्गयो रजतरङ्गभेदग्रहान्न संशयः। तव चैकत्र स्वतन्त्रोभयभेदाग्रहात् प्रत्येकं रङ्गं रजतं वेति संशयः स्यात्।

I.iv.16. अथ यद्धर्मज्ञानाद्यदुपस्थितिस्तत्र तद्भेदाग्रहात् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती। रङ्गरजतधर्मेण रजतरङ्गे स्मारिते न तु रङ्गरजते। माषराशिस्थमसीविषये माषार्थिप्रवृत्तिः मसीनीलिमस्मारितमाषभेदाग्रहात्। अनुभूयमानारोपोऽसिद्ध एव। अन्यथा तवापि प्रत्येकमुभयज्ञानं स्यादिति चेत्—

मैवम्। शब्दाभासात् प्रत्यक्षाद्वा इष्टानिष्टोपस्थितौ तदभावात्।

मम त्वेकधर्मादुभयोपस्थितावपि रजतरङ्गयोस्तत्तया न ज्ञानं दोषादित्युभयसिद्धं विपरीतज्ञानं च दोषात्। न चैवमावश्यकदोषादेव प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती, सत्यस्थले तदभावात्। न च विंसवादिनी दोषात्, इन्द्रियलिङ्गशब्दादिदोषाणामननुगतत्वात्। तज्जन्यज्ञाने च जातिभेदात्।

I.iv.17. नव्यास्तु—रङ्गवृत्तितया ज्ञातधर्मस्य रजते उत्कटाकाङ्क्षा, तेन सह भूयस्सहचारदर्शनात्, न रङ्गे अल्पतथात्वादिति तत्रानुत्कटा सा। एवं रजतवृत्तितया ज्ञातधर्मस्यापि। अतः उत्कटाकाङ्क्षया अनुत्कटाकाङ्क्षाप्रतिबन्धान्न रङ्गे निवृत्तिः। एवं रजते न प्रवृत्तिरिति।

तन्न। इमे रङ्गरजते इति शब्दाभासाद्युगपत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् शब्दादुपस्थितावाकाङ्क्षायास्तुल्यत्वात्।

किं चैवं धर्मयोर्भूयोऽल्पसहचारावगमादुत्कटानुत्कटकोटिको रङ्गं जरतं वेति संशयः स्यात्। उत्कटानुत्कटाकाङ्क्षाकल्पने मानाभावात्, उत्कटत्वानिरुक्तेश्च।

I.iv.18. स्यादेतत्। संवादिविसंवादिप्रवृत्त्योर्वैचित्र्ये विशिष्टज्ञानभेदाग्रहौ हेतू क्लृप्तत्वात्, न तु विशिष्टज्ञानसत्यत्वासत्यत्वे गौरवात्।

असिद्धेश्च। प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिमात्रे चेष्टानिष्टपुरोवर्त्तिज्ञानं हेतुरिति नाननुगमः। न तु विशिष्टज्ञानं गौरवात्। न च भेदग्रहेऽतिप्रसङ्गः। विशिष्टज्ञानं भेदाग्रहं च विशेषद्वयहेतुं विना सामान्यहेतोः कार्यानुत्पादात्। न हि निर्विशेषं सामान्यं नाम। अन्यथा अन्धस्य त्वक्संबन्धे महत्युद्भूतरूपवति चन्द्रमहसि प्रत्यक्षतापत्तिः। द्रव्यसाक्षात्कारहेतोः सत्त्वात्।

एवं रङ्गे रजते च विंसवादिन्यौ भवतः भेदाग्रहात्। न च संवादिन्यौ, विशिष्टज्ञानाभावात्।

अथ रजतरङ्गयोः रजतरङ्गभेदाग्रहात् विसंवादिन्यौ बलात् स्याताम्, तत्सामग्रीसत्त्वात्। विसंवादिनी तत्र सत्यरजते न संभवतीति चेत्—अत एव भेदाग्रहो न तद्धेतुः, तत्सत्त्वेऽपि तदभावात्। न च प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिगतं विसंवादित्वं संवादित्वमपेक्ष्य तद्धेतुना ते जन्येते। कारणस्य कार्यानपेक्षणादिति।

मैवम्। प्रवृत्तेरनिष्टविषयत्वं निवृत्तेरिष्टविषयत्वं विसंवादः। तथा चानिष्टविषयप्रवृत्ताविष्टविषयनिवृत्तौ च भेदाग्रहो हेतुरिति कथं तत इष्टानिष्टिविषयप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती स्यातां, तत्र तस्यासामर्थ्यादिति।

I.iv.19. अत्र ब्रूमः। ज्ञानं स्वविषये प्रवर्तकमित्याद्यप्रवृत्तौ संवादिप्रवृत्तौ च सर्वैरवधारितं, लाघवाद्बाधकाभावाच्च।

तत इष्टज्ञानं शुक्तौ प्रवर्तकं तद्विषयकं, तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वात्, स्वाविषये तस्यासामर्थ्यात्।

अथ भेदाग्रहात् ग्रहणस्मरणाच्चावश्यकाद्विसंवादिप्रवृत्त्युपपत्तेर्विशिष्टज्ञानकल्पने गौरवाच्च स्वाविषयेऽपि ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकमिति कल्पनात् सर्वैः प्रथममवधारितमपि त्यज्यतामिति चेत्—

न। प्रथमप्रवृत्तप्रमाणबलेन तत्रापि विशिष्टज्ञानकल्पनात्।

तत्र बाधकं विना तद्विरोधेन कल्पान्तरानुदयाच्च फलमुखगौरवस्यादोषत्वात्। अन्यथा प्रथमं सर्वैर्गृहीतापि कार्यान्विते शक्तिः सिद्धार्थदर्शनाद्गौरवाच्च परित्यज्येतेति साधु समर्थितं गुरुमतम्।

I.iv.20. ननु स्वविषये ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकमिति सत्यम्। किं तु विसंवादिप्रवृत्ताविदं ज्ञानमेव प्रवर्तकं न त्विष्टज्ञानमपि। तद्धि ज्ञायमानेष्टभेदाग्रहे कारणतावच्छेदकं लाघवादिति दण्डत्ववदन्यथासिद्धम्। एवं हि तत्प्रतिबद्धव्यवहारानुकूलत्वं तद्विषयत्वं रजतज्ञानस्य शुक्तौ नास्ति। अन्यथा रजतज्ञानस्य शुक्तिविषयत्वापत्तेः। संवादिप्रवृत्तौ चेष्टज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम्, तस्य विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् अभेदेनावच्छेदकत्वाभावादिति मम सिद्धान्तसार इति चेत्—

उच्यते। स्वतन्त्रान्वयव्यतिरेकादिष्टज्ञानं हेतुरेव न त्वितरहेतुतावच्छेदकमन्यथासिद्धं वा। न हीष्टज्ञानमादायैव इष्टभेदाग्रहस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकौ येन दण्डत्ववत्तदवच्छेदकम्। नापीष्टज्ञानस्य भेदाग्रहगर्भत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकौ, येन दण्डरूपवत्तदन्यथासिद्धम्।

अन्यथा अगृहीतभेदेष्टज्ञानं हेतुरवच्छेको भेदाग्रह इत्येव किं न स्यात्। तस्मात् स्वतन्त्रान्वयव्यतिरेकादुभयोरपि हेतुत्वम्।

किं चेष्टविषयप्रवृत्तिस्थले प्रवृत्तिमात्रं प्रतीष्टज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वादियमपि प्रवृत्तिस्तज्जन्या क्लृप्तहेतुं विना कार्यानुत्पत्तेः। न चेष्टज्ञानजन्यत्वे इष्टविषयप्रवृत्तित्वमवच्छेदकं गौरवात्। बाधकं विना सामान्ययोः कार्यकारणभावनियमात्। अत एव तन्नोपाधिरपि।

I.iv.21. अथ तत्रापीदं ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम्, देवाधीनं तस्येष्टविषयत्वमपीति चेत्— तर्हीष्टे इदमिति ज्ञानादेव प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्। न ह्यत्रेव तत्रापि ज्ञायमानेष्टभेदाग्रहः प्रवर्तकः। एतेन न रजतज्ञानं शुक्तिविषयकं तत्प्रतिबद्धव्यवहाराहेतुत्वादिति निरस्तम्। असिद्धेः।

ननु ज्ञानं यथार्थमेवेति व्याप्तिरेव तद्बाधिका। अत एव प्रवृत्तिमात्रे विशिष्टज्ञानमिष्टज्ञानं च हेतुर्लाघवात् स्वविषये ज्ञानं प्रवर्तकम्, सर्वैरेवाद्यप्रवृत्तौ तथावगमात्। असत्यस्थले इष्टज्ञानमपि प्रवर्त्तकं न तु भेदाग्रहे हेतुतावच्छेदकमित्यन्यथाख्यातिसाधनं न भवतीति चेत्—

न। तेषामन्यथासिद्धावन्वयव्यतिरेकावधारितकारणतामूलकत्वेन तैरेव व्याप्तिबाधात्। क्लृप्तहेतुं विना कार्यानुत्पत्तेः विपक्षे बाधकाभावाच्च। ज्ञानायथार्थत्वेऽपि निष्कम्पप्रवृत्त्याद्युपायस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्।

एतेन संस्कारेन्द्रियाभ्यां प्रत्यभिज्ञानवच्छब्दाभासादितो वा परस्परं संबन्धविरहिणि एकं ज्ञानं न भवतीति ज्ञानं यथार्थमेवेति व्याप्तिरिति निरस्तम्। व्याप्त्याद्यसिद्धेः, सामग्रीसत्त्वे कार्यावश्यकत्वाच्च।

I.iv.22. एकदेशिनस्तु—रजतरङ्गयो रजतरङ्गभेदाग्रहान्न युगपत् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती। न चान्यथाख्यातिः, दोषवशात् पुरोवर्त्तिनं विहाय स्मृतरजतरङ्गाभ्यां पुरोवर्त्तिनि भेदग्रहात्।

न च रजतत्वेन स्मृतिः संस्कारगोचरसर्वरजतविषया स्यात् सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तेस्तुल्यत्वादिति वाच्यम्। तत्तांशे रजतत्वे च प्रत्यासत्तावपि दोषात् स्मृत्यनुभवप्रतिबन्धवदुपपत्तेः।

किं च प्रत्यक्षे सामान्यं प्रत्यासत्तिः, स्मरणे तु मनः करणं संस्कारः प्रत्यासत्तिः न तु तस्य सामान्यं प्रत्यासत्तिरकरणत्वात्।

तन्न। एकरङ्गरजतमात्रज्ञानान्तरं तयोरेव यमजयोर्वा विपरीतचतुष्केऽतिप्रसङ्गादन्यथाख्यातेर्वा।

I.iv.23. अन्ये तु—रजते नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञाने रजतत्वासंसर्गाग्रहरूपं रजतभेदासंसर्गाग्रहरूपं प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकमिति।

तन्न। अन्यवृत्तितयोपस्थितस्य रजतत्वासंसर्गस्य रजतभेदस्य च रङ्गेऽसंसर्गाग्रहात् निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् रङ्गे च तयोरसंसर्गग्रहेऽन्यथाख्यातिः।

रजते रजतभेदासंसर्गासंसर्गस्यासंसर्गाग्रहान्निवृत्तिरिति चेत्—न। भेदासंसर्गासंसर्गस्य भेदसंसर्गरूपत्वेन रजतभेदसंसर्गासंसर्गग्रहाद्रङ्गे निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। रजतभेदसंसर्गासंसर्गग्रहे चान्यथाख्यातिः।

रजतवृत्तितयोपस्थिते भेदे रजतभेदेन सह भेदाग्रहः प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकः, एवं रङ्गे निवृत्तावपीति चेत्—न। एवमपि शब्दाभासात् युगपत् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यापत्तेः। प्रवत्तिनिवृत्तिविषयनिष्ठभेदयोः रङ्गरजतभेदयोश्च शब्दादनुपस्थित्या प्रतिबन्धकत्वाभावात्।

I.iv.24. अपरे तु—पुरोवर्तिनिष्ठतया ज्ञाते भेदे इष्टानिष्टप्रतियोगित्वाभावग्रहात् प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती। तथा हि—रङ्गे रजतभेदः सन्नपि दोषान्न भासतेऽन्यस्माद्भासत एव। तथा च रङ्गवृत्तितया ज्ञाते भेदे रजतप्रतियोगित्वाभावग्रहाद्यथार्थादेव रङ्गे प्रवृत्तिः, रङ्गप्रतियोगित्वाभावः सन्नपि दोषान्न भासत इति तत्र न निवर्तते। एवं रजतनिष्ठतयोपस्थिते भेदे रङ्गप्रतियोगित्वाभावग्रहात् रजते निवर्तते। रजतप्रतियोगित्वाभावः सन्नपि दोषान्न गृह्यत इति न युगपत्प्रवत्तिनिवृत्ती। न च रङ्गवृत्तिभेदत्वं रजतभेदेऽप्यस्तीति तेन रूपेण सोऽपि भासते, सामान्यबुद्धेः सर्वविशेषविषयत्वात्। तथा च रजतभेदेऽपि तत्प्रतियोगित्वाभावग्रहेऽन्यथाख्यातिरिति वाच्यम्। प्रत्यासत्तावपि रङ्गवृत्तिभेदत्वेन रजतभेदस्य दोषेणाग्रहादिति।

मैवम्। इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रवर्तकमित्यनुभवसिद्धम्। तच्च सत्यस्थले विशिष्टज्ञानं अन्यत्र ज्ञानद्वयमेकं वा ज्ञानमिति विवादः। तत्र तज्ज्ञानं न प्रवर्तकमित्यनुभवबाधितम्। तदपि हेतुरित्यपि न। तस्य सत्यस्थलेऽसिद्धत्वात्। विशिष्टज्ञानापेक्षया गुरुत्वात् शब्दाभासात् प्रवृत्तौ भेदादिज्ञानाभावाच्च। एवं निवृत्तावपि।

I.iv.25. अन्ये तु—इष्टवृत्तितया गृह्यमाणोऽनिष्टवृत्तितया चागृह्यमाणो धर्मः स्वाश्रये प्रवर्तक इति। स च धर्मो रजते रजतत्वं रङ्गे रजतसादृश्यम्। एवं निवृत्तावपीति न युगपत्प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती इति।

तन्न। एवं हि इमे रङ्गरजते इति शब्दाभासात् रङ्गरजतयोः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती न स्याताम्। रजतवृत्तिधर्मस्य च रङ्गे रङ्गवृत्तिधर्मस्य रजते शब्दादनुपस्थितेः। न च शब्दानन्तरं प्रत्यक्षेण तयोरुपस्थितिः, तत्र हेतुर्न शब्द इति वाच्यम्। अनन्यथासिद्धशब्दानुविधानात् इमे रजतरङ्गे इति स्वकीययथार्थज्ञानमानादृत्य तत्रैवेमे रङ्गरजते इति प्रतारकवाक्ये विश्वासेन प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च।

I.iv.26. इतरे तु—रजते रजतत्वं न गृह्यते दोषात्। तथा च रजतवृत्तितया यावदुपस्थितधर्मस्य रजतत्वेन भेदाग्रहान्न प्रवर्तते। रङ्गवृत्तितयोपस्थितस्य च कस्यचिद्धर्मस्य रजतत्वेन भेदग्रहाद्रङ्गे प्रवर्त्तते। एवं निवृत्तावपि। यथा तवाभेदग्रहेऽपि मानान्तरात् भेदग्रहः प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकस्तथा रजते रजतभेदग्रहेऽपि रजतवृत्तितया यावदुपस्थितस्य रजतत्वेन मम भेदग्रहः प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धक इति।

तन्न। एतदपेक्षया विशिष्टज्ञानस्य लघुत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां च हेतुत्वात्। न च हेत्वभावः प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् संस्कारेन्द्रियाभ्यां विशिष्टधीसंभवात्।

तस्य ज्ञानद्वयत्वेऽभेदोच्छेदः, तस्य तदेकमानत्वात्। न चैकविषयत्वेन तयोः परस्परसहकारिता। नामविशिष्टनाम्निप्रत्यक्षे तत्तांशे च तदभावात्, गौरवाच्च। न चातिप्रसङ्गः। भेदाग्रहास्यापि तद्धेतुत्वात्।

I.iv.27. अथ प्रत्यभिज्ञाया एकत्वेऽपि तत्तांशे न साक्षात्कारित्वम्। तत्रेन्द्रियासंनिकर्षात् तज्ज्ञानजन्यत्वाच्च। किं तु स्मृतित्वम्। पुरोवर्त्यभेदांशे च साक्षात्त्वं। स्मृतित्वमनुभूतित्वं च न जातिरव्याप्यवृत्तिर्वेति चेत्—तर्हि संस्कारादसंनिकृष्टमपि भासत इति तवाप्यनुमतम्। तथा च तवैव रीत्या प्रत्यभिज्ञानवदिदं रजतमित्येकं ज्ञानमस्तु, तत्सामग्रीसत्त्वात्। मम त्विन्द्रियजन्यत्वात् जात्यसंकराच्च साक्षात्कारित्वमेवोभयत्र।

ननु यो यत्साक्षात्कारः स तदिन्द्रियसंनिकर्षजन्यः। न च रजते स इहास्तीति चेत्—न। प्रत्यभिज्ञाया इन्द्रियजन्यतया साक्षात्कारित्वेन तत्तायां नाम्नि च व्यभिचारात्। संस्कारस्य संनिकर्षत्वाच्च।

न च रजतत्वप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तसमवायस्य प्रत्यासत्तित्वेन हेतुत्वात्तं विना न तदिति वाच्यम्। तद्विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणज्ञानोपक्षीणत्वेन तस्या हेतुत्वात्।

न हि विशिष्टधीसामग्रीसत्त्वे तेन विना तद्विलम्बः।

I.iv.28. किं च विशेषणज्ञानं विशेष्यसंबन्धस्तयोरसंसर्गाग्रह इति प्रत्यभिज्ञासत्यप्रत्यक्षसाधारणस्य विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षहेतोर्भ्रमेऽपि संभवात्। रजतसाक्षात्कारे रजतसंयोगस्य हेतुत्वेऽपि विशेष्यसंनिकर्षत्वेन हेतुता, न तु रजतसंयोगत्वेन। यत्सामान्ये यत्सामान्यं हेतुस्तद्विशेषे तद्विशेषस्य हेतुत्वनियमात्।

संयोगस्य विशेष्यभानसामग्र्यन्तरितत्वेनान्यथासिद्धतया विशेषसामग्र्यन्तराकल्पनात् गौरवाच्च। प्रत्यक्षहेतुत्वेन क्लृप्तविशेष्यसंबन्धादेव तदुपपत्तेः। अपि च प्रवृत्तौ स्वतन्त्रोपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रह कारणत्वापेक्षया रजतसाक्षात्कारे विशेष्यसंनिकर्षत्वेन हेतुत्वस्य लघुत्वात्।

वस्तुतस्तु—दोषाद्भ्रम इत्युभयसिद्धम्, तत्र भ्रमो नासंसर्गग्रहाभावः। तस्याधिकरणरूपत्वे असाध्यत्वात्। तज्ज्ञानरूपत्वे च तस्य प्रमात्वेन दोषाजन्यत्वात्। भ्रमस्थानाभिषिक्तप्रमा दोषजन्यैवेति चेत्—न। तस्याः क्लृप्तसामग्र्यन्तरजन्यत्वादिति भ्रमोऽसत्यज्ञानमित्यसंनिकृष्टमपि दोषात् भासत इत्यभ्युपेयम्। अपि च दोषस्य विशिष्टमेव ज्ञानं व्यापारः, प्रवृत्तौ तद्धेतुत्वस्य क्लृप्तत्वात्। न च भेदाग्रहः, कल्पनीयकारणभावत्वात्।

I.iv.29. यत्तु—दुष्टात्कार्यं नेति तत्र बीजेन्द्रियसाधारणं न दुष्टत्वमेकमस्ति।

एवं प्रत्यक्षमप्यन्यथाख्यातौ मानं कारणबाधाभावात्। तथा हि—इदं रजततया जानामीत्यनुव्यवसाय-साक्षिकमेवान्यस्यान्यथा भानम्। न हि विषयत्वेऽनुव्यवसायादन्यत् प्रमाणम्। न ह्यतद्विषयस्तज्ज्ञानविषयत्वेन न वा तदविषयकं तद्विषयकत्वेनानुव्यवसीयते। अनुव्यवसायस्य प्रमात्वनियमात्। अन्यथा घटाज्ञानेऽपि कदाचित्पटं जानामीति स्यात्। न च भेदाग्रहदशायां रजतज्ञानविषयत्वासंसर्गाग्रहः। शुक्तौ भेदग्रहेऽपि शुक्ती रजतत्वेन मया ज्ञाता शुक्तौ रजतज्ञानं में वृत्तमित्यनुव्यवसायात्।

अथ विचारसाध्यासंसर्गग्रहबाध्योऽयमसंसर्गाग्रहः, तेन विचारं विना भेदग्रहेऽप्यवतिष्ठत इति चेत् न—। इदं रजततया जानामीत्यत्र शुक्तिकर्मकरजतत्वप्रकारकज्ञानासंसर्गाग्रहस्यात्मन्यसंभवात् तादृशज्ञानाप्रसिद्धेः।

न चेदं जानामीति रजतं जानामीति तदाकारः, तृतीयार्थस्य प्रकारत्वेन प्रकारिणोऽभानेऽभानप्रसङ्गात्।

विशिष्टज्ञानं च सर्वत्र विशेषणविशेष्यीयमित्यन्यथाभानमपि तथा। ज्ञाने रजतत्वानभ्युपगमाद्विशेषण-विशेष्यविषयकत्वाच्च न साकारवादः।

I.iv.30. यत्तु—ज्ञानमिथ्यात्वे बाध्यबाधकव्यवस्था न स्यादविशेषादिति। तन्न। अनन्यथासिद्धाया धियो बाधकत्वात्। तथा हि—यत्र दुष्टादुष्टेन्द्रियजन्ये परस्परनिरपेक्षमेकत्र विरुद्धं ज्ञानद्वयमुत्पद्यते, तत्र प्रथममनुपजातविरोधित्वाग्नानागतं बाधते, तस्याप्राप्तत्वात्। उत्तरं तु

स्वकारणादुत्पद्यमानमुपजात-विरोधितया नानुपमृद्य पूर्वमुत्पत्तुमर्हतीति पूर्वं बाधात्मकमुत्पद्यते अन्यथा नोत्पद्येतैव। न चैवमेवेति वाच्यम्। अनुभवविरोधात्। यदाहुः—

'पूर्वात्परबलीयस्त्वं तत्र नाम प्रतीयते।
अन्योऽन्यनिरपेक्षाणां यत्र जन्म धियां भवेत्॥'

इति। यत्र पूर्वापेक्षमुत्तरं ज्ञानमुत्पत्तुमुन्मुखं तत्रोपजीव्यपूर्वविरोधेनोत्तरं नोत्पद्यते। पूर्वापेक्षमुत्तरं ज्ञानमुत्पत्तुमुन्मुखं तत्रोपजीव्यपूर्वविरोधेनोत्तरं नोत्पद्यते। अतोऽजातं सत्पूर्वं कथं बाधताम्। यथा प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धानुमितिः।

ननु भ्रमस्य किं बाध्यते। न स्वरूपं तस्य सत्वात्। नापि रजतत्वप्रकारकत्वं शुक्तिविषयकत्वं वा, तयोरपनेतुमशक्यत्वात्। जातं हि तद्रजतत्वेन शुक्तिं विषयीकृत्य। नापि व्यवहारः, प्रवृत्यादेर्वृत्तत्वात्। नाप्यनागतव्यवहारजनकत्वम्, तस्य कारणाभावादेवासंभवात्।

उच्यते। बाधकेन भ्रमस्य भ्रमत्वबुद्धेरेव बाधः।

I.iv.31. यत्तु—धियामयथार्थत्वे कथमाश्वास इति। तन्न। प्रामाण्यग्रहोपायस्य दर्शितत्वात्। सत्यत्वनियमेऽपि सदसंसर्गाग्रहस्यागृहीतासंसर्गस्य ज्ञानद्वयस्य च बहुषु दर्शनात्कथमाश्वासः।

अथ सदसंसर्गाग्रहस्य प्रतिसन्धानं विलम्बितम्। सद्विषयत्वं च शीघ्रोपस्थितमित्यौत्सर्गिकसद्विषयत्वज्ञानाद्विश्वासः। यत्र तु कदाचित्संशयस्तत्र ज्ञानान्तरादेव संशयनिवृत्तिरिति चेत्—ममाप्यौत्सर्गिकं धियां सत्यत्वं बाधकेनापनोद्यत इति तदनवतारात् सत्यत्वविश्वासः।

किं च तव ज्ञानान्तरेऽप्यविश्वासः। विशेषदर्शनाद्विश्वासस्तुल्य एव। यथा च तत्रापि न संदेहस्तथोक्तं परतःप्रामाण्ये।

I.iv.32. अन्ये तु—स्मृतयोग्यवैधर्म्याभावोऽधिकरणं तज्ज्ञानं वा। तच्च प्रत्यक्षत एव गृहीतमिति युक्तो विश्वासः। अयोग्ये भेदकेऽधिकरणे च भेदसंशये ज्ञानान्तराद्विश्वास इति।

तन्न। उभयत्रापि ज्ञानान्तराद्विश्वासतुल्यत्वेन शिष्यदन्धनमात्रत्वात्।

वस्तुतस्तु भेदाग्रहादेवाभेदव्यवहरोपपत्तावभेदविषयत्वं क्वापि न सिद्धमस्तीति कथं सद्विषयत्वसिद्धिः।

I.iv.33. यत्तु—दोषो न हेतुरिति, तन्न। फलबलेन तथात्वात्।

अथेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानं कथमयथार्थम्, इदंरजतयोः सत्त्वात्। न च तदुभयतादात्म्यमसत्ः, उभयं तादात्म्यं चेत्यतोऽधिकस्याभावात्। तयोश्च सत्त्वात्। असत्त्वे वा असत्ख्यातिः। एवं संसर्गारोपोऽपीति।

उच्यते। सन्मात्रविषयत्वेऽपि तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकत्वं प्रकारव्यधिकरणविषयताकत्वं वा अयथार्थत्वम्।

I.iv.34. प्राञ्चस्तु—तादात्म्यसंसर्गयोरसतोरेव मन्यन्ते विषयत्वम्। न चैवमसत्ख्यातिः, सदुपरक्तस्यात्यन्तासतः ख्यात्यभ्युपगमात्। सदनुपरक्तस्याखण्डस्यात्यन्तासतः ख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिर्नाभ्युपेयते कारणाभावात्। तदनुपपत्तिस्तुल्यैवेति चेत्—न। अत्र विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्र्या दर्शितत्वात्। तदुक्तं वाचस्पतिमिश्रैः—

'तस्माद्यदन्यथा सन्तमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते।
तन्निरालम्बनं ज्ञानमसदालम्बनं मतम्॥' इति॥

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्याविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे अन्यथाख्यातिवादः

I. v.

प्रत्यक्षलक्षणवादः

I.v.1. सा च प्रमा चतुर्विधा प्रत्यक्षानुमित्युपमितिशाब्दीभेदात्। एवं चतसृणां तासां करणं प्रमाणमपि चर्तुविधं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमान-शब्दभेदात्। अन्येषां यथायथमेतेष्वेवान्तर्भावात्। तथाच वक्ष्यामः।

I.v.2. ननु न प्रत्यक्षं तावदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यभिचारि। आत्मानुमिति-स्मृत्योर्ज्ञानमात्रे चातिव्याप्तेः, आत्मनोऽर्थस्य मनसेन्द्रियेण संयोगादुत्पत्तेः। ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षाव्याप्तेश्च। सन्निकर्षस्य च संयोगादिरूपत्वेनाननुगमाच्च। संयोगाद्यन्यतमस्य चानिर्द्धारितैकपरत्वे भागासिद्धिरितरभेदसाधने, व्यर्थविशेषणत्वञ्च। इन्द्रियार्थयोरेकजन्यत्वस्य लक्षणत्वे व्यर्थविशेषणत्वं। न च तयोरेकैकजन्यत्वमेव लक्षणं, आत्म-मनोजन्यत्वेन ज्ञानमात्रे गतत्वात्। इन्द्रियस्य प्रत्यक्षनिरूप्यत्वाच्च। नापि ज्ञातकरणाजन्यत्वे सति सत्योऽनुभवः प्रत्यक्षं, लिङ्गादेरजनकतया ज्ञानस्याज्ञातस्य करणत्वे अनुमित्यादौ गतत्वात्। ज्ञानाजन्योऽनुभवः सत्यइत्यपि न, विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षाव्याप्तेः तस्य विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वात्। नापि सत्यत्वे सति साक्षात्कारित्वं, नियतव्यञ्जकाभावेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यतया तस्य जातित्वासिद्धेः। सत्त्वे वा तदेव लक्षणं व्यवहारनिमित्तञ्चास्तु किं जात्या।

I.v.3. उच्यते। प्रत्यक्षस्य साक्षात्कारित्वं लक्षणं, चाक्षुषादिज्ञाने साक्षात्करोमीत्यनुगतबुद्धेर्बाधकं विना जातिविषयत्वात्। नचेन्द्रियजन्यत्वं तथा, अन्योऽन्याश्रयात् इन्द्रियस्यातीन्द्रियत्वाच्च। नच नियतव्यञ्जकाभावान्न जातिः, गोत्वादौ सास्नादेरिवाननुगतस्यापि चक्षुःकरणकानुभव-त्वादेर्व्यञ्जकत्वात्। न च जातावनुगतव्यञ्जकनियमः, ज्ञानेच्छा-प्रयत्न-सुख-दुःखादेस्तदभावात्। प्रत्युत नियतव्यञ्जकसत्त्वे जात्यसिद्धिरेव। तत एवानुगतबुद्ध्युपपत्तेः। निर्विकल्पकेश्वर-योगिप्रत्यक्षे च प्रत्यक्षत्वं धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धं।

I.v.4. योगजधर्माजन्यजन्यस्वविषयकसविकल्पकाजन्यसामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्य-जन्यप्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणम् अनागतगोचरसाक्षात्कारहेतुप्रत्यासत्त्यजन्यजन्यसाक्षात्कारत्वं।

अन्ये तु सामान्यज्ञान-प्रत्यासत्त्योरिन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतान्तर्भावात् तज्जन्यं प्रत्यक्षं संग्राह्यमेवेति। यद्वा विषयत्वेन स्वविशेष्यजन्यं ज्ञानं जन्यप्रत्यक्षं। आत्मविशेष्यकानुमिति-शाब्द-स्मृतिषु

विशेष्यत्वेन तस्य न हेतुत्वं। विशेष्यं विनापि तासामुत्पत्तेः। किन्तु समवायित्वेन। यद्वा इन्द्रियजन्यं ज्ञानं जन्यप्रत्यक्षं, इन्द्रियत्वेन जनकत्वं विवक्षितं। जन्यप्रत्यक्षमात्रे इन्द्रियत्वेन चक्षुरादीनां कारणता, अनुगतहेतुं विना अनुगतकार्य्यस्याकस्मिकतापत्तेः। स्मृत्यनुमित्यादौ च मनसो नेन्द्रियत्वेन हेतुत्वं किन्तु मनस्त्वेन। अन्यथा स्मृत्यादेः साक्षात्कारत्वापत्तेः।

I.v.5. इन्द्रियत्वञ्च स्मृत्यजनकज्ञानहेतुमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वं, प्राण-शरीरात्मानश्च स्मृतिजनकमनः-संयोगवन्तः। शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानहेतुमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वं वा। ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानमिति तु वयं। विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षे च विशेषणज्ञानं न करणं व्यापाराभावात्। विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यप्रत्यक्षे च विशेषणज्ञानं हेतुर्न तु विशेषणविशेषणधीरपि विशेषणधीद्वारा करणं मानाभावात्। प्रत्यभिज्ञायान्तु तत्तास्मृतिः कारणं न तु संस्काराद्वारा अनुभवः करणं, तस्याः संस्कारजन्यत्वे स्मृतित्वापत्तेः। स्मृतित्वे लाघवेन संस्कारजन्यत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात्, तद्धेतुत्वेनैव तत्सिद्धेश्च।

I.v.6. प्राभाकरास्तु-साक्षाद्धीः प्रत्यक्षं, साक्षात्वञ्च न जातिः नियतव्यञ्जकाभावात्। नापि सविकल्पकानपेक्षज्ञानत्वं, प्रत्यभिज्ञा-सादृश्य-द्वित्वादिप्रत्यक्षाव्यापनात्। किन्तु यज्ज्ञानं यद्विषयत्वे सविकल्पकाजन्यं तत् तत्र साक्षाद्धीः, मिति-मातृप्रकाशे च सर्वमेव ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानाजन्यत्वात्। जातावनुगतधीरपि प्रत्यक्षा, जाति-व्यक्तिनिर्विकल्पकजन्यत्वात्। सादृश्यादिविशिष्ट-वैशिष्ट्यप्रत्यक्षे च न विशेषणज्ञानं हेतुः, तेन विनापि युगपदिन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टे विशिष्टप्रत्ययोदयात्। दीर्घादिप्रत्यक्षे च न ह्रस्वादिज्ञानापेक्षा, किन्तु तद्व्यवहारे। अनुमित्यादेर्मेयांशे प्रत्यभिज्ञायाश्च तत्तांशेज्ञानजन्यत्वान्न प्रत्यक्षत्वं किन्तु परोऽक्षत्वमेव, मितिमात्रंशे इदन्तांशे च द्वयोरेव प्रत्यक्षत्वं।

I.v.7. यत्तु—तत्ताप्रकाशे न तत्तासविकल्पकत्वेन कारणता, किन्तु तत्ताज्ञानत्वेन। तन्न। अनुमित्यादावपि लिङ्गादिज्ञानत्वेनानुमेयादितुल्यत्वादिति।

I.v.8. अत्रोच्यते। यदि तत्तायां प्रत्यभिज्ञा परोक्षानुभवरूपा तदा नोत्पद्येत, तद्धेतोर्लिङ्गादेरभावात्। तत्ताज्ञानसहितं इन्द्रियं जनकमिति चेत्। तर्हि इन्द्रियजन्यत्वात् तत्र साक्षाद्धीरेव स्यात्। न च ज्ञानानपेक्षेन्द्रियजन्यत्वं तत्र तन्त्रं, गौरवात्, ज्ञानसहितेन्द्रियजन्यत्वेनेदन्तांशेऽप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गाच्च। न ह्येकस्मिन् ज्ञाने जनयितव्ये तदपेक्षा च सम्भवति। अंशे तदुभयमपीति चेत्। न। ज्ञाने अंशस्य विषयत्वेन तदजन्यत्वात्। एवं मिति-मात्रंशे च सर्वं ज्ञानं न प्रत्यक्षं इन्द्रियाजन्यत्वात् साक्षात्कारे तस्य कारणत्वात्। मनोजन्यत्वे अनुमेयांशेऽपि तत्त्वप्रसङ्गः। न च ज्ञानमात्र सामग्रीजन्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षत्वे तन्त्रं, गौरवात्। ज्ञानमात्रञ्च न ज्ञानत्वं तस्याजन्यत्वात्। नापि सर्वं ज्ञानं, प्रत्यक्षज्ञाने प्रत्येकं सर्वज्ञानसामग्र्यजन्यत्वात् सर्वज्ञानसामग्र्यप्रसिद्धेश्च।

I.v.9. अपि च ज्ञाने अवयवाभावेनांशो विषय एव, विषये च ज्ञानं न कारणं। अतोऽनुमिति-प्रत्यभिज्ञयोः स्वविषयेऽनुमेये तत्तायाञ्च प्रत्यक्षत्वं स्यात् विषयस्य सविकल्पकाजन्यत्वात्। अथ प्रत्यभिज्ञायां तत्ताविषयत्वेन तज्ज्ञानं कारणं, एवमनुमित्यादौ मेयविषयत्वेऽपि। मिति-मात्रेदन्ता-धर्मिविषयत्वे च न ज्ञानं कारणं किन्तु ज्ञानसामग्रीति चेत्। न। तद्विषयत्वं हि ज्ञाने

स्वकारणाधीनं तदीयस्वभावत्वं स्वरूपविषेषः। स च ज्ञानाजन्य एव। दण्डिज्ञानादौ चाव्याप्तिः। तस्यानुमित्यादिवद्विशिष्टज्ञानत्वेन विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वात्। न च परोक्षत्वमुपाधिः, प्रत्यभिज्ञायां प्रथमोत्पन्नजाति-व्यक्तिज्ञाने जन्ये जातेरनुगतप्रत्यक्षे च साध्याव्यापकत्वात्। पूर्व्वव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वे सत्येतद्व्यक्तिवृत्तित्वमनुगतत्वमिति तत्र पूर्व्वानुभूतव्यक्तेर्विशेषणत्वेन तत्र ज्ञानस्यानुगतत्वप्रत्यक्षे कारणत्वात्। अन्यथा प्रथममप्यनुगतधीप्रसङ्गः।

I.v.10. अत एव ज्ञानसाक्षादजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्, प्रत्यभिज्ञायां संस्कार एव साक्षाज्जनकः, जातावनुगतधीरपि संस्कारजन्या, एवं सादृश्यादिप्रत्यक्षेऽपि प्रतियोगिसंस्कार एव कारणमिति निरस्तं। दण्डानुभवजन्यदण्डिप्रत्यक्षे धारावाहिकप्रत्यक्षे चाव्यापानात्। उत्तरविशिष्टज्ञाने पूर्वविशिष्टानुभवस्यैव विशेषणज्ञानेत्वेन हेतुत्वात् संस्कारस्य स्मरणेतराजनकत्वाच्च। अन्यथा प्रत्यभिज्ञादेः संस्कारजन्यत्वेन स्मृतित्वं स्यादित्युक्तत्वात्। इतिप्रत्यक्षलक्षणं।

अथ संनिकर्षवादः।

I.v.11. प्रत्यक्षविशेषे संनिकर्षविशेषो हेतुरनुगत एव। संयोगेन द्रव्यग्रहः, संयुक्तसपवायेन रूप-कर्मणोर्ग्रहणं, संयुक्तसमवेतसमावायेन रूपत्वादेः, समवायेन शब्दस्य, समवेतसमवायेन शब्दत्वादेः, विशेषणतया शब्दाभावस्य, इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतया समवाय-घटाभावादेर्योग्यसन्निकर्षादेव ग्रहो न सन्निकर्षमात्रात्।

I.v.12. अथ सूक्ष्मावयवावच्छेदेनावयविसंयोगेऽपि न तद्ग्रह इति महावयवावच्छेदेन संयोगो हेतुः तथा चावयवेन्द्रिसंयोगएव हेतुः। न च ग्राह्यसंयोगावच्छेदकावयवसंयोगापेक्षया ग्राह्यसंयोगस्य लघुत्वात्स एव हेतुः, तस्यातिप्रसक्तत्वात्। एतेन स्वावयवसंयोगापेक्षया स्वसंयोगस्य लघुत्वात् स एव हेतुरिति निरस्तं। नाप्यवच्छेदकसंयोगेनान्यथासिद्धौ तत्राप्यवच्छेदकान्तर-संयोगेनान्यथासिद्धिरिति संयोगो हेतुरेव न स्यादिति वाच्यं। अल्पतरतभागावच्छेदेन संयोगस्य हेतुत्वे अतिप्रसङ्गादिति।

I.v.13. मैवं। द्रव्यग्रहे अवयविमात्रग्रहे वा स्थूलावयवावच्छेदेन संयोगो न हेतुः, आत्म-त्रसरेणुसूक्ष्मभागग्रहे व्यभिचारात्। किन्तु घटादिग्रहे स हेतुः। एवञ्चात्मादिद्रव्यग्रहो ग्राह्यसंयोगजन्य इति घटादग्रिहोऽपि तद्वदेव स्वग्राह्यसंयोगजन्य इति। तस्मिन् सत्यपि घटादिग्रहो नास्तीतियदि तदा स्थूलावयवसंयोगोऽवच्छेदकोऽस्तु तत्संयोगोऽपि वा हेतुः, न तु क्लृप्तहेतुपरित्यागः।

I.v.14. ननु संयुक्तसमवायेनावयविग्रहोऽस्तु, न तु संयोगादिस्तत्र हेतुः, तस्य रूपादिग्रहे क्लृप्तत्वात्। न च लाघवात्संयोग एव तथा, तस्य कल्पनीयकारणत्वात् इति चेत्। न। आत्मग्रहे इन्द्रियसंयोगस्य कारणत्वादन्यत्रापि द्रव्यसाक्षात्कारत्वेन तथा कल्पनात्। न च बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यद्रव्यग्रहे अवय- विग्रहे वा संयुक्तसमवायः कारणं, लाघवेन संयोगस्यैव कारणत्वेन कल्पनात्। ननु संयुक्तसमवायो न गन्धग्राहकः किन्त्वाश्रयसंयोगः। एवं

गन्धत्वग्रहोऽप्याश्रयाश्रयसंयोगादिति संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायोऽपि न हेतुः। न च गन्धे सति गन्धसमवायं विना गन्धाग्रहोऽस्ति। न चैवं संयुक्तघटे भाविगन्धग्रहः स्यात्, गन्धस्यापि स्वग्रहे हेतुत्वात्। न च गन्धस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेनेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाश्रयत्वमनुमेयं, शब्दप्रत्यक्षहेतोः समवायस्य गन्धेऽपि सत्त्वात्, गन्धेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षसाधने साध्याप्रसिद्धेः। मैवं। गन्धसमवायिसंयोगस्य हेतुत्वे हि यदि गन्धसमवायस्य विशेषणता तदा स हेतुरेव। उपलक्षणत्वे च संयुक्तद्रव्यमात्रमुपलक्ष्यं। तथा च घटसंयोगात्पटगन्धग्रहप्रसङ्गः।

I.v.15. अथ स्वसमवायिसंयोगो हेतुः तत्र समवायोऽवच्छेदक इति चेत्। तर्हि संयोगिसमवायस्य हेतुत्वे संयोगोऽवच्छेदकः समवायो हेतुरिति तुल्यं। तदेतत्परिवर्त्त्य क्षौमपरिधानमित्युच्यते। ननु संयुक्तसमवायो न संयोगः, न वा समवायः, न उभौ वा, गन्धे इन्द्रिये चावृत्तेः। न चेन्द्रियेण गन्धस्य परम्परासम्बन्धः, परम्परा हि संयोग-समवायावेव, तत्र विरोध एव नाधिकोऽपसिद्धान्तादिति चेत्। न। इन्द्रिय-तत्संयोग-तदाश्रयसमवायानामेव परम्रास-म्बन्धत्वात्। अन्यथा नीलत्वजातेः परम्परासम्बन्धेन वस्त्र-चर्म-कम्बलेष्वनुगतव्यवहारोच्छेदः।

I.v.16. ननु संयुक्तसमवेतसमयाश्न रूपत्वादिग्रहः, तदभावादिति चेत्। न। तदनभ्युपगमेऽपि रूपादिसादृश्यस्य ततो ग्रहात्। न च द्रव्यसादृश्यादेव तद्व्यवहारः, बाधकं विना प्रतीत्यविशेषाद्वैपरीत्यापत्तेः। आश्रयवैसादृश्येऽपि रूपरसादेः सादृश्यानुभवाच्च। रसत्व-मधुरत्व-गन्धत्वसुरभित्वादिश्च जातिः अनुगतप्रत्ययात्। रूपे च यद्यपीदं नीलमित्यनुभवो न त्विदं रूपमिदं रूपमिति, तथापि पीतोवर्णः नीलोवर्ण इति वर्णाकारानुगतबुद्धिरस्ति रूपत्वे मानं। न च चक्षुराद्येकैकमात्रग्राह्यत्वं रूपत्वादिकं, बाधकं विनानुगतबुद्धेर्जातिविषयत्वात्। इन्द्रियातीन्द्रियत्वेन चक्षुराद्यग्रहेऽपि रूपत्वादिप्रतीतेः। न ह्यननुसंहितोपाधेरुपहितप्रत्ययः। अतीन्द्रियरूप-रस-गन्धाननुमानापत्तेश्च। योग्यताया रूपत्वादिजातिनिरूप्यत्वात्।

I.v.17. यदपि तन्मत्ते नील-पीताद्येकैकमेव नित्यं नातीनिन्द्रयम्, तथापि चक्षुर्घ्राणादिरूपस्यालोक-पृथिव्यादिरूपाभिन्नत्वेन प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः। नचैकमेव रूपमुद्धुतमनुद्भूतञ्चेति, विरोधात्। रूपत्वादिना परस्परव्यावृत्ततया रूपादेरुपलब्ध्या तत्तत्करणत्वेन परस्परव्यावृत्तचक्षुराद्यनुमितिः, परस्परव्यावृत्तचक्षुराद्यनुमितौ च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वादिना रूपादिपरस्प्रव्यावृत्तधीरित्यन्योन्याश्रयाच्च। नील-पीतादिप्रतीतौ भिन्न-भिन्नकरणत्वसिद्धावपि तत्तत्करणग्राह्यत्वस्य सर्वरूपेष्वसिद्धिः। ननु नील पीताद्युपलब्धिकरणेषु गन्ध-रस स्पर्शाव्यञ्जकत्वे सति नीलादिव्यञ्जकत्वा-दालोकवदिति तैजसत्वं प्रसाध्य तैजसेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वेन नीलादौ रूपाकारानुगतधीरेवं गन्धादावपीति चेत्। न। एवं प्रणालीज्ञानाभावेऽपि रूपरसादावनुगतप्रत्ययात् नीलाकारानुगतबुद्धेश्च नीलत्वं जातिः। न च चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वं तत्, पीतादौ गतत्वात्।

I.v.18. नन्वेकैका एव नीलारुणादिव्यक्तयः, नानामसीनीलिम्नि मसीभेदग्रहेऽपि तत्त्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। न चानेकव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वे नित्यत्वे जातित्वापत्तिः, जातेः संस्थानमात्रव्यङ्ग्यत्वात्

अवयवावयविवृत्तित्वात् गोत्वादिना परापरभावानुपपत्तेश्च। नीलतरादिप्रतीतिश्च तदन्यरूपासम्भेदादिति चेत्। न। पाकेन श्यामंनष्टं रक्तमुत्पन्नमिति प्रत्ययात्। न चासौभ्रमः, बाधकाभावात्। न चोत्पाद–विनाशप्रत्ययस्य समवायो विषयः, तदनुल्लेखात्। एवञ्च मधुरादिरसानां सौरभासौरभाणाञ्च गन्धानामेकैकत्वं स्यात् नीलादितुल्यत्वात्। एवमस्त्विति चेत्। न। तेषामुत्पादविनाशानुभवात्। एकैकत्वे मधुरतरत्वाद्यनुपपत्तेश्च।

I.v.19. ननु श्रोत्रेण समवायेन शब्दग्रहे सर्वशब्दोपलब्धिः स्यात्। न च कर्णशुष्कुल्यवछेदेनोत्पन्नो गृह्यते, अवछेद्यस्याकाशत्वेनाविशेषात्। तदन्यत्वे शब्दस्य तत्रासमवायात्। तस्माद्यः शब्दो यं प्रति योग्यः स तेन गृह्यते नान्यः। न च पुरुषविशेषं प्रति योग्यत्वं न स्वरूपं, अनुनुगमात्। न च जातिः, तस्याः निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वात्। न हि गौः कश्चित्प्रत्यगौरिति वाच्यं। सप्रतियोगिकत्वं हि न सावधित्वं दीर्घत्वादिवत्। नापीतरधीनिरूप्यत्वमभाववत्। किन्तु शब्दग्रहे सा जातिः कारणं तदवच्छेदिका वा। अत एव न कुर्व्वद्रूपत्वप्रवेशः सहकारितास्वीकारात्। सर्व्वसाधारणत्वमिष्टमेव सर्व्वैस्तथा व्यवह्रियमाणत्वात्। गोत्वेऽपि तदेव तत्। शब्दमात्रस्य योग्यत्वमननुगतमे व गुणयोग्यत्ववदिति।

I.v.20. मैवं। शब्दस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेन प्रत्यासत्तिसाधनात्। न च समवायोऽतिप्रसक्तोऽन्योऽनभ्युपगत इति वाच्यं। कर्णसंयोगावच्छिन्नसमवायस्य प्रत्यासत्तित्वात्। कर्णसंयोगो हि समवायवृत्त्या शब्दाधारतायां परिचायकः। एवञ्चेह शब्दोनेह शब्द इत्यनुभवात् शब्दस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वे सिद्धे यस्य शब्दस्य समवायवृत्त्या आधारता कर्णसंयोगेनावच्छिद्यते स गृह्यते, यस्य तु तदत्यन्ताभावेनावच्छिद्यते स न गृह्यते। तथा संयोगस्य समवायेनाधारता हस्तसंयोगेनावच्छिद्यते न तदभावेनेति हस्तसंयोगावच्छेदेन गृह्यते नान्यत्र। अन्यथा हस्तसंयोगस्यानवच्छेदकत्वे सर्व्वमिदं समानमिति संयोगस्यापि सर्वत्रोपलब्धिः स्यात्। न चैवं समवायोऽप्यव्याप्यवृत्तिः, समवायेन वृत्त्या तस्याधारावृत्तित्वात्। अभावस्तु विशेषणतया व्याप्यवृत्तिरेव। न चेवं सर्व्वत्र सर्व्वशब्दोपलब्धिः स्यात्, शब्दसमवायस्य सत्वेऽऽपि अन्यत्र शब्दात्यन्ताभावसत्त्वात्।

I.v.21. अथ वीणादौ शब्द इत्यबाधितानुभवबलात् तदवच्छिन्नं नभः श्रोत्रं, न तु कर्णावच्छिन्नमेव, कर्णे न शब्दः किन्तु वीणायामित्यनुभवात्। अन्यथा कर्णे शब्द इति धीः स्यात्। न चानन्तवीणाद्यवच्छेदकत्वेनानन्तश्रोत्रस्वीकारे गौरवं, शब्ददेशत्वेनैकत्वे चातिप्रसङ्गः, सर्व्वदेशानां शब्दावच्छदकत्वादिति वाच्यम्। वीणादिदेशताग्रहस्य बाधकं विना प्रमाणत्वे गौरवस्य न्याय्यत्वात्। प्रत्युत सर्व्वतो दिक्ष्वनन्तशब्दसन्तानोत्पादक्रमेण कर्णोत्पादे कल्पनागौरवं मानाभावत्। न च दूर–सन्निधानयोः शब्दानामबाधिततार–मन्दत्वादिवैधर्म्म्यप्रतीत्या भेदसिद्धेः सन्तानसिद्धिः, दूरत्वादिदोषात्तारत्वाग्रहे मन्दत्वारोपात्तदुपपत्तेः। व्यवहितकर्णे शब्दानुत्पाद–वद्व्यवहितशब्दानुपलब्धिः निमित्तवायुसंयोगाभावात्। ननु व्यवधानाभावस्य हेतुत्वात् तस्य सन्निध्युपक्षीपक्षीणत्वात् कर्णानुपघातोऽपि हेतुरिति न तदुपघाते शब्दग्रह इति।

I.v.22. मैवम्। कर्णावच्छेदेनापि शब्दग्रहात्। कर्णशष्कुल्यप्यवच्छेदिकेति कर्णावच्छिन्नमेव नभः श्रोत्रं आवश्यकत्वात् लाघवाच्च। शब्दमात्रग्रहे तदनुविधानात्। शरीरसंयुक्तस्य सतः साक्षात्प्रतीतिसाधनस्येन्द्रियत्वात् कर्णेन वीणाशब्दं शृणोमीति तत्करणत्वेनाबाधितानुभवाच्च। न तु वीणादिकमनन्तत्वात्, शब्दमात्रग्रहे तदननुविधानात्। वीणाद्यवच्छिन्नस्य नभस शरीरासंयुक्तत्वेनानिन्द्रियत्वात् वीणया शब्दं शृणोमीत्यननुभवाच्च। कथन्तर्हि वीणायां शब्द इति ज्ञानं श्रूयमाणस्य शब्दस्य तदनधिकरणत्वादिति चेत्। न। न हि सर्व्वत्र शब्दे मृदङ्गाद्यधिकरणग्रहनियमः, अन्यथा क्वचिदपि देशे सन्देह–विपर्य्यय–तदनुल्लेखानामनुपपत्तेः। यत्राप्यस्ति तत्र शरीरे सुखमितिवदुत्पत्तये परम्परया वीणाद्यपेक्षणात् तदधिकरणत्वं। तवापि वीणायाः शब्दानाश्रयत्वेन तथैवाधिकरणत्वात्।

I.v.23. नन्वेवं कर्णेऽनेकगकारोत्पादेऽनेकग्रहणप्रसङ्गः। नचैकग्रहेऽन्यग्रहसामग्री प्रतिबन्धिका, कोलाहले तथा अदर्शनादिति चेत्। न। तारेण मन्दाभिभवात्। तुल्यत्वे वानेकग्रहस्येष्टत्वात्। भेदाग्रहस्त्वत्यन्तसारूप्यात्। एवञ्च वीणादेरश्रोत्रत्वे मैत्रेणाहमनुवाकमध्यापितो यद्गीतं न्त्वया श्रुतन्तन्मयापीत्यादिप्रतीतीनां तदुच्चारणादिप्रयोज्यजातीयत्वं विषयः। शब्दे हि कारणविशेषप्रयोज्या जातिरवश्यं वाच्या। अन्यथा शब्दविशेषेण पुत्राद्यनुमानं न स्यात्, जातिं विना विशेषान्तराभावात्। एवञ्च कर्णावाच्छिन्नस्य नभसः श्रोत्रत्वे तेन वीणादिप्रभवशब्दग्रहो न तत्र सन्तानक्रमेणोत्पादं विनेत्यनन्यगतिकतया तत्कल्पनापि प्रामाणिकी।

I.v.24. शब्देन चाव्यवहितपरमाणुदेशोत्पादक्रमेण न शब्दारम्भो येन मेघजादिशब्दानां भूलोकप्राप्तिर्युगान्तरेऽपि न स्यात्। किन्तु मेघाद्यभिहतसर्व्वतोगामिमहावायोर्महति देशे संयोगनिमित्तमासाद्याद्यशब्देन सर्वदिग्वर्त्ती शब्द एक एव जन्यते। निमित्तसंयोगा–नुरोधित्वाद्विभुकार्य्याणां उत्तरोत्तरेणाप्यधिकाधिकदेशतः सर्व्वत्र एकैक एव शब्दो वीची–तरङ्गवदुत्पाद्यते। अतएव सर्व्वैरेकशब्दग्रहः। वायोश्च नयनवन्महावेगतया शीघ्रगामित्वेनाग्रिमशब्दारम्भादाद्यशब्दानन्तरमचिरेणैव शब्दोपलम्भः। वायोरेव च मन्द–तर–तमादिक्रमेण मन्दादिशब्दोत्पत्तिः। यद्वा आद्यशब्देन कदम्बगोलकवद्दशदिशि दश शब्द आरभ्यन्ते तैश्च दश शब्दसन्ताना इति।

I.v.25. नन्वेकशब्देन कथमनेकशब्दारम्भः सामग्र्यभेदादिति चेत्। न। सर्व्वतोऽनेकवाय्वादिसहकारात् प्रागभावभेदाद्वा। न च तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये तद्भेदान्न कार्य्यभेदः, तथा अदर्शनादिति वाच्यं। कार्य्यभेदो हि सामग्रीभेदात्। स च हेत्वन्तरभेदादिव प्रागभावभेदादपि। अन्यथा समवाय्यादिभेदेऽपि कार्य्यवैजात्यं न स्यात्। घटव्यक्तिषु तथा अदर्शनात्। पाकजे रूपादौ हेत्वन्तराभेदेऽपि प्रागभावापूर्व्वरूपादिध्वंसभदेन भेदाच्च। अथ रूपाद्येकैकप्रागभावध्वंसयोः सर्व्वत्र तुल्यत्वे किं विनिगमकं, गन्धादिप्रागभावानां रसादौ व्यभिचारेऽपि गन्धादौ रसादिप्रागभावानामव्यभिचारादिति चेत्। न। वायुस्पर्शे गन्ध–रस–रूपप्रागभाव–प्रध्वंसानान्तेजोरूपे गन्ध–रसाभावयोर्जलरसे गन्धप्रागभावस्य व्यभिचारेणाहेतुत्वे स्वप्रागभावहेतुताया

आवश्यकत्वात्। पाकजेषु रूपरस-स्पर्शेषु गन्धादिप्रागभावानामन्यथासिद्धत्वाच्च। रूपादिषु तथादर्शनात्। गन्धेऽपि स्वप्रागभावस्यावश्यहेतुत्वादभावान्तराणामन्यथासिद्धित्वं।

I.v.26. यद्वा रूप-रसस्पर्शतुल्यत्वेऽप्यग्निसंयोगविशेषात् क्वचित्सौरभमसौरभं चोत्पद्यते। न चाग्निसंयोगो रूपादिमात्रे कारणं, व्यभिचारात्। एवं रसादावपि।

ननुकार्यमात्रे प्रागभावमात्रं न हेतुः, तयोर्व्यतिरेककालानवगमात्। सर्वमुक्तावितरहेत्वभावादेव कार्यानुत्पादादिति चेत् न। हेत्वन्तरसत्त्वेऽप्युत्पन्नस्य पुनरनुत्पादेन प्रागभावस्य हेतुत्वात्। एका सामग्री एकं कार्यं जनयति स्वभावादिति चेत् न ।कार्यानुत्पादस्य सामग्रीविरहप्रयोज्यत्वनियमात्। न च कार्य्यसहभावेन कारणत्वं, गौरवात्। न च विनश्यदवस्थे समवायिनि कार्य्यानुत्पत्तेस्तथात्वमिति वाच्यं। तावता समवायिकारणस्यैव तथात्वात् कारणमात्रे मानाभावेन तस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्। ननु समवेतसमवायो न ग्राहकः शब्दत्वादिजातेरभावादिति चेत्। न। रूपत्वादिन्यायेन तत्साधनात्॥

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्याय-विरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्।

I. VI.

अथ समवायवादः।

I.vi.1. ननु समवायासिद्धेर्न सा प्रत्यासत्तिः। विप्रतिपतिश्च शुक्लः पट इति प्रतीतिः विशेषण-विशेष्यसम्बन्धविषया न वेति। अथ जाति-गुण-क्रिया-तद्वन्तौ मिथः सम्बद्धावनुभूयेते। न ह्यसम्बद्धस्वरूपद्वये विशिष्टधीव्यपदेशाविति चेत्। न। सम्बद्धानुभवेन हि सम्बन्धो न विशेषणं भासते तस्य प्रथममज्ञानात्, संयोगिनाविमावितिवत् समवायिनावित्यननुभवाच्च। नापि विशेष्यः, अनयोः समवाय इत्यननुभवात्। नापि स्वरूपेण भासते, समवायं जानामीति विषयताननुभवात्। ननु नीलोघट इत्याद्यनुभवो विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धविषयः विशिष्टप्रतीतित्वात् दण्डिज्ञानवदिति चेत्। न। अघटं भूतलं ज्ञातमिष्टं कृतञ्चेत्यत्र व्यभिचारात्। सम्बन्धविषयत्वे बाधकं विनेति विशेषणमिति चेत्। न। बाधकाभावस्यैव समर्थत्वे शेषवैयर्थ्यात् साधकाभावेन सत्प्रतिपक्षाच्च। बाधकाभावस्य साधकत्ववत् साधकाभावस्य बाधकत्वात्। तस्मादुभयाभावे संशयः स्यात्। न च प्रतीतिरेव समवायसाधिका, तस्यास्तद्विषयत्वासिद्धेः अन्यथान्योन्याश्रयात्।

I.vi.2. अथाघटं भूतलं ज्ञातमित्याद्यपि विशिष्टधीः सम्बन्धविषया, किन्तु भ्रान्ता बाधकसत्त्वादिति चेत्। तर्हि भूतलेऽघटत्वस्य ज्ञातत्वादेश्चाभावः स्यात्। तथाचव्यवहारविलोपः। सम्बन्धश्च न संयोगः समवायो वान्यतरो वा बाधादसिद्धेर्वा। नापि सम्बन्धमात्रं, ज्ञापकत्वदिना सिद्धसाधनात्। नाप्यविशिष्टव्यावृत्तविशिष्टज्ञाननियामकः, अभावज्ञानादाविव स्वरूपसम्बन्धेनार्थान्तरत्वात्। न च सम्बन्धिभिन्नत्वं साध्ये विशेषणम्, अभावज्ञानादिना व्यभिचारात्। बाधकाभावस्य च विशेषणत्वं हेतौ निरस्तमेव, विनापि भिन्नसम्बन्धमभावज्ञानादाविव विशिष्टधीसम्भ-वेनाप्रयोजकत्वाच्च। विशेषणताविशेषरूपः प्रकारादिकृतो वा विशेषः सम्बन्धाविषयत्वेऽपि तुल्यः। स्यादेतद्-अवयवगुण-क्रिया-जाति-तद्वतामिह तन्तुषु घट इह पटे शौक्लयमिह चलनं पटत्वञ्चेतीहप्रत्ययः आधाराधेयसम्बन्धनिमित्तकः यथार्थेहप्रत्ययत्वात् इह कुण्डे बदरमिति प्रत्ययवदिति चेत्। न। इह भूतले घटाभावो ज्ञानञ्चेत्यादौ व्यभिचारात्, बाधकं विनेत्यस्य निरस्तत्वात्, तथेवाधाराधेयभावादेवोपपत्तेश्च। उत्पत्तयेस्थितये ज्ञप्तये चापेक्षणीयस्याधारत्वात्।

I.vi.3. अन्ये तु—शब्द-जाति-रूपादिरिन्द्रियसम्बद्धः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् घटवदित्यनुमानात् संयोगबाधे इन्द्रियसम्बन्धघटकतया समवायसिद्धिः, इन्द्रियस्य सम्बद्धग्राहकत्वात्। अत एव समवायो

न प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियेणासम्बन्धात्। न च सम्बन्धत्वेन तत्सिद्धिः, अनवस्थानात् स्वभावादेव ज्ञानवत् स्वसम्बद्धव्यवहारकारित्वाच्च। समवायो हि सम्बन्धं विनैव स्वभावादेव कस्यचित्। न च जात्यादेरपि स्वभावादेव स्वसम्बद्धव्यवहारकारित्वे समवायविलोपः, जात्यादेरिन्द्रियासम्बन्धे समवायवदप्रत्यक्षत्वापातादिति। तन्न। समवायस्वीकारेऽपि स्वरूपसम्बन्धस्यावश्यकत्वात्। घट-ज्ञानयोर्भूतलाभावयोरिव वा द्रव्येण गुण-जात्यादिभिः स्वरूपमेव सम्बन्धोऽस्तु, तथा च शब्दस्येन्द्रियविशेषणतया, शब्दत्वस्य विशेषणविशेषणतया, रूपादि-जात्यादेरिन्द्रियसम्बद्ध-विशेषणतया, रूपत्वादेरिन्द्रियसम्बद्ध-विशेषण-विशेषणतयास्वभासम्बन्धरूपया ग्रहणसम्भवे किं समवायेन। द्रव्ये स्वभावसम्बन्धान्नेन्द्रियेण ग्रहणमिति कथं गुणादेस्तेन ग्रह इति चेत्, समवायेनापि न द्रव्यग्रहणमिति तुल्यम्।

I.vi.4. अपरे त्वेकत्र घटे आमपाकदशायां क्रमेण श्यामरक्तरूपोपलम्भोऽस्ति, स च न तदुभयनिबन्धनः, रूपस्य नित्यत्वेनैकदोपलम्भापत्तेः। नित्यत्वादेव च न तयोरुत्पादविनाशौ, तस्मात्तयोः सम्बन्धस्य तौ स्यातां, स एव समवाय इति। तन्न। श्यामं नष्टं रक्तमुत्पन्नमित्याद्यबाधितानुभवात् समवायस्योत्पाद-विनाशानुल्लेखाच्च। त्वन्मते तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्। अन्यथावयविज्ञानगन्ध-रसादेरपि नित्यत्वं समवायस्योत्पाद-विनाशाविति किन्न रोचयेत्। न ह्युत्पाद-विनाशप्रतीतिरप्रामाणिकी बाधकं विनेति।

I.vi.5. उच्यते। गुण-क्रिया-जातिविशिष्टबुद्धयो विशेषणसम्बन्धविषयाः विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात् दण्डीतिबुद्धिवत्। न च व्यभिचारः, अभावादिविशिष्टबुद्धेरपि स्वरूपसम्बन्धविषयत्वात्। न चैवमत्रापि तेनैवार्थान्तरं, यतो गुणक्रिया-जातिविशिष्टबुद्धीनां पक्षधर्मताबलेन विषयः सम्बन्धः सिध्यन् लाघवादेकैक एव सिध्यति, स एव समवायः, न तु स्वरूपसम्बन्धः, तत्तत्स्व-रूपाणामनन्तत्वात् सम्बन्धत्वेनाक्लृप्तत्वाच्च। अथवा विशेषणसम्बन्धनिमित्तका इति साध्यं, हेतौ तु सत्यत्वं विशेषणं, विशेषणसम्बन्धश्च कारणत्वेनैक एव सिध्यति लाघवात् अनुगतकार्यस्यानुगतकारणनियम्यत्वाच्च। न तु स्वरूपसम्बन्धः, तेषामननुगतत्वादनन्तत्वाच्च। न चोभयमप्यप्रयोजकं, विशिष्टसाक्षात्कारस्य सम्बन्धाविषयत्वे तदजन्यत्वे वा गवाश्वादावपि विशिष्टबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात्।

I.vi.6. नव्यास्तु गुण-क्रिया-जातिविशिष्टबुद्धिः सम्बन्धिभिन्नविशेषणसम्बन्धविषया निर्विषयकभाव-विशेषणकविशिष्टबुद्धित्वात् इतरनिरूपणानिरूप्यविशेषणकविशिष्टबुद्धित्वाद्वा, अतोऽभा-वादिविशिष्टबुद्धौ न व्यभिचारः। न चाप्रयोजकं, निरुपाधिसम्बन्धशालित्वात्। सम्बन्धश्चा-विशिष्टव्यावृत्तविशिष्टधीनियामकः। यद्वेन्द्रियप्रत्यासत्तित्वेन समवायसिद्धिः। तथाहि—गुण-क्रिया-जाति-साक्षात्कारः इन्द्रियसम्बन्धसाध्यः जन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वाद्द्पिण्डज्ञानवदित्यतः साक्षात्सम्बन्धबाधकारणत्वेनेन्द्रियसंयुक्ते सम्बन्धः सिध्यन् पक्षधर्मताबलाल्लाघवेनानुगतः समवाय एव सिध्यति, अनुगतकार्य्यस्यानुगतकारणजन्यत्वात्। न तु संयुक्तविशेषणता-रूपस्वरूपसम्बन्धः, तस्य च तत्तद्रूपादिरूपत्वेनाननुगतत्वात्। एवं रूपत्वरसत्वसाक्षात्कारेऽपि

कारणत्वेनेन्द्रियसम्बन्धः समवाय एवानुगतः सिध्यति लाघवात्, न त्विन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणता तस्या रूपत्वादिस्वरूपत्वेनाननुगतत्वात्। अत एव संयोगो विशेषणता च प्रत्यासत्तिरस्तु न तु समवायादिचतुष्टयमिति निरस्तम्। तस्यास्तत्तत्स्वरूपत्वेनाननुगतत्वात्। प्रत्यासत्तित्वेनाभ्युपगते च समवाये प्रत्यक्षता सम्बन्धिद्वयप्रत्यक्षत्वात्।

I.vi.7. नन्वेवमभावविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षेऽपि विशिष्टबुद्धित्वात् संयोग-समवायबाधेऽनुगतं वैशिष्ट्यं सम्बन्धो विषयः निमित्तञ्च भवेदिति चेत्। न । तस्य हि समवायवदेकत्वे घटाभाववति पटवति पटाभावधीप्रसङ्गः, घटाभाववैशिष्ट्यमेव हि पटाभाववैशिष्ट्यं। पटाभाववैशिष्ट्यसत्त्वेऽपि पटाभावो नास्ति, ततः तस्य भिन्नत्वादिति चेत्। न। पटाभावाभावस्याभावत्वे सोऽपि वैशिष्ट्येन सम्बन्धेन तत्रास्ति वैशिष्ट्यस्यैकत्वात्, पटाभावाभावस्य भावत्वे च पट एव प्रतिबन्धको वाच्यः। एवं पटाभावः पटाभावधीहेतुः स्यात्। पटाभावश्च वैशिष्ट्येन सम्बन्धेन तत्रास्त्येव। वैशिष्ट्यस्य प्रत्यभावव्यक्तिनानात्वे चाभावविशिष्टबुद्धौ नैकः सम्बन्धः कारणं विषयो वेति तदभावप्रत्यक्षेऽननुगतमेव वैशिष्ट्यं विषयः कारणञ्च वाच्यं। तथाचाननुगततत्तत्स्वरूपरूपा विशेषणतैवास्तु क्लृप्तत्वात् किमनन्तवैशिष्ट्येन। समवायस्य वैशिष्ट्यस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वे त्वयापीन्द्रि-यसम्बद्धविशेषणतास्वीकारात्।

I.vi.8. ननु समवायस्यैकत्वे कथं रूपि-नीरूपव्यवस्था। घटेन सह रूपसम्बन्धरूपत्वं समवायस्य न वायुनेति चेत्। न। रूपसम्बन्धरूपत्वं हि समवायस्य स्वरूपमेव यदि तदा रससम्बन्धरूपत्वं न स्यात्, तयोर्विरोधात्। अन्यच्च दुर्वचमिति चेत्। उच्यते। वायौ रूपसमवायसत्त्वेऽपि रूपात्यन्ताभावोऽस्ति, न घटे। कथमेवं, अधिकरणस्वभावात् अबाधितरूपि-नीरूपप्रतीतेश्च।

I.vi.9. नन्वेवं ज्ञातो घट इति प्रतीतेर्ज्ञाततापि स्यात्, वर्त्तमाने बाधकाभावात्, अतीतानागतयोश्च तद्धीर्भ्रान्तेति चेत्। न। अतीतानागतयोर्ज्ञातताया अभावे व्यवहाराभावापत्तेः तस्य ज्ञाततासाध्यत्वात्। न च ज्ञातताज्ञानमेव व्यवहारहेतुः, गौरवात्। अतीतादौ ज्ञान-तद्विषयावेव ज्ञातताधीगोचराविति चेत्तर्हि वर्त्तमाने तावेव तद्विषयौ। न ह्यतीत-वर्त्तमानयोर्ज्ञातताप्रतीत्योर्विषयवैलक्षण्यमीक्षामहे।

I.vi.10. ननु रूप-घटयोर्न समवयायः किन्त्वभेदः, दण्डी पुरुष इत्यत्र दण्डि-पुरुषयोरिव नीलो घटा इत्यत्रापि नील-घटयोरबाधिताभेदानुभवात्। नीलो घटो दण्डी पुरुष इति बुद्ध्योर्विशेषणसम्बन्धमात्रगोचरत्वे नीलो घटइतिवद्दण्डः पुरुषः, दण्डी पुरुष इतिवत् नीली घट इत्यपि स्यात्। तस्मादेकत्राभेदो विषयः, अपरत्र विशेषणसम्बन्धः, विषयेणैव धियां विशेषात्।

अथवा विशेषणता-विशेष्यतावच्छेदकयोर्नीलत्वघटत्वयोरेकवृत्तित्वं ज्ञायते, दण्डित्व-पुरुषत्वयोरिव पुरुषे। एवं नील-घटपदयोः शाब्दमपि सामानाधिकरण्यं युज्यते, नीलत्व-घटत्वाभ्यां भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्ताभ्यां तयोरेकप्रवृत्तेः। न च मतुपोलोपादभेदोपचाराद्वा नीलपदं

नीलवत्परमिति वाच्यं। न हि प्रयोगं साधकं ब्रूमः, किन्तु नील-घटयोरभेदप्रतीतिम्। पदेऽपि नोपचारादिकल्पना गौरवात् मुख्ये बाधकाभावाच्चेति।

I.vi.11. उच्यते। शुक्ल-पटशब्दयोरेकार्थत्वे घटःकुम्भ इतिवत् शुक्लः पट इति सहप्रयोगो न स्यात्। अन्धस्य पटग्रहवत् रूपग्रहः, रूपाग्रहवत् पटाग्रहोऽपि वा स्यात्। महारजतरक्ते पटग्रहवत् शुक्लग्रहः शुक्लाग्रहवत् पटाग्रहोऽपि भवेत्। पटमानयेत्युक्ते यत्किञ्चिच्छुक्लमानयेत्॥ अपटः पट इति वदशुक्लः पट इति विरुध्यते, पट-शुक्लयोरभेदात्। अग्निसंयोगादेकत्र श्यामरक्तयोर्विनाशोत्पादे घटस्य तौ स्यातां। घटसत्त्वे वा तयोरपि न स्यातां। अथ शुक्लत्वादीनां द्रव्यभेदात् तद्बोधार्थं सह प्रयोगः। अन्धादिना शुक्लादिग्रहे शुक्लत्वादीनामग्रह उपपद्यते। शुक्लत्वादिजातेश्च द्रव्येणाभेदो न समवायः, किन्तु स्वरूपसम्बन्ध इति चेत्। न। शुक्लत्व-मधुरत्व-सुरभित्वोष्णत्वादीनां द्रव्यवृत्तित्वे द्रव्यग्राहकत्वगादिभिर्ग्रहणप्रसङ्गात्। रूपत्वादीनां द्रव्यवृत्तित्वे प्रतिनिययतेन्द्रियग्राह्यतैव न स्यात्, योग्यवृत्तित्वेन जातेर्ग्रहणयोग्यत्वात्। तत्तज्जाति-त्वेन योग्यत्वेऽननुगमात्। तस्मात् रूपत्वादीनां प्रतिनियतेन्द्रियग्राह्यतापि गुण-गुणिभेदे मानं। अभेदे च कथं पटस्य शुक्लं रूपमिति भेदबुद्धिः। पटो नीलिमेति बुद्धिप्रसङ्गश्च।

I.vi.12. नन्वेकान्ताभेदे सर्वमिदं दूषणं, वयन्तु भेदाभेदवादिनः। तथाच भेदमादायापौनरुक्तयादि, भेदाभेदे चोक्तमेव प्रमाणं प्रत्यक्षम्। अथवोभयसिद्धभेदे सामानाधिकरण्यधीरभेदे प्रमाणम्। यद्वा अत्यन्तमभेदे भेदे च न सामानाधिकरण्यमिति तत एव भेदाभेदसिद्धिः। न च भेदाभेदयोः परस्परविरहरूपतया विरुद्धयोः कथमेकत्र समावेश इति वाच्यं। संयोगतदभावयोरिवाविरोधात्। पाकानन्तरं रक्तोऽयं न श्याम इत्यबाधितानुभवबलात्तत्रैव तदन्योन्याभावसिद्धेस्त्वयापि भेदाभेदस्वीकारात्। अन्योऽन्याभावत्वमव्याप्यवृत्तिवृत्ति, नित्याभाववृत्त्यभावत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्य-धर्मत्वात् अत्यन्ताभावत्ववत्, नित्येति वा न विशेषणं, अव्याप्यवृत्तिप्रतियोगिकप्रागभाव-प्रध्वंसयोरप्यव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्। इत्यतोऽपि भेदाभेदसिद्धिः।

I.vi.13. उच्यते। तस्यैव तत्राभावोऽवच्छेदभेदेन वर्त्तते ज्ञायते च, यथा संयोगाद्यभावः। श्यामावच्छिन्नस्य तस्यैवान्योन्याभावस्तत्रैव रक्तावच्छिन्ने, तदन्योन्याभावाभावश्च श्यामावच्छेदेन। तदिहापि नीलस्यान्योन्याभावो घटत्वावच्छेदेनेति नीलात् घटस्य भेदोऽस्तु। अभेदस्तु नीलान्योऽन्या-भावाभावरूपो न घटे, घटत्वावच्छेदेनैव विरोधात्। एकावच्छेदेन भावाभावयोरेकत्रावृत्तेरज्ञानाच्च। नाप्यवच्छेदकान्तरेण, घटत्वावच्छिन्ने घटे तदभावात्, तदज्ञानेऽपि नीलो घट इत्यनुभवाच्च। न चान्योऽन्याभावरूपो भेदोऽस्तु, अभेदस्तु न भेदाभावः किन्त्वन्य एवेति वाच्यम्। अभेदव्यवहारे तस्याहेतुत्वात्। तस्मान्नीलो घट इत्यत्र नीलसम्बन्ध एव भासते। तथा सति नीली घट इति धीः स्यादित्युक्तमिति चेत्। घट इत्यत्र बुद्धौ यदि सम्बन्धविषयत्वमापद्यते तदिष्यत एव। अथ नीलो घट इतिप्रयोगे सम्बन्धवाचकपदवत्त्वं, तदपीष्यत एव, मतुपो लोपादभेदेपचाराद्वा नीलपदमेव नीलवत्परमिति।

I.vi.14. ननु शब्द-रूपादिषु विशेषणता इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणता वा ग्राहिकास्तु। किं समवायादिना। अथ विशेषणतायां समवायः, इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतायाञ्च संयुक्तसमवायादिरुपजीव्यः, तैर्विना तयोरभावादिति चेत्। विशेषणतास्वरूपे तेषामुपजीव्यत्वं न तु तस्याः प्रत्यासत्तित्वेऽपि। तैर्विनापि समवायाभावयोर्विशेषणतासत्त्वात्। संयुक्तसमवायादिरपि तत्रास्तीति चेत्, आस्तां न तु प्रत्यासत्तिः, किन्तु विशेषणतैव क्लृप्तत्वात्। संयुक्तसमवायादिकं विना विशेषणता रूपादौ न ज्ञायत इति चेत्, माज्ञायि। न हि सा प्रत्यासत्तिर्ज्ञाता, अपि तु स्वरूपसती। मैवम्। शब्दादीनां साक्षात्कारविषयत्वेनेन्द्रिय-सम्बन्धानुमितौ शब्दादौ समवायादिकं ज्ञात्वैव विशेषणताग्रह इत्यवश्यं प्रथमोपस्थितत्वात् समवयादिरेव विषयो न विशेषणता चरमोपस्थितत्वात्।

I.vi.15. ननु अभावग्रहे नेन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणता प्रत्यासत्तिः, चक्षुषा संयुक्ते परमाण्वादौ योगयस्य जलत्वादेरभावग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। किन्तु स्वग्राह्यसम्बद्धविशेषणता। महति वायावुद्भूतरूपाभावस्य कुसुमे सौरभाभावस्य, गुड़े तिक्तत्वाभावस्य वा न चक्षुरादिना ग्रहोऽपि तु योग्यनुपलब्ध्या सोऽनुमीयते। इन्द्रियविशेषणतापि न प्रत्यासत्तिः, चक्षुरादिना स्वविशेषणजलत्वाद्य-भावग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। यदि शब्दाभावः प्रत्यक्षः तदा प्रत्यासत्त्यन्तरं कल्प्यम्। तदभावे प्रत्यक्ष एव न भवतीति चेत्। मैवं । लाघवादिन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतैव प्रत्यासत्तिः।

I.vi.16. न चैवं परमाणौ जलत्वाद्यभावग्रहप्रसङ्गः, यत्र हि यत्सत्त्वमनुपलब्धिविरोधि तत्र तस्याभाव इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेण गृह्यते। न च परमाण्वादो जलत्वादिसत्त्वमनुपलब्धिविरोधि, योग्यसंयुक्तसम-वायाभावेन पृथिवीत्ववदनुपलब्धिसम्भवात्। महति वाय्वादौ उद्भूतरूपाद्यभावश्चक्षुरादिग्राह्य एव, तत्रोद्भूतरूपादिसत्त्वेऽऽनुपलब्ध्यनुपपत्तेः। अत एव स्तम्भे पिशाचतादात्म्याभावः प्रत्यक्षः, स्तम्भतादात्म्ये च तस्य स्तम्भस्येवानुपलम्भासम्भवात्। एवं शब्दस्याप्यभावः प्रत्यक्षः तदा तत्र शब्दसत्त्वस्यानुपलब्धिविरोधित्वादिति तत्रेन्द्रियविशेषणतैव प्रत्यासत्तिः। चक्षुषि जलत्वादिसत्त्वञ्च नानुपलब्धिविरोधीति चक्षुषा न तद्ग्रहः।

I.vi.17. नन्वभावे न विशेषणता प्रत्यासत्तिः, किन्तु समवाय एव, समवायसाधकविशिष्टप्रतीतेरविशेषात्। न च समवेतत्वे तस्य भावत्वापत्तिः, भावस्य तत्त्वे अभावत्वापत्तिरिति वैपरीत्यसम्भवात्। रूपादौ प्रत्यासत्तित्वेन समवायकल्पनमभावेऽपि तुल्यं, विशेषणतापि तुल्या, प्रगाभाव-प्रध्वंसौ प्रतियोग्याश्रये समवेतौ, प्रतियोग्याश्रयनाशजन्यध्वंसो देशे समये वा समवैति तत्रैव निरूपणात्। न च समवायिनाशे ध्वंसनाशः, घटोन्मज्जनप्रसङ्गात् भावत्वस्योपाधित्वाच्च। अन्यथा तवापि तस्य जन्यत्वेन नाशापत्तिः। अथैवमन्योऽन्यात्यन्तभावयोर्नित्यत्वेऽनेकसमवेतत्वे च जातित्वप्रसङ्गः। न च तत्र भावत्वं तन्त्रं, गौरवात्। न चाभावानां विशिष्टप्रतीतौ विशेषो येनात्र समवायपरित्यागः, इति चेत् । न। घटत्वाभावादेर्जातित्वे सत्त्व-द्रव्यत्व-पृथिवीत्वादिना परापरभावानुपपत्तेः। तेषां व्याप्यत्वे घटे तदभावाप्रसङ्गः, व्यापकत्वे सामान्यादो घटत्वाभावो न स्यादिति।

I.vi.18. उच्यते। समवेतत्वे ध्वंसस्य समवायिकारणनाशान्नाशः स्यात्। न च नाश्यत्वे भावत्वं तन्त्रं, गौरवात् प्रागभावेऽभावाच्च। असमवेतत्वे तद् ध्वंसस्य जन्यत्वेऽपि न नाशः आश्रयनाशादेरभावात्। घटोन्मज्जनापत्तेः न नश्यतीति चेत्। न हि प्रयोजनक्षतिभयेन सामग्री न कार्य्यमर्जयति, तस्मादुन्मज्जनाभावनिर्वाहकं ध्वंसस्यासमवेतत्वं कल्पयतां। स्वसमवायिनाशात् ध्वंसपरम्पराकल्पने च घट-कपालादेरापरमाणुनाशे घटादि-तद्ध्वंसविरोधी चरमो ध्वंसः परमाणुवृत्तिः स्यात्। तथा च न प्रत्यक्षः। घटध्वंसस्य कपालसमवेत्वे च न भूतले निरुपणं स्यात्। उभयवृत्तित्वे च व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वेन कपालं विना न निरूप्येत।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे समवायवादः।

I.VII.

अथानुपलब्ध्यप्रामाण्यवादः।

I.vii.1. नन्वभावग्रहो नेन्द्रियात्, किन्तु योग्यानुपलब्धेः तदुपलम्भे तदभावाग्रहात्। नचैवं भावबुद्धिरप्यभावानुपलब्धेरेव नेन्द्रियादिति वाच्यम्। भावग्रहे इन्द्रियानुविधानात्। अन्यथा निमीलिताक्षस्यापि घटाभावानुपलब्ध्या घटग्रहप्रसङ्गः। अत एव भावग्रहे अभावानुपलब्धिः पृष्ठलग्नापि न हेतुः, इन्द्रियेणान्यथासिद्धत्वात्। न हीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षे सति तां विना भावधीविलम्बः। अभावग्रहेऽपीन्द्रियं हेतुः तदनुविधानादिति चेत्। न। अभावेन चक्षुरादेः प्राप्त्यभावेनाश्रयग्रहे तदुपक्षयात्।

I.vii.2. अथाधिकरणधीरिन्द्रियव्यापारः, न च तया तदन्यथा सिद्धं, अन्यथा सन्निकर्षोपक्षीणतया इन्द्रियं न हेतुः स्यादिति चेत्। न। हेतुत्वे सिद्धे तद्व्यापारत्वं, तदेव नास्ति प्राप्त्यभावात्। एतेनाधिकरणग्रहेन्द्रिययोः पृथगन्वय-व्यतिरेकग्रहात् दण्ड-चक्रयोरिव हेतुत्वं द्वयोरिति निरस्तं। प्राप्त्यभावेनाभावाग्राहकत्वात्। न चेन्द्रियं प्राप्तविशेषणमप्राप्तमपि गृह्णाति, संयुक्तसमवायाद्युच्छेदप्रसङ्गात् प्राप्तचैत्रगताप्राप्तदण्डस्यापि ग्रहप्रसङ्गात् इन्द्रियस्य प्राप्तग्राहकत्वाच्च। न च विशेषणता प्राप्तिः, अन्यत्र तदकल्पनात्। न च समवाये तत्कल्पनं, तस्यानभ्युपगमात्, तत एवातीन्द्रियत्वाद्वा।

I.vii.3. अथाभावस्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वेन संयोगादिबाधेइहैवसा कल्प्यते, रूपादौ तद्बाधे संयुक्तसमवायादिरिवेति चेत्। तत्रानुपक्षीणेन्द्रियानुविधानात्तथैव। इह त्वाश्रयग्रह एव तदुपक्षीणं लाघवात्, न तु प्राप्त्यन्तरकल्पना, गौरवात्। अन्यथा त्वगनुविधानाद्रूपं विनापि वायुधीः प्रत्यक्षेति न सा स्पर्शलिङ्गग्रहे उपक्षीयेत। किञ्च विशेषणतायामिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वं तेन सेत्यन्योऽन्याश्रयत्वं। अपि च विशेषणता ग्राह्यस्वरूपमेव। न च त्वगादो स्वरूपसम्बन्धो हेतुः, किन्तु यथायथं संयोगसमवायौ। न च तयोरन्योऽन्यव्यभिचारादिन्द्रियं सम्बद्धं गृह्णातीत्येव व्याप्तिरिति वाच्यं। दृष्टान्ते हि सम्बन्धिगतः सम्बन्धो हेतुर्गृहीतः चक्षुष्यन्यत्रापि तथा, न तु ग्राह्यस्वरूपं, सम्बन्धस्य सम्बन्धिभिन्नत्वनियमात्। न हि स एव तद्वांस्तेनैव भवति।

I.vii.4. स्वरूपसम्बन्धस्य हेतुत्वे च रूपादिग्रहोऽपि तत एवास्तु किं समवायादिना, अतः संयोगविशेषणते एव प्रत्यासत्ती इति षोढ़ा कीर्त्तनमपि विफलं। एतेनालोकापेक्षणे चक्षुरपेक्षा तस्य

तदेकसहकारित्वादिति निरस्तं। प्राप्तिं विना चक्षुषोऽहेतुत्वात्, आलोकस्य च प्रतियोगिग्राहकत्वेन योग्यताघटकतया अभावग्राहकत्वात्। न चेवं प्रतियोग्युपलम्भकत्वेन चक्षुरपि हेतुः, एवं हि तत्तद्व्याप्येतरतदुपलम्भकसाकल्ये अनुपलब्धिर्ग्राहिका भवतीति वाच्यं। प्राप्तिं विना तस्याहेतुत्वेनाश्रयग्रहोपक्षयात्। नन्वेवमन्धस्य त्वगिन्द्रियोपनीते नीले स्मृतपीतस्यानुपलब्ध्या अभावग्रहप्रसङ्गः, प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वे त्वभावस्य नायन्दोषोऽन्धस्य चक्षुरभावादिति चेत्। न। अभावग्राहकत्वेनाभिमतमिन्द्रियमाश्रयग्रहोपक्षीणं, तथाच प्रतियोगिग्राहकेणेन्द्रियेण आश्रयग्रहे अनुपब्ध्याऽभावग्रहात्। अन्यथा चक्षुःसंयुक्ते परमाणौ जलत्वाभावग्रहप्रसङ्गः।

I.vii.5. अथैवं वायौ रूपाभावो जले तिक्ताभावः पाषाणे सोरभाभावश्च न गृह्येत, वाय्वादीनां प्रतियोगिगिग्राहकैश्चक्षुरादिभिरग्रहात्। न च तवापि ते अभावाः कथं प्रत्यक्षाः वाय्वादीनां तदिन्द्रियायोग्यत्वदिति वाच्यं। लिङ्गेन त्वगादिना वोपनीते वाय्वादौ योग्यरूपाद्यभावविशेष्यकं प्रत्यक्षं चक्षुरादिनैव, न वाय्वादिविशेष्यकं, प्रत्यक्षे योग्यविशेष्यस्य हेतुत्वादिति चेत्। न। वाय्वादौ रूपाद्यभावप्रतीतीनामनुपलब्धिलिङ्गकत्वात्। तव नीरूपो वायुरिति वायुविशेष्याभावप्रतीतिवत्।

I.vii.6. अथ भूतले अभावधीरिन्द्रियजन्या साक्षात्कारित्वात्, तत एव विशेषणताकल्पनमपि। न च साक्षात्कारित्वमसिद्धं, परोक्षत्वे अज्ञातकरणकत्वानुपपत्तेः। तथाहि-मन्दिरोदरे चैत्रो निपुणमनुसृतोऽपि न चोपलब्ध इत्यासवाक्यवगतानुपलब्ध्या श्रोतानुमिनोति नासीत्तत्र चैत्र इति। एवमभावधीः परोक्षा चेत्तदा नाज्ञातकरणिका परोक्षत्वजातेर्ज्ञातकरणप्रयोज्यत्वात्। ज्ञातकरणत्वञ्च ज्ञानकरणत्वं लिङ्गादेरजनकत्वात्। तस्मात् साक्षात्कारित्वमज्ञातकरणत्वात्। न चेन्द्रियजन्यत्वमुपाधिः, ततएव तत्साधनादिति चेत्।

I.vii.7. मैवं। परोक्षत्वं हि न जातिः, अनुभवत्वेन सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्। किन्तु साक्षात्कारिभिन्नज्ञानत्वं, एवञ्चाभावज्ञानं परोक्षमेव स्मृतिवत्। यथा च ज्ञातकरणत्वेऽपि शाब्दादिर्नानुमितिरेवमज्ञातकरणत्वेऽपि इन्द्रियजन्यं साक्षात्कार्य्यनुपलब्धिजन्यं तद्विजातीयमनुपलब्धं। यदि चाज्ञातकरणत्वेन साक्षात्कारित्वं तदा ज्ञातकरणत्वेन शाब्दादेरनुमितित्वापत्तिः। ज्ञातकरणत्वेऽपि लिङ्गादिकरणभेदादनुमित्यादिफलभेद इति चेत्, अज्ञातानुपलब्धीन्द्रियकरणभेदात् फलभेद इहापि। एवञ्च साक्षात्कारत्वे इन्द्रियजन्यत्वं परोऽक्षत्वे च तदजन्यत्वं प्रयोजकं, न तु ज्ञाताज्ञातकरणजन्यत्वं गौरवात् स्मृतावभावाच्च।

I.vii.8. नन्वनुपलब्धिर्न मानं, भावभूतमानसहकृतस्यैव मनसो वाह्यानुभवजनकत्वादिति चेत्। न। भावात्वस्य गुरुत्वेनाप्रयोजकत्वात्। अन्यथेन्द्रियसहकृतस्यैव मनसोबाह्यानुभवजनकत्वमित्यनुमानादि न मानं स्यात्। न चेदमभावज्ञानं भावमानसहकृतमनःसाध्यं बाह्याभावाज्ञानत्वाल्लिङ्गादिजन्याभावज्ञानवदिति वाच्यं। अयमभावो नेन्द्रियग्राह्योऽभावत्वादयोग्याभाववत्। इयमभावबुद्धिर्नेन्द्रियजन्या अभावबुद्धित्वाल्लिङ्गादिजन्याभावबुद्धिवदिति सत्प्रतिपक्षात्। अथ

प्रतियोगिग्राहकं मानं तदभावमपि गृह्णाति यथानुमानादि, प्रतियोगिग्राहकञ्चेन्द्रियमतोऽभावग्राहकमिति चेत्। न। भावग्राहकयोरेव लिङ्ग-शब्दयोस्तदभावाग्राहकत्वात्। प्रतियोगिग्राहकजातीयं मानं तथेति चेत्। न उपमाने व्यभिचारात्। न च चक्षुष्ट्वादिकं अभावग्राहकवृत्ति जातित्वात्, उपमानत्वञ्च न जातिरिति वाच्यं। प्राप्तिं विना चक्षुरादेरभावाग्राहकत्वं साधनात्।

I.vii.9. अथ भाववृत्त्यभावभ्रमः स च करणदोषात्। न च प्रतियोगिस्मृत्याश्रयग्रहानुपलब्धयः स्वरूपतो दुष्टाः, किन्त्विन्द्रियं पित्तादिना दुष्टमिति, तदेव च भ्रमहेतुरित्यभावाप्रमायामपि तदेव मानमिति चेत्। न। इन्द्रियस्यापि दुष्टत्वं दोषसाहित्यमात्रं न त्वन्यत्, तच्चानुपलब्धावपि तुल्यं। न च ज्ञातकरणाजन्यभ्रमत्वेनेन्द्रियजन्यत्वं। एवं ह्यभावप्रमाकरणत्वमपीन्द्रियस्य तत एवास्तु किमनया कुसृष्टया। एवमस्त्विति चेत्। न। प्राप्त्यभावेनोक्तोत्तरत्वात्। किञ्चासन्निकृष्टेऽपि दोषादुपनीतेऽभावे भ्रम इन्द्रियेण सम्भवति चक्षुषो पाषाणः सुरभिरिति भ्रमवत्। अभावप्रमा न सम्भवति प्रासप्त्यभावादित्युक्तं। नन्वधिकरणाभावायोर्व्विशिष्टबुद्धिरस्ति, सा नेन्द्रियजन्या अभावबुद्धित्वात्, नानुपलब्धिजन्या भावबुद्धित्वात्, नोभयजन्या जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गात्। अत उभयग्राहकमिन्द्रियमभ्युपेयमिति चेत्, अभाववद्भूतलमित्यनुपलब्ध्युपनीताभावविशिष्ट-बुद्धिरिन्द्रियेणेव, चक्षुषा चन्दनं सुरभीतिवत्, भूतले घटो नास्तीति च चक्षुरुपनीतभूतलेऽ-भावबुद्धिरनुपलब्ध्यैव घ्राणेन चन्दने सौरभमितिवत्।

यत्तु—व्यापाराभावान्नानुपलब्धिः प्रमाण व्यापारवत एव करणत्वादिति। तन्न। क्रियया ह्ययोगव्यव-छेदेन सम्बन्धि करणं, न तु व्यापारवदित्यपि विशेषणं गौरवादिति।

I.vii.10. अत्रोच्यते। प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियेणाश्रयग्रहो न हेतुः, प्राङ्नास्तिताग्रहे त्वन्वयेन व्यभिचारात्। वाय्वादौ च रूपाद्यभावधीरिन्द्रियजन्यैव नानुपलब्धिलिङ्गजन्या अनुपलब्धेरज्ञानात्। आसवाक्यस्यैव तज्ज्ञापकस्याभावात्। अथाज्ञातैव रूपाद्युपलम्भस्यानुपलब्धी रूपाद्यनुपलब्धिं भूतले गृह्णाति, घटाभावमिवेति चेत्। त्वन्मते उपलम्भस्यातीन्द्रियत्वेन योग्यानुपलब्ध्या उपलम्भाभावस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्,; अनुपलब्धिमात्रस्याभावाग्राहकत्वात्। अस्तु तर्हि ज्ञानं योग्यमिति चेत्। न। अपसिद्धान्तात्। योग्यत्वेऽपि भूतलीयघटाभावेऽपि ज्ञातैव योग्यानुलब्धिर्लिङ्गमस्तु, योग्यघटोपलम्भस्यानुपलब्ध्या ग्रहसम्भवात् कृतमनुपलब्ध्या मानान्तरेण।

I.vii.11. घटाभावधीरज्ञातकरणिका लिङ्गाद्यनुसन्धानं विना जायमानत्वादिति चेत्। न। वाय्वादौ रूपाद्यभावप्रतीतिरपि तथा। अथ रूपादिमत्तया ज्ञातत्वाभावस्तदनुमितरूपवत्तानुपलब्धिर्व्वा लिङ्गमिति चेत्। न। वाय्वादौ ज्ञातत्त्वाभावस्यापि रूपाद्यभावतुल्यतया ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। वाय्वादौ तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वे रूपाद्यभावोऽपि तथास्तु। नापि कायवाग्व्यवहाराभावेनानुपलब्धिरनुमीयते उपेक्षाज्ञान-मूकस्वप्नयोर्दर्शनेन व्यभिचारात्। न च व्यवहाराभावमात्रं

लिङ्गं कस्यचिद्व्यवहाराभावस्य व्यभिचारात् सर्व्वव्यवहाराभावस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्।

I.vii.12.किञ्च घटवत्तया ज्ञातत्वाभावेन तदनुमितानुपलब्ध्या वा लिङ्गेन भूतलादावभावानुमितिरस्तु, किं मानान्तरेणानुपलब्ध्या। अपि च प्रतियोगिग्राहकेन्द्रियजन्यमधिकरणज्ञानमनुपलब्धिसहकारि तदा स्याद्यदि तेन विना सा नाभावं बोधयेत्। न चैतद्दृष्टं। वाय्वादौ रूपाद्यभावे तथा दृष्टमिति चेत्। न। असिद्धेः। न च व्याप्तिबलात्सहकारित्वं, एवं हि वाय्वादौ रूपाद्यभाव-प्रत्ययोऽनुपलब्धेर्भवंस्तादृशाश्रयमाक्षिपेत्। अनाक्षेपे वाऽनुपलब्धेर्न भवेत्। ततो न भवति किन्तु लिङ्गादिति चेत्, लिङ्गमपि सैव, तच्च दूषितमेव। किञ्च नानुपलब्धिर्लिङ्गं ततो हि नीरूपो वायुरित्यनुमितिः स्यात्, न तु वायौ रूपाभाव इति। अपि च घटवत्युपलम्भ-प्राक्कालेऽनुपलब्ध्या घटस्मृतिमतः कुतो नाभावधीः? घटाभावादिति चेत्, तर्ह्यभावरूपार्थजन्याभावबुद्धिरर्थजन्यत्वेन साक्षात्कारिणी इन्द्रियजन्या च स्यात्। तदा घट एव प्रतिबन्धक इति चेत्, तथापि तदभावोऽभावबुद्धौ जनक एव स्यात्।

I.vii.13.स्यादेतत्। गृहमुपलभ्य निर्गतश्चैत्रो यत्र केनचित्पृष्टस्तत्र मेत्र आसीदिति, स च क्षणं ध्यात्वाऽनुपलब्ध्या तत्र मैत्राभावमवगम्याह नासीत्तत्र मैत्र इति। सेयं प्राङ्नास्तिताधीर्न स्मृतिः, पुरा गेहेऽनुभूयमाने मैत्रास्मरणेन तदभावाननुभवात्। एवञ्च तत्रैवेन्द्रियव्यापारं विनैवानुपलब्ध्या अभावानुभवादन्यत्रापि सैव हेतुः क्लृप्तत्वात्। तदाहुः। "स्वरूपमात्रं दृष्टं हि वेश्माद्यर्थं स्मरन्नथ। तत्रान्येनास्तितां पृष्टस्तदैव प्रतिपद्यते" इति। मैवं। प्राङ्नास्तितायां हि न तावदज्ञातानुपलब्धिर्भूतले घटाभावस्येवाऽभावग्राहिका, तदानीं गेहस्य विप्रकृष्टत्वेन योग्यानुपलब्धेरभावात्। नापि ज्ञाता, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। अनुपलब्धेरप्यभावरूपतयाऽनुपलब्ध्यन्तरेण ग्राह्यत्वात्। उपलम्भस्यानुप-लब्धिरज्ञातैव स्वरूपसती मैत्रानुपलब्धिं गृह्णाति चेत्, त्वन्नये उपलम्भस्यातीन्द्रियत्वेन तदभावस्य योग्यानुपलब्ध्यग्राह्यत्वात्।

I.vii.14.अथ गेहस्य योग्यमैत्रवत्तया स्मरणार्हस्य स्मरणाभावस्तत्राज्ञातएव गेहे मैत्राभावग्राहक इति चेत्। न। स्वरूपसतः स्मरणाभावस्य ग्राहकत्वे तस्मिन् सत्यभावसंशय-विपर्य्ययाभावप्रसङ्गात्। भवति च कदाचित् तत्रासीदितिविपर्य्ययस्तत्रासीन्न वेति संशयश्च। अथ दोषात्संशयविपर्य्ययौ। न चासाधारणं प्रमाकरणं दूषयन्त एव दोषाः संशयादिहेतवो भवन्ति। न चात्र स्वरससिद्धस्य योग्यास्मरणस्य किञ्चिद्दूषितमिति वाच्यं। दोषसाहित्यमेव हि करणानां दुष्टता। न हि दूर त्वादिना चक्षुषः किञ्चिदपक्रियते, किन्तु मण्यादेर्दाह इव स्वरूपसतामेव प्रतिबन्धकत्वमिति चेत्। न। अज्ञाताद्योग्यास्मरणात् तत्राभावधीरित्यसिद्धेः। किन्तु मनसा ज्ञाताद्योग्यास्मरणाल्लिङ्गात् प्रमाणत्वेन क्लृप्तात्तत्राभावप्रतीत्युपपत्तौ नानुपलब्धिः प्रमाणान्तरं कल्पय्ते।

I.vii.15.योग्यस्मरणाभावो न मनोग्राह्यः, प्रत्यासत्त्यभावात् ज्ञानस्यायोग्यत्वाद्वेति चेत्। न। वाय्वादौ रूपाद्यभावप्रतीतेरलैङ्गिकत्वेनेन्द्रियानुविधानेन तज्जन्यत्वे सिद्धे इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतायाः प्रत्यासत्तित्वकल्पनात्। तज्ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं जानामीत्यनुभवस्य लिङ्गाद्यजन्यत्वात्। न च ज्ञातता

लिङ्गं, निराकृतत्वात्। तवापि कथमभावे संशय-विपर्य्ययाविति चेत्। न। लिङ्गसंशय-विपर्य्ययाभ्यां लैङ्गिकसंशय-विपर्य्ययदर्शनात्। यदा तु सुनिपुणेनैकज्ञानविषयतायोग्यस्य मैत्रस्यानुभवे सति स्मरणार्हस्यास्मरणमवधार्य्यते तदानुमितिः प्रमा। अत एवास्मरणमात्रस्य व्यभिचारमुपलभ्य तदुपेक्ष्य विशिष्टास्मरणं ज्ञातुकामस्य प्रणिधानमुपयुज्यते। अन्यथा ध्यानमनुपपन्नं स्वरूपसत एवास्मरणस्याभावग्राहकत्वात्। तस्माद्योग्यास्मरणं लिङ्गत्वेनैवोप-युज्यते। प्रयोगस्तु-तद्गेहं तदा मैत्राभाववत् तत्तुल्यपरिमाणादियोगितया स्मरणेऽपि तद्वत्तया अस्मर्य्यमाणत्वात्, यदेवं यथा घटाभाववद्भूतलमिति।

इतिश्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे अनुपलब्ध्यप्रामाण्यवादः।

I.VIII.

अथाभाववादः।

I.viii.1. नन्वभावो भावात्मैव, ततस्तत्र संयोगादिरेव ग्राहक इति न तत्र विशेषणता प्रत्यासत्तिः।

I.viii.2. तत्र प्राञ्चः। अस्ति तावदिह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यबाधिता बुद्धिः। सा चेयं न भूतलालम्बना, घटवत्यपि प्रसङ्गात्। नापि केवलतदालम्बना, अतिरिक्तकैवल्यानभ्युपगमात्। भूतलमेव कैवल्यमिति चेत्, तर्हि पौनरुक्तमधिकं, अभेदे आधाराधेयभावानुपपत्तिश्च।

I.viii.3. अथाधिकाभाववादिनापि अभावः साश्रयो वाच्यः, देशादिनियमेन व्यवहारात्। तथाचास्ति भूतले विशेषो योऽभावाश्रयः। स न भूतलमात्रं, घटवत्यपि प्रसङ्गात्। नाभावयुक्तमन्योऽन्याश्रयात्। न च घटवत्, विरोधादिति चेत्। न। विशेषस्यैव अभावाश्रयत्वात् स चाननुगत एव। एकाश्रयता त्वननुगतस्यापि घटाश्रयतेव भवति।

I.viii.4. किञ्च—कुत्राभाव इति, यत्र प्रतीयेत इत्येवोत्तरं। क्व प्रतीयेत इत्यत्र यत्रास्तीत्येव। अन्यथा गोत्वादिकमपि न स्वीक्रियेत, तदाश्रयविशेषादेव व्यवहारसम्भवात्। तथापि कीदृशि भूतले अभाव इति चेत्, अभावपूर्व्वसमये कीदृशं भूतलमिति प्रश्ने घटवदित्युत्तरं, अभावसमयेऽभाववदिति,। मध्यसमयस्तु नास्त्येव, इह भूतले घटोनास्तीत्याधाराधेयभावप्रतीतेश्च। अभावाधारत्वं भूतलस्य न प्रतीयते किन्तु तन्मात्रबुद्धिविषयत्वमिति चेत्, अहो व्याख्याकौशलमनुभवोऽपि व्याख्याय कथ्यते, तन्मात्रपदार्थानिर्वचनञ्च। न हि भूतलबुद्धिस्तन्मात्रबुद्धिः, घटवद्भूतलबुद्धेरपि भूतलबुद्धित्वात्। सा बुद्धिर्न भूतलस्य, किन्तु घट-भूतलयोरग्नीषोमयोरिव देवतात्वमिति चेत्। न। ततो भूतलाव्यवहारप्रसङ्गात् भूतलस्याविषयत्वात्। आशुभाविभूतलविषयकज्ञानान्तरादिति चेत्, तर्हि सैव भूतलबुद्धिस्तन्मात्रबुद्धिरिति तद्देशे घटाभावस्य व्यवहारप्रसङ्गः। एतेन भूतलेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजघटवद्भूतलेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजज्ञानयोर्विशेषोऽङ्गीकरणीयः, सामग्रीभेदस्य कार्यभेदनियतत्वात्। तथाच स एव तन्मात्रपदार्थ इति निरस्तं। ततोऽपि भूतलव्यवहारात्।

I.viii.5. प्रतियोगि-तद्व्याप्येतरजनिता भूतलबुद्धिरभाव इति चेत्। न। घटवति तज्जनिताया अपीतरजनितत्वात्। तन्मात्रजनिता सेति चेत्। न। मात्रार्थस्याभावत्वात्,तस्य चापरिज्ञानात्।

घटाविषया सती भूतलविषयेति चेत्। न। उक्तोत्तरत्वात्। किञ्च प्रतियोगिनिरूपणाधीननिरूपणोऽभावः। बुद्धिस्तु न तथा। प्रतियोगिप्रकाशं विनापि बुद्धिनिरूपणात्। व्यवहारार्थं दृश्यप्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षा, अभावो ज्ञात एवेति चेत् । न। व्यवहारस्य व्यवहर्त्तव्योपलम्भनिबन्धनत्वेन तथा अदृष्टचरत्वात्। यदि च प्रतियोगिस्मरणसापेक्षा तन्मात्रधीरभावपदार्थः, तदान्धकारादौ या तन्मात्रधीः सा अभावो न स्यात्। तथा च तत्र विचरन् कण्ठकैर्विध्येत कण्टकस्मरणं विना कण्ठकाभावाभावात्। निर्जने बन्धविच्छेदेऽपि जलनिःसरणं न स्यात्, तदानीं तन्मात्रबुद्धेः सर्वथाऽभावात्। किञ्च तन्मात्रधीनाशे घटोन्मज्जनप्रसङ्गः, घटाभावाभावस्य घटत्वात्। यदि चाभावो नातिरिक्तस्तदा यत्र घटसंसृष्टत्वबुद्धिरासीत् कुतस्तत्र तन्मात्रधीः, मुद्गरपातजन्यातिरिक्तविषयानङ्गीकारात्। अतिरिक्ताभावे किं मानमिति चेत्, नास्तीति बुद्धिरेव।

I.viii.6. नन्वभावव्यवहारानुपपत्तिरन्योन्याश्रयादिति। अत्र प्राभाकराः। घटवद्भूतलबुद्धिभिन्ना भूतलबुद्धिरभावव्यवहारकारणं। न च दोषात् घटवति घटवत्त्वाज्ञाने भूतलज्ञानमभावः स्यादिति वाच्यं। घटवतो भूतलस्य ज्ञानाद्भिन्नस्य भूतलज्ञानस्याभावत्वात्, तद्भ्रमाच्चाभावभ्रमः। वस्तुतोऽत्यन्ताभावे प्रतियोगिमदधिकरणज्ञानस्याप्रसिद्धेः, प्रतियोगिमज्ज्ञानभिन्नमधिकरणज्ञानं व्यधिकरणाभावव्यवहारे कारणं। समानाधिकरणनिषेधप्रतीतिश्च प्रतियोग्यधिकरणयोः स्वरूपभेदमालम्बते। तेन घटवत्त्वेन ज्ञायमानेऽपि भूतले भूतलं घटो नेति प्रतीतिः। तथाच यस्याभावज्ञानकारणत्वं परेषान्तदेवाभावव्यवहृतिकारणमस्तु। न ह्यधिकरणबुद्धिं विना तद्बुद्धिः। न च भूतलबुद्धिस्तथा, घटवत्यपि प्रसङ्गात्। न चाभावाधिकरणभूतलविषयत्वाद्बुद्धेर्विशेषः, प्रतियोगिसत्त्वेऽपि प्राङ्नासीदिदमत्रेति प्रतीतेः।

I.viii.7. किञ्च—ज्ञानविषयभूतलस्याभावो यदि विशेषणं तदा अभावज्ञानमेव तज्ज्ञानकारणं, उपलक्षणं चेत्, न कश्चिद्विशेषः। प्रतियोगिमत्तयानुपलब्धिरपि कारणमिति चेत्। न। प्रतियोगिमत्तयोपलम्भेऽपि प्राङ्नासीदिदमत्रेति प्रतीतेः। बुद्ध्योश्च विशेषः स्वरूपविशेषावेव, नान्योन्याभावोऽनवस्थानादात्माश्रयाद्वा। भूतलज्ञानापेक्षया घटवद्भूतलज्ञानत्वमेव वा वैधर्म्यभेदः। न चातिरिक्ताभाव-पक्षेऽप्यन्योन्याभावेऽत्यन्ताभावे च नित्ये मानमस्ति, प्रतियोगिनि बुद्धिस्थेऽधिकरणस्वरूपस्यैवानतिप्रसञ्जकत्वात्। न हि तत्राधिकरणस्य प्रतियोगितादात्म्यं प्रतियोगिमत्त्वं वा सम्भवति। अतएवाभावे अभावान्तरं त्वया न स्वीक्रियते अधिकरणस्य तद्द्रैरूप्याभावात्।

I.viii.8. नन्वर्थेनैव विशेषो बुद्धेः, न चात्रार्थभेदोऽस्ति। मैवं। न हि तावदर्थो ज्ञानकारणमवश्यं, किन्तु सामग्रीविशेषाद्बुद्धिविशेषो जायते धारावाहिकबुद्धिवत्। यद्वा घटवद्भूतलभिन्नं भूतलमभावः यत्र परेषामभावः, भेदश्च स्वरूपमेव। तादात्म्येनाप्रतीतौ प्रतीतिरिति तवापि स्वरूपभेदलक्षणं इदानीमिदं भूतलं घटवद्भूतलं न भवतीति प्रतीतेः। एतावांस्तु विशेषो यत् तव समानाधिकरणनिषेधप्रतीतिरियमन्योऽन्याभावभेदमवगाहते, मम तु स्वरूपं। ननु यदेव भूतलं घटवद्भूतलाभिन्नमासीत्तदेव कथन्तद्भिन्नमिति चेत्। न। तवाप्यबाधितसमानाधिकरण-

निषेधप्रतीतिबलेनान्योन्याभावसिद्धौ तथात्वस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। समयभेदेनैव भेदाभेदौ न विरुध्येते इति तु समं। यदि च घटवद्भूतलाभिन्नं तदिदानीं स्यात् तदा घटवद्भूतलव्यवहारस्तत्र स्यात्। घट-तदभावावच्छेदभेदेनान्योन्याभाव-तदभावौ भूतले वर्त्तेते इति चेत्, ममापि भूतलबुद्धिर्घटवद्भूतलबुद्ध्यवच्छेदेन स्वरूपभेद-तदभावौ वर्त्तेते इति गृहाण। ननु भूतले घटोऽस्ति न वेति संशयो घटो नास्तीति विपर्य्ययो वा कथम्भवेत्, प्रतियोगिनि बुद्धिस्थेऽधिकरणस्य तज्ज्ञानस्य चाभावस्योपलम्भादिति चेत्। न। भूतले तज्ज्ञाने वा घटवद्भिन्नत्वस्य घटवद्भूतलज्ञानभिन्नत्वस्य च दोषवशेनानिश्चयात्। भूतलतज्ज्ञान-स्वरूपाणामननुगमात् कथमनुगतव्यवहार इति चेत्। न। अभावेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्।

I.viii.9. न ह्यभावत्वं सामान्यं, अभावत्वगतान्योन्याभावाव्यापकत्वात्। न च भावविरोधित्वं, विरोधस्याभावनिरूप्यत्वात्, भावाभावयोः सहावस्थानाभावस्य स्वरूपानतिरेकाच्च। नापि भावप्रतियोगित्वं, प्रतियोगित्वस्याभावविरहरूपत्वात्, अभावाभावस्य भावस्य भावाप्रतियोगित्वाच्च। नापि सप्रतियोगिकत्वं, समवाय-सादृश्यादीनामपि तथात्वात्। नापि परकीयस्वभावत्वं, ज्ञानादिगतत्वात्, स्वभावशब्दस्य स्वरूपार्थेऽननुगमाच्च। नापि सत्ताशून्यत्वम्, सत्तायामेव गतत्वात्, शून्यत्वस्याभावरूपत्वाच्च। सत्तात्यन्ताभाववत्त्वमभावत्वं, अत्यन्ताभावश्चाभावत्वानवगतावप्यवगतइति चेत्। न। अभावे अभावानभ्युपगमात्, तथात्वेऽपि तत्रैव तदभ्युपगमात्। सत्ताबोधविधुरत्वमभावत्वं, सामान्यादौ सत्तावगमेऽपि बाधात् सा त्यज्यते अभावस्य तद्विरुद्धतयैव प्रतीतेरिति चेत्। न। विरोधित्वस्य स्वरूपानतिरेकात्। सहान-वस्थाननियमो विरोध इति चेत्। न। अनवस्थानस्यावस्थानाभावत्वेनात्माश्रयात्। भावभिन्नत्वमिति चेत्। न। भेदस्य स्वरूपान्योन्याभावरूपत्वे उक्तदोषात्, वैधर्म्यस्य चिन्त्यमानत्वात्, प्रागभावत्वादेरभावनिरूप्यत्वात्। एवञ्चेदभावेऽपि नानुगमस्तदा किमधिकेन। स्वरूपविशेषादेव घटव्यवहारोऽप्यस्त्विति चेत्। न भूतलविलक्षणघटानुभवात्। एक एवाभावोऽनुगत इति चेत्। न। तस्य नित्यत्वेन प्रतियोगिकालेऽप्यभावव्यवहारप्रसङ्गात् प्रागभावादिव्युत्पादनविरोधाच्च।

I.viii.10. यद्वा अभाववादिनाप्यभावज्ञानकारणमनुगतो भूतलबुद्धिविशेषः स्वीकार्य्यः, तद्वरं स एवास्तु प्रमेयं प्रमाणञ्च स्वप्रकाशत्वाद्बुद्धीनाम्। ननु तन्मात्रबुद्धेरभावत्वे तस्याः स्वप्रकाशत्वेन प्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षा न स्यादिति चेत्। न। न ग्रहणाय तदपेक्षा किन्तु व्यवहाराय। ज्ञानस्य सत्यामिच्छायां व्यवहारार्थमधिकोपेक्षेति चेत्। न। दृष्टा हि व्यवहारार्थमधिकापेक्षा यथा परिमाणस्य दीर्घत्वव्यवहारे। तथाह्यधिकसङ्ख्यावच्छिन्नहस्तवितस्त्याद्यवच्छेदः परिमाणस्य दीर्घत्वं, तद्विपरीतन्तु ह्रस्वत्वं, तादृशपरिमाणञ्चावयविग्रहसमकालमेवानुभूतं। दीर्घत्वव्यपदेशस्त्वल्पसङ्ख्याद्यवच्छिन्नहस्ताद्यवच्छेद्यपरिमाणज्ञानमपेक्षते, । तन्मात्रबुद्धेरभावत्वे दृश्यप्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षतया दृश्यतासम्पयत्त्यर्थं केश-कीटादिसूक्ष्मजिज्ञासाप्यर्थवती। न च तन्मात्रबुद्धेरभावत्वे तद्विनाशे अभावाभावे भावोन्मज्जनप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यं। यथा घटाभावो बुद्धिस्तथा बुद्व्यभावस्यापि बुद्ध्यन्तरत्वात्। निर्जनबन्धविच्छेदे च जलनिःसरणं नानुपपन्नं,

मनुष्याभावेऽपि पक्षि-कीटादिबुद्धिविशेषसम्भवात्। मोक्षे पुरुषान्तरस्य नियमे प्रमाणं नास्तीति चेत्। न। कार्य्यात् कारणकल्पनात्। न चैवं बुद्धिनाशे पुनः संसारिता, बुद्धिधारासत्त्वात्। न च सर्वमुक्तिः, प्रमाणाभावात्। प्रतियोगिमदधिकरणभिन्नाधिकरणस्वरूपस्याभावत्वे सर्वं समञ्जसमेवेति पूर्वपक्षः।

I.viii.11. सिद्धान्तस्तु-सप्रतियोगिकोऽभावोऽनूभूयते, घटो न पटोनेत्यनुभवात्, न तु तन्मात्रं। अतोऽभाववित्तिवेद्यत्वं प्रतियोगिनः, प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनज्ञानत्वञ्चाभावस्यानुभवसाक्षिकं गोसादृश्यवत्। न च केवलमधिकरणं तज्ज्ञानं वा अभावः, प्रतियोगिज्ञानं विनापि तद्वित्तेः, तद्वित्तौ प्रतियोगिनोऽविषयत्वाच्च। सप्रतियोगिकत्वाभावे च कस्य प्रतियोगी घटः। अथ केवलमधिकरणं तज्ज्ञानं वा अभावः, स चाप्रतियोगिरेव, अभावव्यवहारस्तु प्रतियोगिज्ञानमपेक्षते इति तस्य प्रतियोगी घटः, घट-तदभावव्यवहारयोर्विरोधादिति चेत्। न। इह घटो नेति नञर्थस्य प्रतियोगी घटोऽनुभूयते, न त्वभावज्ञानानन्तरभाविनोऽभावव्यवहारस्य, तस्याभावानुभव-समयेऽप्रतीतेः। व्यवह्रियतेऽसौ न त्वनुभूयते इति चेत्। न। तादृशानुभवं विना तथा व्यवहाराभावात्। व्यवहारे प्रतियोगिज्ञानापेक्षेत्यपि न युक्तं, व्यवहर्त्तव्यज्ञानस्य सत्यामिच्छायां व्यवहारेऽधिकापेक्षाया अदृष्टचरत्वात्। लाघवादिह तथा कल्प्यते न त्वभाव इति चेत्। न। व्यवहारमात्रे तथा कारणत्वानवधारणात्, व्यवहारविशेषस्याननुगतत्वात्।

I.viii.12. ह्रस्वत्व-दीर्घत्वे च परिमाणान्तरे एव। तवाप्यल्पाधिकसङ्ख्यावच्छिन्नहस्ताद्यवच्छेद्यत्वं परिमाणस्य ह्रस्वत्वं, दीर्घत्वञ्चाल्पाधिकावधिज्ञानाधीनज्ञानं। अतो द्रव्यसमकालं परिमाणानुभवेऽपि नानुभूतमिति न तदा तद्व्यवहारः। गोसादृश्यं यद्यपि गवयगतानि सामान्यानि तज्ज्ञानसमकालमेवानुभूतानि, तथापि गोवृत्तित्वे सति गवयवृत्तित्वं गोसादृश्यत्वं गोज्ञानाधीनज्ञातमिति न तदा सादृश्यव्यवहारः।

I.viii.13. स्यादेतत्, अस्ति तावत्कस्यचिज्ज्ञानात् क्वचिदभावपदप्रयोगः सर्वसिद्धः। तत्र प्रयोगालम्बनं भूतलाद्येव, घटवदतिरिक्ताप्रकाशात्, ततश्च यदपेक्षं यस्याभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वं तत्तस्याभाव इत्युपेयते। तद्बुद्धिजनिताभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वमेव घट-भूतलयोः प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिरूपः सम्बन्धः। अत एव भूतलस्य सप्रतियोगित्वं, तद्बुद्धिजनिताभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वेन तद्बुद्धिं विना अभावपदप्रयोगाविषयत्वात्। अनेनैवोपाधिना घटाभावादिपदव्युत्पतिग्रह इति चेत्। न। अभावप्रयोगालम्बनं न भूतलं। न हि भूतलं घटाभाव इति प्रतीति-प्रयोगौ, अपि तु भूतले घटाभाव इति भूतले घट इतिवत्। भूतले घटो नास्तीति भूतलाधिकरणातिरिक्तनञर्थप्रकाशात्। अपि च घटबुद्धिजनिताभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वं भूतलस्य घटाभावत्वं। तथाच घटाभावत्वे तस्यावगते घटाभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वं, घटाभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वे च ज्ञाते तस्य घटाभावत्वमित्यन्योऽन्याश्रयः, पदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तेऽवगते पदप्रयोगनियमात्। घटाभावत्वञ्च घटाभावपदे प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं। यदि च भूतलं सप्रतियोगिकं तदा प्रतियोगिनं विना केवलं न भासेत सादृश्यादिवत्। घटाभावपदप्रयोगदशायां तत् सप्रतियोगिकं नान्यदेति चेत्, तर्हि

घटप्रतियोगिकत्वे तस्य घटबुद्धिजनितताभावपदप्रयोगविषयत्वं; सति च तस्मिन् घटप्रतियोगिकत्वमित्यन्योऽन्याश्रयः, केवलस्याप्रतियोगिकत्वात्। एवञ्च गोबुद्धिजनितसदृश-पदप्रयोगविषयत्वं गवयस्य गोसादृश्यमस्तु कृतमतिरिक्तसादृश्येनेति सप्रतियोगिकपदार्थापलापः। अपि च न केवलं भूतलमभावः भूतलाभावयोराधाराधेयभावानुभवात्, अभेदे तदनुपपत्तेः। दुःखवदात्मभिन्नस्य च आत्मनो दुःखाभावत्वे मोक्षस्यापुरुषार्थत्वप्रसङ्गः, आत्मनोऽसाध्यत्वात्।

I.viii.14.अथ घटवद्भूतलज्ञानभिन्नं भूतलज्ञानमभावः, तस्य च भूतलाधारता स्वरूपसम्बन्धेनानुभयूत इति चेत्। न। तस्य निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वेनाभावत्वानुपपत्तेः इत्युक्तत्वात्। अपि च तज्ज्ञानं किं स्वरूपसदेवाभावव्यहारकारणं, भूतलाधिकरणनिषेधरूपतयानुभूयमानं वा। नाद्यः, स्वरूपसतो भूतलाधेयतया प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः। न द्वितीयः, घटवद्भूतलज्ञानस्य तदानीममनुपस्थितेः तद्भिन्नज्ञानस्य प्रत्येतुमशक्यत्वात्। किञ्च यदि घटवद्भूतलज्ञानाद्भिन्नभूतलज्ञानमभावः, तदा घटवति दोषात् घटवत्वाज्ञने भूतलज्ञानमभावो भवेत्,। तथाच तदेव तदैव घटवत् घटाभाववच्च स्यात्, न स्याताञ्च घटाभावज्ञान-तद्व्यवहारौ विसंवादिनौ विषयाबाधात्। अथ वस्तुतो घटवतो भूतलस्य ज्ञानाद्भिन्नं भूतलज्ञानमभावः। न च घटवति भूतलज्ञानं तथा, व्यवहारस्तु विसंवादी, तथाविधभ्रमादर्शनादिति चेत्,। तर्हि घटवतो भूतलस्य ज्ञानाद्भिन्नत्वेन ज्ञानं भूतलज्ञानं अभावव्यवहृतिहेतुः। न च तत्सम्भवति, स्वप्रकाशेनानुव्यवसायेन वाधिकरणज्ञाने तदप्रकाशात्, भेदप्रतियोगिनोऽनुपस्थितेः। न च ज्ञानान्तरेण तथानुभवः, योग्यानुपलब्ध्या तत्र घटाभावनिश्चयं विना तथा निश्चेतुमशक्यत्वात्।

I.viii.15.अपिच—अधिकरणतज्ज्ञानानामननुगतत्वेनानुगताभावव्यवहारानुपपत्तिः। न चातिरिक्ता-भावपक्षेऽपि तथा अभावत्वस्यानुगतस्याभावादिति वाच्यं। अनुगताभावत्वं विनापि घटादिर्न पट इति समानाधिकरणनिषेधादनुगतव्यवहारः पटान्योन्याभावेनैकेन, एवं घटादौ न गोत्वमित्यनुगतव्यवहार एकेनात्यन्ताभावेन,। कपालेषु भूतलेषु इदानीं घटो विनष्ट इत्यनुगतव्यवहारो ध्वंसेनैकेन,। घटानुत्पाददशायामेतेषु घटोनास्तीत्यनुगतव्यवहार एकेन प्रागभावेन,। एवं चत्वारोऽनुगतनिषेधव्रूवहाराश्चतसृभिरेव व्यक्तिभिः क्रियन्ते। तव त्वभावचतुष्टयं तत्तदधिकरण-तत्तद्बुद्धीनामननुगतत्वान्न सम्भवति, अनुगताभावचतुष्टयव्यवहारस्य प्रत्येकाभावेनोपपादयितुमशक्यत्वादित्यतिरिक्ताभावव्यक्तिचतुष्टयसिद्धिः। तस्य च यथा अभावत्वेनैकेनैकपदार्थत्वं तथानुपदमेव वक्ष्यामः।

I.viii.16.स्यादेतत्। यस्मिन् समयविशेषे यत्र भूतले अभावः परैः स्वीक्रियते तत्समयविशेषयोग एव भूतलस्य घटाभावः, एवञ्चेह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्याधाराधेयभावप्रतीतिरप्युपपद्यते, समयविशेष-योगस्य भूतलवृत्तित्वात्। न च समयविशेषयोगस्याभावत्वे अननुगमो दोषः, अतिरिक्ताभावपक्षे-ऽपि तुल्यत्वात्, अभावत्वस्य जातेरुपाधेर्वा असत्त्वात्। यदिचाभावप्रतीतिप्रयोगानुगमार्थं तत्र धर्मान्तरं स्वीक्रियते, तदा समयविशेषयोगवृत्त्येव तदस्तु लाघवादिति। तन्न। समयविशेषयोगस्य निष्प्रतियोगिकत्वेनाभाव-व्यवहारासामर्थ्यात्। किञ्च भूतलवत् समयविशेषोऽपि अभावाधारत-

यानुभूयते इदानीं भूतले घटोनास्तीति प्रतीतेः। न च तत्समयविशेषे तत्समयविशेषयोगः, अभेदे सम्बन्धानुपपत्तौ आधाराधेयभावाभावात्। अपि च समये किमभावाश्रयतैव विशेषः, तत्तत्समयस्वरूपं वा, आद्ये अभावस्वीकारः, द्वितीये अननुगमः। मम त्वेकाभावव्यक्तेरेव तथा नानासमयवृत्तित्वात्। किञ्च समयविशेषयोगादिदानीं भूतलमिति प्रतीति-प्रयोगौ स्यातां, विशेषणस्य स्वप्रकारविशिष्टप्रत्यय-जनकत्वात्, न तु भूतले घटाभाव इति।

I.viii.17.यदि च तत्तत्समयविशेषयोगाद्भूतले घटाभावव्यवहारस्तदा यादृशसंस्थानविशेषविशिष्टे कपाले घटो वर्त्तते तादृशकपालादिकमेव तत्तत्समयविशेषयोगाद्घटादिव्यवहारजनकमस्तु, किं घटादिना, प्रतीतिश्च तुल्या। एतेन "दृष्टस्तावदयं घटोऽत्र च पतन् दृष्टस्तथा मुद्गरः। दृष्टा खूर्परसंहतिः परमितोऽभावो न दृष्टोऽपरः। तेनाभाव इति श्रुतिः क्व निहिता किञ्चात्र तत्कारणं स्वाधीना कलशस्य केवलमियं दृष्टा कपालावली" इति निरस्तं। मुद्गरपाताद्विनष्टो घट इति प्रतीत्यातिरिक्तविनाशानुभवात्। न केवलभूतलं तद्बुद्धिर्वा तज्जन्या, तेन विनापि तयोः सत्वात्। त्वन्मते च तयोरभावमात्रत्वेन विनाशत्वायोगात्। योगे वा अभावमात्रस्य विनाशित्वापत्तिः। अथ त्वन्मते यद्विनाशकं तदेव तत्सहितं भूतलं ज्ञानं वा विनाश इति चेत्। न। मुद्गरपातजन्यो हि विनाशोऽनुभूयते। न च तस्यैव तज्जनकत्वं, सप्रतियोगिकश्च विनाशोऽनुभूयते, न च मुद्गरपातस्तथा।

I.viii.18.नन्वभावेन समं भूतलस्य सम्बन्धाभावात् कथं भूतले घटाभावप्रत्ययः। स्वरूपसम्बन्धादिति चेत्, तर्हि घटवद्भूतलस्यापि चत्वरीयाभावेन स्वरूपसम्बन्धस्याभावात्। प्रतियोग्यारोप एव स्वरूपसम्बन्धः, अत एवारोप्य निषिध्यत इत्युच्यत इति चेत्। न। तत्राभावसम्बन्धे सत्यारोपः स एव चाभावसम्बन्ध इत्यन्योऽन्याश्रय इति चेत्। न। सम्बन्धान्तरमन्तरेण विशिष्टप्रत्यय-जननयोग्यत्वस्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धत्वात्। न च घटवद्भूतल-चत्वरीयाभावयोः परस्परं विशिष्टप्रत्ययः। ज्ञान-विषययोः समवाय-समवायिनोरिव सम्बन्धान्तराभ्युपगमे चानवस्थाभिया तत्सम्बन्ध-सम्बन्धिनोरपि तादृशसम्बन्धस्वीकारादिति सिद्धोऽतिरिक्तोऽभाव इति तद्ग्राहिका विशेषणतेति सिद्धमेतत्।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे अभाववादः।

I. IX.

अथ प्रत्यक्षकारणवादः।

A
संनिकर्षवादः

I.ix.1. षोढा सन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षविशेषे कारणं। विषयेणालोकसंयोगविशेषश्च तत्र कारणं, न तु चक्षुषा, प्रकाशस्थेन चक्षुषान्धकारस्थस्याग्रहणात् वैपरीत्ये च ग्रहणात्। नन्वेवं परभागावच्छेदेनालोक-संयुक्तोऽपि घटो गृह्येत। न चावयविग्रहसामग्र्याः स्वावयवग्रहसामग्रीनियमात् परभागावच्छिन्नो न गृह्यत इति वाच्यं । त्र्यणुके व्यभिचारात् प्रत्यक्षावयवे च सामग्रीभेदकल्पने मानाभावात्। अथाभिमुखावयवावच्छेदेन घटालोकसंयोगः कारणं। तर्ह्यभिमुखावयवावच्छेदेन चक्षुरालोकसंयोगोऽपि हेतुरस्तु। यदि चालोकसंयोगावच्छिन्ने चक्षुःसंयोगस्तथा, समान-देशताविरोधश्च निबिडयोरेव, अन्यथा पट-महारजतयोः पटोदकयोश्चाग्रहप्रसङ्गः। तर्हि घटसंयोगावच्छिन्ने चक्षुरालोकसंयोगः कारणमस्तु । अथ चालनीन्यायेन आलोकसंयोगसन्निहिते चक्षुर्घटसंयोगः कारणं, तदा घटचक्षुःसंयोगसन्निहिते चक्षुरालोकसंयोगो हेतुरस्त्विति चेत्। नैवं। अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां विषयालोकसंयोगस्य कारणत्वे निश्चिते तेनैवोपपत्तौ न चक्षुरालोकसंयोगः कारणं कल्प्यते।

I.ix.2. अन्ये तु द्वयोरप्यालोकसंयोगयोः कारणत्वे विषयालोकसंयोगः कारणमेवेति। नन्वभिमुखावयवावच्छेदेन विषयालोकसंयोगयोः कारणत्वे विषयालोकसंयोगः कारणमेवेति।

नन्वभिमुखावयवावच्छेदेन विषयालोकसंयोगस्य कारणत्वे आवश्यकसंयोग एव हेतुरस्त्विति चेत्। न। अवयवसंयोगमात्रस्यातिप्रसक्तेः स्वावयवसंयोगो वक्तव्यः, तथा च स्वसंयोग एव लाघवात्। अवयवसंयोगेन चान्यथासिद्धौ कारणतैव न स्यात् संयोगस्येत्युक्तं। आलोकस्योद्भूतरूपमपि व्यञ्जकं अन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वात्। न तु तेजःकारणतावच्छेदकं तत्, ऊष्मादीनां चाक्षुषत्वाभावात्। न च स्वातन्त्र्येणान्वय-व्यतिरेकित्वात् द्वयोरपि हेतुत्वं, अन्यथा दण्डादेरपि चक्रावच्छेदकत्वं स्यादिति वाच्यं। उद्भूतरूप-तेजोमात्रयोः समवधाने कार्य्यानुदयादिति चेत्। नैवं। उद्भूतरूपस्य तेजस्त्वं तेजसश्च उद्भूतरूपत्वं वावच्छेदकमिति

विनिगमकाभावादुभयोरपि हेतुत्वात्, दण्डचक्रयोरिवैकैकं विहायापरस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकाभावात्।

I.ix.3. एवं चक्षुषो रूपमपि व्यञ्जकं व्यञ्जकतेजोरूपत्वात् आलोकरूपवत्। रूपस्य व्यञ्जकत्वे उद्भूतरूपत्वन्तेजोगतोद्भूतरूपत्वं वा नोपधिः, व्यभिचारेण गौरवेण चाप्रयोजकत्वात्। किन्तु व्यञ्जकरूपमेव तथा, लाघवात्। विषयस्थमपि रूपमुद्भूतं सहकारि तदुद्भवे च मानं। इन्द्रियालोकादिप्रत्यासन्नं महदवयविवायूपनीतसुरभिशीतोष्मचक्षुरादिकं साक्षात्कारकारण-किञ्चित्समवधाननशून्यं, अप्रत्यक्षत्वादन्धकारस्थघटवदिति। तच्च कारणं लाघवादनुगतं सामान्यं रूपादिवृत्ति न द्रव्यगतं, ऊष्मादौ स्पर्शग्रहे रूपस्य प्रभादौ रूपग्रहे स्पर्शस्य ग्रहप्रसङ्गात्, उद्भवत्वैकार्थसमवायाविशेषात्। अन्यथा स्पर्श-रूपयोरग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। नाप्युभयवृत्ति, रूपादिवृत्तित्वेनैवोपपत्तेः। रूप-स्पर्शयोस्तु तन्नाना एकग्रहेऽप्यपरस्याग्रहात्। न च रूपत्वादिना परापरभावानुपपत्तिः, तारत्वादिवन्नानात्वात्। रूपादिप्रत्यक्षे एकैकोद्भवस्यैव प्रयोजकत्वात्। ननु महत्त्वे एवोद्भवत्वमस्तु तदेव प्रत्यक्षत्वे तन्त्रं लाघवात्। न च रूपेऽपि, गौरवादिति चेत्। न। आश्रयमहत्त्वोद्भवाभावेऽपि गन्ध-स्पर्शयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वेनोद्भवत्वमिति प्रत्यक्षमूर्त्तविशेषगुणत्वेन रूपेऽप्युद्भवत्वात्, न महत्वे सामान्यगुणत्वात्। अथानुद्भवत्वमेव जातिः, अप्रत्यक्षत्वप्रयोजकत्वेन साक्षादेव तत्कल्पनात् तदभावात् प्रत्यक्षत्वमिति चेत्। न। अप्रत्यक्षतायाः प्रत्यक्षकारणविरहप्रयोज्यत्वेन प्रत्यक्षकारणस्य लाघवेन जातेः कल्पनात्। न तु प्रतिबन्धकत्वेनानुद्भवत्वं कल्पयित्वा तदभावः कारणं गौरवादिति संप्रदायविदः।

I.ix.4. वयन्तु ब्रूमः। शुक्लत्वादिना कारणरूपाग्निसंयोगप्रयोज्याभ्यां जातिभ्यां परापरभावानुपपत्त्या रूपवृत्युद्भवत्वमनेकं वाच्यं, तथाचोद्भूतत्वेन कारणत्वे अननुगमः। तस्मादनुद्भूतत्वं शुक्लत्वादिव्याप्यं नानाजातिस्तदभावकूटस्तु प्रत्यक्षत्वे प्रयोजकः। अन्यथानुगतप्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः। एवं स्पर्शादावपि। अथ वोद्भूतत्वमनुद्भूतत्वं वा न जातिः, किन्तु रूपत्वव्याप्य-जातिमत्त्वमेवोद्भूतत्वं तदभावोऽनुद्भूतत्वं, प्रत्यक्षे रूपे शुक्लतर-तमत्वादिजातिमत्त्वात्, ऊष्म-चक्षुरादिरूपे तु शुक्लत्वमात्रमेव, तद्व्याप्यजातौ मानाभावादुत्कर्षाभावात्। न च रूपत्वमेव मानं, लाघवेन तस्य प्रयोजकत्वे प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात्। एवं स्पर्शादावपीति। इतोऽपि महत्त्वेनो-द्भवत्वं प्रयोजकं, वाय्वादौ महत्वोत्कर्षेऽप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वात्।

I.ix.5. ननु भर्जनकपालगतो वह्निर्वारिस्थघटव्यञ्जकसूर्यतेजश्च गृह्येत, वारि-कपालयोः प्रत्यक्षत्वेनोद्भूत-रूपवत्त्वात्। तयोः संयोगविशेष एव प्रतिबन्धक इति चेत्। न। जल-कपालादी-नामालोकव्यङ्ग्यतया तद्गृहे प्रतिबन्धकत्वाभावात्। प्रतिबन्धकत्वे वा भर्जनकपाल-वारिसंयोगिवह्नि-सौरालोकयोरग्रहप्रसङ्गः। संयोगे च न विशेषो जातिकृतः, अन्यतर-कर्मजत्वादिना सङ्करप्रसङ्गात्। तारत्ववन्नानात्वे गौरवात्। नापि तत्संयोगभेदः, अननुगमादिति। मैवं जलस्थन्तु तेजो गृह्यत एव। उभयोः स्वच्छतया विविच्य ग्रहो न भवति। भर्जनकपाले चानुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शमन्यदेव तेजः तादृशैरवयवैर्वह्निसहचरितैरारभ्यते, अतितप्ततैलादौ कदाचिदुद्भूतरूपावयवप्रवेशाद्वह्न्यारम्भोऽपि। न चैवं दुग्धसहचरितदधिपरमाणुभिरेव

दध्यारम्भः, दुग्धध्वंसजन्यद्रव्यत्वेन खण्डदुग्धवद्दध्नोदुग्धो-पादानोपादेयत्वात्।

I.ix.6. नन्वेवमुद्भूतरूपवन्ह्यादावुद्भूतस्पर्शो नास्ति, तत्सहचरिततेजोऽन्तरनियमेन तत्रोष्मबुद्धेरूपपत्तेः, उद्भूतरूपोद्भूतस्पर्शसामग्र्योरूष्मणि प्रभादौ विरोधावधारणदिति चेत्। न। यं वह्निमद्राक्षं तं स्पृशामीत्यबाधितप्रत्यभिज्ञानवशात् दर्शन-स्पर्शनाभ्यां वह्नौ रूप-स्पर्शयोरुपलम्भात्। न च तेजस्त्वम्बाधकं, उद्भवानुद्भवयोर्निमित्तभेदसंसर्गप्रयोज्यत्वात्, तेजस्त्वस्य रूपवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्व-साक्षाद्व्याप्यजातित्वेनोद्भूतरूप-स्पर्शवद्वृत्तित्वात्। न चोद्भूतरूपस्पर्शयोर्विरोधः, जल-पृथिव्योरुभयसत्त्वात्। तेजसि विरोधस्य निमित्तभेदोपाधिकत्वादिति। उद्भूतरूपसह-चरितयोर्महत्त्वानेकद्रव्यवत्त्वयोर्युगनद्धवाहितया अन्वयव्यतिरेकतुल्यत्वेऽपि द्रव्यचाक्षुषत्वे नानेकद्रव्यवत्त्वमुभयं वा तन्त्रं किन्तु महत्त्वमेव लाघवात्, अनेकद्रव्योत्कर्षं विनापि तूलकादौ प्रचयजन्योत्कृष्टपरिमाणात् प्रत्यक्षोत्कर्षदर्शनाच्च। दूरस्थकेशराशौ द्रव्यानुत्पादेन महत्वाभावेऽप्येककेशस्य सजातीयसंयोगेनानेकद्रव्यवत्त्वात् द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षतेत्यनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वं तत्र तन्त्रमिति चेत् । न। अनेकद्रव्यसम्बन्धित्वस्य समवायेन प्रयोजकत्वात्। न तु संयोगेन, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तथाच दूरग्रहणे सजातीयसंयोगस्य अनेकद्रव्यवत्त्वे सहकारिता वाच्या, सा महत्त्व एवास्तु। ननु यद्युद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं महत्त्वञ्च द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षतायां स्वरूपयोग्यता तदा दण्डत्ववत्तयोः कारणता न स्यादिति चेत्। न। तदुत्कर्षात् प्रत्यक्षोत्कर्षेण तयोः कारणत्वात्। न ह्यकारणोत्कर्षमकार्य्यमनुविधत्ते। दण्डत्वादौ नैवं, प्रकारभेदेनोभयरूपत्वाच्च। चाक्षुषद्रव्यज्ञाने विषयत्वेन तयोः कारणत्वं, द्रव्ये अनुगतत्वेन कारणतावच्छेदकत्वमिति।

B.

वायुप्रत्यक्षवादः

I.ix.7. ननु—नोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं तत्र तन्त्रं, वायोः प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। तथाहि वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् महत्वे सत्युद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वाद्वा घटवत्। ऊष्मादौ प्रत्यक्षत्वान्न व्यभिचारः। न चाप्रयोजकं, स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षत्वे महत्त्वे सत्युद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वं प्रयोजकं, नोद्भूतरूपत्त्वमपि गौरवात्। न च पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमुपाधिः, स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षत्वे तस्याप्रयोजकत्वात् त्वगिन्द्रियव्यापारानन्तरं वायुर्वातीति प्रतीतेश्च। न च स्पर्शलिङ्गग्रहे तदुपक्षयः, घटेऽपि तथात्वापत्तेः। लैङ्गिकत्वे च स्पर्शो वायुवृत्तिरिति धीः स्यात्, न त्वनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शो वायुरिति, स्पर्शाग्रहेऽपि शीतो वायुरिति प्रतीतेश्च। न च शीतद्रव्योपनायकत्वेनानुमिते वायौ तथा धीः, बाधकाभावात् विशेषदर्शने सत्यारोपाभावाच्च। अथाचाक्षुषत्वं स्पार्शनत्वे बाधकं, चक्षुषानुपलभ्यमानस्य त्वचानुपलम्भादिति चेत्, तर्हि चक्षुरेव द्रव्यग्राहकं त्वचा स्पर्शमात्रं प्रतीयेत वायाविव, प्रत्यभिज्ञापि तद्वदेव। अथानुभवस्य दुरपह्नवत्वात् त्वचाश्रयसहित एव स्पर्श उपलभ्यते, तदा वायावपि तुल्यं। अथ दोषाभावे सति द्रव्यग्रहे तद्गतसङ्ख्यादिग्रहनियमात् वायौ सर्वथा तदग्रहान्न स प्रत्यक्ष इति चेत्। न। न च तावदयं

व्यक्तौ नियमः, पृष्ठलग्नवस्त्रादेः सङ्ख्या-परिमाणाग्रहे, त्वचा ग्रहणात्। तज्जातीये तु फूत्कारादौ सङ्ख्या-परिमाणदीनां वाय्वभिघातस्य च शरीरे प्रत्यक्षत्वात्।

I.ix.8. स्यादेतत्। बहिरिन्द्रियजद्रव्यसाक्षात्कारे महत्त्वे सत्युद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं प्रयोजकं, सति सम्भवे त्यागायोगात्। न तु जन्येन्द्रियग्राह्यविशेषगुणवत्त्वं कार्यमहत्त्वसमानाधिकरणविशेषगुणवत्त्वं वा, रसनगतपित्त-द्रव्यस्योद्भूततिक्तरसस्य वायूपनीतसुरभिद्रव्यस्य च प्रत्यक्षतापत्तेः।

.ix.9. मैवं। नोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं तथा, नयनगतपित्तद्रव्यस्य च प्रत्यक्षतापत्तेः। अस्तु वोद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वं तत्र तन्त्रं। न चैवं प्रभायामप्रत्यक्षत्वं, प्रभा हि तेजसो रूपं, न द्रव्यं। तदाश्रयतेजःप्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षरूपलिङ्गाधीनैव यथा तवोष्मादिप्रतीतिः। तत्र संयोग-कर्मादि कथं प्रत्यक्षमिति चेत्, चान्द्र-सौरदीपप्रभादौ तु न कथञ्चित्। इन्द्रनीलादिप्रभाया रूपस्य पूर्वदेशानुपलम्भेन उत्तरदेशोपलम्भेन लिङ्गेन तदाश्रयतेजःसंयोग-विभागाद्यनुमानमिति। त्वन्नये यथा त्वचा स्पर्शमात्रग्रहान्तरं फूत्कारे संयोगादीनां। एतेन धूम-बाष्पयोरस्पार्शनत्वेनोद्भूतस्पर्शाभावेऽपि चाक्षुषत्वं, अन्यथा तद्गतसंयोग-विभाग कर्मणां प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात् लिङ्गाभावादिति निरस्तं। न च बहिरिन्द्रिययोग्यानेकविशेषगुणवत्त्वं तन्त्रं, तव त्रसरेणु-प्रभयोरप्रत्यक्षतापत्तेः गौरवाच्च। नन्वेवं विनिगमकाभावादुभयोरपि तथात्वमस्तु, तथापि वायुरप्रत्यक्ष इति चेत्, । एवं बहिरिन्द्रिय-जद्रव्यसाक्षात्कारे चाक्षुषत्वे स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षत्वे च प्रत्येकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वे सत्युद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वं प्रयोजकं पर्य्यवस्यतीति गौरवं। मम तु चाक्षुषत्वे उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं स्पर्शनत्वे उद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वं, । यस्य विशेषे प्रयोजकत्वं तस्यानुगतेन रूपेण सामान्यप्रयोजकत्वमिति द्रव्यग्राहकबहिरिन्द्रिय-व्यवस्थापकोद्भूतविशेषगुणवत्त्वं सामान्यप्रयोजकमिति लाघवं। विशेषस्य सामान्यस्य च भिन्नप्रयोज्यत्वनियमात् नैकं प्रयोजकं।

I.ix.10. अथ वायुर्यदि बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यसाक्षात्कारविषयद्रव्यं स्पार्शनसाक्षात्कारविषयद्रव्यं वा स्यात्, उद्भूतरूपः स्यात्। न चेवं, तस्मात् तथा। तादृशसाक्षात्कारविषयद्रव्यस्य रूपजनकत्वनियमादिति चेत्। न। रूपवत्समवेतत्वेन हि द्रव्यस्य रूपजनकत्वं न तु तादृशसाक्षत्कारविषयद्रव्यत्वेन, तस्य रूपजननोत्तरकालीनत्वात्। घटो यदि चक्षुरितरेन्द्रिय-ग्राह्यद्रव्यं स्यात् अरूपमस्पर्शमचाक्षुषादि स्यात्, त्वगिन्द्रियं यदि द्रव्यग्राहकबहिरिन्द्रियं स्यात् रूपवत् स्यात् स्पर्शग्राहकं वा न स्यात् रूपग्राहि वा स्यात् चक्षुर्वत्। न चैवं तस्मान्न तथेति, घटोऽपि न त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यः स्यात्, तद्गतसङ्ख्यादिज्ञानं फूत्कारादाविवेति स्यात्, स्पृशामीत्य-नुव्यवसायश्च घटवद्वायावपि।

.1. अथ स्पार्शनत्वे उद्भूतस्पर्शवदुद्भूतं रूपमपि तन्त्रं, उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वे चाक्षुषत्ववत् स्पार्शनत्वदर्शनादिति चेत्। न। उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वे सत्यपि प्रभायां न स्पार्शनत्वमिति उद्भूतस्पर्शस्यावश्यकत्वेनोद्भूत-रूपस्यान्यथासिद्धत्वात्। न ह्युद्भूतस्पर्शे सत्युद्भूतरूपाभावात् स्पार्शनत्वाभावः। नन्वेवं स्पर्शगत उद्भवः कारणमस्तु, न तु रूपम्कारणमिति चेत्। तथापि

स्पर्शस्तदुद्भवश्च कारणं न तु रूपमपि, तस्मिन् द्वये सति तदभावेन तदभावादर्शनात्। वस्तुतो रूप-स्पर्शगते उद्भवत्वजाती कारणतावच्छेदिके न तु कारणे इति।

I.ix.12. उच्यते। द्रव्यस्य स्पार्शनत्वे उद्भूतस्पर्शमात्रं न तन्त्रं, निदाघोष्मणि वायूपनीतशीतोष्णद्रव्ये च प्रत्यक्षत्वेन तद्गतसङ्ख्या-परिमाण-संयोग-विभाग-कर्मणां प्रत्यक्षत्वप्रसङ्गात्। योग्यव्यक्तिवृत्तित्वेन तेषां योग्यतया द्रव्यग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वावधारणात्। न चोष्मादिजातीये दोषाभावेऽपि घटादाविव करपरामर्शे कदाचित् केनापि सङ्ख्या गृह्यते। तथाद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमात्रस्य तथात्वे चान्द्राद्युद्योतस्य नयनगतपित्तद्रव्यस्य च प्रत्यक्षत्वे तद्गतसङ्ख्याग्रहोऽपि स्यात्। न च घटादाविव निपुणं निभालयन्तोऽपि तद्गतसङ्ख्याद्वित्वादि हस्तवितस्त्यादिपरिमाणं कर्म वा वीक्षामहे, इत्येकैकव्यभिचाराद्विनिगमकाभावादुभयमपि बहिरिन्द्रियद्रव्यप्रत्यक्षत्वे प्रयोजकमिति वायुरप्रत्यक्षः। न चैवमपसिद्धान्तः, पीतः शङ्ख इत्यादौ नयनपित्तपीतिमैव गृह्यते न तु पित्तद्रव्यं, विभक्तावयवत्वात् प्रभायामिव तेजस इति टीकाकृतामभिधानादिति नवीनाः।

I.ix.13. सम्प्रदायविदस्तु-चलति पक्षिकाण्डादौ पूर्वदेशविभागोत्तरदेशसंयोगयोः प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात्, पूर्वोत्तरदेशस्य प्रभामण्डलस्यानुद्भूतस्पर्शत्वेनाप्रत्यक्षत्वात्। तथाच परेषां चलतीतिप्रतीतिरपि तल्लिङ्गिका न स्यात्। अस्माकमपि चन्द्र-तारादौ संयोग-विभागलिङ्गकगत्यनुमानं न स्यात्। न च पूर्वोत्तरदेशे उपलम्भानुपलम्भाभ्यां संयोग-विभागावनुमाय ताभ्यामेव गत्यनुमानं, पूर्वोत्तरदेशयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेन लिङ्गासिद्धेः। तस्मादुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं तत्र प्रयोजकमिति वायुरप्रत्यक्षः।

I.ix.14. ननु शीतो वायुरित्यारोपो न स्पार्शनः, विशेष्यास्यायोग्यत्वात्। न च प्रमायान्तथा, सामान्ये बाधकाभावात्। नाप्यनुमानोपनीते वायौ त्वगिन्द्रियोपनीतः शीतोरोपः शीतद्रव्याभेदारोपो वा, मनसा तल्लिङ्गस्पर्शादिचतुष्कस्याग्रहणात् शीतस्पर्शस्यातल्लिङ्गत्वात्। न च शीतद्रव्योपनायकत्वेनानुमिते वायौ मनसा शीतारोपः, शीतानाश्रयत्वेनानुमिते वायौ तदनारोपात्। नापि पीतः शङ्ख इति वद्बहिरिन्द्रियजन्योऽयं भ्रमः, येनानुमानिकविशेषग्रहेऽपि दोषमाहात्म्याद्भवेत् शीतद्रव्योपनयनजनक-प्रणालीमविदुषोऽपि शीतो वायुरिति प्रत्ययाच्च। नापि लिङ्गाभासजन्यानुमितिरूपोभ्रमः, तदप्रतीतेः, शीतस्पर्शस्य वायुलिङ्गत्वेन भ्रमाविषयत्वात्। न च शीतस्पर्शानुमिते द्रव्ये स्मृतवाय्वभेदारोपः, वायुविशेष्यकशीतप्रत्ययात्। अत एव शीतस्पर्शोऽयं वायोरिति भ्रमशरीरमपास्तं। न च स्वप्नविभ्रमवत् स्वोत्प्रेक्षितपदार्थसंसर्गारोपवच्च मानसोऽयं, त्वगिन्द्रियव्यापारानुविधानादिति। उच्यते। यथा वायुवैधर्म्येण जलवृत्तितया गृहीतस्य शीतस्पर्शस्य वायावारोपो दिङ्मोहवद्दोषमाहात्म्यात्, तथा शीतस्पर्शे वायुलिङ्गत्वारोपाद्वायवीयत्वानुमानं। न चैवं शीतो वायुरिति प्रतीतिः न स्यादिति वाच्यं। शीतोऽयं वायवीयइति ज्ञानानन्तरं शीतोऽयं वायुरिति च मनसारोपात् अनुष्णो वायुरितिवत्।

I.ix.15. अथत्वग्व्यापारानन्तरं कथं वायुर्वातीति प्रतीतिः, तल्लिङ्गसंयोग-विभागयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वात्। न च शरीरे वाय्वभिघात एव तल्लिङ्गं, अभिघातस्य संयोगत्वेनाप्रत्यक्षत्वादिति चेत्। न। अभिघातजन्यसुख-दुःखविशेषेणाभिघातमुन्नीय तस्य स्पर्शवद्वेगवज्जन्यत्वमनुमाय वेगेन कर्मानुमानात्। एवं प्रणालीमविविदुषस्तत्प्रत्ययासिद्धेः। अथ वायुः शीतो वातीति कथं विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यप्रतीतिरेका, शीतविशिष्टप्रतीतेर्मानसत्वेन कर्मप्रतीतेः, आनुमानिकत्वेन जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्। न। शीतविशिष्टत्वेन स्मृते वायौ कर्मानुमानाद्विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यं, न तूभयं विशेषणमेकदा भासते। न चैवं कल्पनागौरवं दोषाय, प्रत्यक्षत्वे बलवद्बाधकसत्त्वात्। एवं बहिरिन्द्रियजद्रव्यप्रत्यक्षत्वे उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्य प्रयोजकत्वे व्यवस्थिते, प्रत्यक्षत्वसाध्यकानुमाने पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नस्य साध्यस्य साधनावच्छिन्नस्य वा व्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमुपाधिः। न च विशिष्टस्य व्यभिचार-व्यतिरेकयोः साधनेऽर्थान्तरं, विशेष्यव्यभिचार-व्यतिरेकसिद्धिपर्य्यवसानादित्युपाधौ वक्ष्यामः।

I.ix.16. अथ वायुवदात्मापि न प्रत्यक्षः, द्रव्यप्रत्यक्षत्वे उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात्। न च लिङ्गज्ञानं विनैवाहं जानामीति प्रत्ययात् न लैङ्गिकत्वं, ज्ञानमविदुषो जानासीति विशिष्टप्रत्ययाभावेन ज्ञानस्य लिङ्गत्वात्। न च घटमहं जानामिति वर्त्तमानप्रत्ययो न स्यात्, घटज्ञानस्यानुमितिपूर्वतृतीयक्षणे विनाशादिति वाच्यं। स्थूलसमयोपाधिमादाय वर्तमानप्रत्ययात्, यथा कुलाले चेष्टादर्शनने करोतीत्यनुमितिरिति। उच्यते। योऽहं घटमद्राक्षं सोऽहं घटं स्पृशामीत्यभेदप्रत्यभिज्ञानादात्मा प्रत्यक्षः। न चैतत्स्पर्शनेन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानाश्रयोऽहं तद्दर्शनज्ञानाश्रयाभिन्नः मदीयाहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वात् तद्दर्शनज्ञानाश्रयवदित्यात्माभेदप्रत्यय इति वाच्यं। मदंशस्याप्रत्यक्षत्वेनानुमानलिङ्गासिद्धेः। न ज्ञानेनात्मानुमानं, ततस्तत्र ज्ञाने आत्मीयत्वनुमानं, ततो मदीयाहंप्रत्ययविषयत्वज्ञानमात्मनीति वाच्यं। एवं प्रणालीमविदुषोऽपि योऽहं सोऽहमिति प्रत्ययात्। न च वायौ प्रत्यभिज्ञानमस्ति, सदागतिमत्त्वेन गतस्य पुनरज्ञानात्। स एव पुनः पुरोवात इति प्रतीतेः तज्जातीयानुमितिरूपत्वात्। तस्माद्वायुर्बहिरिन्द्रियाप्रत्यक्षः, नीरूपद्रव्यत्वात् आकाशवत्। न च साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकमुद्भूत-स्पर्शानाश्रयत्वमुपाधिः, उद्भूतस्पर्शस्य तत्राहेतुत्वेनोपाधेः साध्याव्यापकत्वात्।

C. सुवर्णतैजसत्ववादः

I.ix.17. किञ्चोद्भूतस्पर्शवत्त्वस्य बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यद्रव्यसाक्षात्कारप्रयोजकत्वे सुवर्णरूपं तेजोद्रव्यं प्रत्यक्षं न स्यात्, प्रभावत् तस्यानुद्भूतस्पर्शत्वात्, रूपन्तु तस्योद्भूतमेव। किन्तु उपष्टम्भकपीतरूपाभिभूतं। अभिभवश्च बलवत्सजातीयसम्बन्धः। एवमन्धकारे पीताग्रहणेऽप्यभिभवः। न चैवमन्धकारे सुवर्णोपलम्भापत्तिरभिभूतस्यापि तेजसो ग्रहात्, न च तेजसि तेजोऽन्तरं व्यञ्जकं, इति वाच्यं। रूपे गृह्यमाण एव चक्षुषा द्रव्यग्रहात्, सुवर्णरूपमभिभवादेव नोपलभ्यते, उपष्टम्भकरूपञ्चालोकाभावात्।

I.ix.18. अथ यथा अरुण-कपिलादिरूपाभिभूतमपि वह्निरूपं परं आत्मानञ्च प्रकाशयति तथा कनकमपि प्रकाशेत प्रकाशयेच्चेति चेत्। न। तत्र ह्यभिभूतरूपवह्निसम्बद्धानभिभूतरूपा वह्निमध्यादिव्यापिनी

प्रभैव व्यञ्जिका। यद्वा वह्नौ रूपभास्वरत्वे नाभिभूते, किन्तु शुक्लत्वमात्रं, सुवर्णे तु रूपमभिभूतम् तेन, तद्गतशुक्लत्व-भास्वरत्वे अनभिभूते, अपि व्यक्त्यग्रहान्न गृह्येते इति फलबलात्कल्प्यते। न च पीतिमगुरुत्वाश्रयातिरिक्तं तदसिद्धं,। अस्ति हि सुवर्णस्यात्यन्तानलसंयागेऽपि पीतं रूपं न तद्विजातीयं। तदनुपपन्नमसति द्रवद्रव्यसम्बन्धे, पार्थिवेऽत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगस्य पूर्वरूपविजातीयरूप-जनकत्वनियमात्। जलसम्बन्धे तदपगमे च पटादौ दाहादाहदर्शनात्। तदिदं ध्मायमानं कनकं यद्यत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगि-पार्थिवत्वे सति विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धकद्रवद्रव्यसंयुक्तं न स्यात् पूर्वरूपविजातीयरूपवत्स्यात् वह्निसम्बद्धघटवत्। अन्यथा पार्थिवं न स्यात्, जलं वा स्यात्, अग्निसंयोगि वा न स्यात्।

I.ix.19. तदयं प्रयोगः। अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगि पीतं विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धकद्रवद्रव्यसंयुक्तं, अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगित्वे सति पूर्वरूपविजातीयरूपानधिकरणापार्थिवत्वात् जलमध्यस्थिताग्निसंयुक्तपीतपटवत्। यद्वा पीतं सुवर्णं पीतरूपातिरिक्तरूपोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकद्रवद्रव्यसंयुक्तं नक्तं दिवमग्निसंयोगेऽपि पीतरूपातिरिक्तरूपानाश्रयत्वात् तावत्पर्यन्तमग्निसंयुक्तजलमध्यस्थपीतपटवत्। न चाप्रयोजकत्वं, विरोधिद्रव्यसम्बन्धं विना पार्थिवेऽत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगस्य विजातीयरूपजनकत्वात्। तच्च द्रवद्रव्यं न जलं स्वाभाविकद्रवत्वानाश्रयत्वात्। न चानुद्भूतं तत्, शीतलशिलातले अग्निसंयोगाद्दाहदर्शनेनानुद्भूतद्रवत्वस्य दाहाविरोधित्वात् नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाच्च। नापि तत एव पार्थिवत्त्वं, द्रुतपार्थिवस्य विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धेकत्वे घृतादावपि तथात्वापत्तेः, तत्रापि रूपपरावृत्तिप्रसङ्गाच्च। उपष्टम्भकस्यापि पार्थिवत्वेन विजातीयरूपाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। यद्यपि तेजोऽन्तरं न नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणं, नापि विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धकं, किन्तु तज्जनकं, तथापि प्रत्यक्षद्रव्यत्वेन तस्य रूपवत्त्वे पृथिवी-जलान्यत्वेन तेजस्त्वात् धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धं तथात्वम्,। पीतभागद्रवत्वमप्यग्निसंयोगे न नश्यति, द्रुततेजःप्रतिबन्धादेव, जलमध्यस्थाग्निसंयुक्तघृतवदिति।

I.ix.20. अथ यदि द्रुततेजसो विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तदा जलस्थपटवत् द्रुतसुवर्णमध्यस्थितपटादेरपि रूपपरावृत्तिर्न स्यादिति चेत्। न। लोके सुवर्णत्वेनानुभूयमाने पीतद्रव्ये अविनिर्भागवर्त्तिन्युपष्टम्भके द्रुतन्तेजो विजातीयं रूपं प्रतिबध्नाति नान्यत्र, तथेवान्वय-व्यतिरेकात्। तर्ह्युपष्टम्भकत्वमनुभवसिद्धं सुवर्णस्येत्यावश्यकत्वात्। तस्येव स्वरूपपरावृत्तौ प्रतिबन्धकत्वमस्तु, कृतं दृष्टविजातीयतेजः-कल्पनयेति चेत्। न। उपष्टम्भकमात्रे हि विजातीयरूपप्रतिबन्धकस्वभावत्वं द्रुततेजसोधर्म्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धत्वात्, तस्य तेनैव रूपेण सिद्धेः। यदि द्रुतन्तेजो रूपपरावृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकं स्यात् पटादिरूपपरावृत्तिमपि प्रतिबध्नीयादिति तर्कस्य तद्विपर्य्ययस्य च सिद्ध्यसिद्धिव्याहतत्वात्। अनुभूयमानसुवर्णस्य च उपष्टम्भकरूपपरावृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकस्वभवत्वं न धर्म्मिग्राहकमानादन्यतो वा सिद्धं, येन पार्थिवे असति विरोधिद्रवद्रव्यसम्बन्धे अग्निसंयोगस्य रूपपरावर्त्तकत्वमन्वय-व्यतिरेकसिद्धं परिभूयेतेत्याचार्य्याः।

I.ix.21. नवीनास्तु-अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनानुच्छिद्यमानप्रत्यक्षद्रवत्वाधिकरणं तैजसं, जल-पृथिवीभ्यामन्यत्वे सति रूपवत्त्वात् वह्निवत्। न चासिद्धिः, प्रत्यक्षद्रव्यत्वाधिकरणत्वेन तस्य रूपित्वात्। न च

तज्जलं, सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वानाश्रयत्वात् नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधारत्वात् स्नेहशून्यत्वाद्वा लाक्षावत्। स्नेहे सति स्नेह-द्रवत्वाधीनसंग्रहप्रसङ्गात्। न च पार्थिवं, अत्यन्तग्निसंयोगेऽप्यनुच्छिद्यमानं यद्द्रवत्वं तदधिकरणत्वात् जलपरमाणुवत्। असति विरोधिद्रवद्रव्यसम्बन्धे इति विशेषणं तेन क्वथ्यमानजलस्थघृतेन न व्यभिचारः। न चाप्रयोजकत्वं, अत्यन्तानलसंयोगेन लाक्षादि-घृतादि-पृथिवीद्रवत्वोच्छेदे पृथिवीद्रवत्वत्वमेव प्रयोजकं, असति बाधके अनुगतस्य प्रयोजकत्वे सम्भवति त्यागायोगात्। न च घृतद्रवत्वत्वादिकं, अननुगमता। नापि नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वत्वं, द्रवत्वत्वमेव वा, सुवर्णे द्रवत्वोच्छेदप्रसङ्गात्। अथापार्थिवमपि सांसिद्धिकद्रवत्वं तैले जन्यजलान्तरे चात्यन्ताग्नि-संयोगादुच्छिद्यते, अतोऽनुगतमेव तृणारणि-मणिन्यायेन द्रवत्वोच्छेदप्रयोजकमिति चेत्। न। पृथिवीद्रवत्वोच्छेदे पृथिवीद्रवत्वत्वं, जलद्रवत्वोच्छेदे जन्यजलद्रवत्वत्वं, द्रवत्वमात्रोच्छेदे च जन्यरसवद्द्रवत्वत्वं प्रयोजकं लाघवात्। एतेन विवादविषयः पृथिवी नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाश्रयत्वात् घृतवदिति सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वमपास्तं। अनुकूलतर्काभावेन अग्निसंयोगाद्द्रवत्वोच्छेदप्रसङ्गलक्षण-प्रतिकूलतर्केण च हीनबलत्वात्।

I.ix.22. अथ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वे पृथिवीत्वं समवायिकारणतावच्छेदकं, असति बाधके त्यागायोगादिति चेत्। न। घटादावपि नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च घृतलाक्षादिषु पृथिवीत्वावान्तरं किञ्चिदेकमनुगतं नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकमस्ति। पृथिवीनियतनैमिकिद्रवत्वं कथमपृथिव्यामिति चेत्। न तावत्तिर्य्यग्गमनोर्ध्वज्वलनवत्तज्जातिनियतं, घटादावभावात्। नापि पृथिवीत्वावान्तरजातिविशेषनियतं, घृतं विहाय लाक्षादिष्वपि भावात्। अथोपष्टम्भके पीतिमगुरुत्वाश्रये पार्थिवेऽत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनानुच्छिद्य-मानद्रवत्वाधारत्वमनैकान्तिकं, न हि तेजोद्रवत्वदशायां तद्द्रवमेवास्ते, पीतं द्रुतमिति प्रतीतेरिति चेत्। न। तत्र द्रवत्वाभावात्। पार्थिवद्रवत्वस्यात्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनोच्छित्त्यापत्त्या बाधकेन द्रुतप्रतीतेर्भ्रमत्वात्। तर्हि तदा पीतं कठिनमेवोपलभ्येतेति चेत्। न। जलमध्यस्थितमसीक्षोदादेरिव तदवयवानां द्रवद्रव्यसम्बन्धेन प्रशिथिलसंयोगाश्रयत्वात्। न तु तेषां द्रवत्वं। न चैवं घृतादावपि तथा, द्रवत्वे तत्र बाधकाभावात्।

I.ix.23. अन्ये तु-उपष्टम्भके द्रवत्वमप्युत्पद्यत एव, अनुभवस्य दुरपह्नवत्वात्। अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेन तदुच्छेदस्तु न भवति, द्रवद्रव्यस्य तेजसः प्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। न चैवं द्रुततेजसि मानाभावः। तथाहि पीतन्द्रवत्वाधिकरणं द्रवत्वोच्छेदप्रतिबन्धकद्रवद्रव्यसंयुक्तं, अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेऽप्यनुच्छिद्यमान-द्रवत्वाधारपार्थिवत्वात् क्वथ्यमानजलमध्यस्थितघृतवत्। न चाप्रयोजकत्वं, अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेन विरोधिद्रवद्रव्यसम्बन्धासम्बन्धे पार्थिवद्रवत्वोच्छेदानुच्छेददर्शनात्। अथवा रूपवत्त्वे जलान्यत्वे च सति तैजसत्व-पार्थिवत्वसन्देहे विवादाध्यासितं द्रवत्वाधिकरणं तैजसं, असति द्रवद्रव्यसंयोगे अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेऽप्यनुच्छिन्नानित्यद्रवत्वाधारत्वात्, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा जलं घृतं वेति व्येतिरेकी। न चासाधारण्यं, अगृह्यमाणविशेषदशायां तस्य दोषत्वात्। तथाहि यथा साध्याभाववद्व्यावृत्तत्वेन पक्षे तस्य साध्यसाधकत्वं, तथा साध्यवद्व्यावृत्तत्वेन साध्याभावसाधकतापि स्यादिति सत्प्रतिपक्षोत्थापकतया तस्य दोषत्वं। न च साध्याभाव-

साधकस्य पृथिवीत्वसिद्धिपर्य्यवसायिनस्तुल्यबलत्वं, अनुकूलतर्काभावेन हीनबलत्वात्। यदीदं पार्थिवं स्यादसति विरोधिद्रवद्रव्यसम्बन्धे अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनोच्छिद्य-मानद्रवत्वाधिकरणं स्यात् तैलवदिति प्रतिकूलतर्केण हीनबलत्वात्। यदीदं जलान्यरूपवत्त्वे सति तैजसं न स्यात् पार्थिवं स्यात् यदिच पार्थिवं स्यादत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनोच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणं स्यादित्यनुकूलतर्कसद्भावेन प्रतिकूलतर्काभावेन च तैजसत्वसाधकस्याधिकबलत्वात्। यदि चासारारणस्य साध्य-तदभाववद्व्यावृत्तत्वेन तदुभयसंशयजनकतया दोषत्वं, तथापि विशेषादर्शनसहितस्य संशायकत्वं,। प्रकृते चानुकूलतर्क-विशेषदर्शनसहकृतस्य व्यतिरेकिभावेन, साधकत्वम्। तस्माद्यदा साध्यतदभावकोटौ न विशेषदर्शनं तदा असाधारण्यस्य दोषत्वं। न चैवं शब्दोऽनित्यः शब्दत्वादित्यादिकमपि हेतुः स्यात्, विशेषदर्शनदशायामिष्टत्वात्।

I.ix.24. अन्ये तु-तेजस्त्वं नाद्रवरूपवन्मात्रवृत्ति, रूपवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातित्वात् पृथिवीत्ववत्। यद्वातेजस्त्वं द्रुतवृत्ति, रूपवद्वृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातित्वात् जलत्ववत्। न च रसवद्वृत्तित्वमुपाधिः, रसवत्त्वं द्रवत्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगि अद्रुतवृत्तिद्रव्य-त्वव्याप्यधर्म्मत्वात् पटत्वदिति द्रुततेजः सिद्धौ साध्यव्यापकत्वादिति सामान्यतोदृष्टेन तेजसि द्रवत्वं प्रसाध्य विवादाध्यासितं द्रुतं तैजसं अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनानुच्छिद्यमान-नित्यद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वात् न यदेवं न तदेवं यथा जलमिति वदन्ति।

I.ix.25. अथ प्रथमानुमाने तेजोमात्रावृत्तित्वमुपाधिः। न च पक्षेतरत्वं, प्रदीपत्वादेरपि व्यावर्त्यत्वदिति चेत्। न। बलवद्विपक्षबाधकेन विवादविषये द्रुततैजसत्वसिद्धावुपाधेः साध्याव्यापकत्वात्। एवञ्च विवादाध्यासिते पार्थिवत्व-तैजसत्वसाधकानि यद्यपि बहून्यनुमानानि सन्ति, तथापि विपक्ष-बाधकतर्कात् तैजसत्वसाधकस्य बलवत्त्वमिति ध्येयम्।

I.ix.26. अथ द्रुत-द्रुततरादेः क्रमशः प्रतीतेः प्रबलानलसंयोगेन सुवर्णनाशात्तद्द्रवत्वं नश्यतीति असिद्धोहेतुः। न च द्रवत्वप्रागभावासमानाधिकरणद्रववद्ध्वंसस्वरूप उच्छेदो न सुवर्णे, द्रवत्व-नाशेऽप्यग्निमद्रवत्वेनोत्पादात् घृते च तथेति वाच्यम्। सुवर्णे द्रवत्वनाशे सति विनष्टाश्रये द्रवत्वान्तरस्यानुत्पादेन द्रवत्वप्रागभावासमानाधिकरणद्रववद्ध्वंसस्य सत्त्वादिति चेत्। न। सुवर्णद्रवत्वं ह्याश्रयनाशाद्विनश्यति न त्वग्निसंयोगात्। यदि चाग्निसंयोगाद्विनश्येत् तदा घृतवन्न द्रवत्वान्तरमुत्पद्येत, द्रवत्वोच्छेदकाग्निसंयोगस्य द्रवत्वान्तरप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्। तथा चाग्निसंयोगित्वे सति तद्धेतुकनाशाप्रतियोगिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वादिति हेत्वर्थः। अथवा घृते द्रवत्वोच्छेदसमये समानाधिकरणद्रवत्वसामग्रीमसवधानं नास्ति, सुवर्णे त्वस्ति। एवञ्च समानाधिकरणद्रवत्व-सामग्री-समवहिताग्निसंयोगजन्यध्वंसप्रतियोग्यवृत्तिद्रवत्वावान्तरसामान्यवद्द्रवत्वं हेत्वर्थः।

I.ix.27. यद्वा घृतपरमाणावग्निसंयोगदशायां द्रवत्वनाशे सति द्रवत्वान्तरं नोत्पद्यते, तदारब्धभस्मनि द्रवत्वाभावात्। एवं सुवर्णपरमाणुद्रवत्वम् अग्निसंयोगाच्च यदि विनश्येत् तदा तदारब्धसुवर्णमद्रवं स्यात्। तथा सुवर्णारम्भकाः परमाणवो न पार्थिवाः, अत्यन्ताग्निसंयोगेनानुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधि-

करणत्वात् जलपरमाणुवत्। तैजसा वा तत एव, यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा घृतपरमाणुरिति व्यतिरेकी। एवमपार्थिवारब्धं तैजसारब्धं वा सुवर्णमपार्थिवं तैजसं वा, अत्यन्तानलसंयोगेऽप्यनुच्छिद्य-मानद्रवत्वाधिकरणपरमाण्वारब्धत्वादित्यन्वयिव्यतिरेकी चेति।

I.ix.28. एकदेशी तु द्रवत्वाधिकरणं न तेजः पीतत्वात्। न चासिद्धिः, पीतं द्रुतमिति प्रतीतेः। पीतत्वे पार्थिवत्वापत्त्या बाधकेन पीतं द्रुतमिति प्रतीतेः। पीतत्वे पार्थिवत्वापत्त्या बाधकेन पीतप्रतीतिर्भ्रम इति चेत्। न। शुक्लत्वेऽप्यपार्थिवत्ववत् पीतत्वेऽप्यपार्थिवत्वे बाधकाभावात्। यथा नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वे पृथिवीत्वं न तन्त्रमति प्रसङ्गात्, तथा पीतत्वेऽपि गन्धनियतत्वमपि नैमित्तिकद्रवत्ववदेव। पृथिवीजलान्यत्वे सति रूपित्वेन तेज इति चेत्। न। अप्रयोजकत्वात्। अन्यथा जलतेजोऽन्यत्वे सति स्पर्शवत्त्वेन वायोरपि पृथिवीत्वापत्तेः। अथ रूप-रस-गन्धानामभावान्न तथात्वं, तेषामनुद्भवे च पृथिवी उद्भूतरूप-रस-गन्धाद्यन्यतमवतीत्यादिबहु-विधव्याप्तिविरोध इति चेत्। न। तेजोऽद्रवमेव प्रत्यक्षं, तेजः प्रत्यक्षरूप-स्पर्शाद्यन्यतरवदेव, स्व-परप्रकाशकमेवेत्यादिव्याप्तिविरोधस्य तेजस्यपि सत्त्वात्। द्रवत्वाधिरकरणञ्च न पृथिवीति त्वयैव साधितं। अतो नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणं पीतं सुवर्णं द्रव्यान्तरमेवेत्याह।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे
प्रत्यक्षकारणवादः।

I.X.

अथ मनोऽणुत्ववादः।

I.x.1. नन्विन्द्रियजन्यत्वं सुखादिप्रत्यक्षाव्यापकं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणमिति चेत्। न। ज्ञातकरणाजन्यः सुखाद्यनुभवः इन्द्रियजन्यः जन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वात् रूपप्रत्यक्षवत्, जन्यसाक्षात्कारस्येन्द्रियजन्यत्वादिति तत्रापि तल्लक्षणसत्त्वात्। स्पर्शाद्यविषयत्वेन त्वगादिना नार्थान्तरम्,

I.x.2. गन्ध—रस–रूप–स्पर्शेष्वेकैकमात्रसाक्षात्काराजनकत्वेन पृथिव्यादिभेदसिद्धौ निःस्पर्शं लाघवान्निरवयवञ्च मनः। तच्च विभु, ज्ञानासमवायिकारणसंयोगाधारत्वात् नित्येन्द्रियत्वात् नित्यत्वे सति द्रव्यानारम्भकद्रव्यत्वात्, आत्मादिवत्। न च महत्त्वमुपाधिः, साधनव्यापकत्वादिति।

I.x.3. ननु सुखादिकं मूर्त्तसंयोगासमवायिकारणकगुणवृत्तिगुणत्वावान्तरजातियोगि नित्यवृत्त्यनित्यविशेष–गुणत्वात् शब्दवत् पाकजरूपवच्चेति चेत्। न। अनात्मवृत्तित्वस्य शब्दभिन्नविशेषगुणग्राहकेन्द्रियाजन्यत्वस्य शब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वेन मूर्त्तवृत्तिगुणत्वस्य चोपाधित्वात् अप्रयोजकत्वाच्च। कारणे मूर्त्तत्वस्य गुरुत्वात्। अस्तु वा शरीरात्मसंयोगजन्यत्वेनार्थान्तरम्।

I.x.4. अथासमवाय्यधीनो विभुकार्य्याणां प्रादेशिकत्वनियम इति विभु–मनोयोगादात्ममात्रे सुखादेरुत्पत्तौ नियतदेशता न स्यात् अतोऽणु मन इति। मैवम्। किमसमवायिकारणं स्वावच्छिन्नेविभुकार्य्यं जनयतीति नियमः। स्वावच्छिन्नेजनयत्येवेति वा। स्वावच्छिन्ने एव जनयतीति वा। आद्ये सुखादेरधिकदेशत्वे आपादकाभावः। द्वितीये अणुमनःसंयोगेऽपि स्वावच्छिन्ने अधिकदेशे च जनयेन्नियामकाभावात्। अन्त्ये तवापि सुखादेरणुमात्रदेशतापत्तिः। मनोवैभवेऽप्यविरोधश्च।

I.x.5. अथ निमित्तचन्दनाद्यनुरोधेन सुखादौ न्यूनाधिकदेशता, निमित्तवायुसंयोगादिव शब्दे, न त्वसमवाय्यनुरोधात्। तथाच सुखादिकं तदवच्छिन्न एवोत्पद्यत इति चेत्। हन्त तर्हि वैभवेऽपि तथास्तु। न च विभुकार्य्यासमवायी स्वावच्छिन्ने कार्य्यं जनयत्येव भेर्य्याकाशसंयोग इव शब्दमिति, चन्दनाद्यनवच्छिन्नेऽपि सुखादिकमुत्पद्येतेतिवाच्यम्। तद्देशीयचन्दनसुखे हि तद्देशीयचन्दनसम्बन्धसापेक्षोऽसमवायी हेतुरिति कथं तन्निरपेक्षस्तत्कुर्य्यात्। चन्दनञ्च स्वावच्छिन्ने सुखजनकं कथं स्वानवच्छिन्नेऽपि तदुत्पादयेत्, कथं वा तद्देशीयचन्दनसुखं तद्देशचन्दनसम्बन्ध–जन्यं तेन विनेवोत्पद्यते।

I.x.6. अथ मनोवैभवे सुखाद्युत्पत्तौ नियत उपाधिर्वाच्यः, तेन नानानिमित्तसमवधानेऽपि तदवच्छेदेनैकदा सुख–दुःखादिष्वेकमेवोत्पद्यते, न नाना। एकावच्छेदेनैकदा एक एव विभुविशेषगुण उत्पद्यत इति नियमात्। निमित्तस्य त्ववच्छेदकत्वे नानासुखादिकमुत्पद्येत शब्दवदिति चेत्। न। श्रोत्रे कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छेदेन नानानिमित्तादनेकशब्दोत्पादात्। अन्यथा कोलाहलग्रहो न स्यात्। नानावच्छेदेनैकदा चन्दन–दहनादिसम्बन्धे सुख–दुःखयोश्चैकदा अनुभवसिद्धत्वेनेष्टापादनात्। न च तद्यौगपद्यप्रत्यो भ्रमः, बाधकाभावात्। न चान्यत्र क्रमादत्रापि क्रमानुमानं, अन्यत्र क्रमस्य निमित्तक्रमाधीत्वात्।

I.x.7. एवञ्च विवादविषयसुख–दुःखानि युगपदुत्पन्नासमवायिकारणकानि युगपदुत्पद्यमानत्वात् युगपदुत्पन्नघटादिवत्। अबाधितानुभवाच्च नासिद्धिः। एतेन चरणदुःखं यदि शरीरावच्छिन्नासमवायिहेतुकं स्यात् शरीरव्यापकं स्यादिति निरस्तं। निमित्तसमवधानस्य तन्त्रत्वे अस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्। अन्यथाणुत्वपक्षे शरीरव्यापकं सुखादि न स्यात्। आभिमानिकाभ्यासिक–मानोरथिकसुखेषु ज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नद्वेषेषु च देशानियमः। शरीरावयवेषु यत्क्रियायामिछा तदवच्छेदेन प्रयत्न इति तत्रैव चेष्टा आवश्यकत्वात् अनियतदेशज्ञानेच्छादौ लघुत्वाच्च। अन्यथाणुत्वपक्षे प्रयत्नस्याणुदेशत्वं शरीरमात्रदेशत्वं वा स्यात्।

I.x.8. अन्ये तु सुखादौ तन्निमित्तावच्छेदेनात्ममनःसंयोगोऽसमवायी, तन्मात्रसुखाद्युपलम्भात्। न त्वात्ममनःसंयोगमात्रमतिप्रसङ्गादित्याहुः।

यावति यत्सुखादिप्रागभावः तावत्येव तत्सुखादिकमुत्पद्यत इत्यपरे।

I.x.9. यत्तु—तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये तद्व्यापकत्वेन प्रागभावस्यावश्यकत्वमिति। तन्न। प्रागभावस्याहेतुत्वापत्तेः। तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये तदभावेन कार्य्याभावाभावात्। एतेन व्यापकमनवच्छिन्नं नेन्द्रियमतिप्रसङ्गादित्याकाशे कर्णशुष्कुलीवन्नियत उपाधिर्वाच्यः, स च न शरीरं, तदवयवमात्रं वा, नियतस्तदवयवी वा, चेष्टाश्रयमात्रं वा, नानावयवावच्छेदेनाव्यप्य–वृत्तिसुखाद्युपलब्धेः, एवञ्च सूक्ष्ममिन्द्रियमुपाधित्वेन कल्पनीयं, तथाच तदेव मनः किमुपधेयेन बिभुना, तत्र च सर्व एव हेतवो धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधिता इति निरस्तं। इन्द्रियत्वेन तस्य शरीरमात्रस्योपाधित्वेऽपि निमित्तवशात् सुखादेर्नियतदेशतोपपत्तेः। न चैकदानेकविषयेन्द्रिय–सम्बन्धे युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्त्या इन्द्रियसहकारितयानुमितं मनोऽणु, तदेव सुखग्राहकमिन्द्रियं लाघवादिति तद्वैभवहेतवो बाधिता इति वाच्यं। बुभुत्सावशात् करणधर्मत्वाद्वा अणुत्वपक्षे श्रोत्रे अनेकशब्दसमवायेऽपि बुभुत्सितमात्रशब्दग्रहवत् व्यासङ्गदशायां युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तेः, अन्यत्र दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणादौ युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तेरिष्टत्वादिति।

I.x.10. अत्रोच्यते। व्यासङ्गदशायामिन्द्रियाणां स्व–स्वविषयसम्बन्धेऽप्येकस्मात् ज्ञानं नान्यस्मादित्यनुभव–सिद्धमतो यस्यासम्बन्धान्न युगपज्ज्ञानानि तदिन्द्रियसहकारिक्रमेण तदधिष्ठायकं मनस्तदेव सुखादिग्राहकमिति तस्य धर्म्मिग्राहकमानबाधितं विभुत्वं। तथाहि–चाक्षुषज्ञानवतो मैत्रस्य स्व–

स्वविषयसम्बद्धानि घ्राण-रसन-त्वक्श्रोत्राणि स्व-स्वविषयसाक्षात्कारहेतुसंयोगशून्यानि, तदानीं स्वविषयसाक्षात्काराजनकत्वात् इन्द्रियासम्बद्धघटवत्। एकैकं वा पक्षः, अन्यथा हेतुसाकल्ये युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः। न च वैभवेऽप्यदृष्टविलम्बाद्विलम्बः, तदितरहेतुसाकल्ये तस्यापि सत्त्वात्, इन्द्रियान्तरविलोपप्रसङ्गाच्च। न च बुभुत्सावशात् क्रमो, दृश्यते हि नृत्यदर्शनवतो बुभुत्सातोऽभिमतविषयान्तरज्ञानमिति वाच्यं। सा हि न स्वविषयज्ञाने हेतुः, अबुभुत्सितेऽपि ज्ञानोदयात्। नाप्यन्यज्ञानप्रतिबन्धिका, घटबुभुत्सायामपि पटज्ञानोदयात्। बुभुत्सा च क्रियाहेतुमनोगोचरप्रयत्नद्वारेन्द्रियान्तरादाकृष्य अभिमतार्थग्राहिणीन्द्रियान्तरे मनो निवेशयन्ती बुभुत्सितग्रहे हेतुरन्यग्रहे प्रतिबन्धिका च न तु साक्षात्। अत एव बुमुत्सासत्त्वेऽपि मनोगोचरप्रणिधानाभावे सा न किञ्चित्कारी।

I.x.11. नन्विन्द्रिय-मनःसंयोगविशेष एव विषयविशेषग्रहे हेतुः कल्पय्ताम्। न चैवं सिद्धकारणभावस्य विशेषकल्पने हेत्वन्तरोच्छेदः, तस्याप्यन्वय-व्यतिरेकित्वादिति चेत्। न। इन्द्रिय-मनःसंयोगे हि विशेषो न जातिरूपः, अनुगतहेत्वभावात् जातिसङ्करप्रसङ्गाच्च। नापि सहकारिरूपः, तस्यैव हेतुतापत्तेः। अथास्तु करणधर्म्मत्वेन क्रियाक्रमः, एकङ्करणमेकत्रैकदैकावच्छेदेन तुल्यदेशे वा एकजातीयामनेकां क्रियां न करोति, किन्त्वेकामेव। एकत्रेत्यादिविशेषणात्कुठाराग्निसंयोग-शब्देषु न व्यभिचार इति चेत्, तर्हि चक्षुराद्यवच्छेदेन भिन्नदेशीयशब्दवत् परमाणाविव विजातीयामग्निसंयोगवदनेकां क्रियां कुर्य्यादेव। अथ ज्ञानकरणमेकत्रात्मन्येकदेकमेवं ज्ञानं करोति समूहालम्बनकरणवत्, कथमन्यथा नानासामग्रीसत्वे समूहालम्बनमेकम्। यत्त्वपरज्ञानसामग्री यदि तदा कार्य्यावश्यम्भावः, तदसत्त्वे किं करणधर्म्मत्वेन, तस्य सहकार्य्यन्तरपर्य्यवसायित्वादिति। तन्न। समूहालम्बनसाम्यात्। करणस्यैकदैकमात्रजनकत्वेना-पराजनकतया तत्र कारणाभावेनैव सामाग्र्यसत्त्वादिति चेत्, तर्हि पञ्चसु यदेकं जनयति नापराणि तत्र नियामकमास्थेयम्। अन्यथा ज्ञानजनने तेषां कलहङ्कः समादध्यात्। किञ्चैवं युगपज्ज्ञानानि माभूवन्, युगपज्ज्ञानन्तु केन वार्य्यते एकजन्यसमूहालम्बनवत्। न च चाक्षुषत्वादिजाति-सङ्करापत्तेर्नैकज्ञानमिति वाच्यम्। एवं हि फलविरोधेनैकमपि ज्ञानं न जनयेदविशेषात्। उत्पद्यतां वा चाक्षुषादिविजातीयं ज्ञानं सामग्रीसत्त्वात् चित्ररूपवत्। फलबलात्तत्र तथेति चेत्, तर्ह्यत्र फलाभावे हेतुः कल्यताम्, अन्योऽन्यप्रतिबन्धकस्य तत्त्वेवा ज्ञानमेव न स्यात्, न त्वेकज्ञानमित्युक्तम्।

I.x.12. ननु चक्षुरादि न सम्भूय जनकं, अन्यविषयेऽन्यस्यासामर्थ्यात्, शीतं सुरभि शुभ्रं चन्दनमित्यत्रैव कारणान्तरानुपनयाच्च। न च स्वस्वविषयज्ञानायोद्यतमिन्द्रियं कारणान्तरसहकारात् तत्तद्विषय-मादायैव स्व-स्वविषयं ज्ञापयेदिति वाच्यं। भिन्नविषयप्रमाणानां सम्भूयाजनकत्वनियमात्। तत्तदिन्द्रियं तत्तज्ज्ञानांशे जनकमित्यपि न, विषयस्यांशत्वादिति चेत्। मैवं। न हीन्द्रियाणां सम्भूय कारित्वं, किन्त्वार्थः समाजः। प्रत्येकज्ञानसामग्रीसत्त्वादेकदानानाज्ञानप्रसक्तौ करणधर्म्मत्वेन मनस्तावद्गोचरामेकामेव ज्ञानक्रियामुत्पादयेत् समूहालम्बनवत्। न

चैकक्रियाजननदशायामपरविषयक्रियायां मनो न समर्थमिति कथं तां जनयेदिति वाच्यम्। भिन्नक्रियायामसामर्थ्येऽप्येकेकक्रियायां सामर्थ्यात्।

I.x.13. वस्तुतस्तु—विशेषाभावादेकामिवापरामपि बुद्धिम् जनयेदविशेषात्। न चैकामपीत्यनेक-ज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्वा न त्वेकविषयज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिति नियामकमास्थेयं। समूहालम्बने फलबलेन परस्परापेक्षितत्वेनैकैव सामग्री। ननु मनोऽणुत्वे कथं मन्दोऽपि बुभुत्सितः शब्दो गृह्यते नान्यः। अथ शब्दे बुभुत्सैवेतरग्रहप्रतिबन्धिका, अग्रहस्य तदनुविधानात्। अनन्यगतिककार्य्यदर्शनात् बुभुत्सितशब्दग्रहसामग्र्येव वा बलवतीति यदि मन्यसे, तदा वैभवेऽपि तत एव युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिरिति चेत्। मैवम्। बुभुत्सा न रूपादिग्रहे हेतुर्न वेतरग्रहे प्रतिबन्धिकेत्युक्तत्वात्। किञ्च रूपादिसकलबुभुत्सायां परस्परप्रतिबन्धादज्ञानं, बुभुत्साधीनसामग्रीबलवत्त्वाद्वा सर्व्वेषां ज्ञानं स्यात्, न त्वेकस्य पञ्चावधानस्य। सर्व्वेषां ज्ञानं भवत्येवेति चेत्। न। तत्रापि क्रमानुमानात्। अन्यथा सर्व्वबुभुत्साधीनप्रणिधानेऽप्यन्येषां कथं न स्यात्।

I.x.14. नन्वणुत्वेऽपि दशभिः पठ्यमानासु गाथासु तावद्गोचरबुभुत्सायां प्रणिधाने चोक्तरीत्या सर्व्वेषां ज्ञानमज्ञानं वा, न त्वेकज्ञानमिति चेत्। अत्र कश्चित्। श्रोत्र-मनःसंयोगे आत्म-मनःसंयोगे वा कश्चिद्विशेषः कार्य्योन्नेयः किञ्चिच्छब्दग्रहे हेतुः, तदन्यग्रहे प्रतिबन्धक इति। तन्न। वैभवेऽपीन्द्रिय-मनःसंयोगविशेषस्य तथात्वे व्यासङ्गोपपत्तेः। अनुगतरूपाभावेन प्रतिव्यक्तिप्रतिबन्धकत्वे हेतुत्वे च व्यभिचारात्। संयोगे च विशेषस्य जातित्वे जातिसङ्करः। उपाधित्वे स एव हेतुर्न मनः।

I.x.15. अपरे तु-प्रत्यक्षानुकूलेन्द्रिय-मनः संयोगद्वारा बुभुत्सा प्रणिधानञ्च प्रत्यक्षहेतुरिति चाक्षुषादिबुभुत्सितग्रहे क्लृप्तत्वात् ताभ्यां श्रोत्रे बुभुत्सितशब्दावच्छेदेन मनः संयुज्यत इति स गृह्यते नान्यः, क्वचित्प्रणिधानं विनैव तथा। अन्यत्र प्रणिधानाधीनक्रियया अश्रूयमाणशब्दाव-च्छिन्नात्मनो विभज्य बुभुत्सितशब्दावच्छेदेन मनः संयुज्यते इति तद्ग्रहो न सर्व्वस्येति। तत्तुच्छम्। युगपत्पठ्यमानासु विंशतौ गाथासु तावद्गोचरबुभुत्सायां प्रणिधाने च तावद्गाथावच्छेदेन मनःसंयोगाद्युगपत्तासामुपलम्भप्रसङ्गात् प्रत्येकसामग्रीसत्त्वात् निकटाहन्यमानढक्कादिशब्दानां श्रोत्रव्यापकत्वनियमाच्च।

I.x.16. अथ यत्र कोलाहले श्रूयमाणेएव बुभुत्सितशब्दग्रहः, तत्रोभयशब्दावच्छेदेन मनःसंयोगादुभयग्रहः। कोलाहले तूपेक्षाज्ञानन्तदिति तथात्रापीति चेत्। तर्हि कृतमनया कुसृष्ट्या। अबुभुत्सिते उपेक्षाज्ञानंमेवास्तु, न च तदपि, इतो न शब्दान्तरमश्रौषमित्यनुभवात्। अन्यथा वैभवेऽपि व्यासङ्गदशायामितरेषामुपेक्षाज्ञानमेवेति।

I.x.17. अत्रोच्यते। यद्यपि बुभुत्सा-प्रणिधाने न शब्दग्रहमात्रे सहकारिणी न वेतरग्रहप्रतिबन्धके, तथापि नानाशब्दसमवायदशायां यः शब्दग्रहः तत्र तयोस्तथाभावः, तथैव तयोरन्वयव्य-तिरेकनियमात्।

यद्वा—कोलाहले श्रूयमाण एव बुभुत्सितग्रह इत्यन्येऽपि कोलाहलत्वेन तद्विषया एव। बहूनाञ्चैकदा समवाये युगपत्सन्निधाने वा व्यक्तिग्रहे तद्गतगत्वकत्वादिग्रहो न भवति। अगृहीतकत्वादिनानाशब्दस्य कोलाहलबुद्धिविषयत्वात्। तस्यां दशायाम्बुभुत्सितशब्दकत्वादि-जातिग्रहे बुभुत्सैव शरणं, एककालीनबहुशब्दबुभुत्सा च न हेतुः, व्यभिचारात्।

I.x.18. यत्तु कोलाहलादन्यत्रैकदा नानाशब्दग्रहे श्रोत्रं न समर्थं, किन्त्वेकशब्दग्रहे, विनिगमिका बुभुत्सैवेति। तन्न। एकगीयमानापेक्षयेकदा नानागीयमानसजातीयगीतादिषु सुखादिवैलक्षण्यानुभवात्।

I.x.19. अथ दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणे कथं पञ्च ज्ञानानि। क्रमस्तत्रेति चेत्। न। ज्ञानानां यौगपद्यप्रत्ययस्य बाधकं विना प्रमात्वात्। व्यासङ्गो बाधक इति चेत्, तर्हि मनोऽवयव्यस्तु तेन सङ्कोच-विकाशाभ्यामुभयमुपपद्यते इति केचित्। तन्न। यदि हि सङ्कोच-विकाशहेतुरदृष्टं, तर्हि तत एव तदुभयमस्तु, कृतं मनसा। नाप्येक-पञ्चबुभुत्सया तौ भवतः, तस्या अहेतुत्वात्। हेतुत्वे वा अस्तु विभु मनः, अवयवितो लघुत्वात्।

I.x.20. अथ यथा क्वचित् बुभुत्सया क्वचित्तीव्रविषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिन्द्रिय-मनःसंयोगः, एवं मनःसंङ्कोच-विकाशयोर्बुभुत्सादिकं हेतुरिति चेत्, तर्हि पञ्चबुभुत्सायां प्रणिधाने च सर्व्वदा सर्व्वेषां पञ्च ज्ञानानि जायेरन्। पञ्चावधानज्ञाने क्रम एव। एतेनाणुमनःपञ्चतयमस्तु, अवयिवितो लघुत्वात्, बुभुत्सादिवशात्तेषामेक-पञ्चेन्द्रियसम्बन्धादुभयमुपपद्यत इति निरस्तम्। पञ्चबुभुत्सायां सर्व्वेषां पञ्चेन्द्रियसम्बन्धे व्यासङ्गानुपपत्तेः। कथं तर्हि दीर्घशष्कुलीभक्षणे गन्ध-रस-रूप-स्पर्श-शब्दान् प्रत्येमीत्यनुव्यवसायः, क्रमिकज्ञानपञ्चतयेन युगपन्मनःसन्निकर्षाभावादिति चेत्। न। अनुव्यवसायस्यैकत्वासिद्धेः, अनुव्यवसायाः पञ्चैव समयसौक्ष्मयत्तेषां क्रमो न गृह्यते।

I.x.21. अथवा—क्रमिकानुव्यवसायाहितसंस्कारात् पञ्चज्ञानविषयस्मृतावनुभवत्वारोपात् युगपत्प्रत्येमीत्य-नुव्यवसायः। विभुत्वे हेत्वभावादात्म-मनःसंयोगाभावान्नात्मसुखाद्युलम्भः स्यात्। द्रव्यत्वेनात्मसंयोगित्वासाधने त्वजसंयोगसिद्धौ तत एव तद्विभागित्वेऽपि सर्व्वदा तयोः परस्परविरुद्धसंयोग-विभागप्रसङ्गः।

I.x.22. ननु अणुत्वे असमवाय्यनुरोधात् चेष्टाहेतुप्रयत्नस्याणुदेशत्वं शरीरदेशमात्रत्वं वा स्यात्। न तु शरीर-तदवयवदेशत्वं, येन क्रियानियमोभवेत् नियमकाभावात्। न च नोदनाभिघातादि-वाव्यापिनोऽपि प्रयत्नात् शरीरादिक्रिया, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। एवमेकदा विंशतिप्रयत्नाभावात् कथमङ्गुलीषु विंशतिः क्रियाः। न च यौगपद्यभ्रमः, बाधकाभावात्। युगपत्सन्निकर्षाभावे-नाङ्गुल्यश्चलन्तीति समूहालम्बनानुपपत्तेः विंशतिज्ञानानामेकदानुव्यवसायासम्भवात्, अग्र-पश्चाद्भावे विनिगमकाभावाच्च। क्रमोत्पादे च भ्रू-नयन-कर-चरणादिसकलशरीरावयवानां युगपद्विचित्रनानाकर्मसमूहरूपं नृत्यं न प्रत्यक्षं स्यात्। तथाच प्रत्येककर्मजन्यसुखाद्विलक्षण-सुखविशेषो नानुभूयेतेति।

I.x.23. अत्र ब्रूमः। सुखे चन्दनादिवत् चिकीर्षैव नियामिका। यत्क्रियायां चिकीर्षा सा क्रिया तच्चिकीर्षाजन्यात् प्रयत्नाद्भवति। तत्र शरीरक्रियापि तच्चिकीर्षाजन्यादणुमात्रदेशादपि प्रयत्नाद्भवति। अथवा यस्य क्रियायां चिकीर्षा तदवच्छेदेन प्रयत्न उत्पद्यते, तेन शरीरावच्छेदेनोत्पन्नप्रयत्नादेव शरीरक्रिया। एव विंशतिक्रियाचिकीर्षाजन्यादणुमात्रदेशादपि प्रयत्नाद्विंशतिक्रियाः युगपदुत्पद्यन्ते। अथवा अङ्गुलीविंशतिक्रियासु चिकीर्षेति विंशत्यवच्छेदेन विंशतिप्रयत्नाद्विंशतिक्रियाहेतव उत्पद्यन्ते, एवं नृत्यादावपि। एतच्चिकिर्षानुविधानात् क्रिया-प्रयत्नयोरध्यवसेयं। तदेवमणुमनःसिद्धौ तद्ग्राह्या आत्मविशेषगुणाः बुद्धि-सुख-दुःखादय इति नाव्यापकं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणम्।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ
प्रत्यक्षखण्डे मनोऽणुत्ववादः।

I.XI.

अथानुव्यवसायवादः।

I.xi.1. ननु वर्त्तमानं ज्ञानं न मानसं, किन्तु स्वयमेव स्वव्यवहारहेतुः। स्वस्मिन् सत्येव स्वव्यहारात्,। न तु ज्ञानान्तरमपेक्षते, तदन्वय-व्यतिरेकाननुविधानात्। ज्ञानान्तरविरहदशायां स्वविरहादेव स्वव्यवहारविरहात्, स्वत एव स्वव्यवहारोपपत्तौ ज्ञानान्तरकल्पने गौरवाच्च। घटादिव्यवहारे ज्ञानान्वयव्यतिरेकादस्तु तदपेक्षा। स्वीयमतीतमनागतं परकीयञ्च ज्ञानं स्वव्यंवहारे ज्ञानान्तरमपेक्षत एव, व्यवहारकाले तदभावात् ज्ञानान्तरान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानाच्च।

I.xi.2. नन्वेवमिच्छादिकमपि स्वव्यवहारज्ञानं नापेक्षेत, ज्ञानतुल्यतया स्वयमेव स्वव्यवहारशक्तत्वादिति चेत्। न। व्यवहारस्य ज्ञानजन्यत्वनियमेनेच्छादिव्यवहारे ज्ञानापेक्षणात्। अथ ज्ञानमात्रं न व्यवहारहेतुरतिप्रसङ्गात्, किन्तु व्यवहर्त्तव्यविषयमिति ज्ञानव्यवहारोऽपि तद्विषयज्ञानान्तराद्भवेदिति चेत्। सत्यं। स्वस्यैव स्वविषयकत्वात्। यद्व्यवहारानुकूलशक्तियोगि यज्ज्ञानं तस्यैव तद्विषयकत्वात्। शक्तिश्च पदार्थान्तरं न कारणेतेति नान्योऽन्याश्रयः। स्वव्यहारे ज्ञानं शक्तमितिस्वविषयकं। व्यवहारशक्ति-समवायादयश्च स्वभावतएव तदीयाः, सम्बन्धान्तरेऽप्यन-वस्थानात् स्वभाव एव शरणं।

I.xi.3. एतेन भेदनियतो विषय-विषयिभावः कथमभेद इति निरस्तं। स्वव्यवहारशक्तत्वस्य स्वविषयत्वस्याभेदेऽपि सम्भवात्। अस्तु वा ज्ञानस्य स्वभावविशेष एव स्वविषयत्वं, सम्बन्धं विनैव स्वभावविशेषाद्यथा ज्ञानं घटीयं घटव्यवहारजननयोग्यं स्वीयमपि तथा। कोऽसौ स्वभाविशेष इति चेत्। न। आख्यातुमशक्यत्वेऽप्यनुभवसिद्धस्य स्वभावविशेषस्य माधुर्य्यादिविशेषवत् प्रत्याख्यातुमशक्यत्वात्। यद्यपि स्वभावविशेष इति वाक्येनाख्यायत एव, तथापि पदेनाख्यातुमशक्यत्वात्।

I.xi.4. अथ व्यवहारो ब्यवहर्त्तव्यभिन्नज्ञानसाध्यः, कथं तेन विना स्यादिति चेत्। न। व्यवहारं प्रति व्यवहर्त्तव्यज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात्, न तु व्यवहर्त्तव्यभिन्नज्ञानत्वेन गौरवात्। समूहालम्बनञ्चैकैक-व्यवहारजनकत्वादेकैकविषयकमपि, न तु समूहविषयकमेव। अतिरिक्तस्य तस्यासत्त्वेन सन्निकर्षाभावात्। भ्रमस्थले रजतव्यवहारानुकूलशक्तिरस्त्येव रजतज्ञाने, किन्तु दोषादभिभूतैव सा जायत इति न तया रजते व्यवहारः। रजतज्ञानं न शुक्तौ प्रवर्त्तकं, किन्त्विन्द्रियजन्यमिदं

ज्ञानमेव,। रजतार्थिप्रवृत्यर्थं तूपस्थित-रजतभेदाग्रहमपेक्षत इति रजतज्ञानं कारणतावच्छेदकम्। एवञ्च स्वविषयत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं, न तु स्वव्यहारे ज्ञानान्तरानपेक्षत्वं गौरवात्। अन्यथा ज्ञानस्य स्वाविषयत्वेन संस्कारभावात् स्मरणं न स्यात्।

I.xi.5. यत्तु—स्वव्यवहारे ज्ञानान्तरानपेक्षत्वमुक्तं तत् स्वप्रकाशत्वनिर्व्वाहकतया,। प्रमाणञ्च स्वप्रकाशे प्रत्यक्षमेव,। सर्वाः प्रतीतय इदमहं जानामीत्येवमाकाराःज्ञातारं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयञ्चोल्लिखन्त्यो जायन्ते,। तत्रात्मा कर्तृत्वेन, ज्ञेयं कर्मतया, ज्ञानं क्रियात्वेन भासते। अतो ज्ञातृ-ज्ञेय-स्वविषयं ज्ञानमनुभूयत इति त्रिपुटीप्रत्यक्षवादिनः।

I.xi.6. नन्विदमिति व्यवसायः, तदुत्तरमिदमहं जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायो मानस इति चेत्। न। स्वप्रकाशत्वेनोपपत्तौ ज्ञानान्तरकल्पने गौरवात्। परिशेषाच्च स्वप्रकाशत्वं, परप्रकाशकत्वे हि न ज्ञानमेव सिद्ध्येत्, मानाभावात्। न हि तत्र ज्ञातता लिङ्गम्, अतीतानागतयोस्तदभावात्। नापि मानसं प्रत्यक्षं,। अजिज्ञासितस्य मानसत्वे, ज्ञानाविरामादनवस्थानात्, विषयान्तरासञ्चाराच्च। जिज्ञासितस्य ग्राह्यत्वे, ज्ञानं न मानसं जिज्ञासाग्राह्यात्मधर्मत्वात् संस्कारवदित्यनुमानप्रतिरोधः। अतएव जिज्ञसां विनैव सुखादीनां मानसत्वं। जिज्ञासापि ज्ञानसाध्येत्यनवस्था, धर्मिज्ञानेच्छादिभिर्ज्ञानस्य नाशाच्च न प्रत्यक्षत्वम्।

I.xi.7. अथ ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षं प्रत्यक्षात्मगुणत्वात् आत्मविशेषगुणत्वे सति क्षणमात्रस्थायित्वात् सुखवत्, ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षजनकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाश्रयः प्रत्यक्षत्वात् सुखवदिति चेत्। न। मानसत्वेऽनवस्थानात्। अतएव चक्षुर्जन्यं ज्ञानं न चक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयः, प्रत्यक्षत्वात् रासनवत्, नैतज्ज्ञानविषयो वा एतज्जनकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षानाश्रयत्वात् गगनवत्, चक्षुर्न चाक्षुषज्ञानग्राहकं बहिरिन्द्रियत्वात् रसनवदिति प्रतिपक्षानुमानमपास्तं। परप्रकाशत्वे अनवस्थया ज्ञानासिद्धावाश्रयासिद्धेः। स्वप्रकाशत्वेन तत्सिद्धौ धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात्। किञ्च स्वव्यवहारशक्तत्वं स्वविषयत्वं, तच्च स्वसन्निकर्षाजन्यत्वे स्वाजन्यत्वे च न विरुद्धम्। न च स्वव्यवहारे शक्तत्वस्याभाव एव साध्यः, अप्रयोजकत्वात्, स्वसन्निकर्षाजन्ये स्वाजन्ये व्यवहारशक्ते घटादौ व्यभिचाराच्च।

I.xi.8. अतएव स्वप्रकाशत्वेन पूर्वानुभवविषयता तत्तानुभूतमात्रविषये स्मरणे उत्सर्गतो भासते, ज्ञानान्तरस्यानावश्यकत्वात्। स्वस्य स्वाजन्यत्वे कथं स्वकर्मतेति चेत्। न, अतीतानागतयोरिव स्वविषयत्वं, न तु कर्मत्वं, विषयत्वञ्चाभेदेऽपि, स्वव्यवहारशक्तत्वस्य ज्ञानस्वभावविशेषस्य वा विषयत्वात्। न चाधीकर्मतया शशशृङ्गवदसत्त्वं, तस्य कदाप्यप्रकाशात्,। धीजन्यव्यवहार-भागित्वं कर्म्मत्वं स्वप्रकाशेऽपि, तदन्यफलभागित्वञ्च घटेऽप्यसिद्धं, ज्ञाततानिषेधात्। ज्ञानानपेक्षेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षजं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमतः सर्व्वज्ञानं ज्ञानानपेक्षात्म-मनःसन्निकर्षजन्यत्वेन स्वात्मनि प्रत्यक्षं,। विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षञ्च न विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं, निर्व्विकल्पकनिषेधात्। सविकल्पकत्वेन ज्ञानाजन्यज्ञानं वा प्रत्यक्षं तेन निर्ब्बिकल्पजन्यं जातिविशिष्टज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं, न त्वसाधारणेन्द्रियादिकरणकं, तेन विनाप्यनुमित्यादौ स्वात्मप्रकाशात्। इन्द्रियादिकन्त्वर्थप्रकाशएव

हेतुः,तस्येव तत्प्रतिबद्धहेतुजन्यत्वादिति।

I.xi.9. अत्रोच्यते। प्रत्यक्षं न स्वप्रकाशे प्रमाणं, व्यवसायानामिदमहं जानामीत्याकारासिद्धेः। न चैवमनुभवविरोधः, अर्थनिश्चयेन प्रवृत्त्यादिदर्शनात्। व्यवसायस्य अर्थविषयत्वमात्रमनुभूयते, न तु स्वविषयत्वमपि, गौरवेण तस्य स्वविषयभानतया प्रवृत्त्यहेतुत्वात्। अनुभवोऽपीदं रजतमित्याद्येव। न चैवमिदमहं जानामीत्यनुभवापलापे उपेक्षणीयता, व्यवसायोत्तरकालं तदुपगमात्। इदं रजतमित्यादिलौकिकानुभवात् व्यवसायस्य तदाकारतां निषेधामो, न त्वनुव्यवसायस्य। ननु भिन्नानुव्यवसायेऽनवस्थानात् व्यवसाय एतानुव्यवसाय इति चेत्, तर्हि परप्रकाशे बाधकात् स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धौ सर्व्वप्रतीतीनामिदमहं जानामीत्याकारतासिद्धिः, तथाच स्वप्रकाशत्वासिद्धौ सर्वप्रतीतीनामिदमहं जानामीत्याकारत्वमसिद्धमिति न सा प्रतीतिः स्वप्रकाशत्वे प्रमाणं।

I.xi.10. अपिच—क्रियायाः कृतेर्वा समवायित्वं कर्त्तृत्वं, परसमवेतक्रियाफलशालित्वं करण-व्यापारविषयत्वं वा कर्म्मत्वं,। धात्वर्थत्वमन्यद्वा क्रियात्वम्। इदमहं जानामीति व्यवसाये न भासते, तद्बोधकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावात्। किन्त्विदंविषयकज्ञानत्वविशिष्टस्य ज्ञानस्य वैशिष्ट्यमात्मनि भासते। न च स्वप्रकाशे व्यवसाये तादृशं स्वस्य वैशिष्ट्यं भासितुमर्हति, पूर्व्वं विशेषणस्य तस्याज्ञानात्। तस्मादिदमहं जानमीति न व्यवसायः, किन्त्वनुव्यवसायः। स्यादेतत्। कर्तृत्वादिज्ञानवैशिष्ट्यमात्मनि मा ज्ञायि, व्यवहारस्य स्वविषयकज्ञानसाध्यत्वसिद्धौ तदेव ज्ञानं स्वविषयकं कल्प्यते लाघवात्। ज्ञानवित्तिवेद्य आत्मापि तद्विषय इत्यात्मविषयत्वं सर्व्ववित्तीनामिति चेत्। न। स्वजनकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षानाश्रयत्वेन स्वस्य स्वाविषयत्वात्। विषयत्वनियामकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादेरभावे स्वविषयत्वानुपपत्तेः, कारणं विना कार्य्यानुत्पादनात्, प्रत्यक्षाजनकस्य प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वानुपपत्तेश्च। आत्मधर्म्मप्रत्यासत्त्यनाश्रये प्रत्यक्षविषताया जनकत्वव्याप्तत्वात्। ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेनेन्द्रिय-सन्निकर्षाश्रयत्वात्, मनःसन्निकर्षजन्यत्वेन मानसत्वं।

I.xi.11. तदयं प्रयोगः। विवादाध्यासितं इन्द्रियजन्यं ज्ञानं नैतज्ज्ञानविषयाश्रयः, एतज्जनकेन्द्रियसन्नि-कर्षानाश्रयत्वात् एतदजनकत्वाद्वा असन्निकृष्टवत्। नैतज्ज्ञानविषयकं वा, आत्मधर्म-प्रत्यासत्त्यनाश्रयत्वे सति एतदजन्यत्वे च सति साक्षात्कारित्वात्। प्रत्यक्षविषयो ज्ञानं स्वप्रत्यक्षजनकेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाश्रयः प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वादिति मनःसन्निकर्षग्राह्यं। चाक्षुषज्ञानं न चक्षुर्जन्यज्ञानविषयः चक्षुरसन्निकृष्टत्वात् घटवत्। ज्ञानं प्रमेयमेवेति व्याप्तिज्ञानं ज्ञानत्वप्रत्यासत्त्या स्वविषयं, ईश्वरज्ञानमहेतुकत्वेन सर्व्वविषयत्वात् स्वप्रकाशं। ननु परप्रकाशकत्वे ज्ञानमेव न सिध्येदनवस्थानादिति धर्मिग्राहकमानात् स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धावनन्यगतिकतया स्वस्यासन्निरकृष्टस्यापि प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वम्, अतो धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधितास्त्वदीयहेतव इति चेत्। न। वित्तेरवश्यवेद्यत्वाभावेनानवस्थाविगमात्। संयुक्तसमवायेन मनोवेद्यत्वादपेक्षणीयान्तरा-

भावाच्चोत्पन्नैव कुतो नावश्यवेद्येति चेत्। न। सुखादि तद्बुद्ध्यादिसामग्र्या प्रतिबन्धात् विषयान्तरसंचारदर्शनेन तस्या बलवत्वात् अनुद्भवादिति केचित्।

I.xi.12. योग्यात्मविशेषगुणत्वात् ज्ञानत्वात् ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमेवेति व्याप्तेः, वित्तेरवश्यवेद्यत्वेन स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति चेत्। न। व्याप्तेरसिद्धेः परप्रकाशकत्वेऽनवस्थानात्। स्वप्रकाशे कारणानुपपत्तेः सन्निकृष्टमेव प्रत्यक्षं, तद्विषयजन्यमेव प्रत्यक्षमिति व्याप्तेश्च। अन्यथा कारणं विना कार्य्यानुत्पत्ति-व्याप्तेर्विनिगमकं कारणसत्त्वेऽपि प्रतिबन्धात् कार्य्यानुत्पादे कारणत्वमप्रत्यूहम्। क्लृप्तकारणं विना कार्य्योत्पादे कारणताभङ्गः कार्य्यानुत्पादश्च। अपि च परप्रकाशे अनवस्थानात् परिशेषानुमानेन ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वं। तथाच स्वप्रकाशत्वानुमितेरपि स्वप्रकाशत्व-मनुमित्यन्तरगम्यमेवं तस्यापीत्यानवस्था स्वप्रकाशत्वानुमितिपरम्पराद्वारा तवापि स्यात्। विषयान्तरसञ्चारस्य प्रतिबन्धकत्वं, यावज्जिज्ञासं वा स्वप्रकाशत्वानुमितिरिति यदि, तुल्यं परप्रकाशत्वेऽपि। न च ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमित्यनुमित्या स्वप्रकाशत्वमपि सामान्यप्रत्यासत्त्या विषयीकृतमिति वाच्यम्। परतः पक्षेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्, त्वया तदनभ्युपगमाच्च।

I.xi.13. किञ्चानुमित्यादो जातिसङ्करान्न प्रत्यक्षत्वम्। न च ज्ञानसापेक्षं मनोजनकमित्यनुमिति-विषयवदात्मनि न तत्प्रत्यक्षम्। तस्य स्वविषयत्वे ज्ञानानपेक्षेति चेत्। न। ज्ञानं ज्ञानजन्यं, तच्च स्वविषये स्वात्मन्येकमेवेति कथं तदपेक्षं तदनपेक्षञ्च, विरुद्धत्वात्। न च ज्ञानभिन्नविषयत्वं सापेक्षं, तथात्वे बहिर्ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं न स्यात्। अथान्यस्यान्यविषयत्वे सन्निकर्षादिर्नियामकः, स्वविषयत्वे किन्तेन, अनतिप्रसङ्गात् सन्निकर्षस्याननुगमाच्च। व्यवहारे शक्तत्वं विषयत्वमभेदे सन्निकर्षं विनापीति चेत्। न। अन्यत्र प्रत्यक्षमात्रे सन्निकर्षस्य हेतुत्वात् अन्यथाननुगमापत्तिः। अथ या वित्तिर्न वेद्या सा प्रमाणाभावादसतीति तदधीनसत्त्वस्य विषयपर्य्यन्तस्यासत्त्वं स्यादिति चेत्। न। अविरललग्नतद्वित्तिवित्तिधारा नाभ्युपेयते, किन्नाम केनचित्कदाचित्काचिद्वित्तिर्व्य-वहारस्मरणलिङ्गादिना प्रतीयत इति सर्व्वा प्रमाणसिद्धैवेत्यभ्युपगमात्। अथ स्यादेवं यदि घटोऽयं घटमहं जानामीत्यतोऽधिका घटतद्वित्तिधारावाहिविषयशतभारमन्थरा काचिद्वित्तिरस्मदा-देरुत्पद्यमानानुभूयेत, नचैवमिति चेत्। न। अनुव्यवसायो विषयमात्रनिरूप्यो न तु तद्विषयपरम्प-रानिरूप्यो गौरवात्। तथाच ज्ञानज्ञानत्वेन सर्व्वावित्तिरस्मदादेरुत्पद्यमानानुभूयत एव। न चैवमनिर्मोक्षः, योगजधर्म्मप्रत्यासत्त्या सामान्यलक्षणया वा व्याप्तिज्ञानरूपस्यानुव्यवसायस्यापि स्वविषयत्वाभ्युपगमात्।

I.xi.14. न च तद्व्यवहाशक्तत्वं तद्विषयत्वं, तद्विषयत्वेन तद्व्यवहारकारणत्वग्रहे सति तच्छक्तत्वज्ञानं, तच्छक्तत्वञ्च तद्विषयत्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयात्। कारणत्वग्रहं विना शक्तेरग्रहात् त्वन्मतेऽपि रजतज्ञानस्य शुक्तिविषयत्वापत्तेश्च। रजतार्थिप्रवृत्तौ रजतज्ञानं हेतुः, न तु तदवच्छेदकमित्युक्तत्वात्। लाघवेन स्वविषये ज्ञानस्य प्रवर्त्तकत्वं, सर्व्वैरेवाद्यप्रवृत्तौ तथावगमादिति चेत्, हन्तैवमन्यथाख्यातिरस्तु न त्वन्यथासिद्धरजतज्ञानस्याप्रवर्त्तकत्वमिति। एतेन यथा तद्गुणसंविज्ञान-बहुव्रीहिसिद्धं कुटादिपदमशक्यमपि कुटं गुणमादायैव प्रधानमन्यपदार्थं बोधयति, तथा

ज्ञानमविषयमप्यात्मानमादायैव स्वविषये व्यवहारं करोति संस्कारञ्च। स्वजन्यव्यवहारविषये ज्ञानस्य संस्कारजनकत्वात्। स्वजन्यव्यवहारविषयः स्वात्मा विषयश्चेति प्राचीनं गुरुमतमपास्तम्। अन्यत्र लाघवेन ज्ञानस्य स्वविषये व्यवहार-संस्कारजनकत्वकल्पनात्। स्वविषये स्वात्मनि व्यवहार-संस्काराजनकत्वात्। व्यवहार-संस्कारयोः स्वविषयज्ञान साध्यत्वेन स्वाविषयक-ज्ञानासाध्यत्वात्।

I.xi.15. ननु ज्ञानस्य मानसत्वे कथं जानामीति विशिष्टबुद्धिः, ज्ञानत्वनिर्व्विकल्पकजन्यज्ञानक्षणे विशेष्याभावेन प्रत्यक्षानुत्पत्तेरिति चेत्। न। ज्ञाननाशक्षण एव ज्ञाने ज्ञानत्वविशिष्टबुद्धिः विशेष्यस्य पूर्व्वक्षणसत्त्वात्। प्रत्यक्षे स्वसमयवर्त्तितया गौरवेण विशेष्यस्याहेतुत्वात्। जानामीतिवर्त्तमानत्वेन स्थूल उपाधिर्भासते, न तु क्षणः, तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्। ततो ज्ञानविशिष्टबुद्धिरात्मनि, विशेषण-ज्ञानस्य पूर्व्वसत्त्वात्। विशेषणञ्च न विशिष्टप्रत्ययहेतुर्गौरवात्। किन्तु तज्ज्ञानमावश्यकत्वात्। अतएव तत्तां विनापि तद्बुद्धेः प्रत्यभिज्ञा।

I.xi.16. यत्तु—व्यवसायनाशक्षणोत्पन्नव्यवसायान्तरे ज्ञानत्वविशिष्टबुद्धिरिति। तन्न। तद्धेतोरभावात् अनुमिनोमीत्यादौ अनुव्यवसाये अनुमितित्वाभावाच्च।

यद्वा ज्ञानं ज्ञानत्वञ्च निर्व्विकल्पके भासते, ततो ज्ञानत्ववैशिष्ट्यं ज्ञाने ज्ञानवैशिष्ट्यञ्चात्मनि भासते। विशेष्ये विशेषणं विशेषणे विशेषणान्तरञ्च भासत इत्येव हि विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यार्थः।

I.xi.17. वस्तुतस्तु ज्ञानमभाव इव विशिष्टज्ञानविषय एव। अनुव्यवसायस्य विषयरूपविशेषणविषयक-व्यवसायसाध्यत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्रीसत्त्वात्। ज्ञानत्वमपि तत्र भासते तज्ज्ञानसामग्रीसत्त्वात्। अंशे तत्सप्रकारकं निष्पकारकञ्चेति नरसिंहाकारं। तत्रैव विशिष्टज्ञाने ज्ञानत्ववैशिष्ट्यं भासते,। अनुमीनोमीत्यादो तु न तथा, अनुव्यवसाये अनुमितित्वाभावादिति।

इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे अनुव्यवसायवादः।

I.XII.

अथ निर्विकल्पकवादः।

I.xii.1. तच्च प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकञ्चेति। तत्र नाम जात्यादियोजनारहितं वैशिष्ट्यानवगाहि निष्प्रकारकं निर्विकल्पकं। ननु ज्ञानत्वं सविकल्पकभिन्नवृत्ति इत्यत्र किं मानं। न प्रत्यक्षमसिद्धेः, अतीन्द्रियत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च। न च व्यवहारः, तस्य सविकल्पकसाध्यत्वात्। नापीदं न विवेचितं पूर्वमधुना विवेचयामीत्यनुभवप्रमाणकावालोचन-विकल्पौ, बहुविशेषणज्ञाना-ज्ञानाभ्यां तदुपपत्तेः।

I.xii.2. ननु गौरितिप्रत्यक्षं विशेषज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादनुमितिवदिति। अथ विशेषणविशेष्यज्ञान-सामग्रीतः साकाङ्क्षोभयविषयमेकं विशिष्टज्ञानं। तत्र प्रत्यक्षे योग्येन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादनुमितौ पक्षधर्म्मताबलात् व्यापकत्वावच्छेदकप्रकारेण शाब्दे योग्यतादिवशात्पदार्थतवच्छेद-करूपेणापूर्वमेव विशेषणं भासते,। उपमितावप्येवमेवेति न क्वापि विशेषणज्ञानं जनकं। न च प्रत्यभिज्ञायान्तत्तानुभवस्तथा, तत्तानुभवेऽपि संस्कारस्यानुद्बोधात्। विलोपाद्वा प्रत्यभिज्ञाना-नुत्पादेनोद्बुद्धः संस्कार एव प्रत्यासत्तितया विशेषणज्ञानार्थमिन्द्रियसहकारी,। सुरभिचन्दन-मित्यादावपि विशेषणज्ञानार्थं तज्ज्ञानं प्रत्यासत्तिस्थानीयमिन्द्रियसहकारि,। भ्रमो विशिष्टज्ञानमेव नास्तीतिचेत्। उच्यते। साध्यप्रसिद्धिपदार्थोपस्थिति-वाच्यत्वज्ञानतत्तानुभवानामनुमित्या-दिहेतुत्वम्। साध्यप्रसिद्ध्यादिकं विनानुमित्यादेरसम्भवात्। साध्यादिकञ्च विशेषणमिति तज्ज्ञानमनुमित्यादिहेतुः। यद्यप्यनुमित्यादिप्रत्येकं प्रति साध्यादिविशेषणज्ञानत्वेन न कारणता। तथापि विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रं प्रति विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन कारणता, बाधकाभावात्।

I.xii.3. स्यादेतद्वह्निमानित्यादिज्ञानं प्रति वह्निज्ञानस्य न विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन कारणता, द्रव्यत्वेन वह्निज्ञानेऽपि वह्निमानितिज्ञानाभावात्। किन्तु विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेनातो न विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणज्ञानं हेतुः। विशेषणज्ञानत्वमपि तत्रास्तीतिचेत्। न। तस्यातिप्रसक्तत्वात् अन्यथासिद्धेश्च। न च तादृशविशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं साध्यं, बाधादिति। तन्न। विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानं प्रति हि विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं ज्ञानं कारणमुभयसिद्धम्, अतो विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रं प्रति विशेषणज्ञानं हेतुः। यद्विशेषयोः कार्य्यकारणभावस्तत्सामान्ययोरपि बाधकं विना कार्य्यकारणभावनियमात्।

अन्यथा सामान्यकार्य्योच्छेदः। न चातिप्रसङ्गः। विशेषसामग्रीविरहेण तत्तत्कार्य्यविशेषानुदयात्। न च परोक्षत्वमुपाधिः,। प्रत्यभिज्ञायां साध्याव्यापकत्वात्। नापि विशिष्टविशेषणकत्वं, पक्षेतरत्वादिति।

I.xii.4. मैवं। तथापि स्मृतिवत्पूर्वानुभवस्य संस्कारद्वारा जनकत्वात्, सिद्धसाधनात्। न चाव्यवहितविशेषण-ज्ञानजन्यत्वं साध्यं, अप्रयोजकत्वात्, प्रत्यभिज्ञावत् स्मृत्यैवोपपत्तेर्वा। नापि तत एवाव्यवहितविशेषणानुभवजन्यत्वं साध्यं, अप्रसिद्धेः, प्रत्यभिज्ञानादौ व्यभिचाराच्च। अथ तत्कालोत्पन्नरूपादिविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षे संस्काराभावेन स्मरणाभावात् पक्षधर्म्मताबलेन निर्विकल्पकसिद्धावन्यत्रापि सामग्रीतौल्यात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेत्। न। प्रत्युत्पन्नविशेषणस्थले हि शुक्लत्वादिविशिष्टशुक्लवैशिष्ट्यबोधो वा अविशिष्टतद्विशिष्टबोधो वा, ?। आद्ये शुक्लत्वादि-जातिस्मरणं प्रथमं, ततः प्रत्यक्षेण तद्विशिष्टशुक्लबोधः, ततः शुक्लत्वादिविशिष्टशुक्ल-दिवैशिष्ट्यबोधः द्रव्य इति किमनुपपन्नं। शुक्लत्वादिजातिस्मरणमेव वा सामान्यलक्षणया सकलरूपादिविषयमस्तु। द्वितीये अननुभवः, न हि शुक्लत्वादिप्रत्ययविलक्षणं शुल्करूपादिविशिष्टबोधं कश्चिदनुभवति।

I.xii.5. अथ जागराद्यविशिष्टानुभवो विशेषणज्ञानजन्योविशिष्टज्ञानत्वात्। न च तत्र संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वविशेषणानुभवः तज्जन्यविशेषणस्मरणं वा तत्र सम्भवति, उद्बोधकं विना संस्कारस्य स्मरणे विशिष्टबोधे वा सामर्थ्याभावादित्युद्बोधकं वक्तव्यं, उद्बोधकञ्चान्यत्र ज्ञानं दृष्टमिति तदेव वाच्यं। न च तद्विशिष्टज्ञानमेव। तत्रापि विशेषणज्ञानापेक्षायामनवस्थापत्तेरित्यालोचनसिद्धिरिति। तन्न। सत्यपि ज्ञाने संस्कारानुद्बोधात्। यस्मात् फलं भवति स ज्ञानविशेषस्तथेति चेत्। न। अननुगतत्वात्। यदनन्तरं फलं दृश्यते तदेवाननुगतमप्युद्बोधकं कल्प्यते फलबलादिति चेत्। तर्हिजागरकारणानन्तरं संस्कारोद्बोधोऽस्तीति तदेव कारणमस्तु क्लृप्तत्वात्। अत एव संस्कारोद्बोधे न नियतो हेतुरिति। "सदृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृतिवीजस्य बोधकाः" इत्याहुः। एवञ्च प्रणिधानादिसूत्रमपि सङ्गच्छते।

I.xii.6. अपिच—विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादित्यत्र व्यवच्छेद्यमविशिष्टज्ञानं तच्चाप्रसिद्धं सिद्धौ वा व्यर्थमनुमानं। ज्ञानत्वञ्च स्वतोऽसिद्धव्याप्तिकं, निर्विकल्पके व्यभिचाराद् अनवस्थापाताच्च। किञ्च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वं न तावत् वस्तुगत्या विशेषण-विशेष्यविषयकज्ञानत्वं, आलोचनेन व्यभिचारात्। नापि विशेषणत्वविषयकत्वं, अतद्व्यावृत्तिबोधजनकज्ञानविषयत्वस्य विशेषणत्वस्य तत्राप्रकाशात्। नापि वैशिष्ट्यविषयकज्ञानत्वं, तथा सति गौरितिविकल्पे वैशिष्ट्यं विशेषणमित्यालोचनस्यापि तद्विषयत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानत्वे अनवस्थापातादिति। नापि सप्रकारकज्ञानत्वं, प्रकारश्च विषयताविशेष इति वाच्यं। ज्ञानविषयस्वरूपातिरिक्ताया विषयताया अभावात्। न च विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं सप्रकारत्वं, यद्विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं यत् स एव तत्र प्रकार इति गौरितिविकल्पे तस्येव साध्यत्वात्, ईश्वरज्ञानस्य निष्प्रकारकत्वापाताच्च। नाप्यतद्व्यावृत्तिविषयत्वं, अपोहवादनिरासेन गौरितिविकल्पे तथात्वासिद्धेः। नाप्यतद्व्यावृत्तिबोधजनकत्वं तत्, आलोचनव्यावृत्तानुगतरूपमन्तरेण अतद्व्यावृत्तबोधजनकत्वस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात्। न च गौरितिज्ञानमेतदन्यसविकल्प-

कान्यज्ञानभिन्नं प्रमेयत्वात्, यद्वा चक्षुः चाक्षुषसविकल्पकज्ञानातिरिक्तज्ञानजनकं इन्द्रियत्वादिति तत्सिद्धिः। अप्रयोजकत्वात्, उभयत्र सविकल्पकपदानन्तरं निर्विकल्पकादिपदप्रक्षेपेण तृतीयादिज्ञानसिद्धिप्रसङ्गाच्चेति।

I.xii.7. अत्रोच्यते। प्राथमिकं गौरिति प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं जन्यविशेषणज्ञानजन्यं, जन्यविशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् अनुमितिवत्। न च स्मरणं तत्र सम्भवति,। तज्जन्मनि तेन गोत्वस्याननुभवात्। अथ यथा बालस्याद्यप्रवृत्तिबलात् प्राग्भवीयसंस्काराद्व्याप्तिस्मरणं, तथेहापि जन्मान्तरीयसंस्कारा-द्गोत्वस्मरणमस्तु प्राथमिकविशिष्टज्ञानवलादिति चेत्। न। जीवनादृष्टेन तत्र संस्कारोद्बोधात्तथास्तु, इह तु न विलक्षणमुद्बोधकमस्ति। अतो गोत्वासन्निकर्षेऽपि-गोत्वस्मरणप्रसङ्गः। य एव गोत्वेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षस्तव निर्विकल्पके हेतुः स एव संस्कारोद्बोधक इति चेत्, तर्ह्यत्र क्लृप्तकारणभावात् गोत्वेन्द्रियसन्नि-कर्षाद्गोत्वानुभव एव स्यात्, स्मरणसामग्रीतोऽनुभवसामग्र्या बलवत्त्वात्। न च तत् विशिष्टज्ञानं, पूर्वं विशेषणज्ञानाभावादित्यर्थान्निर्विकल्पकं। अतएव न तत्र ज्ञानत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानत्वानुमानं, कारणबाधेन बाधात्। यदि चानुभवसामग्रीतः स्मरणं तदा नित्यानां वैदिकार्थानां च स्मरणं स्यान्न त्वनुभवः।

I.xii.8. न च गोत्वज्ञानं गोत्वज्ञानजन्यं जन्यज्ञानजन्यं जन्यविशेषणज्ञानजन्यं चेत्यन्यत्र दर्शनात्, प्रथमं न गोत्वानुभव इति वाच्यम्। एकस्येव जन्य-जनकत्वानवच्छेदकत्वात् अनवस्थापाताच्च। ननु गौरित्यत्र गोत्ववैशिष्ट्यङ्गवि भासते, तथाच तद्विषयकं ज्ञानं स्यात्, तच्च निर्विकल्पकमिति चेत्। न। गोत्वं हि तत्र विशेषणं, न तु तद्वैशिष्ट्यं। ननु तथाभूतविशेषणधीजन्यविशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणं स्वधर्मविशिष्टं कथं भासेत, पूर्वं तस्यानवगमात्,। अवगमे वा तस्यापि विशेषणान्तरवतो विशेषणमित्यनवस्थेति चेत्। न। गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञाने विशिष्टस्य गोत्वस्याभानात्। अथ सर्वं विशेषणं विशेषणवदेव। गोत्वादावपि व्यक्त्यादेर्विशेषत्वादिति चेत्,-अस्तु तथा। किन्तु विशेषणं विशेषणवदेव भासेत इनि न नियमः। अन्यथा गौरिति ज्ञाने विशेषण तद्विशेषणानन्तपरम्पराविषयत्वे विषयापर्य्यवसानप्रसङ्गः। क्वचिन्निर्विशेषणस्यापि भाने प्रथमतोऽपि तथा स्यादविशेषात्।

I.xii.9. न च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादित्यत्र हेतोर्व्यर्थविशेषणत्वं। येन विशेषणेन विना व्याप्तिर्ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते तस्यैव सार्थकत्वात्। व्यभिचारवारकस्यापि सार्थकत्वे एतदेव मूलं। इहापि ज्ञानत्व-विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वयोर्विशेषणं विना व्याप्तिर्ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते, अनवस्थानात् सामान्यतो व्यभिचारावगमात्। अतएव चक्षुस्तैजसत्वादिसाधने रूपादिषु मध्ये रूपस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वादित्या-दावसिद्धवारकमपि विशेषणं सार्थकं। तेन विना रूपस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वादित्यस्या-प्रसिद्धेर्व्याप्त्यग्रहात्। विशेषणं विनापि यत्र व्याप्तिग्रहस्तत्र व्यर्थविशेषणत्वं, यथा गोत्व-धूमत्वशरीराजन्यत्वादौ। यस्य यत्र यः सम्बन्धः स एव तत्र तस्य वैशिष्ट्यन्तेन हि स्वासम्बद्धेभ्यो व्यावृत्तो बोध्यते। यथा दण्डी पुरुष इति ज्ञाने दण्डसम्बन्धः पुरुषेऽवगत इति तेनायमदण्डव्यावृत्तो

बोध्यते। तथा गौरिति विकल्पेऽपि,। तथाच विशेषणवद्विशेष्यज्ञानत्वं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वं। एतदेवातद्व्यावृत्तबोधजनकतावच्छेदकं। ननु दण्ड-पुरुष-सम्बन्धा इत्यत्रापि दण्डसम्बन्धः पुरुषेऽवगत इति ततोऽप्यदण्डव्यावृत्तपुरुषबोधः स्यादितिचेत्। भवत्येव, दण्डसम्बन्ध एव पुरुषे दण्डज्ञानं विना न ज्ञायते इति ब्रूमः। यत्र विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्री नास्ति तत्र निर्विकल्पकं, ज्ञानकरणजन्ये सर्वत्र विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वान्न तदिति प्रत्यक्षमेवैतदिति।

I.xii.10.अतएवाभावे न निर्विकल्पकं, तद्बुद्धौ प्रतियोग्यधिकरणज्ञानयोः कारणत्वेन तदुभयविशिष्ट-ज्ञानसामग्रीनियमात्। यद्यभावे निर्विकल्पकं, तदा घटाभाववद्भूतलमिति ज्ञानं न स्यात्, विशेषणज्ञानं विना तदभावात्। भावे वा न निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः। विशिष्टज्ञानत्वस्य तत्रैव

व्यभिचारदिति चेत्। न। प्रथमम्भूतले घटो नास्तीति बुद्धिः, तत्र भूतलं विशेषणं, अभावो विशेष्यः, विशेष्यज्ञानञ्च न कारणं, पश्चाद्भूतलविशेष्यकं घटाभाववदिति ज्ञानं। नन्विन्द्रियसम्बद्ध-विशेषणतया अभावो गृह्यत इत्युक्तं, अतः कथं स विशेष्य इति चेत्, भूतलविशेषणतया स्वभावप्रत्यासत्त्या गृह्यत इति तदर्थः, न त्वभावस्य विशेषणतया भानमिति। अतएव वायौ रूपाभाव इति प्रतीतेश्चाक्षुषत्वमुक्तमाचार्य्यैः। अयोग्यविशेष्ये इन्द्रियस्यासामर्थ्यात्।

I.xii.11.ज्ञानत्वे च निर्विकल्पकं विषयविशिष्टत्वांशे सविकल्पकमपि, अनुव्यवसायस्य व्यवसायजन्य-त्वेन नियमतः पूर्वं विषयरूपविशेषणभानात्। तत्रैव ज्ञाने तदेव ज्ञानं निष्प्रकारकं सप्रकारकञ्चेति न विरुद्धं, अंशभेदमादायाविरोधात्। अतएव निर्विकल्पकत्वसिवकल्पकत्वे न जाती, चाक्षुषत्वादिना सङ्करापत्तेः। गौरिति सविकल्पकमपि गोत्वांशे निर्व्विकल्पकमेव, तत्र प्रकाराभानात्, भाने वानवस्था, निर्विकल्पकासिद्धिश्च।

विशेषणतावादः

I.xii.12.प्रकारश्च द्विविधः, विशेपणोपलक्षणभेदात्। ननु व्यावर्त्तकत्वाविशेषे कथन्तयोर्भेदः, व्यावर्त्तकत्वे सति सद्विशेषेणमसदुपलक्षणं यथा दण्डी पुरुषः कुरुणा क्षेत्रमिति चेत्। न। काकवद्देवदत्तगृहं जटाभिस्तापस इत्यादावुपरिभ्राम्यतः काकस्य जटादेरसत्त्वेऽप्यविशेषणत्वादुपलक्षणत्वाच्च। एतेन व्यावृत्तिबोधकाले व्यावर्त्तकं सद्विशेषणमसदुपलक्षणं, तेन काकादीनां व्यावृत्तिबोधसमये सतां विशेषणत्वमेव व्यावृत्तिबोधसमये असतामुपलक्षणत्वं। अतएव काकैर्जटाभिः कुरुणेत्यादावित्थम्भूतलक्षणे तृतीयेतिनिरस्तं। व्यावृत्तिबोधसमये सतोऽप्युपरिभ्रमतः काकादेरविशेषणत्वात् उपलक्षणत्वाच्च।

I.xii.13.नापि विशेष्यवृत्तित्वे सति प्रत्याय्यव्यावृत्तिसमानाधिकरणत्वे सति व्यावर्त्तकं विशेषणं, यद्वा यत्र विशेष्यत्वावच्छेदेन व्यावृत्त्या वा यत्समानाधिकरणत्वेन प्रतीयते तत्र तद्विशेषणं। विशेष्यत्वञ्च प्रत्याय्यव्यावृत्त्यधिकरणत्वमिति जटाभिस्तापस इत्यादौ जटादावतिप्रसङ्गात्। न हि तापसे न जटा वर्त्तते। नापि विशेष्यसमानविभक्तकत्वं विशेषणत्वं, काकवद्देवदत्तगृहमित्यादावुप-लक्षणेऽपि गतत्वात्,। अनभिधानदशायामविशेषणत्वापाताच्च।

I.xii.14.अथ—व्यावर्त्तकत्वे सति विशिष्टधीविषयत्वं विशेषणत्वं,। विशिष्टबुद्धिश्च न विशेषणत्वगोचरा, गौरवात्, किन्तु विशेषणविषया, विशेषणोपलक्षणसन्देहानुपपत्तेः। अत एव चाक्षुषत्वादिविरोधः, उपलक्षणत्वे तूपलक्षितं संस्थानादि विशिष्टधीविषयो न काकवत्त्वं, तदभावेऽपि तद्गृहप्रतीतेस्ताद्रूप्यात्। अन्यथा भ्रमत्वापत्तेः। न च शब्दोपस्थापितस्य कथं शाब्दज्ञानबहिर्भाव इति वाच्यं। तथैव व्युत्पत्तेः। न हि गङ्गायां घोषइत्यत्र प्रवाहोऽपि तीरावच्छेदकतया भासते। किन्तु तीरत्वेन तीरविशेष एव। अन्यथा अजहत्स्वर्थासाम्यात्। न चैवमुपलक्षणपदस्य लाक्षणिकत्वं, अशक्यस्य संस्थानादेरुपस्थापनादिति वाच्यं। उपलक्षणबुद्ध्युपा-स्थापितकारणन्तरजन्यसंस्थानोपस्थित्या तदन्वये तात्पर्य्यादिति। मैवं। तथा व्युत्पत्तेरसिद्धेः। न ह्युपलक्षणपदातिरिक्तमुपलक्ष्योपस्थापकमस्तीत्युपलक्षणपदं स्वार्थमुपस्थाप्योप-लक्ष्यमुपस्थापयतीति लक्षणैव स्यात्। अन्यथा लक्षणोच्छेदः, घटो नास्तीत्यत्रोपलक्षणस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽभावधीविषयत्वात् नियतोपलक्ष्याभावाच्च। नापि व्यावर्त्तकत्वे सति क्रियान्वयि विशेषणमन्यदुपलक्षणं। क्रियाहीने सुभगोऽयं दण्डी महाबाहुरित्यादौ दण्डादेरविशेषणत्वापातात्, परम्परयोपलक्षणेऽपि क्रियान्वयित्वाच्च।

I.xii.15.अथ अतद्व्यावृत्तिर्वैशिष्ट्यं। तथाच विशिष्टज्ञाने अतद्व्यावृत्तिर्विषयो, न विशेषणमुपलक्षणं वा। तथाच विशिष्टधीकारणज्ञानविषयत्वे सति प्रत्याय्यव्यावृत्तिसमानाधिकरणं विशेषणमिति। तन्न। नीलमुत्पलमित्यादावनीलानुल्लेखे अतद्व्यावृत्त्यनुल्लेखात्, नीलज्ञानामीत्यनुव्यवसाय-विरोधात्, अपोहापाताच्च।

I.xii.16.अथ व्यावर्त्तकं साक्षात्सम्बद्धं नीलादि, परम्परासम्बद्धं गृहोपरि भ्रमत्काकादि, तत्र व्यावर्त्तनीयमधितिष्ठति, यद्धि साक्षादेव तद्विशेषणमतो विपरीतमन्यत्। दण्डी पुमानिति विशेषणमत्र दण्डः पुंसो, न जातिरनुदण्डमसौ च तस्य इति सम्बन्धिद्वयातिरिक्तसम्बन्ध-घटकाभावे सति सम्बन्ध एव साक्षात्सम्बन्धः। स च संयोग-समवायस्वरूपसम्बन्धसाधारणो ज्ञाने विषयस्याधिकिरणे अभावस्य सम्बन्धिनि समवायस्यास्तीति तेषामपि विशेषणत्वमिति शिवादित्यमिश्राः। तन्न। गौरनित्यो रूपवांश्चलति रूपवति रस इत्यादौ जाते रूपस्य च साक्षात्सम्बन्धेऽप्युपलक्षणत्वात्। लोहितः स्फटिक इत्यादौ परम्परासम्बन्धेऽपि लोहितत्वस्य विशेषणत्वात्।

I.xii.17.अथान्वयप्रतियोग्युपस्थापकतया अन्वितमुपलक्षणं, साक्षादन्वितं विशेषणं। काकादेः संस्थानाद्युपस्थापकतयोपयोगात्, अतथात्वे दण्डादिवद्विशेषणत्वमेवेति चेत्। न। उपलक्षणपदस्य लाक्षणिकत्वापत्तेः, प्रतियोगिनोऽभावे धर्मान्तरानुपनयाच्च।

अथ व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिसमये विशेष्यसम्बद्धं व्यावर्त्तकं विशेषणं, तदानीं विशेष्यासम्बद्धं व्यावर्त्तकमुपलक्षणं। न च जटा यदा यत्रास्ति तदा तत्र उपलक्षणं। अत एव तत्रैव तदेव सम्बन्धसमये विशेषणमसम्बन्धसमये उपलक्षणमिति। तन्न। रूपवति घटे रस इत्यादौ रूपस्य

विशेषणत्वप्रसङ्गात्। दण्ड्यासीदित्यादावतीते दण्डस्याविशेषणत्वापाताच्च। एतेन यत्र यद्विशेष्यावच्छेदकधर्मेण व्यावृत्त्या वा समानाधिकरणत्वेन प्रतीयते तत्र तद्विशेषणमित्यपि प्रत्युक्तं।

I.xii.18. अत्रोच्यते। दण्डी पुरुष इतिज्ञानानन्तरं दण्डवत्यदण्डव्यावृत्तिरवगम्यत इति प्रत्याय्यव्यावृत्त्यधिकरणता पुरुषस्य दण्डेनावच्छिद्यते न पुरुषत्वेनातिव्याप्तेः। उपलक्षणे तु गृह-तापसादिनिष्ठप्रत्याय्याय्यव्यावृत्त्यधिकरणता न काक-जटादिभिरवच्छिद्यते तदभाववत्यपि व्यावृत्तिप्रतीतेः, किन्तु संस्थानविशेषत्वादिना।

एवञ्च प्रत्याय्यव्यावृत्त्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकत्वे सति व्यावर्त्तकं विशेषणं, तदन्यव्यावर्त्तकमुपलक्षणं।

I.xii.19. व्यावृत्त्युल्लेखानन्तरमेव विशेषणत्वबुद्धिः। तदाहुराचार्य्याः "सदसद्वा समानाधिकरणं व्यवच्छेदकं विशेषणं, व्यधिकरणमुपलक्षणम्" इति। अस्यार्थः। स्वाधिकरणमात्रवृत्तिव्यावृत्तिबोधकत्वं स्वावच्छिन्नाधिकरणताकव्यावृत्तिबोधकत्वं स्वानधिकरणाधिकरणकव्यावृत्त्यबोधकत्वे सति व्यावृत्तिबोधकत्वं वेति, उपलक्षणन्तु स्वानधिकरणेऽपि व्यावृत्तिं बोधयति।

I.xii.20. अथ वा विवक्षितान्वयप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं विशेषणं, दण्डिनमानयेत्यादौ दण्डस्तथा। तदनवच्छेदकं उपलक्षणं, काकेन देवदत्तस्य गृहा इत्यादौ काको न गृहस्य देवदत्तान्वय-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकः, तद्विरहदशायामपि देवदत्तान्वयावगमात्। किन्तु गृहविशेष एव उपलक्षणपरिचितः। अत एवान्वयाप्रतियोगित्वेऽपि नोपलक्षणवैयर्थ्यं। यद्वा यदन्विततया ज्ञात एव विशेष्ये तात्पर्य्य-विषयेतरान्वयधीस्तद्व्यवच्छेदकं विशेषणं। अनेवम्भूतं तदुपलक्षणं, उपलक्षणानच्छिन्नेऽप्युपलक्ष्ये तात्पर्यविषयीभूतान्वयबोधात्। अयमेव कार्य्यान्वयि विशेषणं तदनन्वय्युपलक्षणमित्यस्यार्थः। न तु तात्पर्य्यविषयीभूतविशेष्यान्वयबोधविषयत्वं विशिष्टज्ञानविषयत्वं वा, प्रतियोग्यभावबुद्धिविषय इति मते तदभावात्। यद्वा विशेष्यान्वयिना यस्यावश्यमन्वयस्तदवच्छेदकं विशेषणं, तदनन्वय्युपलक्षणमिति तत्तोपलक्ष्य-विशेष्यमात्रान्वयात्, यद्व्यावर्त्तकं विशेष्यान्वयिनान्वीयते तद्विशेषणं, तदन्यदुपलक्षणमिति वा। यद्वा तात्पर्य्यविषयान्वयप्रतियोगी उद्देश्यान्वयप्रतियोगी वा धर्मो विशेषणन्तदन्यदुपलक्षणमित्यलं विस्तरेण।

इति श्रीगङ्गेशोपाध्यायविराचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे निर्व्विकल्पकवादः।

I. XIII.

अथसविकल्पकवादः।

I.xiii.1. सविकल्पकञ्च विशिष्टज्ञानं यथा गौरयमिति। तच्च सामान्यादीनां परमार्थसत्त्वेनार्थ-जत्वादिन्द्रियजत्वाच्च प्रत्यक्षं। क्वचित् संस्कारसहकारिवशेन तत्ताविशिष्टस्येदन्ताविशिष्टा-भेदोल्लेखी ऐन्द्रियकोविकल्पः।

I.xiii.2. नन्वेककार्य्यसहकारित्वमन्यत्र। प्रत्यभिज्ञानन्तु नैकं ज्ञानं, तदंशे पारोक्ष्यस्येदमंशे चापारोक्ष्यास्यानुभवेन विरुद्धधर्म्मसंसर्गात्। न चेदंयथार्थं, अनेकदेश-कालसम्बन्धस्यैकत्रबाधात्। एककालादिसंसर्ग-तदभावव्यवच्छेदवत्, तदविनाभूतकालान्तरादिसम्बन्धव्यवच्छेदात्। तदयथार्थत्वे बहु विल्पवेतेति चेत्। न। पारोक्ष्यापारोक्ष्ययोरिहासिद्धेः, इन्द्रियजन्यत्वेना-परोक्षत्वनियमात्, तत्तांशस्य च स्मृत्युपनीतत्वात्, इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणताप्रत्यासत्तेः। न चैककालसम्बन्धः कालान्तरसम्बन्धाभावाविनाभूतः, एकस्मिन्नानादिक्सम्बन्धस्य ज्ञाने अनेकविषयत्वस्य च व्याघातापत्तेः, साक्षात्करोमीत्यनुव्यवसाये बाधकाभावाच्च।

I.xiii.3. ननु केयन्तत्ता। न तावदतीतसमयसम्बन्धः, अनागतागोचरस्मृत्ति-प्रत्यभिज्ञयोस्तत्तोल्लेखात्, प्रत्यक्षानुभूयमानघटादौ अतीतसमयावच्छेदानुमाने तत्ताधी-व्यपदेशयोरभावात्। अतीतसमयसम्बन्धावगमेऽपि सोऽयं न वेति संशयात्, स नायमिति विपर्य्ययात्, तदभावावगमेऽपि सोऽयमिति प्रतीतेः, अतीतसमयविशिष्टः स इति सहप्रयोगगात् काले तदभावाच्च। एतेन ज्ञातधर्मान्तरवैशिष्ट्यन्तत्तेति निरस्तम्। न च तद्वति गुणादिकमेव तत्ता, तदवगमेऽपि तदनवगमात् तदनवगमेऽपि तदवगमाच्च। नाप्यतीतज्ञानवैशिष्ट्यं, परेण ज्ञात इति ज्ञानेऽपि स इति प्रयोगाभावात्। नाप्येतज्जन्मातीतस्वज्ञानवैशिष्ट्यं, तदवगमेऽपि तत्तासंशय-विपर्य्ययदर्शनात्, अतीतज्ञानविशिष्टः स इति सहप्रयोगात्, अतीतानुभवविषयत्वस्यानु-भवाविषयत्वेन स्मृत्या तदुल्लेखानुपपत्तेश्च।

I.xiii.4. यत्त्वतीतानुभवविषयत्वं तत्ता। तच्चानुभवाविषयत्वेन यदा ज्ञानान्तरेण गृह्यते तदा स घट इति स्मरणं, नोचेत् प्रमुष्टतत्ताकं घटइति। तन्न। अतीतानुभवषियत्वस्यानुमितौ भानेऽपि स इति धीव्यपदेशयोर भावात् अतीतानुभवविषयत्वनिश्चयेऽपि तत्तासंशयविपर्य्ययदर्शनात्, सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तेः, ज्ञानान्तरेणातीतानुभवविषयत्वग्रहे तत्तोल्लेखापत्तेश्च।

I.xiii.5. अथातीतधर्म्मवैशिष्ट्यं तत्ता। स धर्म्मः क्वचित् समयः क्वचित् ज्ञानादिः। न चातीतधर्म्मविशिष्टः स इति सहप्रयोगानुपपत्तिः, धर्म्मविशेषमादाय तदुपपत्तेस्तदप्रतीतावपि स इति प्रतीतिरसिद्धैव। न चातीतधर्म्मविशिष्टप्रतीतावपि स न वेति संशयात् स नायमिति विपर्य्ययाच्च नैवमिति वाच्यं। निश्चितधर्मेतरधर्म्मविशेषत्वेन तयोरुपपत्तेररिति चेत्। मैवम्। यदि वस्तुगत्या योऽतीतो धर्म्मस्तद्वैशिष्ट्यन्तत्ता तदाअनुभवेऽपि तद्विषयत्वात्ततोल्लेखापत्तिः। नाप्यतीतत्वेन यो भासते धर्म्मस्तद्वैशिष्ट्यं, भासमानधर्म्मस्यातीतत्वेनानुभवाविषयत्वात्, प्रत्युत वर्त्तमानत्वे- नानुभवात्, स्मृतौ तदुल्लेखानुपपत्तेश्च। न चानुभवानन्तरं यदा ज्ञानान्तरेणातीतधर्म्मवैशिष्ट्यभानं तदा स्मृतौ तत्तोल्लेखो नान्यदेति वाच्यं। अतीतधर्म्मस्यानुमितौ तत्तोल्लेखापत्तेः।

I.xiii.6. इदन्तापि न तन्मात्रवृत्ति गुणादिकं, अनुमानादिना तदवगमेऽपि अयमितिव्यपदेशाभावात्। प्रत्यक्षेण तदवगमे अयमिति ब्यपदेश इति चेत्। न। वाच्यस्य प्रमाणगोचरतया व्यपदेशस्य नियन्तुमशक्यत्वात्। गुणादावपि तन्निर्वचने अननुगमात्। न चैतद्व्यक्त्याश्रयत्वं,। इदमेतदोः पर्य्यायत्वात्। नापि प्रत्यक्षज्ञानगोचरत्वं। अचाक्षुषत्वापत्तेः, अतीते तदनुमानेऽयमिति-बुद्धिव्यवदेशाभावात्, स्मृत्यापि तदुल्लेखापत्तेश्च।

I.xiii.7. अत्र केचिदाहुः। तत्तेदन्ते स्मृत्यनुभवभासिन्यौ अखण्डे एवोपाधी क्लृप्तधर्म्मातिरेकिणौ,। एवञ्चेदन्तासंस्कारेणेदन्तैव तत्तया स्मर्य्यते। न च तत्तायाः क्वचिदनारोपे कथमारोप इति वाच्यं। प्रत्यभिज्ञायान्तत्तांशे यथार्थत्वात्। इदन्तानुल्लेख्यनुभवप्रभवस्मरणे धर्म्मान्तरमेव तत्तया भासते। अत एवायं घट इति न स्मरणमतः सर्वा स्मृतिरयथार्था अयथार्थानुभवा च। हरि-हराद्यनुचिन्तनञ्च कवि-काव्यमूलज्ञानवन्मनोरथज्ञानवच्च साकाङ्क्षपदार्थज्ञानप्रभवमनुभवरूपमेवेति। तन्न। स्मृतेः पूर्वमिदन्तोपस्थितिं विना तत्र तत्तारोपासम्भवात्। किञ्च तत्तांशेऽननुभूतगोचरत्वेन स्मृतेः संस्कारसीमोलङ्घने इदन्ता तत्तया स्मर्य्यत इत्यत्र मानाभावात्। घट एव तत्तया स्मर्य्यते इत्यस्तु लाघवादिति।

I.xiii.8. अत्रोच्यते। अनुभवे कालो धर्म्मान्तरं वा यो वर्त्तमानत्वेन विषयः स एव स्मरणस्य। अनुभव-स्मरणयोरेकविषयत्वेऽपि स्मरणे तत्र तच्छब्दप्रयोगः, संस्कारजज्ञानस्येव तच्छब्दप्रयोगहेतुत्वात्। अत एव प्रत्यभिज्ञाने तत्र तच्छब्दप्रयोगः, प्रत्यक्षानुभवे तत्रैव इदम्शब्दप्रयोगः, न तु विषयकृतोऽनुभव-स्मरणयोर्विशेषः। अत एवायं घट इत्यनुभवादयं घट इति न स्मरणं, स घट इति स्मरणकारणं स घट इति नानुभवः।

I.xiii.9. यद्वा अयं घट इत्यत्र यद्धर्म्मवैशिष्ट्यं भासते तस्यातीतत्वं तत्ता, तद्वैशिष्ट्यमननुभूतमपि स्मृतिविषयः। इदन्ताविशिष्टगोचरसंस्कारात् कथन्तत्तास्मृतिरिति चेत्। न। स घट इति स्मृतिं प्रत्यनुभवस्य हेतुत्वनिर्वाहकतया संस्कारस्य तथैव कल्पानात्, अयं घट इति स्मृतेः स घट इत्यनुभवस्यादर्शनाच्च। समानविषयत्वेन स्मृतेरयं घट इति स्मृतिर्न स घट इति नानुभवश्च स्यात्। न चैवं स्मृतिरिरननुभूतत्तांशे अनुभवः स्यात्, संस्कारासाधारणकारणकत्वेन स्मृतित्वात्।

सहप्रयोगश्च धर्म्मविशेषमादाय प्रतिविधेयः। अत एव संस्कारहेत्वनुभवप्रामाण्यपारतन्त्र्येण यथार्थत्वेऽपि स्मृतिरप्रमेति सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तः।

I.xiii.10. यद्वा नेयं यथार्था। तथाहि स्मृतिः स्वविषयवर्त्तमानत्वविषया, अतीतानागतागोचरप्रतीतित्वात्, प्रत्यभिज्ञावत्। प्रतीतित्वाद्वा घटोऽस्तीति प्रतीतिवत्। प्रतीतेः समयविशेषविषयत्वनियमात्। ज्ञानसामग्रीमहिम्ना चाननुभूतेऽपि समयांशे स्मृतिर्न तत्र संस्कारव्यापारोऽन्यथासिद्धत्वात्। अत एव पाकरक्ते श्यामोऽयमिति धियोऽयथार्थत्वव्यवहारः, लौकिकानां श्यामत्वस्य वर्त्तमानत्वेनावगमात्। एतेन श्यामधीस्तत्र यथार्थैव, घटे कदाचित्तत्सत्त्वात् इदानीमयं श्याम इतिप्रतीतेराकार एव नेत्यपास्तम्। अत एवातीतानागतवह्न्यगोचरत्वे विद्यमानधूमेन पर्व्वते वह्निरत्यिनुमितेर्वर्त्तमानवह्निविषयत्वादिदानीं वह्निनिश्चयेन वह्न्यर्थिप्रवृत्तिः, अन्यथेदानीं तत्सन्देहे प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात्। यदा धूमस्तदा वह्निरिति व्याप्तावपि तदज्ञानदशायां प्रवृत्तेरन्यथानुपपत्तेः।

I.xiii.11. यद्वा स घट इतिस्मृतौ तत्ताविशिष्टस्य वर्त्तमानता भासते, संस्कारस्य वर्त्तमान-ज्ञानसामग्रीसहितस्यैव हेतुत्वात्, सोऽयमिदानीमित्यादौ तथा कल्पनात्, गेहे स घट इति स्मरणान्निःशङ्कप्रवृत्तेश्च। अन्यथा तत्ताविशिष्टस्य इदानीं सन्देहे सा न स्यात्। न च वर्त्तमानत्वांशेऽननुभूतविषयत्वं, वर्त्तमानत्वेनानागतवर्त्तमानस्य पूर्वमनुभवात्। एवञ्च स्मृतेस्तथाभूतस्य वर्त्तमानता विषयः, तत्र विशेष्यस्य विशेषणस्य वा वर्त्तमानत्वाभावात्। स्मृतिरयथार्थैव। न च पूर्वं तथासीदर्थ इति तद्यथार्थत्वं, पाकरक्ते श्यामोऽयमिति ज्ञानस्य यथार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात्। प्रमुष्टतत्तांशे च स्मरणे अविद्यमानधर्मावच्छेदः न भासते। तदाहुराचार्य्याः। "स्मृतेर्याथार्थ्यमपि कुतः" इति।

इति महामहोपाध्याय-श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्त्वचिन्तामणौ प्रथमे प्रत्यक्षखण्डे सविकल्पकवादः।

समाप्तः प्रत्यक्षखण्डात्मकः प्रथमपरिच्छेदः।